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EDITORIAL
There are occasions when the editor of this journal takes up the  pen to  write 
ra ther th an  edit, yet such occasions have been few and far in between— and th a t 
is how it should be. However, now th a t th irty  years have passed since the first 
volume of Acta Oeconomica had been published, it seems to  be fitting to  open the 
th irty-first year w ith an editorial. A lthough anniversaries when journals tu rn  th irty  
usually go unnoticed, we made it a point to  carry in this issue articles by authors 
who have made special contributions to  this journal in previous decades.
Acta Oeconomica turned th irty  six years after the sweeping political and eco­
nomic changes of 1990. Therefore, it seems to  be justified to  consider the accom­
plishm ents of H ungarian economics and economic policy over the past th irty  years, 
and w hether the journal has managed to present a realistic picture of these ten­
dencies. The question is also particularly relevant for this journal because— along 
w ith some other institu tions—it is the product of a rem arkable stage in economic 
reforms, which started  in the second th ird  of the 1960s.
The late György Cukor, who was active in encouraging the in ternational co­
operation  of economists, raised the idea of launching a Hungarian economic journal 
in a foreign language years before Acta Oeconomica first came out. Initially his 
recom m endation was ignored.
In 1965 the Class of Economics and Legal Science was set up a t the  Hungar­
ian Academy of Sciences and this made it possible to  s ta rt Acta Oeconomica. It 
would be false m odesty not to  add th a t the author of this editorial wrote the rec­
om m endation, acting a t the request of the Economics Com m ittee of the  Academy.
Economics gained in prestige in Hungarian academic circles because the 
preparation  of reforms had got underway in the second th ird  of the 1960s. Launch­
ing an economics journal in a foreign language and m aking a cautious opening 
towards the external economy were organic components of this process. This open­
ing was inevitable for the K ádár regime because the preparations of the reform were 
only perm itted  after it was realised how serious the disequilibrium  of the external 
economic balance was.
It goes w ithout saying th a t Hungary was not the only country to  experience 
such developments. The need to improve the efficiency of economic m anagem ent 
applying economic means appeared on the agenda of several countries of the region, 
including the Soviet Union. Economists of these countries badly needed closer 
research ties. Moreover, the drive towards reform a ttrac ted  the a tten tion  of W estern 
economists who specialised in Eastern European affairs. A plethora of research 
papers— which were norm ative in nature bu t included critical observations and 
thereby broke fresh ground— were offered for publication. Consequently, dem and 
and supply were both there to  justify  the starting  of a new journal.
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In Hungary, ju s t as elsewhere in the region, economics was under political 
control. There were several levels of this control, the highest one being the A gitation 
and P ropaganda Com m ittee of the Hungarian Socialist W orker’s Party  (HSW P).
T h a t Com m ittee, and the staff of a departm ent subordinated to it, checked 
on the work of newspapers and periodicals. Fortunately, Acta Oeconomica was not 
categorised as a periodical because it was not sold by street vendors. I t was available 
either on subscription or in the bookshop of the Academy. As a consequence, the 
ebb and flow of daily politics had no direct influence on our work. The lim its of 
the room for manoeuvre were fixed “merely” by the self-censorship of the  authors 
and the editor.
There were, in addition, adm inistrative lim itations. Initially K ultúra, the 
only export/im p o rt house th a t was authorised to trade in periodicals, succeeded 
in having Acta Oeconomica included on the list of periodicals th a t could be dis­
tribu ted  in the socialist countries. Later on it was struck off the list, apparently  
a t a Soviet initiative (because the journal also carried articles in Russian). The 
agitprop departm ent of the HSW P rejected the idea th a t the journal be d istributed  
as a present by H ungarian diplom ats and trade mission staff abroad. T h a t was the 
price the journal had to  pay for not being under direct political control.
T his peculiar situation  made it possible, for instance, to  publish an article by 
Ferenc Jdnossy on w hat he called the “quasi developed” nature of the Hungarian 
economy. Prior to its publication in Acta Oeconomica, the paper was harshly 
criticised a t a public conference by the Prime M inister himself. There were other 
instances when politics interfered with our work. At a tim e when the Sino-Soviet 
relations were at a low ebb, we could afford to  publish a critical analysis of the 
Chinese economy. (It had for a long time been forbidden to openly criticise the 
economic performance or economic policy of other socialist countries.) T h a t article 
on C hina a ttrac ted  so much atten tion  th a t it was transla ted  from English into 
Germ an and published in its entirety by Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
It was another sign of H ungary’s external economic opening th a t in 1970 
the Council for World Economy was set up to  act as an advisory body to the 
Secretariat for International Economic Relations. We agreed with the Chairm an 
of th a t Council, Professor József Bognár— who died in November 1996—th a t the 
Council would not launch a journal of its own bu t would, instead, g ran t resources 
for doubling the size of Acta Oeconomica as from 1971.
The spectrum  of the journal—which until then focused on Hungarian eco­
nomic policy and especially issues of the economic reform— broadened. As from 
the th ird  volume, articles by foreign authors also occasionally appeared (as for 
instance, th a t by W illiam Fellner, Jan  Tinbergen and R obert Triffin), as well as 
the results of H ungarian research on the world economy. (The Institu te  for World 
Economics was formed in 1973.) Acta Oeconomica increasingly showed th a t in­
ternational organisations were not the only fora where H ungarian economists met 
foreign economists. B ilateral committees of economists (for instance, H ungarian-
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A ustrian, H ungarian-B utch, H ungarian-B ritish, H ungarian-French, H ungarian- 
G erm an, H ungarian-Soviet, etc.) were formed, in which economists m et regularly. 
A change of a ttitu d e  occurred simultaneously with the expansion of the size: the 
journal announced th a t it would launch a programme of an alternative approach 
to problems of the socialist economy (József Bognár).
The year 1972 witnessed a change of direction in H ungarian economic and 
science policy. Regression came first, to be followed by repression. These develop­
m ents had limited but lasting effects on the journal. The political clim ate of the 
tim e did not tolerate the proposals for carrying on with the 1968 reform (itself the 
result of hard-won compromises). Many of the articles which economists published 
between 1963 and 1972 included original ideas and critical views. By contrast, 
political pressure slowed down the reform drive for some years.
T he editorial opening the second decade in the life of the journal did not pro­
claim a new program m e, it only promised to retain  the results achieved th a t far. 
T h a t was also an accomplishment at th a t time, as illustrated by the fact th a t the 
next issue carried an article by Ferenc Donáth, a politician and scholar specialising 
in agricultural affairs, who served on the 1956 government of Imre Nagy. Articles 
th a t expressed fresh ideas were published about the economic relations of the East 
and the West (A ndrás Köves) and on sociological tra its  of state-ow ned enterprises 
(Teréz Laky). The editor needed a tightrope dancer’s sense of equilibrium  to get 
such articles published in those days. An example is Volume 17, which included 
two articles w ritten by Soviet authors. One of them  was insipid and covered some 
Comecon-related issue. However, the other one discussed East-W est economic re­
lations, and it was written by the former son-in-law of Khruschev (who had been 
ousted by th a t tim e). Later on its author (N. Shmeliov) became an advisor to 
Gorbachev.
Volumes th a t appeared following 1978 once again carried articles of more in­
terest. Examples included an article by László Szamuely  and Tam ás Bauer  th a t 
criticised industrial combines (it had been published in lim ited circulation a few 
years before); an article w ritten by a Soviet author ( Lisichkin) who was barred 
from publishing in economics journals a t home; reviews of books th a t in the li­
braries of other Comecon countries were available for “reliable” researchers only. 
As from th a t time, Acta Oeconomica became a forum for the writings of authors 
who found it difficult to publish in other Comecon countries an d /o r of approved 
authors who could not have published the article concerned in any other journal 
(e.g. Balcerowicz, Dyba, Popov and others). It m ust be adm itted  th a t the journal 
also served as a mouthpiece for official H ungarian economic policy.
A t the time when the reform drive was slowed down for a few years, empirical 
economic research gained in im portance—which could also be seen in the selection 
of articles in the journal. Members of a new generation of economists m ade a novel 
empirical approach to phenom ena of socialist planned economy, though theoreti­
cally they were successors of the originators of reform thought (like János Kornai).
l A d a  Oeconomica 48, 1996
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A lthough, as a rule, they did not risk drawing sweeping conclusions (which would 
have contradicted the purposes of empirical research), but they shed new light on 
how the planned economy actually worked. By the 1980s empirical researchers 
and reform economists had produced those works (parts of which were published 
by Acta Oeconomica) which pu t the entire system of planned economy into a new 
perspective. (Issues discussed included the soft budget constraint (János Kornai), 
the bargaining over the plan targets (Tamás Bauer), and the function of various 
cam paigns in economic m anagem ent (A ttila K. Soós).)
As illustrated by articles in our journal, H ungarian economists— along with 
the Polish colleagues—excelled in making a comparative analysis of economic sys­
tems by offering a critical analysis of the conventional command economy and the 
so-called “reform planned economy” .
In the field of research on the world economy, a new tendency appeared at 
the time: s truc tu ra l analysis (e.g. Béla Kádár). Its main representatives played a 
leading role in shaping economic policy after 1990 and Acta Oeconomica carried 
several writings of these scholars.
In the early 1980s the journal carried articles of those representatives of the
new reform generation who played a decisive role in dism antling the system  of
planned economy between 1988 and May 1990, e.g. László Antal, György Surányi , 
Lajos Bokros. Some of them  are still active in shaping economic policy.
In the middle of the 1980s the reform tendency was once again pushed to
the background temporarily. This could be seen on the debate on how open the 
H ungarian economy should be. Advocates of the conservative view argued th a t the 
H ungarian economy should become less open if it wished to  overcome stagnation  
and indebtedness. Those advocating the conservative stance had the political sensi­
tiv ity  to  see th a t the drive to  continue the reforms may endanger the  dom inance of 
the public sector, central planning—th a t is, the pillars of socialist economy. M any 
of the articles we carried rebuffed the conservative views (among them  András 
Nagy).
Many economists had recognised by the last third of the 1980s th a t the eco­
nomic system  could not be reformed w ithout a reform of the political system . This 
conclusion was expounded in “Change an reform” , an essay prepared by a team  of 
economists most of whom worked in the Financial Research In stitu te  and the Insti­
tu te  of Economics of the H ungarian Academy of Sciences. This essay served later 
as the economic policy manifesto of the opposition roundtable i.e. in the course 
of their negotiations with the communist ruling party  on the details of the transi­
tion to  the m ulti-party  parliam entary system and m arket economy. This was also 
published in our journal.
We were able to publish “Change and reform” a t th a t tim e because both  
central planning and the so-called ideological control had become ever weaker and 
then collapsed. The covert transition  to  the post-K ádár era began. As a sign of the 
deterioration in the country’s economic situation and shrinking role of the sta te ,
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
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the journal was not able to  generate public resources necessary for producing two 
volumes per year. Ju st as 16 years before, we could afford to  publish only one 
volume per year.
As mentioned above, until the late 1980s our journal was the m outhpiece of 
H ungarian economic reform towards the outside world. W hen assessing this role 
it is inevitable to  pu t the question: how im portant were the economic reforms for 
the fu ture development of the H ungarian economy? On the one hand, the reform 
endeavours transform ed the fears of the political elite— which became ingrained 
because of the lasting effects of 1956 and the Soviet m ilitary presence— into con­
scious (bu t contradictory) economic policy actions. Thanks to the reforms, the 
H ungarian economy became more open than  th a t of any other socialist country. 
More scope was assured for enterprise autonomy and the unfolding of the private 
sector (the legitim ate second economy). Thereby the reforms change the a ttitudes 
of the people in general, and the economic elite in particular. On the o ther hand, 
the reform endeavours strengthened the citizens’ dependence on the sta te  (even if 
in a new form). The so-called “second economy” could flourish in the shadow of the 
public sector and the related trade with the other socialist countries. Although the 
attem pts at reform undermined the egalitarian ideals, they kept alive the popula­
tio n ’s illusions about a paternalistic state. They also helped legitimise the people’s 
failure to  fulfil their obligations towards the state.
As if to  finish w ith its role as the propagator of the reforms, the journal 
interviewed noted Hungarian and foreign economists on w hether they considered 
the socialist m arket economy or market socialism a viable model. The m ajority  of 
the 30 interviewees answered th a t even the notion was unacceptable for them . In 
1992 we pu t similar questions to  economists on issues of the transition  to m arket 
economy, and the interviewees were eager to expound their ideas.
The sweeping changes th a t occurred in Hungary in 1989-90 posed a m ajor 
challenge to our journal. Many of our former authors quit the researcher’s career or 
carried on with their work abroad. The conditions of domestic economic research 
also deteriorated in other aspects. Due to the financial problems of research in­
stitu tes and the low pay of research staff, some researchers switched over to  deal 
with consultancy services. Moreover, the former system  of collecting statistical 
d a ta  collapsed and this further narrowed the scope for analyses. The adm inistra­
tive barriers to Hungarian scholars publishing their writings abroad disappeared. 
Therefore, more and more scholars decided to have their papers published in foreign 
journals. Workshops specialising in questions of transition were set up in W estern 
Europe and under the auspices of international organisations, which swelled the 
number of publishing opportunities. Eastern Europe a ttrac ted  the a tten tion  of 
researchers who had never examined this part of the world before. In sum, our 
jo u rn a l’s position weakened in term s of both dem and and supply.
We had to rethink our future role, functions and the content of the journal. 
It goes w ithout saying th a t the issues of the transition  could not be ignored, even
Acta  Oeconomica 4&, 1996
6 E D IT O R U L
if com petition is the  ho ttest factor in th a t field. Over the past six years we have 
made it a point to  reduce radically the ratio  of norm ative articles. Instead, we have 
provided more scope for the results of empirical research, and diversified the content 
of the journal by covering new fields, like economic sociology, housing, education 
and the pension system, as well as new issues of transition. These were not covered 
by the journal before.
From the late 1950s the application of m athem atical m ethods gained increas­
ing scope in Hungarian economics and found its way to  m ainstream  economics. 
M acroeconomics is their principal field of application, though niicroec~nomics is 
also more and more affected. Acta Oeconomica has so far failed to  pay sufficient 
a tten tion  to  this development. True, one of its issues was devoted to  Szigm a , the 
journal of the Hungarian m athem atical economics school. It is part of our future 
program m e to pu t our readers in the picture in this field.
Now and then we ask whether or not it is worthwhile publishing an English- 
language economic journal in Hungary under such severe financial conditions. We 
are deeply convinced th a t it is worthwhile. Why? The Hungarian language is 
accessible to  a limited circle of readers only and authors unable to  publish their 
writings in a foreign language would be left out from the in ternational circula­
tion of ideas. Young researchers find it difficult to place their writings in foreign 
journals (where supply exceeds dem and). As Hungary is not the only transition  
country in Eastern Europe, the international fora offer only limited scope for anal­
yses dealing with Hungarian issues. Last but not least, Acta Oeconomica has won 
in ternational recognition, as illustrated by our presence in num erous bibliographical 
survey databases.
We have to  acknowledge the past and present contribution of colleagues w ith­
ou t whose dedication this journal could not have lived to  see this anniversary. Credit 
m ust be given, for launching the journal, to the late Professor István Friss, who was 
first chairm an of the Academ y’s Class of Economics and Legal Science and director 
of the In stitu te  of Economics. The first chairman of the editorial board  was the 
la te  Professor Imre Vajda an em inent personality who participated  in strengthening 
ties among H ungarian economists and thpse between them  and foreign economics. 
A fter his untim ely death he was tem porarily substitu ted  by the late György Cukor. 
In the period when the late József Bognár was chairman of the  editorial board the 
intellectual character of the journal was renewed and its size grew. The next chair­
m an of the editorial board was Professor Mihály Simái.  Both he and his successor, 
Professor T ibor Erdős played an im portan t role in assuring the intellectual and 
financial conditions for the publication of the journal. The journal enjoyed the 
support of the past and present members of the editorial board, who are always 
elected by the Academ y’s Class of Economics and Legal Science.
The editorial office of the journal had quarters a t the A cadem y’s Institu te  
of Economics and later, for a few years, the Economic Inform ation Unit. Today
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the  office and the equipm ent are once again assured by the Institu te  of Economics, 
whose director is now Jenő Koliai.
Scholarly journals always need sponsors. Our principal source of support is 
the H ungarian Economist Foundation under the chairm anship of Béla Csikós-Nagy 
and the H ungarian Economic Association. After support from the Council for 
World Economy discontinued, the journal received considerable support from the 
Academy, the H ungarian Soros Foundation, the Institu te  for Economic and M arket 
Research and the H ungarian Mineral Oil and Gas Industry Co. Ltd. (M OL). The 
Publishing House of the Academy m aintained this journal even in the period when 
most journals of the Acta-series had to  vanish.
For two decades László Szamuely helped me in editing the journal. To­
day M ihály Laki has a lion’s share in the editing. They have m ade an im por­
ta n t contribution to  earning international recognition for the journal. As for the 
day-to-day m anagem ent of the affairs of the journal, credit should go to  K atalin 
Lorschy. Thanks to  her conscientious work over two decades, the journal has been 
published— even if not always a t regular intervals—m ostly in tim e. Her prede­
cessors were Erzsébet Juhász, Ju d it Vári, Em ánuel Szmikun  and the la te  Miklós 
Bródy. In copy-editing and translating  the texts into English credit m ust go to 
György Hajdú , the  late G. F. Ray, Rudolf Fischer, Philip Rawlinson, Ilona Lukács,  
Péter Fiers, Iván Sellei, A nna Neimann  and many others.
Last, bu t not least, we have to  thank the contribution of those domestic and 
foreign authors who have helped us to  develop the internationally  acknowledged 
character and quality of this journal.
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
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SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO 
OVERCOMING THE DEPRESSION IN HUNGARY
T. ERDOS
T he a u th o r exam ines th e  factors which m ake the  overcoming of the  transfo rm ation  crisis 
difficult. He p o in ts ou t th a t th e  budget deficit has a  m oderate  dem and  increasing effect only 
because of th e  double dig it inflation. Owing to  the  obsolate p roduction  stru c tu re  also the  curren t 
balance is in the  red despite the  depression which diminishes the  level of aggregate dem and. 
Business investm ent shows a  very m oderately increasing tren d  a t  the  end of the  depression as well 
because th e  level of the  ra te  of re tu rn  is depressed and  the real ra te  of in terest is extrem ely high. 
In  th e  a u th o r’s opinion the  drop  of real wages together w ith the  real devaluation of th e  H U F m ay 
con tribu te  to the  increase of exports and  business investm ent and  by th is way to  overcom ing the 
depression re la ted  to transform ation .
The process of transform ation to m arket economy has been accompanied by 
a deep and lasting depression in all the former socialist countries. In Hungary, for 
instance, G D P fell by slightly more than 20 percent between its peak level in 1989 
and its lowest point in 1993. The drop of industrial activity was even more— in
1992 the extent of the fall was 30 percent in the case of gross industrial production. 
Registered unem ploym ent had risen to 12.6 percent by 1992, and in 1993 its real 
level was even higher. A more reliable picture about the labour m arket can be 
obtained by looking a t the changes in the level of employment. I t had plum m eted 
by 25 percent by 1993, indicating th a t a considerable proportion of the population 
who were of working age were out of the registered labour force a t th a t tim e. The 
depression which has accompained the systemic transition  can be regarded as the 
deepest in the history of the Hungarian economy; moreover, it appears to  lasting 
longer than  any of the recessions which have taken place in the past.
T he depression, however, is not only significant for its extrem e deepness and 
severity. In fact, by the end of 1993 signs of recovery could be observed in industrial 
activity; however, the dynam ic of this recovery was conspicuously weak. Despite 
the rise of G DP in 1994 and 1995, its level still lagged far behind the previous 
peak; the shortfall am ounted to  17 percent even a t the end of 1995. In o ther words, 
the yearly growth rate of G D P was not more than  1-2 percent, which is quite 
unusual during a recovery period. Furtherm ore, the depression was accompanied 
by double digit inflation and the rate of inflation was highest ju s t at the tim e 
when the fall in production was a t its greatest. In contrast with the experience of 
usual business cycles, the trade and current balance showed a sharply worsening 
trend; also, while exports were essentially stagnating, im ports were growing fast as 
a  result of opening the economy. Although the behaviour of the budget balance 
was normal, the depression itself was marked by a rising budget deficit. T he share
0001-6373/96/S5.00 ©  1996 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
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of deficit relative to  G D P was high, am ounting to  around 8 percent. Moreover, this 
share showed a rising trend even by the tim e the G DP started  to increase again. 
A nother peculiar feature of the budget deficit is th a t it is the interest paym ents 
which account for the deficit’s rising trend, and most of these interest paym ents are 
a result of double digit inflation. The features mentioned here are closely connected 
to  the problem th a t the recovery, which started  at the end of 1993 a n d /o r a t the 
beginning of 1994, has proved to be noticeably fragile despite the considerable drop 
in production (i.e. relative to  its previous peak).
Factors influencing the overcoming of the depression in the business cycle
M ost cyclical depressions soon come to an end as a result of the factors which 
affect changes in aggregate demand and in the am ount and share of profits gained 
by enterprises. On the demand side, the changes in exports and im ports, the 
appearance an d /o r increase of the budget deficit, the development of investm ents, 
and the changes of private savings all cause aggregate dem and to  become larger 
than  aggregate supply over time. This results in a new recovery process. Even if the 
existence of the sta te  budget and external trade are disregarded, the reversal in the 
proportion between aggregate dem and and aggregate supply can easily be pointed 
out. Consum ption declines a t a slower rate than production as a consequence 
of the falling savings ra tio  of the population and the rising trend of real wages 
received by those in employment. Furthermore, investm ents also tend to  decline at 
a decelerating pace due to the fact th a t certain investm ents aimed at m aintaining 
fixed capital are unavoidable during the period of crisis. Looking a t the role of 
the budget deficit and th a t of the current balance makes the process even clearer. 
Both can considerably raise the level of aggregate dem and for goods produced in 
the country.
The entire process can be examined from the aspect of profits realized by the 
enterprise sector as well. The budget deficit and the surplus of the curren t balance 
both raise the profits realized by the to tality  of enterprises. This is because both  
increase the to ta l revenue over the to ta l am ount of costs by an am ount th a t is ex­
actly equal to the sum of the budget deficit and the surplus of the current balance. 
Moreover, any worsening in the budget and improvement in the current balance 
lead to an increase in the profits realized on the macroeconomic level— i.e. prof­
itability  may show signs of improvement even if the budget balance shows a surplus 
and the current balance is in the red. Since, during the crisis, the budget balance 
tends to  become worse, and the current balance tends to  improve, taking their role 
into account makes the beginning of a new recovery much more understandab le .1
1 The argum en ta tion  relies on the theory abou t the determ inan ts of profits realized on the 
m acro level. The point is th a t, in a  closed economy, costs—i.e. wages, energy, m aterial, e tc .—are
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The problem  is, however, th a t the depression taking place in Hungary in the course 
of the current economic transform ation is very different from the usual nature  of 
depressions. It is precisely this problem which explains the deepness and persis­
tency of the depression which has dogged the progress of the H ungarian economic 
transform ation.
Factors which make the overcoming of the transformation crisis difficult
Budget deficit and inflationary interest payments
Like any depression, the one taking place together with the systemic change 
in Hungary has been accompanied by an increase in the budget deficit. The deficit, 
counted according to the SNA system , had been increasing year after year and its 
peak level occurred in nominal term s in 1994 and 1995. Nevertheless, the  aggregate 
dem and-enhancing effect of the rising budget deficit cannot be easily proved. The 
entire process was, namely, affected by the high inflation rate. A ltogether, budget 
receipts and expenditures were not increasing in real term s. C alculating on the 
basis of 1990 prices, the outlays of the central budget had slightly fallen by 1994 
and the percentage drop of expenditures has come to 2.5 percent. Considering the 
budget receipts their fall in real term s was enormous, am ounting to  23 percent. 
Since the budget was almost nearly balanced in 1990, the different movements of 
budget receipts and expenditures resulted in the large level of deficit both  in real 
and nom inal term s by 1994.
The effect of the deficit on the aggregate dem and is, however, sharply debated 
in Hungary. Financial authorities, the M inistry of Finance and the N ational Bank 
of Hungary consider this deficit to  be a factor which enhances the aggregate de­
m and considerably. Yet many experts dealing with financial interrelationships from 
theoretical aspects as well lay stress upon the composition of budget expenditures. 
(Tanzi, Bleijer and Teijero 1993)“ They emphasize th a t the deficit is mainly made
a t the  sam e tim e receipts for the enterprise sector if employees’ savings are zero and  th e  s ta te  
budget is in equilibrium . E xpenditures on capitalist consum ption an d  business investm ents raise 
the  receipts of the  enterprise sector over its to ta l costs. T he difference—i.e. betw een th e  am ount of 
business investm ents and  capitalist consum ption—equals the profits achieved on the  m acro level. 
T he la t te r  m ay significantly differ from  the  sum  of business investm ent and  cap ita lis t consum ption  
if employees save a  p a r t of their incomes, the  s ta te  budget is no t balanced a n d /o r  its  balance is 
changing. Furtherm ore, th is is also the  case if the  curren t balance shows a  positive o r negative 
sign a n d /o r  th is balance is changing. The theory of m acroprofit, relying on th e  Keynesian system , 
was e laborated  by Kalecki (1954).
2Am ong H ungarian au thors Deddk (1994), Oblath (1995), Pete  (1994), Erdős (1995) lay  stress 
upon th e  im portance of th e  com position of budget expenditures an d  the  role of infla tionary  in terest 
paym ents.
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up of interest paym ents and the level of the la tte r is fairly large because of the great 
in ternal and external indebtedness of the state, and the high level of nom inal in ter­
est rates. In short, when looking a t the effect of the budget deficit on the aggregate 
dem and we also have to  allow for the share of inflationary interest paym ents in 
the to ta l budget expenditures. The experts mentioned above assert th a t savers do 
not spend their interest incomes if the la tte r com pensate mainly for the loss in the 
savers’ financial capital (i.e. bank deposits, bonds, etc.); the la tte r supposes th a t 
savers are exem pt from the “money illusion” . In this case they simply add their 
interest incomes to  the nominal am ount of savings instead of raising the level of 
their spending on goods and services. Taking into account the fact th a t, under the 
present conditions, savers in Hungary constitute the richest group of people, the 
ones whose spending does not necessarily depend on their nom inal interest incomes 
means th a t an outcome in which budget deficit does not perceptibly have the effect 
of increasing the aggregate dem and has a fairly large probability. This is of great 
im portance when examining the chances of overcoming the depression.
Suppose th a t budget deficit is entirely made up of inflationary interest pay­
m ents and it does not enhance the aggregate dem and at all. In this case, the 
depression is not alleviated by the budget deficit and, for this reason, the fall in 
production m ust be deeper and the duration of the recession m ust be longer, other 
things being equal. Furtherm ore, the effect of the budget deficit on the profits 
of enterprises cannot be reckoned with either. If aggregate dem and rem ains un­
affected, the revenues of enterprises also do not have an influence on the deficit. 
Consequently, the differential between prices and costs are not enhanced. As a 
result, the profits of enterprises show a downward trend, as if the sta te  budget had 
been balanced. Moreover, while the to tal budget deficit may show a powerfully 
increasing trend, aggregate dem and could still drop dram atically  if the  primary  
balance of the budget is greatly improving in the meantime. Namely, the interest 
burdens of the s ta te  budget can increase by a larger extent than  the to ta l of the 
budget deficit if the inflation ra te  is high, the level of the indebtedness of the sta te  
is large, and nominal interest rates are flexibly adjusted to inflation. In short, it is 
not a t all certain th a t a rising trend in the budget deficit is necessarily beneficial to 
the changes of aggregate dem and and profitability. Much depends on the changes of 
the prim ary balance of the sta te  budget and on the problem of whether inflationary 
interest paym ents lead to an increase in spending on the part of savers or no t.3
Of course, the linkages connected to the im pact of the budget deficit are not 
entirely unam biguous.4 Even if inflationary interest incomes are saved by the pop­
ulation, the budget deficit may have a certain aggregate dem and-increasing effect. 
Namely, not all the interest paym ents accrue to the savers. There are financial in­
3 T he different im pact of the  p rim ary  balance relative to the  to ta l budget balance was powerfully 
em phasized by O b la th  (1995).
4 T he problem  is exam ined in detail by Erdos (1995).
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term ediaries between them  and the sta te  budget—for instance, commercial banks. 
Consequently, a certain proportion of the interest paym ents raises the revenue of 
banking institutions. This part of the interest paym ents is already being spent. 
Furtherm ore, some savers may suffer from money illusion; thus they are probably 
spending at least a share of their inflationary interest revenue rather than  adding 
it to  their accum ulated money savings. Finally, not all the interest paym ents are 
connected to  savings. There have been cases, for instance, in which the sta te  budget 
has provided interest-bearing sta te  securities to banks in a bad financial position 
in order to  consolidate the banking system. The interest paid on these securities 
is, of course, adjusted to the inflation rate. However, such interest paym ents are 
used up by the banks, and are continuously pumped into the economy.
Considering all th a t has been said, the following sta tem ent can be formu­
lated: As a consequence of inflation and the great indebtedness of the sta te , a large 
proportion  of interest paym ents has been provided from the sta te  budget year after 
year. Since a considerable part of these paym ents is not spent, the budget deficit 
gives only a m oderate stim ulus to aggregate demand.
The impact of the trade and current balance
Examining the im pact of the trade and current balances in Hungary, the 
striking problem is their definite depression-deepening effect. It is fairly conspicuous 
th a t the trade balance in Hungary radically worsened up until 1994; this was so 
despite the grave depression and the fact th a t during this tim e there was no deep 
crisis in W estern Europe and the world m arket. W hen a depression occurs the trade 
balance should show a strongly improving trend under norm al conditions because 
of the shrinkage of the internal m arket. The la tte r involves a sharp fall in im ports 
and a rising trend in exports. In Hungary, however, all has happened differently. 
Since the depression has come about as a consequence of the systemic change, and 
a  significant feature of the la tte r has been the collapse of the intra-Com econ trade, 
Hungary has had to encounter sharp com petition in the world m arket. W hile, in 
1990, the trade balance showed a surplus of almost 1 billion dollars, from 1992 it 
registered a deficit and by 1993 and 1994 this deficit was fluctuating between 3.2 and 
3.7 billion USD; such figures represented 7-8 percent of the GDP. The movement 
of the current balance showed a somewhat more complicated picture because it was 
improving slightly in 1991 and 1992. In 1993, however, the current balance also 
deteriorated  suddenly.5 It is also worth mentioning th a t at the beginning of the 
systemic change, the trade balance showed hardly any signs of deterioration. The
5 Source: National Bank.. .  (1995) T he development of the  trad e  balance was, w ith the  exception 
of the  Czech Republic and  Slovakia, fairly sim ilar in the o th er E ast E uropean countries. ( United 
Nations  1995)
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sudden change took place only in 1993 when the trade deficit grew dram atically. 
Im m ediately after the systemic change the firms made efforts to  com pensate for 
the fall of sales in the former Comecon m arket, and this led to  a  sudden increase in 
the W est-related exports. However, exports could not be increased for any length 
of tim e because a m ajority of firms were exporting at a loss. The firms were 
try ing to  m aintain the level of production and employment achieved formerly, and 
also attem pting  to cover at least a part of their fixed costs. Yet this involved a 
situation  in which the high level of im ports could not be balanced by exports for 
any prolonged period.
T he exchange rate policy has also played a role in the changes experienced by 
the trade and current balances. Real devaluation was considerable in 1991 and this, 
in all probability, contributed to the fast increase of exports. Later, however, the 
exchange rate  policy became one of revaluation rather than  devaluation (considered 
in real term s). This m ust have had some role in the sharply deteriorating movement 
of the trade and current balances in 1993 and 1994.
If the level of im ports tends to exceed the level of the exports, and private 
savings do not show a declining trend—moreover, if the budget deficit is not rising 
either— the m arket position of domestic firms worsens. Under these conditions 
foreign firms “compete away” purchasing power from domestic enterprises; this 
implies th a t, due to  foreign com petition, domestic firms can only reckon w ith less 
revenue and profit.
O f course, the worsening of the m arket position and of the profitability of 
domestic firms due to  the im port surplus is not inevitable. If private savings are 
declining and the budget deficit is rising along with the growing im balance of ex­
ternal trade, then the market, position of the domestic firms may even improve 
and they could move from deficit to rising profits. In Hungary, however, when 
the am ount of im port surplus was sharply rising (in 1993 and 1994) the sum  of 
the net private savings in real term s showed only a m oderate fall in 1993, and 
it had already increased by 1994. The budget deficit was increasing throughout 
the depression period but most of this deficit can be accounted for by the rapidly 
increasing inflationary interest payments.
Sum m arizing the problems examined thus far, it can be established: in Hun­
gary, as in many countries, m arket conditions were worsening and the level of profits 
was declining in the course of the depression. The striking feature of the  depres­
sion was, however, th a t the worsening trend of m arket positions and the level of 
profitability were not alleviated by the summarized effect of the s ta te  budget and 
the current balance. This result was essentially unavoidable. Owing to  the obsolete 
struc tu re  of production, even an equilibrium  state  of the trade balance could not 
be m aintained. Moreover, the fall of to tal ou tpu t was in p art brought about by the 
deterioration of the trade balance. This was because of the way in which domestic 
firms sudden had to face sharp com petition in the world m arket. In order to bring 
the trade balance and the current balance in a sta te  of equilibrium  powerful invest­
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m ent activity, reshuffling of the structure of production, and privatization need to  
be carried out; yet there are also several other crucial tasks such as the development 
of a capital m arket, the banking system, raising the share of small- and middle- 
sized enterprises, and developing the m anagem ent of firms. Over a relatively longer 
period equilibrium  can only be unstable. It is worth drawing atten tion  to the fact 
th a t not only in Hungary but in m ost of the Eastern European countries, the deficit 
of the trade balance showed a sharply rising trend from 1990 to  1993.
The whole process is of crucial im portance from the viewpoint of the develop­
m ent of investm ents carried out by enterprises. Investm ent activity tends to  decline 
in every depression, in particular due to difficulties in selling the goods produced 
and the increasing extent of excess capacities. The declining trend of investm ents 
can strongly be enforced by the growing deficit of the trade and current balances. 
One of the determ inants of profit expectation is the change in the actual am ount 
and share of profits. If they are declining, firms are inclined to reckon with a further 
fall in profits. Expectations become optimistic usually when the am ount and share 
of profits stop declining and begin rising. Business investm ent, in tu rn , greatly 
depends on profit expectations. Accordingly, the peculiar changes of the trade and 
current balances, and the problem th a t the budget deficit in Hungary did not nec­
essarily raise aggregate dem and, had much to do with the changes in the p a tte rn  of 
investm ents. The investm ent ratio was not high in 1989, and business investm ents 
plum m eted a t least as fast as GDP fell—it is more than  likely th a t this was in part 
due to  pessimistic profit expectations.
Although it is precisely investm ent activity th a t can lay the foundation for a 
sound recovery process, the conditions for reversing the trend of investm ents were 
not favourable in Hungary for long. This was not only because the forces driving 
down the volume and rate of profits were powerful bu t also because of the factors 
determ ining the level and movement of nominal and real interest rates.
The problem of the nominal and real rate of interest
Investments carried out by enterprises are determined by the expectable rate 
of profit and the real rate of interest in particular. A lbeit, it. is the real ra te  of 
interest th a t has to be related to the rate of profit. Nevertheless, we have to  s ta rt 
w ith an exam ination of the change of nominal interest rates in Hungary.
The level of nominal interest rates has been fairly high since the beginning 
of the system ic change. This can mainly be traced back to  the high inflation rate. 
T he increase in consumer prices reached 35 percent in 1991 and, since then, prices 
have been growing by more than  20 percent on a yearly average. Of course, nom inal 
deposit interest rates paid on the savings of the population had to be adjusted in 
order to  be more or less in line with the increase in consumer prices. As a m atter
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of course, credit interest rates were higher than the interest rates paid on deposits. 
Considering only the credits raised by firms, the high nominal interest rates to  be 
paid by them  would not have caused too grave a problem if the sales prices the firms 
had to  reckon with had grown at least a t as high a rate as the percentage ra te  of the 
interest to be paid on credits. In reality, however, the situation  was the opposite 
during the tim e of depression. Firm s had to calculate with the (expectable) increase 
of producer prices because these were the prices at which their sales were executed. 
In addition, due to the transform ation to m arket economy, consumer prices usually 
increase at a  considerably higher rate than producer prices.
T he faster increase of consumer prices is an unavoidable result of the growing 
share of the private sector in the area of retail trade; this entails an increasing retail 
trade m argin. Of course the la tte r causes consumer prices to  increase faster relative 
to producer prices. Some other factors have similar effects. For instance, w ith the 
beginning of the transition, a reshaping of the tax  system  was started . C oncom itant 
w ith this was a  sharp increase in the share of sales and excise taxes, while the 
proportion  of direct taxes— prim arily those imposed on the enterprises’ profits— 
declined radically. A special case regarding the formation of prices concerns the 
changes in the price of services. Technical progress is usually slower here than 
in the area of the production of tangible goods, and this entails slower growth of 
the productivity  of services. Furtherm ore, since the central control of wages and 
salaries was abolished after systemic change, the growth rate of nom inal wages 
has accelerated; this has led to  a fast increase in prices, especially in the area of 
services, where the growth rate of productivity is only m oderate. Considering the 
fact th a t m ost services (the so-called “consumer services” ) are taken into account 
when calculating the consumer price index, the la tte r had to  increase rem arkably 
faster than  producer prices.
All in all, due to the peculiar changes of consumer and producer prices, 
firms have had to face an extrem ely difficult situation when trying to  carry out 
investm ents. T heir own investm ent funds have been only m oderate owing to  the 
low level of production and the low rate  of profit. A t the same time, the  real rate 
of credit interest has been too high for the firms. It moved between 10-15 percent 
for m ost of the period of transform ation up until 1994, w ith the exception of 1991. 
T he discrepancy between the real rate of profit and the real ra te  of in terest was so 
powerful th a t investm ent activity for most of the domestic firms seemed hazardous. 
It is instructive to  note th a t lively investm ent activity was being implemented 
m ainly by enterprises which were in foreign or mixed ownership; investm ent activity 
was also powerful in enterprises which were able to get credits from abroad and 
which were able to  sell abroad in particular. Another detail worth pointing out 
is the fact th a t the expansion of investm ents— which extended to  a considerable 
p art of domestic enterprises— was first experienced in 1995, when the increase in 
producer prices had caught up with the increase in consumer prices. T hus in 
1995 real credit interest rates for firms fell significantly. Experience proves th a t
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the relative level of the ra te  of return realized by enterprises, along w ith the real 
ra te  of interest, have noticeably affected the actual changes of investm ents. T heir 
approach to one another is conducive to investments, ju st as their moving away from 
one another has an adverse effect. Because the real rate of interest exceeded the 
real ra te  of return by a considerable extent in nearly every year of the depression, 
the discrepancy between them  m ust have played a fairly determ inant role in the 
sluggish investm ent activity.
The crowding out effect
T he former problem raises the question of the “crowding out effect” of the 
budget deficit. It is a widely held opinion in Hungary th a t the large share of the 
s ta te  deficit, relative to  the G DP and to the volume of private savings, has played 
and continues to play a significant role in the high level of real interest rates; in 
this way, the budget deficit “crowds ou t” private investm ent.6 The problem  of the 
“crowding out effect” , however, raises peculiar theoretical and practical problems 
under the condition of transition.
To begin with, it needs to be noted th a t the budget deficit, however large it 
may be, does not inevitably lead to “crowding ou t” . A typical case of this is the 
sta te  of depression when there are free capacities. Under such conditions, economic 
perform ance is inside the “production possibility frontier” and, accordingly, this 
has an effect on the budget deficit, the GDP produced, and private savings also 
increase. Because, in this case, the level of savings is not given, the dem and for 
credit respectively from the sta te  budget and firms can easily be met w ithout the 
level of the real rate of interest rising. The firm s’ investm ent activity can thus be 
unchanged or it can even increase. Of course, a “crowding ou t” effect may appear 
in the case of the existence of free capacities as well if the m onetary authorities 
pursue a conservative m onetary policy which does not allow the money supply to 
increase. In this case it is not the budget deficit th a t is to  blam e for the  increase 
of the real ra te  of interest bu t the insufficient money supply—in other words, the 
blam e lies with a faulty m onetary policy.
Let us suppose, however, th a t the m onetary policy is correct, and th a t the 
budget deficit does have an aggregate demand-increasing effect.
A lthough, in Hungary, the depression itself suggests th a t a large level of 
free capacity exists, both in the labour and production facilities, we have to  deal 
with the problem of crowding out cautiously. F irst, it can be asked where the 
production possibility frontier is to be located. On the effect of the systemic change, 
the proportion of western-related exports is suddenly enhanced, and this means
6T he problem  is exam ined with reference to Hungary, with theoretical approach, by Erdos 
(1993) and Dedak (1994).
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th a t the quality requirem ents raised towards the production capacities and labour 
m ust be evaluated under the new external trade conditions. W hat were real and 
m arketable production facilities under the conditions of Comecon trade are hardly 
usable and com petitive once they are exposed to  the conditions of com petition 
in the world m arket. Since the Hungarian economy depends greatly on external 
trade and the degree of its openness is significantly above the international average, 
the production possibility frontier m ust have shifted inwards as a consequence of 
western related exports becoming the determ ining factor in the to ta l volume of 
exports.7 It follows th a t the mere fact of the depression in Hungary does not 
necessarily imply th a t there is a large volume of com petitive free capacities in the 
country. If external competitiveness is also taken into consideration, not only one 
bu t two production possibility lines can be drawn: the first one concerns physical 
capacities, the second one external competitiveness. The second one has shifted 
inwards considerably, as a result of the change in the composition of foreign trade 
partners, and it leaves a part of the production facilities out of account. The first 
one is located outside and refers to the possible level of GDP, in physical term s. 
If the actual level of production is between the two lines, the trade balance must 
be in deficit, for the value of im ports cannot be met by the value of exports. 
This situation  may not last for long. The country in question has to  raise either 
the capacity of its m arketable production facilities and its com petitive exports so 
as to  balance its external trade, or it has to restrict its production in order to 
reduce the am ount of im ports and the deficit of the trade balance. Over tim e, the 
distance between the two curves diminishes. Noncompetitive production capacities 
are successively elim inated, which means th a t the outer line will shift inwards. It 
is only the line which takes into account the competitiveness th a t tends to  shift 
outw ards as a result of the continuing investment activity. I t can be supposed th a t 
the level of production in Hungary is between the two lines.
Concerning the problem of the budget deficit’s crowding out effect, the fol­
lowing needs to be taken into consideration. If the deficit leads to a rise in aggregate 
dem and, production could fall out of the production possibility line (representing 
com petitiveness), and thus be located nearer the origo. This causes a trade deficit, 
or the deficit may increase. Unless the deficit is abolished—for example, by a deval­
uation of the national currency— a restriction has to be implemented which results
7T h e  probability  th a t  th e  p roduction  possibility frontier is shifted inw ards is also ra ised  by 
Barta  (1994, pp. 20-42): “Economic p o ten tia l ou tp u t adjusts the  technical po ten tia l o u tp u t to 
th e  conditions on th e  m arket in the  m edium -run ... T he m ain criterion here is the  m edium - and  
long-term  com petitiveness of p roduction  of a  given firm, industry  o r th e  whole economy: as 
an  economic p o ten tia l of the country only those production capacities could be regarded which 
produce th e  o u tp u t which is effectively dem anded not only in th e  sho rt-te rm  b u t also in the 
m edium - and  long term ... If we, ’guesstim ate’ the decline of po ten tial o u tp u t ... we m ay arrive a t 
th e  decrease of p o ten tia l o u tp u t for the  whole economy by abou t 16-20 percent on Ju n e  19 9 3 /June 
1990 basis” .
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in the rise of the real rate of interest. The higher real interest rate crowds out 
investm ent. In Hungary, the high average level of real credit interest rates and 
the insufficient level and dynamic of investment activity can, a t least in p art, be 
accounted for by the large share of the deficit in the central budget. If th is is true, 
the budget deficit is a serious problem because sound recovery in Hungary, where 
the structu re  of production is obsolete, cannot be imagined w ithout rapidly rising 
investm ents.
However, the expasive effect of the budget deficit in Hungary can be ques­
tioned despite the above considerations. It is not clear th a t the budget deficit in 
Hungary is mainly to  be blamed for the high real level of credit interest rates and 
the relatively depressed level of investments. The controversies around this question 
are closely connected to the problem of inflation and, as a consequence, the large 
volume of inflationary interest payments. The la tter raises doubt as to whether the 
budget deficit has a considerable increasing effect on aggregate dem and. If not, the 
deficit of the trade balance can hardly be explained by the budget deficit. Con­
sequently, the la tte r is not directly related to the restrictive measures applied by 
the financial authorities, and it cannot explain the high level of real credit interest 
rates.
Nevertheless, the budget deficit may have a certain crowding out effect even 
if it is m ade up of inflationary interest payments. The problem is th a t, w ith re­
gard to  its effect, the budget deficit can a tta in  a very high share relative to  GDP, 
involving difficulties in its financing. In other words, the budget deficit raises the 
dem and for additional financial means. Yet during a period of high inflation, the 
m onetary authorities are reluctant to increase money supply. The thesis is essen­
tially denied th a t recipients of interest paym ents add most of their interest revenue 
to the cum ulative am ount of savings— i.e. they do not intend to  spend the interest 
revenue received. Of course, risks are im portant. A proportion of the additional 
money supply may result in an increase in money spending; some savers may suffer 
from money illusion, inducing them  to spend more. The whole problem becomes 
more in tricate if it is also taken into account th a t the required additional “dose” of 
the base money from the central bank which should be pu t into circulation is not 
easy to determ ine. All in all, difficulties in financing the budget deficit frequently 
emerge and this often results in a rise of nominal and real interest rates.
Naturally, in an open economy, events are usually more complicated. If the 
current, and capital balances are in surplus, money supply can increase essentially 
faster than money demand; thus in spite of the budget deficit interest rates may 
show a declining trend. W hat is generally true, however, is th a t the m onetary 
authorities are usually cautious in monetizing the budget deficit. This usually tends 
to raise nom inal and real interest rates, even when the deficit should not otherwise 
cause interest rates to increase (i.e. in the case of a resilient money supply).
T he crowding out effect of the budget deficit in Hungary definitely exists. A 
final explanation for its occurrence is the high level of risk in lending credits. This is
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observable in the course of transition because of the large num ber of bankruptcies 
and widespread insolvency among firms. To lend credits to a great num ber of 
firms is risky, and the risk cannot always be compensated for by the high level of 
credit interest rates. W ith regard to the degree of risk, interest rates are highly 
differentiated in Hungary due to  the respectively better or worse situations of the 
firms th a t are dem anding credits. (Interest rates for credit are often two times 
higher for bad firms than  for reliable ones in Hungary.) As a result of the riskiness, 
commercial banks often prefer buying sta te  securities, which bring in relatively 
m oderate yields, ra ther than  giving credits to  firms which appear to  be unreliable. 
Accordingly, the budget deficit must also have a considerable crowding out effect if 
the interest rates paid on sta te  securities are not high enough. Consequently, the 
budget deficit in Hungary has an unequivocally adverse effect on the developm ent of 
business investm ent; this is true in spite of the deep depression and the questionable 
role of the deficit in affecting the changes of aggregate demand.
Deficit spending and anti-crisis economic policy measures
The reduction of the budget deficit
As has been pointed out, the budget deficit has a crowding out effect in 
Hungary. For this very reason the announcem ent of the aim  to reduce the budget 
deficit was raised precisely under the conditions of the crisis.8 Those who are 
convinced th a t radical improvement in the budget balance is absolutely necessary 
are of the opinion th a t the m ost im portant barrier to the increase of business 
investm ent in Hungary is the budget deficit. They also refer to the problem  th a t 
when the size of external indebtedness is already high and only a relatively low 
am ount of direct capital inflow can be reckoned with, the im port of capital may 
not provide enough im petus to investments in the country. Since private savings 
cannot be increased significantly by the interest rate policy— because the real rate 
of in terest for firms is already high and the average level of personal income is on 
a depressed level— the reduction of the budget deficit is an unavoidable necessity.9
In fact, budget expenditures in real term s have substantially  decreased despite 
the depression; this is because the inflation rate has been higher than  the growth
8 “Fiscal policy... d id  no t take note of the warnings th a t the budget deficit, showing so h igh  a 
level, b id  up  the  ra tes  of in terest and exerted a crowding ou t effect in relation  to th e  cred its  to  be 
given to  enterprises, and thus it could hardly  be financed for long by relying on in te rn al savings 
only.” Balassa  (1995. p. 71)
9T he opinion is spreading, in reaction to the high share of budget deficit in m any countries, 
th a t a  balanced budget should be achieved and  the budget deficit has harm ful effects on the 
economy. (Buchanan, Rowley and Tollison 1986)
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ra te  of expenditures in nom inal terms. Furtherm ore, when the depression seemed to 
be coming to an end and the recovery process became obvious, restrictive measures 
were actually applied so as to decrease the level of interest rates and drive back 
the crowding out effect. In order to  reduce the budget deficit a tariff surcharge of 
8 percent was one of the measures imposed to  raise the budget revenue. Certain 
social outlays were also decreased an d /o r abolished.10 Furtherm ore, m any of the 
budget outlays were nominally fixed or held back in order to  reduce expenditures 
in real term s. In 1995, as a consequence of the measures applied, the share of the 
budget, deficit was sharply reduced relative to GDP. Along with it, nom inal and 
real interest rates showed a declining trend; alongside this the trade and current 
balances indicated th a t they were improving strongly.
As regards the problem of whether the reduction of the budget deficit is a 
proper solution under the condition of transform ation crisis or not, there are still 
ou tstanding  controversies in Hungary. The Keynesian thesis, however, th a t the 
reduction of the deficit diminishes aggregate dem and significantly is not doubted. 
O f course, it is not only the decrease in the deficit bu t also the m ultiplier effect 
of its fall which has to be taken into account. Since, a t present, the m arginal 
propensity to  consume in Hungary is relatively high, the numerical value of the 
m ultiplier m ust be relatively large. The high share of taxes, in tu rn , has a reducing 
effect on the multiplier. The problem is complicated by the fact th a t Hungary is 
an open economy because im ports and exports am ount to around 30 percent of 
GDP. This means th a t if a fall in the budget deficit leads to  a drop in aggregate 
dem and, the la tte r makes its effect felt also in the reduction of im ports, and not 
only in the decline in demand for goods and services produced domestically. All 
in all, however, the contractive effect of the diminished budget deficit on domestic 
production is marked. It causes serious problems if the level of G DP and th a t of 
aggregate dem and are already depressed as a result of the crisis. Among other 
things, it is exactly the prospective development of business investm ent th a t may 
suffer from the contractive effect of a reduction of the budget deficit. The crux of 
the m atte r is th a t the la tte r is suggested in order to weaken the crowding ou t effect. 
Yet one of the main determ ining factors of the investm ent activity of enterprises 
is the present and prospective development of aggregate dem and and GDP. This 
implies, th a t a reduction of the budget deficit, with the aim  of giving stim ulus to 
business investm ent, is advisable only if a fall in aggregate dem and and G D P can be 
avoided. This may occur if it can be guaranteed th a t there will be a rapid increase 
in exports an d /o r spectacular improvement of the trade- and current balances can 
be expected in line with certain economic policy measures. W hat is more, there 
may even be rising aggregate dem and due to the favourable conditions prevailing 
in the external m arkets, traceable to the fast economic growth taking place abroad.
’ R estrictive m easures aim ed a t driving down social outlays are criticized by Kovcs  (1995).
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In Hungary, from 1995 on, when economic performance was still much lower 
than  it was in 1989, the government did apply serious measures for reducing the 
budget deficit. However, these were accompanied by other measures aimed at stim ­
ulating exports, and also by an im port-contracting economic policy. At the same 
tim e, the recovery process in the world economy, which started  in 1994, continued 
in 1995, and this has provided favourable conditions for Hungarian exports. Thus 
it must be kept in mind th a t exports in Hungary react extremely elastically to  the 
changes of the m arket conditions in partner countries.
Devaluation and the fall o f  real wages
W ith regard to the measures aimed at giving a stim ulus to exports, it is 
the real devaluation of the national currency which needs to be emphasized. The 
effect, of the real devaluation is commonly known. W hat deserves special atten tion  
is the degree of devaluation parallel with changes in the rate of inflation and the 
development of the nominal and real wages. The development of exports, apart 
from considering changes in economic conditions in foreign countries, can only be 
understood by looking at both the effect of devaluation and changes in nom inal 
and real wages.
The devaluation of the forint amounted to nearly 30 percent in 1995. Until 
M arch 1995 the so-called “adjustable peg” was applied under conditions in which 
the national currency was devalued by 3.4 percent in two steps in 1995. From 
13 M arch the “crawling peg” system  was applied, and it was introduced with a 
massive devaluation, running to 9 percent.11 In the framework of the “crawling 
peg” devaluation am ounted to 14.9 percent. This, together with the former steps 
applied, resulted in a devaluation of 29.6 percent for 1995. It is worth emphasizing, 
however, th a t the ra te  of inflation also reached a high level. The annual average 
for the consumer price index am ounted to 128.2 in 1995 (1994 =  100), while the 
wholesale price index in industry ran to 127.3 (1994 =  100). Calculating on the
11 T he application  of the  “crawling peg” has advantages and disadvantages. If the  “crawling 
peg” is applied and the  ap p ropria te  economic policy m easures make it credible for actual changes 
in the  price level and  the  form ation of the trade- and current balances to be in harm ony with 
th e  exchange ra te , enterprises can reckon with a more reliable calculation basis vis à vis ex ternal 
trad e . Together w ith a  concom itant antiinflationary  policy, inflationary  expecta tions can also 
be favourably affected on the  basis of the  “crawling peg” system . N otw ithstand ing  the  above, 
the  “crawling peg” nevertheless implies severe constrain ts for m onetary  policy. R eal devaluation , 
for instance, can only be applied to  a  m oderate  degree because, otherwise, e ither th e  inflow of 
speculative cap ital would enormously increase (involving undesirable consequences), or in the  
case of an  inadequate  in terest ra te  policy the  conditions of private saving would spectacularly  
be worsened. Some disadvantageous consequences of the use of th e  “crawling peg” are already 
being experienced in H ungary in connection with the  inflow of speculative m oney cap ita l, and  the  
ste riliza tion  which needs to  be applied by the  central bank.
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basis price indices only, it can be concluded th a t competitiveness has not essentially 
improved as a result of the devaluation implemented in 1995.12 Calculations based 
on unit labour costs, however, show very strong improvement. While over the first 
three quarters of 1995 un it labour costs rose by 8 percent in the area of industry, the 
wholesale price index increased by 27.3 percent. In other words, the im provement 
of competitiveness on the basis of unit labour costs came to nearly 18 percent. Also, 
if we take into account the fact th a t export prices rose faster in 1995 than  domestic 
consumer and wholesale prices, the final result is clearcut enough: despite the fast 
increase of prices in the domestic economy, devaluation in 1995 could have led to  
a strong increase of exports due to  the considerable im provem ent in profitability. 
T his assertion draws a tten tion  to the role of the fall in nom inal and real wages in 
the changes of economic growth, employment and the trade and current balances.
In the Keynesian system , under the conditions of a closed economy, the fall 
of nominal and real wages is unsuited to the raising of the level of em ploym ent 
because it causes aggregate dem and to fall. In this case reduced real wages can 
lead to  an increase in employment on the microeconomic level only. In an open 
economy, however, interrelationships are already different and Keynes also put 
em phasis on the im portance of the decrease of real wages when taking external 
economic interrelations into consideration.
In Hungary, exports absorb a considerable part of GDP. Exports of course, 
depend on price competitiveness. If real wages decline, profits realized can be 
increased if aggregate demand does not fall appropriately. In Hungary, despite the 
enorm ous fall in real wages, (it am ounted to 12 percent in 1995) aggregate dem and 
perceptibly increased owing to  the improving external m arket conditions. This can 
be accounted for by the continuing economic growth in W estern Europe and in 
other developed m arket economies, and also by the increased price com petitiveness 
of H ungarian exports. Due to  the strong fall in real wages the internal m arket has 
narrowed considerably. A t the same time, prices achievable abroad were growing 
steeply in forint term s and, because of sharply falling real wages, costs were growing 
in forint term s only moderately. As a result, exports could be increased a t a high 
ra te  in nom inal and also in real terms. Im ports showed a declining trend in real 
term s owing to the narrowing internal market, the increased costs of im ports and the 
tariff surcharge imposed in March 1995. The final result is, th a t while the internal 
m arket narrowed, the trade and current balances significantly improved and the
I2T his approach  is sharply critized by Tarafds (1995). T he au th o r writes: “T he reduction  of 
inflation has for years been driven back to  the  um pteen th  place am ong the  priorities of economic 
policy. T he resto ration  of the  double equilibrium  ( th a t of the  budget and  trad e  balance— E .,T .), 
economic grow th and em ploym ent no t only always come before antiinflationary  objectives b u t 
d ivert a tten tio n  and efforts away from searching for antiinflationary  policy m easures. T he la tte r  
would no t, in the  sho rt run , endanger the  realization of the  aim s preferred by the  policy b u t 
would definitely lay the  foundation  for the  accom plishm ent of the  aim s regarded as being m ore 
im p o rtan t."  (p. 122.)
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to ta l aggregate dem and for domestic goods did not fall bu t actually rose. All this 
happened despite the fact th a t not only the m arket-contracting effect of decreasing 
real wages has to be taken into account, but also the effect of the reduction of the 
budget deficit. The point is th a t a sharp reversal took place in the relative growth 
ra te  of exports and im ports. As a result of the drastic measures applied, both the 
volume and the value of exports began rising significantly faster (relative to  those 
of im ports) by 1995.
Referring back to the problem of the budget deficit it m ust be noted tha t 
the reduction of the deficit is conducive to business investm ent if to ta l aggregate 
dem and rem ains a t least unchanged. There is only one way to  avoid a further drop 
in aggregate demand: exports m ust be stim ulated, im ports m ust be restricted, 
and the trade- and current balances m ust radically be improved. The m ajor tools 
for realising this aim  are real devaluation and reduction of real wages. Both the 
revitalization of business investment and the improvement of the trade- and current 
balances entail a fall in real wages. The la tte r can only be avoided if economic 
grow th is accelerated considerably. This, however, is virtually impossible to  achieve 
because of the  delicate position of the trade balance and, in the background, the 
weakness of the structure  of production. For this reason, only m oderate economic 
grow th ra te  can be expected. Given this fact, both the improving trade balance 
and the rising investm ent ratio  go together with the absolute fall of consum ption 
and the fall in real wages. The thesis can be form ulated th a t, during the tim e of 
depression brought about by the transform ation, the fall in real wages per employee 
has been unavoidable; moreover, this fall represents an indispensable precondition 
for the s ta rt of the new recovery process.
Inflation and real wages
Recently, the question among experts over whether the recovery can or can­
not be continued w ithout decreasing the real wages has not been a controversial 
theme. However, there is intensive discussion concerning the way in which the fall 
in real wages should take place, as well as the degree of this fall. It is commonly 
agreed th a t, in 1995, the decrease in real wages was too intensive. A much lower 
decline had been expected, even a t the beginning of 1995. The way in which the 
decrease in real wages should be implemented is even more controversial. T he dis­
cussion focuses on the role of inflation. Of course, no one doubts th a t the bringing 
down of real wages cannot be carried out by reducing them  in nom inal term s. In 
fulfilling this aim the inflationary process has to be relied on. However, one open 
problem concerns how the desired drop in real wages should be accomplished, par­
ticularly with regard to  the level of the nominal wage increase and the inflation 
rate. E xperts who are averse to inflation stress th a t the growth rate of nom inal
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
T. ERDŐS: OVERCOM ING TH E DEPRESSION IN HUNGARY 25
wages should be as low as possible and, a t the same tim e, they lay em phasis on 
an antiinflationary policy. O thers, who do not a ttrib u te  a high role to inflation, 
are inclined to  accept a higher inflation rate in order to  evaporate the excess pur­
chasing power of the population and enforce a fall in real wages.13 They usually 
require powerful devaluation of the national currency, advocate the elim ination of 
the producer and consumer price subsidies in a short time, and are sceptical when 
the question concerns the possibility of bringing about a general wage-price agree­
m ent between employers and employees with the assistance of the governm ent. Up 
until 1995 the group of economists and policymakers whose views tended to  pre­
dom inate could not be blamed for holding an anti-inflation a ttitude . This makes 
the fact, understandable tha t, although Hungary did not suffer from hyperinflation, 
the double digit inflation proved to be stubborn and in 1995 inflation accelerated 
noticeably.
By the beginning of 1996 the influence of the anti-inflation group of experts 
had increased considerably. By 1996 inflation, together with the fall of real wages, 
had led to  a strengthening of social tensions. A lthough the prim ary balance of the 
sta te  budget improved conspicuously—moreover, it a tta ined  a significant surplus— 
the inflationary interest paym ents of the budget increased enormously because the 
inflation ra te  rose from 18 percent in 1994 to more than  28 percent in 1995. As 
a result, the to ta l deficit of the sta te  budget (according to  the SNA system ) rose 
from 286 billion to 293 billion forints, while the prim ary balance showed a surplus 
of 171 billion forints. This contrasted with 1994 when the prim ary balance was in 
deficit by 37 billion forints. The contradiction of an inflationary economic policy 
arises in the problem tha t, although it contributes to driving down real wages (and 
in this way strengthens competitiveness abroad and, by holding down the rise in 
the nom inal am ount of budget expenditures, it leads to the improvement of the 
prim ary balance) the more rapid inflation raises the internal burdens of the sta te  
b u d g e t.14 Accordingly, the difficulties in financing the deficit of the sta te  budget 
persist, as does the crowding out effect of the deficit. It is becoming increasingly 
obvious th a t, over a longer period, the costs of inflation are larger than its benefits 
and the radical reduction of the inflation rate is one of the fundam ental conditions 
of overcoming the depression and of in itiating sustainable economic grow th. The 
level of real wages at present is low enough—relative to  productiv ity— to be able 
to ensure competitiveness with respect to the cost and price of exportable goods. 
T he key tasks, such as ensuring the dynamic increase of exports and a  favourable
13 “T he rise of the ra te  of inflation entails extrem ely large add itional nom inal expenditu res 
because of the  increasing in terest burdens of the  indebtedness of th e  s ta te , while it m akes it 
possible for the  s ta te  to be able to reduce the  real value of its  prim ary  expenditu res (calculated  
by leaving ou t th e  sum  of in terest paym ents) to  an ex ten t th a t would be unim aginable w ithout 
the  h igh inflation ra te ” . (Kopint-Datorg  1996)
14 T he factors of inflation and the m easures to be applied in the  fram ework of an  an tiin fla tionary  
policy are  thoroughly exam ined by Cinkotai (1995).
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clim ate for investments over a longer period, are to be fulfilled with an inflation 
ra te  which approaches the inflationary price rise in the m ajor trading partners in 
W estern Europe. It also means th a t the devaluation of the forint should gradually 
play a diminishing role in keeping the trade and current balances in equilibrium.
Prospects and factors for attaining sustained economic growth
Exam ination of the peculiarities of the transform ation crisis shows th a t there 
are very strong indications th a t it can be overcome because there are several factors 
which will only detain the s ta rt of recovery for a tem porary period. Moreover, these 
factors cause the growth rate of production to  remain relatively low during the tim e 
of recovery. (For instance the lack of m arketable productive capacities despite the 
powerful relapse of production.) Notwithstanding these drawbacks, like any other 
crisis, the depression related to  transform ation is also transitory.
After a tem porary upsurge of inflation its radical drop can be expected on 
condition th a t the government pursues a consistent antiinflationary policy. The 
gradual accomplishment of the transform ation will make the reduction of the rate 
of inflation possible. After private ownership has gained predom inance, the share 
of capitalist consum ption in GD P does not necessarily increase; in o ther words, 
on average, the excess of prices over costs rem ains relatively stable. Over tim e 
the price subsidies will also be elim inated. Consequently, the rate of inflation 
becomes lower, since th a t part of the firm s’ losses which is caused by the lessening or 
abolition of price subsidies need not be compensated by raising prices. Furtherm ore, 
if employers and employees do enter into an overall price-wages agreem ent inflation 
can be radically m oderated (of course, this goes together with the adap ta tion  of 
other antiinflationary measures). In this case, the inflationary interest paym ents of 
the sta te  budget could fall significantly as a result of the strong decline of the budget 
deficit. The la tter is beneficial to  changes in the nominal and real in terest rates 
and, in this way, also to  the development of business investm ent. The possibility 
is not precluded th a t one digit inflation can be achieved in three or four years or 
so as against the inflation rate of 20-30 percent which Hungary has experienced 
in recent years. If the antiinflationary policy is consistent, the credibility of the 
government will grow and favourable inflationary expectations may also be relied 
on.
Besides the real rate of interest, profit expectations play a further crucial role 
in the development of business investment. The improvement taking place in the 
trade and current balances should result in an increase in the profits realized by the 
to ta lity  of enterprises. W ith a favourable change in the volume and ra te  of profits, 
profit expectations will also improve, and will obviously have a significant effect 
on the behaviour of enterprises: i.e. their propensity to invest will also become
Acta  Oeconomica 48, 1996
T . ERDŐS: OVERCOM ING TH E DEPRESSION IN HUNGARY 27
favourable. In short, investments will tend to increase not only because of the fall 
in real interest rates, bu t also as a consequence of the rise in profits and auspicious 
profit expectations.
Profit expectations will also improve due to the increase in business invest­
m ent itself. Any increase in business investm ent raises the difference between the 
to ta l revenue and to tal cost on the macroeconomic level. This differential reacts 
elastically to  the changes in investm ents since the la tte r can be regarded as an ou t­
lay for the to tality  of enterprises, w ithout involving any rise in costs. In a closed 
economy all the outlays of enterprises are at the same tim e revenues for them , unless 
the volume of private savings is increasing. Of course, a certain proportion  of the 
investm ent expenditures raises the demand for investm ent goods from foreign coun­
tries. Yet, since the larger part of business outlays— and within it the investm ent 
expenditures—is directed toward the domestic market, and private savings do not 
increase significantly from one year to  another, the rise in investm ent outlays has 
a profit-increasing effect even if the respective increm ents of investm ent and prof­
its are not equal. If profits and profit expectations s ta rt increasing—for example, 
because of the improving trade balance—the process becomes self-strengthening 
through several transm issions over a longer period. This process is observable in 
Hungary: since 1994 and more noticeably since 1995, business investm ent, profits 
realized, and the trade balance have all been showing an improving a n d /o r rising 
trend.
The development of aggregate demand is also of im portance. The reduction 
of real wages in itself diminishes aggregate demand. However, its effect on the 
development of exports and im ports, and the effect of the la tte r on the rise of profits 
and business investm ent (furtherm ore, the role of the increasing investm ents in the 
development of to ta l profits achieved as well as in th a t of aggregate dem and) all 
cause the to ta l m arket to expand. S tatistical d a ta  prove th a t aggregate dem and 
increased in 1995, although the consum ption of the population fell significantly in 
Hungary; the extent of the improvement of the trade balance and the increase in 
business investm ent was larger than the extent of the fall in private consum ption.
W hen looking a t the development of aggregate dem and the changes in the 
sta te  budget also deserve a ttention . As has already been mentioned, the budget 
deficit rose som ewhat in nominal term s in 1995. In the same year, however, the 
prim ary balance of the sta te  budget improved significantly. Taking into consid­
eration the point th a t the dem and effect of inflationary interest paym ents can at 
least be disputed, the sta te  budget could have had a further decreasing effect on 
aggregate dem and. This la tte r im pact, however, must not be added to  the effect 
of the fall in personal consum ption, because much of the im pact of the improving 
prim ary balance within the sta te  budget manifests itself in the fall of private con­
sum ption. T h a t is, double counting has to be avoided. It is, however, true th a t the 
im provement of the prim ary balance must have had some additional reductive effect 
on aggregate dem and. Consequently, the growth of exports and the restriction on
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im ports, cis well as the growth of business investment, also had to overcompensate 
for the adverse effect of the changes in the sta te  budget in 1995.
This la tte r problem calls a tten tion  to an im portan t viewpoint concerning 
economic policy. The deficit of the sta te  budget should really be reduced through 
an antiinflationary policy and, in this way, through the curtailm ent of inflationary 
in terest paym ents. To begin with, it should be kept in m ind th a t the ra tio  of the 
budget deficit in Hungary is greatly determ ined by the depressed level of G DP 
and the fact th a t both the inflation rate and the level of internal indebtedness 
of the sta te  budget are high. As a consequence, making mechanical comparisons 
between the deficits of the Hungarian sta te  budget and the ones observable in the 
developed market, economies is highly misleading. In this connection, the problem 
of a full employm ent deficit can be referred to; furtherm ore, it should be noticed 
th a t wherever the inflation rate  and the internal indebtedness are high, the ratio  
of the budget deficit m ust be large. Considering these interrelationships it m ust be 
established th a t the ratio  of the Hungarian budget deficit is not as high as seems, 
relative to  several developed m arket economies.
Nevertheless, the im portance of the reduction of the budget deficit should not 
be underestim ated, even though this reduction should not be pursued by improving 
the prim ary balance of the sta te  budget. Instead, the antiinflationary policy should 
be strengthened and in this way the inflationary interest paym ents and, along with 
them , the to ta l deficit should be reduced. If the prim ary outlays of the budget 
are to be decreased in the framework of the reform of the sta te  household, tax 
burdens should also be reduced in order to  give a stim ulus to  private initiatives. 
The advantage of this policy is th a t the reduction of the budget deficit can be 
brought about by exerting as m oderate a contracting im pact on aggregate dem and 
as possible.
In order to stim ulate a rise in investments and exports the application of 
discrete economic policy measures is also necessary. Concerning stimuli to be given 
to  investm ents, the widespread use of accelerated depreciation, the ad justm ent 
of depreciation rates to the expectable inflation, credits given to investm ents at 
favourable term s, and support to the extension of export capacities can be men­
tioned. Ensuring favourable conditions for direct capital im ports is also of crucial 
im portance. Concerning the stim uli to be given to exports the risk factors relat­
ing to  exports have to  be reduced perceptibly. The financial conditions of export 
credit insurance m ust be improved radically. Emphasis m ust be given to financing 
exports. Most exports can only be successful if they are linked to the provision 
of long term  credits. Financing these, however, is too costly to  exporters given 
the conditions of current credit interest rates. For this reason, export credentials 
should be discounted at favourable interest rates; of course, this is only possible 
with the use of sta te  funds. The taking of diplomatic steps is also needed in order 
to  improve the conditions for gaining access to foreign m arkets.
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The conclusion can be drawn th a t the depression, which is traceable to  the 
transform ation to m arket economy, is not an everlasting phenomenon. T he fac­
tors leading towards a sustained growth process are clearly recognizable. T he new 
grow th path  is, however, not easy to  enter. For instance, although it is true  th a t, 
under present conditions in Hungary, the reduction of real wages is unavoidable 
the  la tte r has to be seen, from a certain  point of view, as one of the im pedim ents 
confronting the investm ent activities of firms. The fall in real wages may cause 
technical progress to slow down through the substitu tion  effect. In o ther words, 
capital goods become relatively more expensive than  labour; accordingly, the  busi­
ness investm ent underlying technical progress could be driven back, with preference 
being given to  the hiring of new workers. If this happens, both investm ent activities 
and stru c tu ra l changes would become more sluggish. This calls our a tten tion  to  the 
fact th a t the reduction of real wages is not om nipotent and m ust not be applied 
for long. The problem of inflation is another example which illustrates the im ped­
im ents facing entry to a new growth path. The radical reduction of the inflation 
rate is not easy to achieve, especially in a short tim e.13 Inflationary expectations 
are strong in Hungary, and the credibility of the government with regard to its 
determ ination in following a consistent antiinflationary policy is, a t the tim e of 
w riting, highly doubted. The attem pts of the trade unions to  achieve acceptance 
of the indexation of nom inal wages is strong enough to  render a reduction of the  
inflation ra te  as more unlikely. If the high inflation rate  continues, it will worsen 
the respective chances of reducing the budget deficit and the level of real interest 
rates. O f course, these are impeding factors bu t not ones th a t cannot be elim inated 
a n d /o r surm ounted. Both recovery and sustained economic growth are a tta inab le  
in the coming years although the rate of growth will not be conspicuously high until 
the end of this decade.
References
B alassa, Á. 1995. „Egyensúly, növekedés és m onetáris politika a  gazdasági á ta laku lás folyam a­
táb an , 1990-1998.” In: Reform, rendszerváltás, modernizáció  (Equilibrium , econom ic 
grow th and  m onetary policy in th e  process of economic transition  1990-1998. In: Reform, 
system ic change, m odernization). B udapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
B árta , V. 1994. “C an we delineate po ten tial ou tp u t for an  economy in tran s itio n ?” Luxem burg: 
IIASA. June.
B runo, M .-G uido  Di Tella-D ornbusch, R .-F ischer, S. 1988. Inflation stabilization. C am bridge: 
M IT Press.
B uchanan, J . M .-Rowley, C. K .-Tollison, R. D. 1986. Deficits. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
C inkotai, J . 1995. A m agyarországi inflációs folyam at főbb determ inációi (M ajor de te rm in an ts of 
th e  inflationary process in  H ungary). Unpublished m anuscrip t. B udapest.
l j T he difficulties of the  reduction  of inflation, especially in the  developing countries, a re  thor- 
oughly exam ined in the  economic lite ra tu re . (Bruno, Di Telia, Dornbusch and Fischer  1988)
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
30 T . ERDŐS: OVERCOM ING TH E D EPR ESSIO N  IN HUNGARY
D edák. I. 1994. „M egtakarítási rá ta , infláció, költségvetési deficit” (Savings ra tio , inflation, bud­
get deficit). Külgazdasági Szemle . pp. 7-8.
E rdős, T . 1995. „Antiinflációs politika és gazdasági válság” In: Reform, rendszerváltás, moderni­
záció (A ntiinflationary economic policy and economic crisis. In: Reform, system ic change, 
m odernization). B udapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
E rdős, T . 1993. „Kiszorítási h a tá s  és válságellenes gazdaságpolitika” (Crowding ou t effect and 
anticrisis economic policy). Külgazdaság , p. 11.
Kalecki, M. 1954. Theory of economic dynamics.  London: George Allen an d  Unwin L td .
K opint-D atorg . 1996. Konjunktúrajelentés.  A világgazdaság és a magyar gazdaság helyzete és 
kilátásai 1996 tavaszán  (Economic report. Position and prospect of the  world economy 
and  the  H ungarian economy in spring 1996). B udapest: K opint-D atorg. p. 1.
Köves, A. 1995. „Egy alte rna tív  gazdaságpolitika szükségessége és lehetősége” (The necessity and  
possibility of an a lternative  economic policy). Külgazdaság , 6. pp. 4-17.
N ational B ank of Hungary. 1995. Yearly report, 1994. B udapest.
O b la th , G. 1995. A költségvetési deficit makrogazdasági hatásai Magyarországon (M acroeconomic 
effects of th e  budget deficit in H ungary). B udapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
Pete, P. 1994. „M akroökonómia, seigniorage, állam adósság” (M acroeconomy, seigniorage, s ta te  
deb t). Közgazdasági Szemle,  p . 6.
Tanzi, F .-B leier, M .-Teijero, M. 1993. “Effect of inflation on m easurem ent of fiscal deficits.” In 
Bieier, M., Cheasty, A. (ed): How to measure the fiscal deficitf In te rna tional M onetary 
Fund.
T arafás, I. 1995. „M onetáris politika: eszközök, feltételek” In: Reform, rendszerváltás, moderni­
záció (M onetary policy: tools and  conditions. In: Reform, system ic change, m odern iza­
tion). B udapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
U nited  N ations. 1995. Econom ic survey.
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
Acta Oeconomica, Vot. 48 (1 -2),  pp. 31-58  (1996)
THE STRUGGLE FOR FISCAL CONSOLIDATION DURING 
THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION
M. D ^B R O W S K I
Fiscal policy is one of the m ost difficult com ponents of transition , serving as an  excellent 
litm us tes t of the  progress achieved in  o ther areas of system ic changes. A typical scenario of 
events s ta r ts  w ith the  initial fiscal crisis connected w ith decom position of th e  previously existing 
political and  economic system . A radical stabilization  and liberalization  associated  w ith the  
removal of subsidies should provide a  way ou t from the aforem entioned crisis. However, the  
in itia l stab iliza tion  success is usually  no t sustainable and  it is followed by a  secondary fiscal crisis, 
roo ted  in  th e  o u tp u t decline, inefficiency of tax  system , the  excessive social obligations of the 
s ta te , an d  som etim es in a  lack of consistency in  conducting a tough policy. It is m uch m ore 
difficult to  respond  to the  secondary crisis th an  to the  prim ary one. W h at is badly  needed is a  
com prehensive reform  of th e  tax  system  and  social policy. Post-transform ation  grow th helps to 
alleviate th e  secondary crisis leading to the  fiscal consolidation stage.
Introduction
In practice the transition process in post-com m unist countries covers all as­
pects of economic and social life, as well as economic policy. By its nature , it 
m ust also affect public finance and fiscal policy, and when the transition  process 
is in itiated , the crisis in this la tte r sphere reflects—often in a drastic m anner— the 
economic problems inherited from the previous economic system. These problems 
include: macroeconomic imbalance, structural and price distortions, redundancy 
and ineffectiveness of social policy instrum ents and institu tions (as well as pub­
lic social services), over-regulation, paralysis of m arket adjustm ent mechanisms, 
and the dominance of sta te  ownership. The crisis of public finance also frequently 
serves indirectly as an indicator of the extent to which the former political regime 
lost control over public finances and incomes policy (extrem e cases of such loss of 
control include Poland in 1987-1989 and the USSR in 1990-1991).
In the transition  to a m arket economy, the sta te  of public finances usually 
serves as an excellent litmus test of the progress achieved and the degree of internal 
consistency and far-sightedness of the transform ation policy. Simplifying some­
w hat, one can sta te  th a t the share of public spending in gross domestic product 
(G D P), the degree of stability of public finances (including the budgets of territorial 
units and off-budget institutions), and the size of public debt constitu te synthetic 
indicators of the quality of the transition  process and development perspectives in 
a given economy.
0001-6373/96/S5.00 ©  1996 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
32 M. D 4 B R 0 W S K I: FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
The purpose of this study is to describe the subsequent stages of the transition  
in light of the basic accompanying fiscal difficulties, and to form ulate general con­
clusions regarding the factors which substantially affect the sta te  of public finances 
and the quality of fiscal policy in post-com m unist countries.
The structure  of the study is as follows: the next section contains a proposed 
scheme for distinguishing successive stages of fiscal policy during the transform ation 
period. In the following four sections, four such stages of fiscal policy are discussed. 
These are: initial destabilization, initial stabilization, secondary fiscal crisis, and 
finally, fiscal consolidation. The last section presents a sum m ary and concluding 
remarks.
This paper was w ritten on the basis of statistical d a ta  and inform ation col­
lected in the course of the research project “The Fiscal Crisis in Central and Eastern  
Europe under T ransition” , carried out in 1994-1995 by CASE (Center for Social 
and Economic Research) under the au th o r’s supervision. It was sponsored by the 
Ford Foundation, and other information was acquired from the database of the 
W orld Bank EC 2 D epartm ent (C entral Europe). The au thor was able to  use the 
World Bank database during his time at the World Bank as a visiting research 
fellow from O ctober 1994 to May 1995. Generally available IM F and World Bank 
publications were used as supplem entary sources of inform ation. However, it is 
im portan t to remember th a t the incompleteness and incom parability of statistical 
d a ta  is a m ajor methodological difficulty in examining fiscal policies of the tran ­
sition period, and thus this has also been a drawback for the preparation of the 
present study.
The fiscal scenarios of the transition process
Both the fiscal situation of post-com m unist countries and the natu re  of their 
fiscal problem s have changed during the course of the transition  process. One can 
“stylize” the following four-stage fiscal policy scenario which m ost of the countries 
th a t succeeded in completing the first transform ation stage went through:
1. Macroeconomic destabilization (including fiscal destabilization) in the pe­
riod directly preceding the launching of political and systemic transform ation;
2. Initial macroeconomic stabilization connected with economic liberaliza­
tion;
3. Secondary, post-stabilization fiscal crisis;
4. R estoration of fiscal potential connected with economic revival and ad­
vancem ent in the reforms of the public finance system.
T his “stylized” scenario is based mainly on the experience of the Polish econ­
omy, though a sim ilar “route” of events can be also noticed in o ther countries which 
conducted the transform ation process in a comprehensive and quick way. Such a
Acta Oeconomica 4à, 1996
M. D 4 B R 0 W S K I: FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 33
scenario, however, is less observable in the case of the rem aining categories, since 
the countries th a t initiated a program m e of radical reforms relatively late, a t best 
can find themselves only reaching the second stage. In the countries th a t were 
gradually and inconsistently carrying out reforms, an overlapping of the separate 
stages (m ainly of first and third ones) ensued. A t the same tim e the first stage 
turned out to  be a long and very painful one in an economic and social sense.
There are also countries th a t do not fall w ithin the scope of the “stylized” 
scenario, or in which some scenario stages are only vaguely outlined. For example, 
Czechoslovakia and to some extent Hungary “by-passed” the initial fiscal crisis, 
although the la tte r country suffers seriously from the secondary crisis (i.e. th a t of 
post-stabilization and post-liberalization). The third stage, however, appeared to 
be relatively mild in the Czech Republic and Estonia. These and other exceptions 
will be discussed more extensively later.
Initial destabilization stage
T he post-com m unist countries inherited from the command system  a number 
of serious economic problems. These are the m ost serious ones:
1. Full or alm ost full nationalization, which “squeezed” individual savings 
and— directly or indirectly—limited private economic activity. The natu ral conse­
quence was the practice of financing investment mainly from budgetary and quasi- 
budgetary resources (e.g. off-budget funds, funds collected by bodies such as asso­
ciations of enterprises, targeted central bank credits); only in a secondary way did 
investm ents come from profits of enterprises and private savings collected by the 
s ta te  savings bank and redistributed through the banking system  for development 
processes steered by the state.
2. The existence of huge structural distortions resulting from the creation 
of strong monopolistic structures, autarkic trade policy, adm inistrative regulation 
of prices, and centralized investment decisions. Under the CMEA regime, Central 
and East European economies as well as the USSR were strongly oriented toward 
domestic and regional markets. The currency inconvertibility, sta te  price control, 
trade restriction and sta te  monopoly in foreign trade—all these factors led, more 
or less, to  the isolation of those economies from the in ternational m arket.
3. Substantial social obligations of the sta te  in comparison with the economic 
development level reached by those countries (Sachs 1995a).
4. Perm anent domestic and external macroeconomic disequilibrium, severely 
felt mainly in the last phase of the former system ’s existence.
W ith regard to  the subject-m atter of the present study, the m ost im portan t 
is the last of the problems listed above, in particular fiscal disequilibrium. The 
la tter constituted one of the main reasons for m onetary imbalance (since the fiscal
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or quasi-fiscal deficit was financed by m onetary emission). This led, in tu rn , to 
inflationary pressure, either in a hidden (shortage of goods) or open form (price 
increase). Foreign credits appeared to be an alternative method of financing the 
actual deficit of the public sector. In the case of most East European countries 
(Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and a t the end of the 1980s, the USSR), 
this led to  enormous external indebtedness.
Passing on to  the analysis of the sources of fiscal disequilibrium , two groups 
of factors can be theoretically distinguished. The first group consists of those which 
were perm anently effective through the whole period of the planned economy, and 
the second includes those which emerged during the last phase of th a t system —
i.e. during its accelerated collapse. In practice, however, an a ttem p t to  draw a 
distinctive boundary-line between both kinds of reasons may raise some doubts.
If we look a t the list of m ajor economic problems inherited from the cen­
trally  planned economy, we can w ithout any hesitation point to  item s 2 and 3 as 
the sources of perm anent fiscal tensions. More detailed historical analysis reveals, 
however, some differences. W hereas structu ral distortions were rooted in the  early 
stages of socialist industrialization programmes due to  the central allocation of re­
sources and adm inistrative prices and sta te  monopoly in foreign trade, the social 
part of the heritage of the previous system is of more recent origin.
A restrictive welfare spending policy was characteristic during the first decades 
of the communist regimes. The situation gradually started  to change only after 
S ta lin ’s death, along w ith growing social dissatisfaction (bloody events in the G er­
m an D em ocratic Republic in 1953, in Poland in 1956 and 1970, in Hungary in 1956, 
and the Prague Spring in 1968). Post-Stalinist communist leaders (Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev in the USSR, K ádár in Hungary, Ulbricht and Honecker in GDR, Husak 
in Czechoslovakia, Gierek and Jaruzelski in Poland) began to try  to  a ttrac t social 
support for their governments. However, the biggest jum p in social welfare spend­
ing was recorded towards the close of the existence of the communist regimes, when 
the process of seeking social approval became more intense. It was often connected 
with p artia l dem ocratization of the system, and with the efforts of the then gov­
erning elites to  gain the electorate’s approval. The m ost spectacular explosion of 
welfare spending and wages occurred in Poland in 1987-1989 and in the USSR.
The scale of s ta te  social spending has always been a feature differentiating 
E astern Europe and the former USSR from communist countries in East Asia. The 
la tte r countries have provided much more modest social nets than  those in C entral 
and East European countries and the former USSR (Sachs 1995a). T hanks to this 
they were able to m aintain macroeconomic discipline at a fairly high level (although 
V ietnam  was forced to conduct a radical stabilization operation in early 1989).
The explosion of social spending towards the close of the com m unist regimes 
was not the only reason for fiscal crisis and growing inflationary tensions. The sta te  
de facio  lost control over sta te  enterprises and their finances (especially wages).
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The first historical reason for this loss of control, and consequently for the 
emergence of fiscal tensions, was the incompleteness of economic reforms. The la tte r 
dism antled, to  some extent, the traditional system of central planning bu t offered 
no alternative solution in exchange. Several decades of experience with a ttem pts 
to  reform the socialist economy (beginning with the early stages of self-government 
reform in Yugoslavia in 1950) have clearly shown th a t "market socialism” or other 
variants of the "third way” are difficult to reach, and at the same time lead to seri­
ous macroeconomic disequilibrium problems. It is no accident th a t Yugoslavia and 
Poland were the leaders in macroeconomic instability among the socialist coun­
tries, and th a t the first destabilization phase in the USSR (under G orbachev’s 
“perestroika” ) was connected with partial enlargement of sta te  enterprise au ton­
omy. Of all the reforming countries, only Hungary succeeded in avoiding serious 
crisis, although this economy also could not be considered as a model of stability  
(especially if the scale of external indebtedness is taken into account).
The problem related to the detailed mechanisms which lead to  fiscal desta­
bilization under partial liberalization of the command economy is discussed in 
economic literature. Generally, emphasis is placed upon the loss of trad itional 
budgetary or quasi-budgetary revenues which, in classic socialist economies, were 
obtained prim arily through the s ta te ’s confiscation of almost all enterprise prof­
its. As the financial autonomy of enterprises increases, the budget loses part of 
these revenues. If, in the meantime, the sta te  does not create alternative ways of 
collecting money from enterprises and citizens (through an obligatory system  of 
direct and indirect taxes) or reduce its expenditures, then the budget deficit grows 
(McKinnon  1992). This is not, however, the only mechanism. The description of 
the adverse influence of incomplete reforms on fiscal equilibrium can be extended 
by incorporating a few additional factors and phenomena in the analysis.
The growth of sta te  enterprise autonomy in wage determ ination (indispens­
able for the creation of a more aggressive system of financial incentives for employees 
and m anagem ent), coupled with a lack of adequate interest in profit, leads to a de­
cline in profit, and thus to a drop in budgetary revenues. Additionally, the level 
of wages paid in the enterprises indirectly affects— through informal and formal 
“indexation” systems— the level of wages in the government sector, pensions, and 
other social contributions financed out of the budget or from off-budget funds.
Even more harm ful is a gradual and selective price liberalization, which leads 
to growing gaps between market prices and adm inistratively determ ined or regu­
lated prices. This creates a situation where subsidies, tax  concessions, or other 
forms of financial com pensation for producers are necessary. Since the goods and 
services sold a t controlled prices— due to  their great political sensitivity— cover a 
large group of products with a large share in the overall m arket turnover, the final 
consequence of gradual price liberalization is an increase in budgetary subsidies 
and a decline in budgetary revenues. The la tter are due to the application of tax 
concessions or a general fall in profitability.
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In the light of existing empirical experience, gradual and poorly coordinated 
price liberalization—which is subject to  public political bargaining—constitutes the 
m ajor th rea t to  macroeconomic stability a t the end of the command system . In ad­
dition to  the earlier discussed negative influence on budget equilibrium , one should 
also focus on the increase in money velocity. This is caused by the inflationary 
expectations resulting from slow price deregulation. This problem was severely felt 
in Poland in 1987-1989 and in the USSR in 1989-1991, where the problem of price 
liberalization was a subject of public discussion, and the final political decisions in 
th a t m atte r were delayed for many months. To a lesser extent this process could 
also be observed in other countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (in the second 
half of 1990 before price liberalization became effective on 1 January  1991), and the 
former G D R (just before the introduction of the Monetary, Economic and Social 
Union 1 July 1990).
The destabilizing influence of gradual and inconsistent reforms in the late 
stage of socialism was additionally strengthened due to  the weakness, and some­
tim es disintegration, of the socialist sta te  (e.g. the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 
1990-1991). This mechanism has been described in more detail above w ith regard 
to  the explosion of welfare spending and wages.
Only Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the G D R avoided serious fiscal crisis a t the 
beginning of the transform ation period; however, in these countries the macroeco­
nomic stabilization level was far from W estern standards. In the cases of Czechoslo­
vakia and the former GDR, the m aintenance of an unreformed com m and system, 
and then its quick replacem ent with market regulation mechanisms, proved to  be 
of the greatest im portance. Both countries were characterized by a high level of 
political and economic discipline during the central planning era, and sta te  au thor­
ity and control over the economy did not undergo spontaneous disintegration, as 
was more or less the case in the other countries.
H ungary’s success in avoiding political and economic disintegration occurred 
despite the completely different initial situation of this country from th a t in Czech­
oslovakia and the GDR respectively. In the 1980s, Hungary was the leader in 
political and economic freedom in the communist camp. The decentralized version 
of the planned economy which existed in Hungary, although not free of some of the 
weak points observed in Yugoslavia and Poland, rem ained capable of disciplining 
economic agents. The last communist government of Károly Nemeth, w ith a clear 
pro-reform attitude , was also able to  avoid those blatantly  populist decisions which 
destabilize public finances.
Table 1 presents basic indicators reflecting the fiscal situations of six former 
m em bers of the CM EA in the year preceding the launching of the fundam ental 
transform ation process. It should be emphasized, however, th a t this d a ta  is only 
approxim ate, due to  the aforementioned incom parability of statistical d a ta  between 
these countries. A quasi-fiscal deficit (usually connected with central bank oper-
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Table 1
General government revenues, expenditure and deficit in the year 
preceding the beginning o f transition fin percent o f GDP)
C ountry Year Revenues E xpenditures Deficit
Poland 1989 34.65 39.86 5.21
Hungary 1989 61.16 62.30 1.14
Czecho-Slovakia 1990 61.86 62.60 0.74
USSR 1991 38.00 53.00 15.00
Bulgaria 1989 77.92 79.46 1.54
R om ania 1989 50.79 44.07 -6 .7 2
Source: IM F and  C entral B ank d a ta ; CASE database.
ations or foreign credits), not included in official budgetary statistics, constitutes 
another factor distorting the picture.
D ata  presented in Table 1 confirm the dram atic sta te  of public finances in 
the USSR before its breakup (1991), and also the relatively high government deficit 
in Poland in 1989. In the case of Poland, the general indicator for 1989 “hides” 
substantially  deeper crises of public finances in the second and third quarter of 1989 
(in the fourth quarter of 1989 the process of w ithdrawing subsidies was s ta r te d , and 
the budget was almost balanced for the quarter). In all countries there were also 
quasi-fiscal expenditures of the central bank.
Some comments on Romania are necessary as this country showed a signif­
icant budget surplus. In the second half of the 1980s, Rom ania im plem ented a 
restrictive program m e aimed at external debt repaym ent (i.e. debts accum ulated 
in the 1970s). This policy, accompanied by economic and political restrictions, was 
one of the factors th a t led to the uprising against Ceau§escu’s regime in December 
1989.
The stage of initial stabilization
The experience of approxim ately 30 countries undergoing the transition  pro­
cess from plan to market reveals tha t macroeconomic stabilization is a necessary 
(although insufficient) condition for achieving progress in other areas of transfor­
m ation (Balcerowicz and Gelb 1994; Balcerowicz 1994; de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
1995). Since a considerable fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit constitutes a main source 
of macroeconomic instability at the very beginning of transition, an anti-inflation 
program m e m ust aim  to eliminate or reduce this deficit. The “stan d ard ” set of 
measures for doing so includes:
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1. the elim ination or a substantial cut in consumer and producer subsidies,
2. a cutback of other government expenditures (mainly investm ent expendi­
tures and defence spending),
3. reduction of tax concessions and an increase in tax  rates, or the in troduc­
tion of additional emergency taxes if necessary,
4. elimination of central bank quasi-fiscal spending (mainly in the form of 
negative real interest rates, differentiated exchange rates and credits directed at 
particu lar sectors of the economy).
The measures listed in items 1, 3 and 4 are impossible w ithout price liberal­
ization. In tu rn  price liberalization (under the conditions of extensive monopoliza­
tion which prevailed in most of the post-com m unist economies a t the beginning of 
transition) requires external liberalization of the economy.
As the criterion for the success of the initial stabilization stage, I suggest us­
ing an indicator which shows a sustained (i.e. a minimum of two successive years) 
fall in inflation below the level of 50 percent per annum  and which is concurrent 
with the free form ation of most prices. This would elim inate the so-called “mone­
ta ry  overhang” which is a characteristic of K ornai’s economics of shortage (Kornai 
1980). Obviously, the level of 50 percent inflation is purely arbitrary, bu t it seems 
to be a reasonable threshold for the elem entary stability  of prices following their 
general liberalization.1
Table 2 presents results of macroeconomic stabilization.2 The criterion of 
macroeconomic stability  defined above was met, before the end of 1995, by the fol­
lowing eight countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Albania, 
Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. If we take into consideration a December to Decem­
ber inflation index, we should also include C roatia, Macedonia and L ithuania. The 
aforementioned criterion seems to be almost satisfied by Moldova, K irgizstan and 
Romania.
Table 3 shows budgetary revenues, expenditures and balance (in percent of 
G D P) in 29 post-com m unist countries in 1989-1994. However, for m any countries 
(m ainly the former USSR and Yugoslavia respectively) a full tim e-set of d a ta  is 
not in my possession. In spite of this incompleteness, it is obvious th a t most 
countries th a t succeeded in achieving fundam ental macroeconomic stability  (i.e. 
inflation below 50 percent per annum) enjoy relatively low budget deficits. Only 
3 out of 11 countries included in this group have deficits exceeding 3 percent of 
GDP. These were A lbania, Hungary and Lithuania. In 1994 L ithuania was only 
beginning the stabilization  process, and according to prognoses its fiscal balance
'A  sim ilar criterion  has been adopted  by Anders A s lu n d  (1994).
2These results are approxim ately m irrored by the average yearly d a ta , which w ith some lag 
respond to current (Decem ber-to-Decem ber) inflation rates. A certa in  com plication resu lts  from  
the fact th a t in some cases the anti-inflation policy is applied in the second h a lf of the  calendar 
year. The s ta tistica l effect—in the form  of a  drop  in the average annual inflation ra te— is visible 
only in the following year or even two years later.
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Table 2
Inflation in selected post-communist economies ( CPI— increase in the average yearly
indicator in percent)
C ountry 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995“
Poland 251.0 586.0 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 29.0
Czech Republic 2.3 10.8 56.7 11.1 20.8 10.2 9.0
Slovakia 0.0 10.8 61.2 10.1 23.0 14.0 10.0
A lbania 0.0 0.0 35.5 225.9 85.0 28.0 9.0
E stonia 6.1 23.1 210.6 1069.0 89.0 48.0 26.0
L atv ia 4.7 10.5 124.4 951.2 109.0 36.0 25.0
H ungary 17.0 29.0 34.2 22.9 22.5 19.0 29.0
Slovenia 1306.0 549.7 117.7 201.2 32.0 19.8 13.0
L ithuan ia 2.1 8.4 224.7 1020.3 390.2 72.0 36.0
Kirgizs tan 0.0 3.0 85.0 854.6 1208.7 280.0 44.0
Moldova 0.0 4.2 98.0 1276.0 789.0 327.0 20.0
R om ania 1.1 5.1 174.5 210.9 256.0 131.0 34.0
R ussia 2.2 5.6 92.7 1353.0 896.0 220.0 181.0
B ulgaria 6.0 22.0 333.5 82.0 72.8 89.0 62.0
Belarus 1.7 4.5 83.5 969.0 1188.0 2200.0 737.0
K azakhstan 0.0 4.2 91.0 1610.0 1760.0 1980.0 165.0
Turkm enistan 2.1 4.6 102.5 492.9 3102.0 2400.0 226.0
U kraine 2.0 4.0 91.2 1210.0 4735.0 842.0 321.0
U zbekistan 0.7 3.1 82.2 645.0 534.0 746.0 273.0
A rm enia 0.0 10.3 100.0 825.0 3732.0 5458.0 185.0
A zerbaijan 0.0 7.8 105.6 616.0 833.0 1500.0 464.0
Mongolia 0.0 0.0 208.6 321.0 183.0 145.0 25.0
M acedonia 1246.0 120.5 229.7 1925.2 248.0 65.0 18.0
C roatia 2520.5 135.6 249.5 938.2 1516.0 98.0 2.0
Georgia 0.0 3.3 78.5 913.0 3126.0 18000.0 163.0
T ajik istan 0.0 4.0 111.6 1157.0 2195.0 452.0 389.0
“ IM F forecast
Source: de Melo, Denizer an d  Gelb (1995), table  3; IM F d a ta
for 1995 should be much better. A lbania has received considerable non-repayable 
foreign assistance and concessionary loans have been granted by the IM F and the 
World Bank. Hungary, as mentioned earlier, did not go through pre-transform ation 
destabilization, and thus it did not have to introduce strict stabilization measures. 
All adjustm ent activities related to budgetary expenditures in 1991-1993 turned 
out, however, to be insufficient. This is why Hungary is the country which suffers 
m ost severely from the so-called secondary fiscal crisis (see the following section). 
Moreover, Hungary is also the only country th a t will register an increase in inflation 
in 1995.
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Table 3
General government revenues, expenditures and budget balance in transition countries
(in percent of GDP)
C ountry Ind icato r 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994k
A lban ia revenues 48.0e 47.0e 31.0e 25.5e 28.0e 27.7b
expenditures 57.0C 62.0e 62.0e 48.0e 44.0e 41.0 6
balance - 9 .0 e - 1 5 .0 e -3 1 .0 e -2 2 .5 e -1 6 .0 e -1 3 .3 6
A rm enia revenues 52.2e 42.7e 29.1e 21.5e 17.6e 37.O*1
expenditures 49.8e 36.9e 36.4e 61.5e 66.4e 61.06
balance -f 2.4e + 5 .8 e - 7 .3 e -4 0 .0 e -4 8 .8 e - 2 4 .0 6
A zerbaijan revenues 22.3e 26.4e 25.5e 23.4e 36.06
expenditures 24.3e 31.9e 30.5e 27.5e 49.06
balance - 2 .0 e - 5 .5 e - 5 .0 e - 4 .1 e -1 3 .0 6
Belarus revenues 47,5e 43,3e 43,6e 36,66
expenditures 43,9e 46,8e 51,9e 38,l 6
balance 3,6e - 3 ,5 e - 8 ,3 e -1,5*-
B ulgaria revenues 59.6“ 51.6“ 42.3“ 38.3° 37.4“ 38.0*1
expenditures 61.0° 60.4“ 50.9“ 45.3° 51.2“ 44.I*1
balance - 1 .4 “ - 8 .8 “ - 8 .6 ° - 5 .0 “ - 1 0 .9 “ - 6 .1 6
C ro a tia revenues 14.9d 20.4d 20.1d 27.2d
expenditures 19.5d 20.6d 20.7d 27.6d
balance -4 .5 * —0.2d —0.6d —0.4d
Czecho-Slovakia revenues 69.5“ 61.1“ 55.0“ 56.4“
expenditures 72.3“ 61.5“ 57.1“ 60.1“
balance - 2 .8 “ - 0 .4 “ - 2 .1 “ - 3 .7 “
The Czech Republic revenues 42.8e 42.4e 35.3e 49.5“ 48.5“ 51.26
expenditures 42.4e 41.2e 37.0e 47.5“ 47.5“ 50.76
balance + 0 .4 C + 1 .2 e - 1 .7 e + 2 .0 “ + 1 .0 ° + 0 .5 b
Slovakia revenues 50.9“ 48.1“ 50.56
expenditures 64.0° 55.1“ 53.0*1
balance -1 3 .1 “ - 7 .0 “ - 2 .5 6
E sto n ia revenues 43.0e 35.7e 38.5e 31.4° 32.5“ 35.06
expenditures 42.5e 33.3e 32.5e 31.0“ 33.9“ 35.06
balance + 0 .5 e + 2 .4 e +6.0° + 0 .4 “ - 1 .4 “
-OOO
Georgia revenues 31.5e 33.2e 30.0e 10.2e 2.7e 15.06
expenditures 30.6e 32.0e 35.9e 24.01*
balance + 0 .9 e 1.2e - 5 .9 e - 9 .0 6
K azakhstan revenues 40.7e 41.4e 35.1e 24.6e 22.3e 19.06
expenditures 39.2e 38.4e 44.1e 31.9e 23.5e 23.56
balance +  1.5e + 3 .0e - 9 .0 e - 7 .3 e - 1 .2 e —4.5*
K irgizstan revenues 38.5e 39.5e 35.2e 15.8e 14.2e 24.3b
expenditures 36.4e 37.9e 27.3e 33.9e 23.0e 32 .7b
balance + 2 .I e + 1 . 6 e + 7 .9e -1 8 .1 e - 8 .9 e - 8 .4 fc
L ithuan ia revenues 49.8e 45.0e 44.0e 33.3° 25.1“ 25.16
expenditures 53.8e 48.8e 36.7e 32.9“ 30.4“ 30.46
balance - 4 .0 e - 3 .9 e + 7 .3e - 0 .4 “ - 5 .3 “ - 5 .3 6
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Table 3 (continued)
General government revenues, expenditures and budget balance in transition countries
(in percent of GDP)
C ountry Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19946
L atv ia revenues 31.0° 36.6C 26.5e 36.76
expenditures 29.8e 35.8e 21.8e 38.76







Moldova revenues 35.3C 35.2C 26.2e 20.3e 12.4e 17.1*
expenditures 33.7C 32.4° 26.3e 42.4e 18.1e 25.96
balance +  1.6e + 2 .8 C - 0 .1 e - 2 2 .1 e - 5 .7 e - 8 .8 6
M ongolia revenues 48.6C 50.6C 47.4e 29.9e 36.2e 36 .26
expenditures 65.3C 64.1c 55.1e 42.7e 53.2e 48.0*
balance — 16.7C -1 3 .5 e - 9 .7 e -1 2 .8 e -1 6 .9 e - 1 1 .8 6
Poland revenues 41.4“ 42.8“ 41.5“ 43.9“ 45.5“ 47.9i>
expenditures 48.9° 39.8“ 48.0“ 50.7“ 48.4“ 50.4*






- 6 .8 “
35.9“
41.9“ -f




R om ania revenues 51.0“ 39.8“ 39.4“ 37.6“ 30.8“ 32.6b
expenditures 42.8“ 38.7“ 38.8“ 42.2“ 31.0“ 35.6*
balance + 8 .2 “ + 1 .1 “ + 0 .6 “ - 4 .6 “ - 0 .2 “ - 3 .0 6
Slovenia revenues 48.9e 43.7d 46.6d 49.8d 43 .l d
expenditures 49.3e 41.0** 46.4e1 49.4d 44 .l d
balance - 0 .4 e + 2 .7 d + 0 .2 d + 0 .4 d - 1 .0 d
T ajik is tan revenues 40.3° 46.8e 40.7e 32.8e 27.2e 35.46
expenditures 38.6C 43.4e 31.9e 69.8e 52.2e 38.16
bidance + 1 .7 e + 3 .4e + 8 .8e -3 7 .0 e - 2 5 .0 e - 2 .7 6
T urkm enistan revenues 32.4C 42.7e 44.7e 22.5e 13.4e 6.2*
expenditures 31. 2e 41.1e 41.2e 32.6e 17.0e 7.36
balance +  1.2C + 1 .6 e + 3 .5e -1 0 .1 e - 3 .6 e -1 .1 *
U kraine revenues 26.4° 27.4e 38 ,3 ' 44,0e 42 ,4 ' 42,36
expenditures 25.7C 26.6e 51 ,9 ' 73,3 ' 52 ,1 ' 51.4b
balance + 0 .7 C + 0 .8 e - 1 3 ,8 ' - 2 9 ,3 ' - 9 ,7 ' —9.1*
U zbekistan revenues 35.2C 45.0e 45.5e 31.9e 41.0e 43.0*
expenditures 35.8° 45.9e 50.0e 42.1e 43.4e 45.06
balance —0.6e - 0 .9 e - 4 .5 e - 1 0 .2 e - 2 .4 e -2 .0 *
Hungary revenues 59.6“ 58.0“ 56.1“ 57.8“ 54.1“ 52.36
expenditures 61.0“ 57.5“ 58.3“ 63.4“ 60.5“ 58.8*
balance - 1 .4 “ + 0 .5 “ - 2 .2 “ - 5 .6 “ - 6 .4 “ -6 .5 *
Source: WEO  (1994), tab le  14, and  15 (a); de Melo, Denizer, and  Gelb (1995), tab le  8 (b); 
PR D  W B d a ta  base (c); M ultiQ uery D atabase (1995) (d); D^browski and Antczak  (1995) (e).
1 w ithout hidden im port subsidies
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T he 11 countries mentioned above differ from each other in the scale and 
in their detailed path  of fiscal adjustm ents. Due to  lack of comprehensive da ta  
and the peculiar situation of “newly” independent countries of the former USSR 
and Yugoslavia, Table 4 contains da ta  regarding only five East and C entral Euro­
pean countries. Although Bulgaria initially adopted a very am bitious program m e 
of liberalization and stabilization (which peaked in 1991), the governm ent later 
suspended this programme; thus, inflation never fell below 50 percent per annum, 
and w hat is more, in the winter of 1993-1994 a noticeable macroeconomic desta­
bilization was recorded (see next section). Nevertheless, it seems to be reasonable 
to include Bulgaria in the analysis due to its typical ( th a t is, typical for strongly 
centralized economies) path of fiscal adjustm ent for the first years of the transfor­
m ation process.
Table 4
Adjustments of revenues and expenditures in selected post-communist countries during 
stabilization-liberalization stage (in percent of GDP)
C ountry Period of tim e Expenditures Revenues
Czecho-Slovakia 1989-1991 -1 5 .2 -1 4 .5
Poland 1989-1990 -9 .1 +1.4
H ungary 1989-1990 - 3 .5 - 1 .6
Bulgaria 1989-1992 -1 6 .2 -2 1 .5
A lbania 1990-1992 -1 4 .0 -2 6 .5
Source: See Table 3
Analyzing Table j , there are two paths which can be distinguished for ad just­
ment processes im m ediately after initiation of the transform ation process. The first 
one is represented by Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and A lbania, whose economies were 
strongly centralized before the beginning of the transform ation process and resem­
bled the model com m and system. In 1989, these 3 countries registered a high share 
of budgetary expenditures in G DP (from approxim ately 58 percent of G D P in Al­
bania, up to 72.3 percent in Czechoslovakia). In addition, a significant decline both 
in expenditures and revenues was recorded. In Czechoslovakia, however, the fall in 
expenditures and revenues was very similar, and this resulted in the preservation 
of a low budget deficit. In Bulgaria and Albania, the decline in revenues signifi­
cantly exceeded the decrease in expenditures; thus, the budget deficit increased. In 
both countries falls in real GD P were much stronger than  in Czechoslovakia. This 
implies th a t there was a more dram atic decrease in real expenditures, and an even 
more substan tia l drop in real revenues.
In Czechoslovakia the decline in the share of budgetary expenditures and 
revenues in G DP was the effect of a conscious and tightly controlled government
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policy of liberalization and comprehensive restructuring of the economic system. 
However, in A lbania and Bulgaria, in addition to the aforementioned processes, 
there have also been other contributory factors, such as significant weakening of 
fiscal adm inistration  and loss of government control over the enterprise sector.
W ith  regard to Hungary and Poland, in 1989 the economic systems of both 
countries were much more decentralized, and the scope of adm inistered prices and 
subsidies, as well as th a t of price distortions, was smaller. The Hungarian economy 
was more m arket-oriented and better balanced in fiscal and m onetary respects than 
the Polish economy (See section on the initial destabilization stage). In 1988-1989 
Poland experienced a substantial drop in the share of revenues in G D P and a slight 
fall in the share of expenditures in G D P (Bratkowski 1993; Braikowski ei al. 1995). 
In 1989, at the starting  point, Hungary had a much higher share of government 
expenditures (61 percent of GDP) than Poland (48.9 percent); this is sim ilar to 
the situation  typical for countries which had a highly centralized version of the 
planned economy (see above). In 1989 the share of subsidies in the H ungarian 
G D P (12.1 percent) was, however, lower than the Polish share (12.9 percent), not 
to  m ention the Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian shares (15.5 percent and 25 percent 
respectively). In 1989, in comparison with the Polish budget, the H ungarian budget 
had a higher share of the following expenditures:
—  expenditures on goods and services (20.5 percent of G D P in Hungary and
10.2 percent of G D P in Poland), i.e. financing the budgetary sphere,
—  debt service expenditures (2.4 percent and 0 percent, respectively),
—  social security benefits expenditures (14.4 percent and 11.2 percent, re­
spectively),
—  capital expenditures (6.6 percent and 3.3 percent).
A lower initial share of subsidies in GDP, and in the case of Poland a lower 
share of budgetary expenditures and revenues in G DP as well, indicate the reason 
why both countries (i.e. Hungary and Poland) followed a less s tric t “adjustm ent 
p a th ” in the field of fiscal policy than  Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Albania. In 
1989-1990, as far as Hungary is concerned, the adjustm ent path  consisted in rela­
tively slight cuts both in general government expenditures (by 3.5 percent of G D P) 
and revenues (by 1.6 percent of G D P). Consequently, Hungary went from a slight 
governm ent deficit ( -1 .4  percent of GD P in 1989) to a negligible surplus (+0.5 
percent of GD P).
Poland—where in 1989 the government deficit am ounted to 7.5 percent of 
G D P— was on the edge of hyperinflation in the second half of 1989. Therefore, 
Poland had to make deeper and more asymmetric adjustm ents than Hungary, low­
ering expenditures by 9.1 percent of G DP in 1990 (a t the same tim e, there was 
a substan tia l fall in G D P) and increasing revenues by 1.4 percent of GDP. As a 
result, in 1990, a general government surplus am ounting to  3.0 percent of G D P was 
achieved.
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Table 5
General government subsidies (in percent of GDP ) in the countries conducting a radical
variant of stabilization
C ountry 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Changes
Czecho-Slovakia 25.0 16.2 7.7 5.0 - -2 0 .0 “
Poland 12.9 7.3 5.1 3.3 2.2 -1 0 .7 6
H ungary 12.1 9.6 8.0 5.8 4.8 — 7.36
B ulgaria 15.5 14.9 4.2 1.8 4.8 -1 3 .7 “
A lbania 8.3 15.7 20.3 8.2 2.2 - 1 8 . I e
Eipla.na.tion: “for 1989-1992; bfor 1989-1993; cfor 1991-1993 
Source: W EO  1994
T he available d a ta  allow us to examine only two item s on the expenditure 
side: i.e. subsidies ( Table 5 ) and capital expenditures ( Table 6); these are bo th  
im portan t in the standard  adjustm ent package for the first transform ation stage.
Table 6
Investm ent expenditures of general government (in percent of GDP) in the countries 
conducting a radical variant of stabilization
C ountry 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Czecho-Slovakia 8.5 6.9 8.4 11.3 -
Poland 3.3 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.5
H ungary 6.6 4.7 6.2 8.1 6.2
B ulgaria 5.5 3.1 2.0 2.8 1.9
A lbania 29.3 18.8 6.1 4.3 7.7
Source: See Table 5
T he m ost significant reduction of subsidies was made by Czechoslovakia (by 
20 percent of G D P in 1989-1992); Czechoslovakia was also the country which had 
the highest starting  level (25 percent of G D P). Czechoslovakia was followed by 
A lbania (reduction by 18.1 percent of G DP in 1991-1993, w ith a s ta rting  level of
20.3 percent in 1991), Bulgaria (13.7 percent of GD P in 1989-1992, although in
1993 an increase of 3 percent of G D P was registered), Poland (10.7 percent of GD P 
in 1989-1993) and Hungary (7.3 percent of G DP within the same period).3 It is 
worth repeating th a t the drop in subsidies was accompanied by a slum p in GDP, 
and thus the decrease in overall real subsidies was even greater than  the fall in
3 I t  is w orth  em phasizing th a t  bo th  H ungary and  Poland reduced the  share  of subsidies in G D P 
in th e  preceding years due to  p artia l price liberalization. In Poland, a  su b stan tia l cu t in subsidies 
was ind icated  in the  second ha lf of 1989 afte r food price liberalization. In 1988-1989, a  fall in 
general governm ent cap ital expenditures was also registered (Bratkowski et al. 1995).
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their share in GDP. In 1993, the level of subsidies in Poland and A lbania am ounted 
to  2.2 percent of GDP, while in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, they 
am ounted to 4-5 percent of GDP.
As far as capital expenditures of the respective countries are concerned there 
is no uniform trend. Albania, with a record level in 1989 (29.3 percent of G D P ),4 
had by 1992 made the greatest relative reduction in these expenditures, which were 
down to 4.3 percent of GDP. In 1993, however, they increased to  7.7 percent of 
GDP. Bulgaria and Poland, beginning from a much lower level (5.5 percent and
3.3 percent of G D P respectively, in 1989), recorded a steady decline in capital 
expenditures (although in Bulgaria, there was a tem porary increase in 1992), while 
adopting a “m ilder” trajectory  than  A lbania’s. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
after a tem porary and slight drop in 1990, the share of capital expenditures in 
G D P increased over the following years.
T he available statistics on budgetary revenues render impossible a detailed 
evaluation of the fiscal results due to  the suspension of tax  concessions, the unifica­
tion of turnover tax  rates, the lowering of marginal income tax  rates (especially for 
the private sector), and other reform activities. In the first period of transform ation 
a generally observed fall in the share of budgetary revenues in GD P was brought 
about by lowering the highest turnover tax rates (effectively, the elim ination of 
price distortions) and income tax  rates, as well as by elim inating the so-called “du­
plication effect” ( Barbone and Marchetti 1995); i.e., taxation  of profits generated 
by subsidies.
Secondary fiscal crisis stage
The improvement of the fiscal balances, resulting from radical adjustm ent 
activities a t the very beginning of transition process, has turned out to  be unsus­
tainable. A m ajority  of the post-communist countries th a t succeeded in the second 
stage experienced a secondary (post-stabilization) fiscal crisis shortly afterwards. 
Only the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia have m anaged to avoid serious 
problem s connected with balancing the budget (see below).
The m ost im portan t concrete reasons for the secondary fiscal crisis are the fall 
in budgetary revenues (particularly from enterprise income tax) and the increase 
in welfare spending.
Table 7 presents changes in the ratio of budgetary revenues to  G D P in the 
period 1989-1994. Twenty of the 26 countries included in Table 7 registered a fall 
in budgetary revenues, sometime very noticeable. Five of the six countries th a t 
recorded an increase in ratio of revenues to GDP have recently become indepen-
4 In A lbania in 1989 all the  enterprise investm ent spendings were financed from the  s ta te  budget.
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
46 M. D ^B R O W SK I: FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
Table 7





T he Czech R epublic -1 0 .9
Slovakia -1 1 .6
B ulgaria -2 1 .9
E ston ia - 8 .0
L ithuania -2 5 .2
L atv ia -1 5 .1
R om ania -1 8 .5
Albania -2 0 .3
Mongolia -1 2 .4
R ussia -4 .5
Kirgizstan -1 4 .2
Moldova -1 8 .2
K azakhstan -2 1 .7
U zbekistan +7.8
Belarus - 1 .6
U kraine +  15.9
T urkm enistan -2 6 .2
C roatia +  12.3
M acedonia + 6.6
A rm enia -1 5 .2
Georgia -1 6 .5
A zerbaijan +  10.2
T ajik is tan - 4 .9
Source: de Melo, Denizer and  Gelb (1995, Table 8)
dent. Those countries have taken over rights to  certain revenue sources held earlier 
exclusively a t the union level. Additionally, two of them  (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan) 
have crude oil pools and other raw m aterials th a t can be easily exported. In 1989, 
the level of revenues in Poland was exceptionally low due to  the dram atic collapse 
of the public finance system and the concomitant hyperinflationary effects (the 
“Oliviera-Tanzi” effect). This was probably also the case for three former Yugoslav 
republics— Slovenia, C roatia  and Macedonia.
T he picture conveyed in Table 7 is incomplete, since the figures referring to an 
increase in revenues are of aggregated character; thus they relate to  the whole five- 
year period in which different stages of fiscal policy overlap for different countries. 
I t is w orth noticing th a t 1989 was, for m ost countries (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Rom ania, Albania, the USSR), a year of “norm al” planned economy (although in
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many cases it was the last year). In Hungary, the processes of liberalization, the 
removal of subsidies and reform of the tax  system  were already advanced. A similar 
situation  existed in Poland, which had entered the initial stage of fiscal crisis. High 
inflation was also raging in Yugoslavia.
An even less com parable year is 1994, since some of the countries were still 
in the stage of initial fiscal crisis, others were only a t the end of the stabilization 
phase, still others were at different stages of secondary fiscal crisis, and a small 
num ber of countries were emerging from crisis. The aggregation of the  d a ta  makes 
it impossible to  differentiate falls in revenue resulting from price liberalization and 
the removal of price distortions, from those resulting from  a decrease in the fiscal 
“effectiveness” of the sta te  apparatus. Therefore, in order to  illustra te  the sym p­
tom s of fiscal crisis more precisely, one should refer to  more disaggregated d a ta  
related both to the revenue and expenditure items, which are of key im portance 
for this stage.
Both the sources and the course of the secondary fiscal crisis can best be 
identified by look at examples of East and Central European countries, although 
the crisis sym ptom s (particularly a fall in revenues derived from enterprise income 
tax) can also be noted in most countries of the former USSR—even in countries 
such as Russia— where there is still three-digit annual inflation. This means tha t 
they have not brought the initial stabilization process to  an end.
Table 8
Proceeds from tax on enterprise profits (in percent of GDP), 1989-1994
C ountry 1989. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
B ulgaria 23.2 17.9 17.4 8.3 5.6
Czecho-Slovakia 11.0 12.2 13.7 11.7
T he Czech Republic 11.1 7.5
Slovakia 10.3 6.5
Estonia 5.3 4.0
Hungary 8.1 7.6 5.7 2.6 2.2
L ithuania 6.3 4.7
Poland 9.7 14.0 6.1 4.6 5.3
Rom ani ac 7.3 5.1 5.3 3.5
Arm enia 8.2 4.6
Mongolia 21.3 19.5 13.1 11.7 13.0
Slovenia 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.8
C roatia 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.7
A lbania 0.5 0.7 2.2
Source: W EO 1994, Table H  \ M ultiQ uery D atabase 1995; IM F d a ta
Table 8 shows the revenue from taxes on enterprise profits. In alm ost all 
countries a downward trend can be observed. Czechoslovakia constitutes an excep­
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tion (until 1992, an exceptionally high level of proceeds from the above-m entioned 
source were m aintained5), as do Albania and the post-Yugoslav countries, where 
this tax  was always of m inor im portance. A rapid fall in average enterprise prof­
itab ility  is the basic reason.6 Some reasons for th a t fall include:
—  withdraw al of direct and indirect subsidies (in the form of real interest 
ra te  credits) and elimination of the “duplication effect” related to them ,
—  increase in domestic and external com petition, and thus reduction of mo­
nopolistic profits: many enterprises are affected by deep financial crisis due to 
difficulties in selling current production,
—  weakening of sta te  enterprise m otivation to  gain profits due to  a tem po­
rary  system ic and ownership vacuum,
—  tendency to  hide profits both in the private and sta te  sectors in order 
to  diminish tax  obligations (in a part of the sta te  sector this may be additionally 
connected w ith pre-privatization tactics),
—  fall in the inflation rate  and elimination of so-called “paper profits” re­
sulting from  high inflation.
The last element seems to  have played a key role in all countries which have 
been trying to  overcome high or very high inflation. The large share of tax  proceeds 
in G D P in Poland in 1990, and then its rapid decrease (in spite of the fact th a t 
effective tax  rates remained unchanged) can serve as an example.
In m ost countries, a drop in relative proceeds from enterprise profit taxes 
was partially  com pensated by increases in personal income taxes (this includes 
taxes on profits derived from the economic activities of individuals). This effect 
was particularly  dram atic in Poland where, in 1992, with the introduction of the 
Personal Income Tax Act, a jum p in budgetary proceeds from this tax  was registered 
(from 2.4 percent of G D P in 1991 to  6.3 percent of G D P the next year).
In contrast to corporate income tax, the proceeds from turnover taxes, VAT 
and excise taxes either did not fall in relation to G D P (except for an initial period 
of price deregulation in several countries), or decreased on a sm aller scale (see 
Table 9). The C entral European countries th a t replaced the trad itional turnover 
tax  w ith VAT (Hungary in 1988, Slovenia and C roatia  in the 1990s, the  Czech and 
Slovak Republics a t the beginning of 1993, Poland in the second half of 1993) show 
a higher level of indirect tax  proceeds than those countries th a t did not introduce 
any reforms; in addition, proceeds began to grow im m ediately when the reforms 
were im plem ented. This proves the higher tax  efficiency of VAT in comparison with 
the trad itional turnover tax.
5 In 1993, b o th  th e  Czech and  Slovak Republics registered a  falling tendency, b u t th is  m ay 
p a rtly  be th e  result of a  drop  in enterprise incom e tax  ra tes  (Stepanek et al. 1995; Adamec  1995).
6In  a  few cases, a  reduction  in tax  ra tes and an increase in the  range of tax  exem ptions have 
p layed a  certa in  role. T he tax  exem ptions, however, have a bigger influence on d im inishing the  
effective tax  rates in those post-com m unist countries where financial discipline has been consid­
erably  weakened (e.g. U kraine or Russia), and  which are no t included in Table S.
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Table 9
Turnover tax, VAT and excise proceeds (in percent of GDP), 1989-1994
C ountry 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Bulgaria 11.2 9.0 7.4 6.1 7.6
Czecho-Slovakia 17.7 18.0 12.6 12.8
T he Czech Republic 11.5 12.0
Slovakia 13.4 13.8
Estonia 8.0 9.2
Hungary 16.1 13.8 13.9 13.6 14.3
L ithuania 11.3 7.2
Poland 8.8 6.3 7.4 9.0 10.6
R om ania 18.8 11.8 8.3 7.0 7.4
Mongolia 7.2 8.4 7.4 5.0
Slovenia 10.2 10.7 11.7 11.7
C roatia 7.8 11.6 13.5 17.5
A lbania 7.5 7.9 5.8
Source: W EO 1994, Table 14', M ultiQ ueiy D atabase 1995
T he introduction of VAT (NDS— nalog s dobavlennoi stoimosti)  in the coun­
tries of the former USSR (a t the beginning of 1992) resulted in a much worse 
fiscal perform ance. A part from the generally lower efficiency of ta x  adm inistration  
and the weaker financial discipline of the enterprises, the numerous constructional 
defects of the post-Soviet NDS seem to have played a substan tia l role.
So far, we have analyzed the share of various taxes in officially registered 
GDP. An additional dram atic aspect of the situation has consisted in the slump 
in G D P in all post-com m unist countries a t the discussed stage of the transition  
process. In reality, therefore, these countries were faced not only w ith substan tia l 
declines in the share of budgetary revenues in GDP, but also w ith an even greater 
decline in overall real revenues.
The proceeds from m ost sources are correlated with G D P value, while the 
same cannot be said for expenditures. Most of them are more or less fixed (for ex­
ample, paym ents to  government employees, public debt servicing or welfare spend­
ing), which is why their share in G D P—given a real fall in th is aggregate— can 
be expected to  grow. In practice, in the case of social contributions, m ost of the 
post-com m unist countries have not only been unable to  reduce their com m itm ents 
in this area, bu t they have also had to face new requirem ents and challenges, con­
nected mainly with the effects of unemployment. Of course, unem ploym ent had not 
existed officially in C entral and East European economies (w ith the exception of 
Yugoslavia). A rapid growth of the number of pension recipients was a  side-effect 
° f  the fall in employm ent and, in some countries, was also partly  due to  gradual, 
adverse dem ographic changes. The withdrawal of many general subsidies for goods
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and services, the fall in registered employment and real wages, and the term ina­
tion of the perform ance of social functions by sta te  enterprises for their employees 
have caused an increase in the dem and for social welfare paym ents. A dditional 
needs in this field have appeared in countries w ith ongoing arm ed and national­
istic conflicts. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of systemic solutions in the field of 
social policy inherited from the command system  an d /o r created hastily in the first 
stage of transform ation—often under the pressure of the first dem ocratic election 
cam paigns or misleading ideas as to the real financial capabilities of the s ta te— 
have been conducive to the expansion of welfare spending. T he biggest problem s 
have resulted from overly liberal legislation designed to  counteract unem ploym ent 
and from pensions legislation. In case of the la tter, the m ost significant sources of 
excessive expenditures are usually linked with:
—  overly low retirem ent age and numerous entitlem ents to  early retirem ent; 
in m ost post-com m unist countries retirees and pensioners can continue to work 
w ithout any significant restrictions (this is usually a “relict” of the era of labour 
deficits),
—  other branch and occupational privileges (the use of preferential coeffi­
cients in the calculation of entitlem ents, bonuses, etc.),
—  an overly short period of work used in calculating pension entitlem ents, 
which may lead to m anipulation in order to increase paym ents,
—  non-equivalent (highly subsidized) pension schemes in the agricultural 
sector,
—  liberal definitions of entitlem ents and liberal rules for granting disability 
pensions,
—  poorly constructed and calculated principles of valuation and re-valuation 
of paym ents.
Any attem pts to revise the operating principles of pension schemes (such as 
the elim ination of obviously inequitable privileges, inefficient regulations which are 
conducive to  abuses, and entitlem ents which exceed the financial capabilities of the 
sta te) are more than  likely to  encounter the political resistance of large group of 
pensioners and persons of pre-retirem ent age (Sachs 1995b), as well as the objection 
of constitu tional courts th a t consider the aforementioned steps as an infringem ent 
of the citizens’ rights (Poland and Hungary can serve as examples of the la tte r).
Table 10 indicates a rapid growth of the share of welfare spending in GD P 
in all East and C entral European countries (excluding Rom ania and the former 
Czechoslovakia).' The level of social expenditures is significantly lower in the
r T he sam e situ a tio n  exists in Slovenia, which is no t included in  Table 10 due to  th e  lack of 
a  com parable da tab ase. According to  Boris Pleskovic’s d a ta  (1995) th e  pension expenditu res 
am ounted  to  11 percent of G D P in 1991, 12.7 percent of G D P in 1992, 13 percent of G D P in 
1993, an d  13.7 percent of G D P in 1994. T he expenses of the  obligatory H ealth  insurance Fund 
accounted  for 5 percent, 7.2 percent, 7.5 percent and  7.3 percent of G D P in the  respective years.
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Table 10
Share of welfare spending in GDP (in percent), 1989-1993
C ountry 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
A lbania 7.1 8.6 12.0 10.8 12.7
B ulgaria 10.4 12.0 14.2 14.1 15.8
Czecho-Slovakia 13.6 13.6 16.1 16.4
T he Czech Republic 14.0 13.5
E ston ia 7.6 8.8
L ithuania 19.2 14.3
Slovakia 18.8 16.7
Hungary 14.4 14.9 18.1 18.9 18.2
Poland 11.2 10.6 17.3 19.9 20.4
R om ania 9.5 10.6 10.1 9.1 8.9
Russia 6.1 6.7
Source: W EO 1994;
countries of the former USSR, since most of them  experienced strong inflation­
ary depreciation of welfare paym ents. The la tte r was not allowed to happen in 
C entral Europe thanks to  the well-developed indexation systems. Moreover, the 
labour m arket situation  still exerts lower pressure on the pension scheme in the 
post-Soviet countries. Nevertheless, an upward tendency of welfare spending share 
(including pension benefits) in G D P was observed in those countries in 1994-1995.
Social programmes are not the only reason for secondary fiscal crisis on the 
expenditure side. In various countries there were also other reasons for increases in 
budgetary obligations. These were: internal and external debt servicing (Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Poland), so-called enterprise and bank restructuring (Hungary, Bulgaria), 
and sometimes various forms of subsidies (Bulgaria).
The problem  concerning the extent to which secondary fiscal crisis is in­
evitable and how it can be avoided was, and to  some degree still is, the subject 
of ongoing disputes. The supporters of gradual transform ation ( “the gradualists” ) 
initially blamed the excessive radicalism  of economic stabilization and liberalization 
program m es (referred to as “overshooting” ) for the secondary fiscal crisis ( Nuti and 
Portes 1993; Kolodko 1991). According to them, so-called “shock therapy” led to 
an excessive fall in ou tpu t and enterprise efficiency. These factors then led to a 
fall in budgetary revenues as well as excessive unem ploym ent and the concom itant 
costs of unem ploym ent insurance benefits.
In Polish discussions, an argum ent concerning the alleged discrim ination 
against the sta te  sector (see Kolodko 1992) has been pu t forward m any times, 
though the followers of this idea have never presented any convincing evidence. 
Another argum ent has been related to  the allegedly negative im pact of privatiza­
tion on economic activity and budgetary revenues ( Kowahk  1993).
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The la tte r issue has also been a subject of concern to radical reformers. In the 
beginning the sta te  sector seemed to show greater tax  discipline than  the private sec­
tor (particularly  the thousands of small individual and family firms) and privatized 
sector. Moreover, rapid privatization has been recognized as an unem ploym ent- 
increasing elem ent th a t leads to the growth of budgetary obligations. I t has thus 
inspired discussions on the optim um  pace of enterprise privatization and restruc­
tu ring  and transform ation as a whole (Roland 1994; Aghion and Blanchard  1993).
The supporters of radical transform ation have emphasized the negative in­
fluence on public finances of such factors as delays in implementing fiscal reforms, 
overexpansion of social programmes, the results of the external shock coming from 
the collapse of the CMEA, and the lack of tight wage control in sta te  enterprises 
(Dqbrowski 1992; Gomulka 1993; Crombrugghe 1993; Bratkowski 1993).
Now, from the perspective of the experiences of transition  which have been 
accum ulated so far, the above controversy does not look as dram atic as it did a few 
years ago:
F irst , the examples of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia reveal th a t 
fiscal crises can be avoided. It m ust be noted th a t the fiscal policy scenario was 
different in each of the aforementioned countries. Estonia, having a relatively low 
level of general government revenues (31-35 percent of G DP in 1992-1994) has 
been able to  impose iron discipline in the field of expenditures, particularly  in the 
area of welfare spending. In contrast, Slovenia’s high welfare spending indicator is 
closer to the H ungarian or Polish one than  to th a t of Estonia. However, Slovenia 
has not only been able to m aintain the earlier ratio  of general governm ent revenues 
to  GDP, bu t even to  increase it. To some extent, Slovenia has also benefited from 
the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, having been in the past an im portan t net 
donor to  o ther federal republics. All these reasons also apply in case of the Czech 
Republic (i.e. m aintenance of a relatively high level of tax  proceeds prim arily from 
enterprises, disciplined welfare spending in comparison with Poland, Hungary and 
even Slovenia, and term ination of earlier fiscal transfers to Slovakia).
Second , there is no correlation between the occurrence of the secondary fiscal 
crisis and the application of the radical transform ation variant. The countries hard ­
est hit by the crisis were Hungary, which in 1990-1992 was the standard  exam ple 
of the gradualist stra tegy  (this is reflected in the d a ta  in Table 5, which indicate 
the m oderate pace of subsidy elim ination), and Bulgaria, where frequently chang­
ing governm ents very quickly detoured from the radical change path  and began to 
“soften” budget constraints for enterprises. Among the countries th a t avoided the 
secondary fiscal crisis are two exceptionally radical reformers, namely E stonia and 
the Czech Republic.
Third, a heavy fall in officially registered G D P turned out to be unavoidable. 
Generally, however, it was smaller and shorter in the countries th a t adopted the 
m ost radical transform ation variant (de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 1995; D^browski
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1995; EBRD  1994; Balcerowicz and Gelb 1995; Aslund 1994). These were the first 
countries to return  to the path  of economic growth.
Fourth , any fears of the negative im pact of overly rapid privatization on public 
finances have not been confirmed. The greater tax  discipline of the sta te  sector has 
tu rned  ou t to be a transitory feature. S tate enterprises have quickly learn t from 
the private sector how to hide turnover and profits (or to transfer them  out of the 
enterprise) and avoid taxes. Such practices have occurred on the greatest scale in 
the countries where the privatization of medium and large enterprises has been slow 
and the sta te  sector has not been subject, from the very beginning, to  hard budget 
constraints (Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania).
Fifth, the experiences of some W estern countries (Sweden, Italy, Finland, 
France, and even the USA) show th a t the problem of social and pension benefits 
guaranteed by the sta te  is not exclusively typical for the countries undergoing the 
radical transition  from plan to market.
Stage of fiscal consolidation
In the case of radical reformers, there has been a phase of ou tpu t decline 
in the transform ation process. This lasted no longer than  two (Poland) or three 
years (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia) from 
the beginning of the fundam ental stabilization operation. Economic grow th, if 
it is based on sound principles (i.e. it is not chiefly the result of, for example, 
the development of branches subsidized from the sta te  budget), is connected w ith 
a proportional (or greater) increase in revenues and not necessarily w ith a fully 
proportional rise in expenditures (see the role of fixed expenses, discussed above);8 
thus, it should by itself help towards a fiscal recovery. In addition, long-term  
tax  reforms (in particular, introduction of VAT and consolidated tax  on personal 
incomes), improvement of the tax  adm inistration, and adjustm ent of budgetary  
expenditures (mainly related to social programmes) have delivered some positive 
results.
M ovement from the th ird  stage (secondary fiscal crisis) to  the fourth stage 
(fiscal consolidation) is best exemplified by the Polish case, in which the budget 
deficit has been falling since the second half of 1993. The effects of economic 
growth (since 1992) and the aforementioned tax reforms have contributed to  an
8In practice it is no t always possible to hold expenditures down during a  period of econom ic 
growth and increased budgetary  revenues. Two political elem ents play a significant role. These 
a re: the  willingness of different groups, being the beneficiaries of the  budget, to p a rtic ip a te  in 
the resu lts of economic growth; furtherm ore, government difficulty in  opposing different pressure 
groups and  carrying ou t unpopular reforms which lim it budgetary  com m itm ents. T he fiscal crisis 
usually serves as the  best a rgum ent for breaking the  resistance of in te rest groups when a good 
situation  in the  field of revenues softens the  power of th is argum ent.
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improvement of the budget situation. To a lesser degree, this improvement is also 
due to cuts in welfare spending and the real salaries of government employees. 
These reductions were made in the second half of 1991 and in 1992 and 1993, but 
they were of a partly  tem porary and mechanical character and have not been linked 
with deeper systemic reforms in this field. Moreover, under the left-wing coalition 
(which has been governing since autum n 1993) they were partially reversed. The 
significant reduction of the budget deficit is mainly the result of an increase in the 
share of general government revenues in G DP as well as the fast growth of GDP.
Sym ptom s of the gradual improvement of the budget situation  can be ob­
served in other countries which are advanced in the transform ation process, such 
as Slovenia, C roatia, Estonia and the Czech and Slovak Republics. Some of them  
(as m entioned in the previous section) have been able to  avoid the secondary fiscal 
crisis. Slovenia, like Poland, benefits mainly from the effects of economic growth 
and tax  reforms. Estonia and the Czech Republic, in addition to strengthening 
their income base, have managed to initiate more am bitious, long-term  oriented 
reforms of, respectively, the pension scheme, social policy and social services. In 
Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic there have only been debates on these 
issues.
The prospects for relative fiscal stability in the group of countries th a t are 
already a t the fourth stage will depend almost entirely on the intensity of the 
reforms of pension schemes, other segments of social policy, and basic areas of social 
services (e.g. health service and education). The fiscal situation of the countries 
th a t do not conduct these reforms quickly enough will mainly depend on their 
ability to m aintain the h itherto  existing pace of growth. An economic slum p may 
easily lead to  another serious fiscal crisis.
Summary and conclusions
As the analysis presented here shows, fiscal policy has turned out to  be one of 
the m ost difficult components of transition  policy, reflecting the problem s th a t arise 
in other areas of systemic change. W hen countries have not been able to  realize a 
consistent policy of economic liberalization, elim inate open and hidden subsidies, 
introduce hard budget constraints for sta te  enterprises, inhibit in terventionist incli­
nations, carry out tax  reforms and improve the efficiency of tax  adm inistration  and 
the entire fiscal apparatus, and launch reforms of social services, etc., they have 
fallen into a fiscal crisis. This crisis usually leads to  high inflation, and in some 
extrem e cases to  hyperinflation. The same correlation exists in politics: countries 
th a t are politically unstable and have weak, inefficiently operating  or sim ply un­
derdeveloped s ta te  structures (as in the case of newly independent s ta tes), or are 
engaged in arm ed conflicts, experience the greatest financial difficulties.
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In general, the fiscal situation  changes rapidly as the transform ation process 
unfolds. A typical scenario of events starts  with a fiscal crisis (a t the beginning 
of transition) connected with the decomposition of the previously existing political 
and economic system . Radical stabilization and liberalization associated w ith the 
removal of subsidies should provide a  way out from the aforem entioned crisis. This 
stage of fiscal adjustm ent, though difficult from a political point of view,9 is quite 
simple from  a conceptual and technical point of view and may bring relatively fast 
results. It is not, however, the end of the complicated process of essential fiscal ad­
justm en ts. In itial stabilization success is usually not sustainable and it is followed 
by a secondary fiscal crisis, rooted in the transform ational ou tpu t decline, ineffi­
ciency of the tax  system, excessive social obligations of the sta te , and is sometimes 
due to  a lack of consistency in conducting a tough policy. It is much more difficult 
to  respond to  the secondary crisis than  to  the prim ary one. W hat is badly needed 
a t the secondary stage is a comprehensive reform of the tax system and social pol­
icy. W ith  regard to  the technical and conceptual aspects, these ventures are more 
difficult th an  the simple removal of subsidies, and are usually carried out in a more 
difficult political situation  than the first package of reforms. Post-transform ation 
growth helps to alleviate the secondary crisis.
This sequence of events is not universal for post-com m unist economies. A 
few of them  have m anaged to  avoid the prim ary fiscal crisis, a t least in its m ost 
extrem e form, and a  few have m anaged to  avoid the secondary crisis. This was 
the case in the countries th a t undertook adjustm ent activities early or found them ­
selves in an exceptionally favourable initial situation. Yet there is a much larger 
group of countries in which the second stage (of macroeconomic stabilization  and 
liberalization) took a num ber of years to complete or was not completed a t all, and 
for which no final result can yet be foreseen.
In spite of the views expressed by some economists and politicians several 
years ago, a more gradual pace of reform did not lower the social costs of tran ­
sition or prevent the secondary fiscal crisis; on the contrary, the populations of 
the countries conducting slow reforms were forced to pay an enormous inflation 
tax  for the benefit of ineffective sectors of the economy, and they also experienced 
(and are still experiencing) a much deeper and longer-lasting drop in GDP, stronger 
differentiation of incomes and wealth, and a number of pathologies including “crim­
inalization” of economic life. The typical sym ptom s of the secondary fiscal crisis 
have overlapped w ith the prim ary fiscal crisis very quickly. The scale of necessary 
ad justm ent activities is much greater and more painful, and prospects for economic
’ 1 .es/.ek Balcerowicz em phasises the  fact th a t, thanks to the  unique political a tm osphere a fte r 
a com m unist regim e’s collapse, trad itiona l political barriers are substan tia lly  softened for a  certain  
period of tim e. T his period  provides reform ers with the  possibility to conduct a  set of difficult and 
unpopu lar reforms. Balcerowicz calls this unique political occasion “th e  period of ex trao rd inary  
politics” , which a fte r  a  certain  period (1-2  years) is replaced by “norm al politics” (w ith  the  
increasing influence of different lobbying groups).
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recovery are less bright than  in the countries th a t have decided on a package of 
radical reforms from the very beginning.
The transform ation process has not been completed yet. This is true of fiscal 
policy as well. Even the countries whose budgets are not in deficit and whose public 
debt and inflation are low (i.e., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia or C roatia) 
have to  face the problems of incomplete institu tional reforms in the field of social 
policy and restructuring of the government sector and ineffective sectors of industry. 
In o ther countries—even those recording a rapid pace of economic grow th, such as 
Poland and A lbania—the list of challenges is longer.
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POST-COMMUNIST PRIVATIZATION: FLAWS IN THE 
TREUHAND MODEL
M. KASER
T he p ap er describes the  “T reuhand m odel” a n d  the lessons th a t  m ay be draw n in  the  
W est E uropean  context and  considers the aspects in which the  m odel differed from  o th er p riv a ti­
zations already undertaken  in  o ther transition  economies. It concludes th a t  th e  E as te rn  L änder 
“d e industria lization” th a t resulted  from  the application  of the  T reuhand  m odel could have been 
less severe under a lte rna tive  possible policies, an d  th a t th e  rea tta in m en t of p re -tran sitio n  G D P 
likely in 1996 has been heavily dependent on resource inflows from  th e  W estern L änder, which 
will have to persist to avoid retrogression. Equivalent external su p p o rt cannot be expected  for 
o th er transitions.
On 30 December 1994 Birgit Breuel wrote to her staff in the T reuhandanstalt 
th a t w ithin its specified life-span of four and a half years the crucial m andate 
had been achieved.1 The aim was concisely expressed in the Treuhandgesetz, the 
Trusteeship Act, passed by the first freely-elected Parliament of the G D R  on 17 
June 1990, seven m onths after the breaching of the Berlin Wall:
The Treuhand is an independent government agency established for the priva­
tization  and use of state-owned assets based on the principles of the social m arket 
economy. The Treuhand promotes the structural adjustm ent of the economy to 
meet m arket requirem ents by developing potentially viable firms into com petitive 
enterprises and then transferring them  into private ownership.
The im plem enting state-enterprise closures and the restructuring of the re­
m ainder was to  a degree justifying the term  “deindustrializtion’ 2 and it may be 
contended th a t they brought levels of unemployment in excess of w hat was needed 
to  facilitate greater competitiveness in labour cost. Such costs had already been 
heightened by currency unification a t par with the D-Mark and by the extension 
of Federal trade-union authority  to the Eastern Länder. The attractiveness of 
higher wages to enterprise “insiders” (who in industry and mining greatly  ou tnum ­
ber “outsiders” , those made redundant by the operation of the T reuhand) could 
have been m oderated by the application of profit-sharing or equity-participation 
schemes. Federal unionization and the imposed forms of corporate governance by
1 T his paper is an  ad ap ta tio n  of a  lecture (on 31 January  1995) in itiating  the  O pen Sem inar 
series of the  In s titu te  for G erm an Studies, University of B irm ingham . T he assistance of Johannes 
Stephan  is appreciatively acknowledged in compiling G D P and unem ploym ent d a ta . A fter the  
com pletion of th a t  revision M O C T - M O S T : (1995) devoted an issue to  “G erm an unification  and  
its afte rm ath : integration  outcom es” . See also Furstenburg (1995, pp . 269-98); an d  Sinn  (1995, 
PP. 403-426).
2For pe rh ap s the  first powerful argum ent on such consequences, see Carlin (1994, pp . 127-153).
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contrast fostered a m anagem ent-labour relationship which prioritized wage rem u­
neration over corporate saving and hence enhanced neither in ternational com peti­
tiveness nor the rate  of investm ent needed to draw the East from a “Mezzogiorno” 
lag behind the W estern Länder. The weight accorded commercial banks (despite 
the encouragem ent of "development banking” ) in decision-making may have con­
strained both domestic funding and access to international financial m arkets. Even 
if m arket prospects were clouded by general recession and the breakdown of the 
E a s t’s former m arkets in Comecon and the USSR, enterprise sales prices may have 
been pitched too low, and the consequential Federal indebtedness left too high. To 
th a t debt is added a continuing flow of resources from the W estern to  the Eastern  
Länder: the m agnitude of such external support differentiates them  from  its G D R 
predecessor as the pre-transition outpu t volume (though not the struc tu re) is being 
regained.
The operation of the Treuhand 1990-94
T he responsibility undertaken by the Treuhand towards its enterprises was 
more extensive th an  th a t of any single sta te  agency in the other transition  economies. 
I t had first to  guarantee bank credit for working capital to m aintain an enterprise in 
operation  or until definitive closure: the new Länder did not therefore experience, 
as elsewhere, the accum ulation of inter-enterprise debt and of tax  arrears ensuing 
from the initial post-com m unist recession in economic activity. Secondly, it was 
required to assure new owners with unencumbered title, thus protecting them  from 
form er owners or from claims for environm ental damage. Finally, it had to  assume 
th a t p a rt of the cost of shedding labour which Federal Germ an law enjoined. (Lip- 
schiiz and McDonald  1990, pp. 7-9; Tanzt 1992, pp. 69; 73-74) It took over four 
types of sta te  property—around 30,000 small retail and catering outlets, hotels and 
warehouses, more than  8,000 m anufacturing and m ining establishm ents, one-third 
of all agricultural land and two-thirds of all forests. I t also received the property  of 
P arty  and Party-sponsored mass organizations, public utilities and surplus m ilitary 
and security service assets. To elim inate a possible contention th a t it was selling the 
"property  of the people” (Volksvermögen), those enterprises and properties were 
converted into joint-stock companies of which the Treuhand held all the equity.
( Vehse 1994, p. 64)
It created specialized branches for the retail group, for real esta te  and for agri­
cultural land and forests: most such assets were quickly disposed of, bu t agricultural 
land will need another decade for resolution, partly  because of the complexity of 
restitu tion claims and the confinement of transfer of tenure to  a maxim um  of 12- 
year leases. An im portan t clarification was made by a judgem ent of the Federal 
A dm inistrative C ourt in February 1995, s ta ting  th a t industrial and landed property
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which had passed into s ta te  hands very shortly after the establishm ent of the G D R 
on 7 October 1949 (valued at some DM 40 bn in the cases reviewed) had neverthe­
less effectively been ordered by the Soviet occupation authorities. (Dempsey  1995) 
To indicate the Federal G overnm ent’s recognition of the legitimacy of the Soviet 
occupation, restitu tion  under the 1990 German Unification Treaty was confined to 
owners expropriated by the Nazi government, 1933-45, and by the GD R, 1949-90.
This paper concentrates on the second group, which employed alm ost 4 mil­
lion at the takeover. W hen examined by the Treuhand nearly 90 percent, or 7,600 
s ta te  enterprises, were insolvent (akut Zahlungsunfähigkeit). They were, moreover, 
mostly w ithin huge Kom binaten—an outcome of the reversal of economic reform 
in the 1960s: 9 out of ten employees worked in ju st 270 Kombinaten. The first task 
was to unbundle some into saleable units and to merge others, as a result of which 
the T reuhand initial manifest of 13,815 became 12,354 enterprises. By the end of 
its m andate in December 1994 only 65 firms were still to  be privatized— ownership 
had been transferred in 8,444 and 3,718 had been liquidated (the balance of 127 
were in transitional sta tus). T h a t liquidation, or the restructuring of those to be 
privatized, brought 3 million redundancies in an initial workforce (including small 
business) of 4.5 million— and th a t in a to ta l Eastern Länder employment of 8 mil­
lion. The m otto  caustically a ttribu ted  to it was “sell or slaughter” . Political protest 
was muffled by the social safety net federally funded a t W estern Land levels: as 
it was, in a survey of July 1994 conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 
27 percent of Eastern G erm an respondents believed th a t the “re-establishm ent of 
socialism would be better for G erm any’s future than the existing free-enterprise 
system  in the Federal Republic” (11 percent in the Western Länder), and a m a­
jority  (54 percent) considered th a t “socialism makes sense in principle and is also 
feasible” (20 percent in the West). ( Veen and Zelle 1995, p. 55)
W ithin its own terms, the Treuhand was super-efficient. It operated in a 
devolved m anner, transacting 80 percent of its business through 15 regional offices 
and employing a t a peak only 4,800 staff at end-1993. It should be regarded less as a 
seller of physical assets (it called itself an interm ediate owner, Zwischeneigentümer) 
than as a buyer of invisibles— management expertise, technology, access to  m arkets 
and above all purchaser obligations. These obligations were of three kinds. Two 
were embodied in 18,000 contracts, whereby buyers have undertaken to  invest DM 
207 bn and to  m aintain 1.45 mn jobs for a specified period. Foreigners undertook 
such contracts in about the same proportion as their purchases in to ta l sales, 10 
percent (DM 21 bn capital and 152,000 jobs); overall less than one in 10 contracts 
are being renegotiated. The third purchaser obligation is environm ental restoration 
and the T reuhand has paid DM 100 bn to  cover such liabilities and indebtedness. 
All but two of the enterprises remaining unsold (63 firms employing some 200,000 
staff) have been reconstituted into four management corporations (K om m anditge­
sellschaften), and will be dealt with at a slower pace (1995-2000), bu t a t about the 
same cost— the DM 45 bn earm arked is DM 225,000 per job  in the unlikely event
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of all jobs being saved, against roughly DM 180,000 per job  m aintained hitherto . 
T h a t of course was the average, for the cost of saving the shipyards was DM 800,000 
per job  and in the deal for EkoStahl in the former S talinstad t, DM 680,000.
In money term s, the cost was great. There was a promise in the Unifica­
tion T reaty th a t proceeds from the sale would be “exclusively and only” used for 
the benefit of the new Länder—stronger words than had figured in the earlier 
S ta te  Treaty, “with priority”— and th a t citizens would receive personal dividends 
in proportion to their then savings balance in GD R Marks. (Schreiil  1992, p. 147) 
T heodor Waigel, Finance M inister at the tim e and a signatory of the S tate  Treaty, 
spoke of proceeds of “several hundred billion DM” , and the first Treuhand chief, 
Detlev Rohwedder, spoke of DM 600 bn receipts. This order of m agnitude was a 
gross value of G D R  sta te  enterprises of 924 bn GD R Marks, or 620 bn G D R M arks 
after deducting the value of those to be retained by a government (m ostly local) 
authority. In the event, revenue from sales was only DM 73 bn and the Federal 
Unwelcome Legacy Repaym ent Fund is shouldering a debt of DM 270 bn; by the 
end of 1995 DM 644 bn was the aggregate of all W est-East transfers.
Economic effects in Germany and the EU
The policy embodied in “sell or slaughter” was in view from the sta rt. 
Rohwedder wrote: “Privatization is the most effective rescue operation ...the  closure 
of enterprises should form the core of new activ ity” .3 But, as already observed, it 
was carried to  the stage of “deindustrialization” : the workforce in industry dropped 
from 3.2 mn in the G D R to 0.6 mn in the Eastern Länder in 1994. It correspond­
ingly brought mass unem ploym ent—higher than in m ost transitional economies. In 
January  1996 it was 14 percent of the labour force, against 8 percent in the W est­
ern Länder. For the country as a whole, those figures marked a passage of the “4 
million barrier” : 4,158,000 or over 9 percent unem ploym ent.4 Aggregate ou tp u t fell 
a t its nadir (1991) by one-third, (Hoffmann  1994, p. 664) and though now on the 
upswing—growth in both 1994 and 1995 was 9 percent, against a W estern G erm an 
2.3 percent— there may be no increment in jobs. A survey of the G erm an Federa­
tion of Cham bers of Industry and Trade of 25,000 companies showed for 1996 th a t 
27 percent of Eastern Land firms were planning to reduce em ploym ent, while ju s t 
10 percent forecast new hirings; the W estern Land firms were gloomier— 38 percent
3 “P rivatsierung ist die w irksam ste Sanierung...Stillegungen sollen zum  K rista llisa tionskern  
n eu er A k tiv itä ten  werden” , c ited  (from  Treuhandansta lt ,  E n tsch lo ssen  s a n ie r e n , A pril 1992) by 
C laus K ö h ler  (1996).
4 I n fo r m a t io n s d ie n s t  des In s t i tu t s  der deu tschen  W ir tsc ha ft  ( I W D ) ,  no. 7, 1996: th e  com­
m entary  poin ts ou t th a t  the  h ard  w inter brought heavy unem ploym ent in build ing—b u t th a t  
unem ploym ent in those trades was 70 percent in th e  E ast and  only 30 percent in the  W est.
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shedding staff, with only 7 percent augmenting employment. (Norman  1996) The 
Eastern part in 1995 regained the 11 percent of all-German G D P th a t it had in the 
heyday of the GDR, against the 28 percent it generated before the Second World 
War, and the nadir of 7 percent in the second half of 1990.5 But whereas the 
G D R  was highly self-sufficient, the regained level is heavily dependent on im ports. 
Im ports used only to  be less than one-fifth of G DP in the la te  com m unist period, 
but today the Eastern Länder produce only 60 percent of w hat they consume and 
invest; exports are some one-third of West GDP, but they are only one-fifth of th a t 
in the East. The 1995 net W est-East German transfer of resources was some 40 
percent of the E ast’s G DP.6 The net inflow of resources is so large partly  because 
of the E ast’s poor export performance: a mere DM 30 bn of goods and services 
to  W estern Lander in 1994 and a share in external exports only one-tenth of its 
share in the G erm an population. Quite apart from the cost of restructuring  the 
economy for privatization and the budget deficit caused by governm ent social and 
other spending in the East, the Eastern Länder are not paying their way.
To some extent the causes are to be found in changing dem and, bu t they 
are more a ttribu tab le  to  changes in supply. On the dem and side, the planned 
economy, which was rightly term ed a “shortage economy” , absorbed w hatever was 
produced: as in all Soviet-type economies, production, not consum ption, was the 
goal. Production cuts and factory closures of goods th a t simply were not wanted, or 
of poor quality or performance, were rational once th a t plan obligation ceased. East 
Germ any lost most of its export markets in Comecon, first as East Europe dispensed 
with communism and Comecon alike, and then as the Soviet Union broke up. All 
those former markets went into recession, but by 1995 their aggregate production 
was slowly recovering again in East Europe (where there had been positive growth 
since 1993), although in the CIS it was still declining (by 4 percent in 1995). 
M ilitary dem and collapsed— not so much from the departure of Soviet occupation 
forces, who were highly self-sufficient, but as Warsaw Pact orders disappeared. 
Russian defence industry in 1994 produced only one fifth of w hat it had done 
w ithin the USSR in 1991—night-vision opticals from Jena  and Kalashnikovs from 
Suhl were no longer ordered. Russia is now exporting defence goods ($2.5 bn), not. 
im porting as it once did from Warsaw Pact allies. On the dem and side also, East 
Land households simply stopped buying East Land consumer m anufactures: with 
DM in their hands, they spent in the first couple of years alm ost nothing on East 
Land m anufactures where a Western product was available.
'Tn 1995 “In landsprodukt" in E astern  Germ any was DM 378 bn and W estern was DM 3081 bn.
I He full year d a ta  were obtained direct from the A uskunftsdienst des sta tistischen B undesam tes; 
half-year d a ta  for 1995 and  d a ta  for years back to  second half 1990 are in D eutsche B undesbank, 
Monaisbericht.  E stim ates for 1936 and 1980 were compiled by Michael K aser (1987, pp. 123-124 
and 138-139) from  sources there sta ted .
6 The Economist,  30 Septem ber 1995, p . 21.
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T he crucial problem was, and remains, on the supply side. W hereas every 
o ther transition  economy allowed its currency to devalue as it m arketized, the 
Eastern Lander revalued. Thus the Russian rouble fell to  one quarter of its real 
value against the US dollar in the first four m onths after price liberalization, but 
the un it of East Germany went in precisely the opposite direction: it was a t a 
stroke quadrupled in value against the DM.
The one-for-one currency exchange was disastrous in the longer term , al­
though it was welcomed by G D R citizens, for it protected their savings (above a 
certain limit at a 2:1 rate); gave political support in the subsequent elections to 
the government party; and inhibited East-W est m igration. A possible alternative 
would have been converting wages paid a t a different ra te  of exchange from wages 
received—for example the employer would convert wages at DM 0.50 per G D R 
Mark (not far off the productivity differential) but a 100 percent wage subsidy 
would yield the employee a rate of 1:1; the subsidy could have been annually di­
minished (intendedly in line with productivity gains). Such a wage subsidy might 
have been in aggregate smaller than  th a t of unemployment benefit, and would 
have afforded weak enterprises a substantial breathing space for restructuring  with 
be tte r sales prospects. ( Hatndcke-Hoppe-Arndt et al. 1992, p. 182) The em bed­
ding by the 1:1 rate of Eastern German economic inferiority was not for lack of 
w arning— Eastern productivity was something like one-third of W estern and the 
purchasing power parity  of the Mark was a quarter of a DM. In a united  G er­
many the trade unions of the W estern Länder soon offset w hat gains the T reuhand 
m ade by shaking out overemployment and uncom petitive plants: they extended 
their wage negotiations to  the Eastern Länder, so th a t money wages rose irrespec­
tive of com parative productivity. One argum ent they deployed was th a t raising 
the Eastern wage would inhibit a feared m ajor influx of Easterners into the West­
ern labour m arket which would in turn trigger a Western wage decline. ( Bös 1993, 
p. 204) Again, there was a short-term  benefit— Eastern workers still in em ploym ent 
received substantial pay rises— but long-run disadvantage. In the  East G D P per 
gainfully-occupied person (a measure of labour productivity) was in 1991 a mere 
31.0 percent of th a t in the W estern Länder, while labour costs per employee (re­
flecting the average wage) was 46.7 percent of th a t in the W estern. A rithm etically, 
the dividend of the la tte r by the former showed wage costs per un it of p roduct as 
1.5 those of the W estern Länder (1.506 on those data). The gap has been dim in­
ishing: on these measures productivity in the East was 50.7 percent of the West in 
1993, 53.0 percent in 1994 and—following the greater investm ent in the E ast per 
employee— in 1995 54.4 percent; wages were 67.5 percent of the West in 1993, 70.4 
percent in 1994 and 72.5 percent in 1995. (IW D  1996, No. 6) If, however, the longer 
w ork-hours, shorter holidays and fewer fringe benefits of the Eastern enterprise are 
taken into account, the gap is narrower. Volkswagen calculates th a t the  wage cost
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in its Eastern works is now 40 percent of th a t in its W estern works, ra ther than  
the 70 percent implied above as a regionwide average.
Table 1
Average wage and social charges per hour worked in 199J,
DM at prevailing exchange rates
C ountry W age per hour 
( i )
Social charge per hour 
(2)
Colum n (2 )/(1 ) 
(3)
G erm any: West 24.21 19.76 81
G erm any: E ast 15.48 11.05 71
H ungary 2.35 2.28 97
Poland 2.06 1.71 83
Czech Republic 2.02 1.35 67
Slovakia 1.70 1.20 71
R ussia 0.85 0.59 69
R om ania 0.88 0.53 60
B ulgaria 0.76 0.57 75
Source: O ECD , Deutsche B undesbank and  In stitu t der deutschen W irtschaft, I n fo r m a t io n s d ie n s t  
des In s t i t u t s  der deu tschen  W irtscha ft  ( I W D ) ,  no. 6, 1996.
The com bination of lower productivity per employed person in the E ast­
ern Länder and a diminishing wage discount with respect to the W estern Lander 
is aggravated in in ternational competitive term s by the strength  of the D-Mark. 
Allowing for the longer hours worked, the Eastern Lander’s wage costs are much 
higher than  those of other transition  economies (as 1994 estim ates in Table 1 show) 
at prevailing exchange rates. R estructuring and exchange-rate depreciation has en­
abled the o ther European transition economies to achieve highly com petitive un it 
labour costs with respect to  W estern Europe. Working to  an A ustrian com para­
tor on purchasing power parities (P P P ), the Wiener In stitu t für Internationale 
W irtschaftsvergleiche dem onstrates unit labour costs (A ustria =  100) in 1995 as 
12 in Ukraine, 15 in Bulgaria, 23 in Slovakia, 26 in Rom ania, 29 in the Czech 
Republic, 33 in Russia, 34 in Hungary, 36 in Poland and 59 in Slovenia. (Pod- 
kaminer ei al. 1996, pp. 35-39) Showing a P P P  estim ate for 1993 of G D P per 
capita  ($17,000) very close to  the G erm an average ($16,500), A ustria may be taken 
as a surrogate for Germany. Table 2, giving East Germany $6,300 per cap ita  G DP 
against $19,400 for West Germany, might not imply so wide a gap as in Table 1 , 
and a further modification is the lower proportion levied of social charges in E ast­
ern than  in W estern Germany. Even so, as Table 1 also shows, the Eastern Länder 
ratio of supplem entary social charges per person is 71 percent of the money wage, 
against 81 percent in West Germany, and lower th a t in some of its East European 
com petitors.
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Table 2
Indicators of aggregate economic activity in 1995 
Index numbers, United States dollars and percentages
C ountry G D P (1989=100) 
in 1995 
0 )
GN P per c ap ita  ($) 
in 1993 
(2)
Percent unem ployed 
in mid-1995
(3)
Germ any: W est 118 19,400 8.9
Germ any: E as t 91 6,300 14.3
H ungary 86 6,050 10.6
Poland 97 5,000 15.1
Czech Republic 85 7,550 2.8
Slovakia 84 6,290 13.3
R ussia 49 5,050 7.7
R om ania 81 2,800 9.9
B ulgaria 75 4,100 10.7
Source: Germ any: Col (1) from 1991-1994 d a ta  (B ru tto in landsp roduk t a t  1991 prices) in S ta tis- 
tische B undesam t, Daten Report 1994 • P- 250, extended back to  1989 for the  W est an d  forward 
to 1995 for bo th  from Wirtschaft und Statist ik,  passim , and  back to  1989 for the  E ast from  DIW  
estim a tes in Lutz Hoffm ann, in Jo in t Economic C om m ittee of Congress, East-C'entral European 
Economies in Transition,  US Governm ent P rin ting  Office, W ashington DC, 1994, pp . 65-6; Col. 
(2) 1983 estim ates a t  purchasing power parity  for E ast and  W est G erm any from  World Fact Book  
1994 , CIA, W ashington DC; Col. (3) from  IW D ,  no. 7, 1996 and  Wirtschaft und Statistik.  O th e r 
transition  countries: col. (1) from  EBRD Transition Report 1995 , p. 15 an d  col. (2) from  ibid., 
p. 21; col. (3) from  E C E Economic Bulletin fo r  Europe , vol. 47 (1995), Table 2.2.5.
Note: C ountry  o rder is the  sam e as in Table 1 for ease of com parison.
A further disadvantage to Eastern Land firms of the tie to  W est Land wage 
rates was the rescaling of skill differentials. As Kohler notes, the s truc tu re  of wages 
had been ideologically skewed in favour of physical work, and the first stage of collec­
tive wage bargaining with W estern union participation demoted th a t work in favour 
of the  white-collar and intellectual groups which rank high in the West. (Kohler 
1996) R ational as this would have been on a level playing field, the Mezzogiorno re­
lationship described below suggests th a t knowledge-based industrial processes and 
services in the East would have benefited from the pre-Unification rem uneration 
ratio . As is noted below, such industries have tended to  be discounted in finding 
expansion finance and their potential com petitive edge in “high-tech” salaries has 
been blunted. M aintenance of the skill differential would have added to the a ttrac ­
tion of commuters living in an Eastern, but working in a W estern, Land and to 
more perm anent m igration, each lightening unem ploym ent in the East.
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The East-West economic dichotomy
Such relationships and the currency tie which precludes com petitive deval­
uation  have endowed Germany with a “Mezzogiorno problem ” . The reference is 
to  the  50 years since the end of the W ar during which Southern Italy  has lagged 
behind the North, despite heavy subsidies from the North to the South. A recent 
political consequence was the rise of the Liga Nord, which, claiming th a t N orthern 
Italy should cease to subsidise a perm anently poorer South, urged the political 
and economic separation of the halves. A recent econometric study of G erm any 
suggests th a t the East could converge with the W estern economy only on a time- 
scale as long as 30 to 40 years and th a t in the interim  slow productiv ity  catch-up 
will require heavy continuing fiscal transfers. O ther estim ates have, however, pu t 
convergence a t ten or at most twenty years.7
It is almost too obvious to point out th a t Germany and the European Union 
have been emerging from recession more slowly due to  the Germ an costs of unifi­
cation. Federal government transfers since Unification ran at DM 152 bn in 1993, 
DM 155 bn in 1994 and DM 195 bn in 1995. They resulted in both  a serious budget 
deficit (as percentage of G DP 6.2 in 1993, but down to 3.3 in 1995); a “Solidarity” 
supplem ent on income tax; and a diversion of 45 percent of G D P in to  taxes and 
social security imposts. The familiar consequence has been to  keep interest rates 
high in G erm any and throughout the European Union; public sector borrowing and 
taxation  have crowded out private investm ent. The G erm an fiscal deficit will per­
sist under continuing W est-to-East transfers, debt service and the loss of revenue 
from the extension to 1998 of the 50 percent tax  write-off for investm ent in the 
East. The tax  burden was increased in 1995 by the réintroduction of the Solidarity 
Tax. In a broader context, the Mezzogiorno problem poses the obstacles to m on­
etary union before adequate convergence has been achieved among the unifying 
economies. The M aastricht Treaty was of course correct in specifying m onetary 
indicators for convergence before European M onetary Union, targeted for January  
1999, bu t the G erm an unification experience lends weight to the argum ents for 
adding real indicators (some of which are implicit in the M aastricht aims of co­
hesion), and for postponing the deadline until both sets of indicators m atch the 
desiderata.
Im m ediate factor mobility applied not only to capital but to labour. The 
Federal Government withdrew the privileges granted to  G D R  em igrants (such as 
guaranteed accom m odation on arrival and cash allowances for resettlem ent), but 
m igration in search of employment continued. One flow is of com m uters— residents 
of the E ast w ith a workplace in the West— and another, now dim inishing in the  light 
° f  high W estern unemployment, is for perm anent settlem ent. In macroeconomic
' “T h irty  to 40 years” is from  Hallet and Yue Ma (1994, pp. 1731-61) “20 years” is from  Sinn  
a 'id Sinn  (1991) “10 years" is from M aytr  (1992)
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term s, such labour flows are part of the solution of the Mezzogiorno dichotomy, re­
ducing overstaffing in the low productivity zone by employment where productiv ity  
is higher (by virtue of inherited capital endowment and organizational efficiency).
In the much shorter term  there was a beneficial if transient consequence to 
the fiscal transfers in the West G erm an partia l recovery in 1994: neither personal 
consum ption nor net exports contributed to it, bu t construction in, and W estern 
exports to , the East were (with stockpiling) the significant factors. An Eastern  
investm ent m ultiplier may have persisted in 1995: an IW  forecast for th a t year put 
construction per capita a t DM 9,800 in the East against DM 5,500 in the West, 
raising its share in the national aggregate from 12.9 percent in 1994 to  24.3 per­
cent. (IW D 1995, No. 4) The m aintenance of higher capital form ation in the new 
Lander— to which execution of the Treuhand investm ent guarantees contributes— 
would accelerate the closure of the Mezzogiorno-type gap. G D P grow th is also likely 
to  rem ain higher as its composition in the east shifts towards services, neglected 
in the G D R  period and with lower capital-to-output ratios than  in the expansion 
of physical production. Deutsche Telekom’s reequipm ent of the Eastern telecom­
m unications network may have a high such ratio, bu t its empowerment of Eastern  
subscribers with a com petitive edge is undoubted. The level of in frastructure in 
the East is estim ated a t reaching equality with th a t in the West by about the year 
2000.
Comparison with other economic transitions
C apital and current inflows from outside have been massive since Unification: 
no other transition  economy could have had the resources th a t the W est furnished 
the East in Germany. A t the other extreme, the Soviet-type Asian economies of 
M ongolia and the C entral Asian successor states had large inflows abruptly  cut off 
when they began their revolutionary change. (Pomfrei 1996, pp. 81 (Mongolia) 
and 96-97 (C entral Asia); Kaser 1996) Nor could any transition  s ta te  other than 
East Germ any have had access to  a pool of entrepreneurship and corporate capital 
which could be draw n on w ithout a barrier of language and cultural comprehension: 
only C hina, a ttrac ting  overseas Chinese, was able to marketize with such an influx. 
In G erm any some of this cultural benefit has been offset by m utual psychological 
disapprobation: “Wessies” see themselves as paying heavily for Eastern economic 
ad justm en t and “Ossies” deprecate the s tra ta  of m anagers and officials who have 
taken the place of locals. Clashes— arising inter alia from a “know-all” a ttitu d e  
on the p art of those disparaged by “Ossies” as “Besserwessi”— led the T reuhand to 
appoint m ediators (Vertrauensbevollmächtige) to  iron out trouble. (K öhler 1996) 
More generally, such a takeover of m anagem ent positions precluded some of the 
transfers into the private sector of potential entrepreneurs who, under central plan-
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ning, had staffed adm inistrative organs and who, in other transition  economies, 
were both a plus (by reason of training and talent) and a minus (where the nomen­
klatura captured privatizations).
R estitu tion  to former owners was a means of “reprivatizing” in Germany, as 
it was also in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic States; bu t it was precluded 
in the CIS, partly  because of the remoteness in tim e of the  original expropriations 
and the absence of any political lobby of previous proprietors.
Unlike any other transition  economy, the Germ an Government was under lit­
tle pressure to  implement a targetted  anti-monopoly policy when it abandoned the 
adm inistrative economy. One reason was unwillingness to inhibit the purchase by 
West G erm an (or EU) firms of a Treuhand plant—often a regaining of a  possession 
in pre-1945 Germany. Only subsequently have the effects of such purchases been 
m onitored, bu t the Federal Government does not seek to  inhibit by break-up the 
general drive to  greater in ternational competitiveness (which is lower in G erm any 
than  am ong all its main industrial exporters). A second reason was th a t any enter­
prise which was in such a monopoly position in the G D R was im m ediately exposed 
on Economic and M onetary Unification to com petition from business in the W est­
ern Länder and the EU as a whole. The switch of West G erm an exports to  the 
Eastern Länder is evident. Its share of to tal world export m arkets has dropped 
two percentage points since the late 1980s and external surpluses then of some 4 
percent of G D P have reversed into current account deficits of around 1 percent 
of GDP. ( Marsch 1995) No other transition  sta te  has been forced into such acute 
com petition from im ports from, or gained unrestricted access to, the $1.7 trillion 
trade m arket of the EU. Even the four Visegrad powers (the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Hungary and Poland), Rom ania and Bulgaria (and prospectively Slove­
nia and the Baltic S tates), which have achieved Association Agreements with the 
European Commission, face severe constraints on their sales of steel, textiles and 
agricultural produce.
In addition to external access, there was also a benefit in “internal access” , un­
available to  other economies in transition, although in its consequences not wholly 
beneficial. The application of Federal German law to the new Länder was a short 
cut to the protection of property and contracts and to  the prudential and reg­
ulatory provisions which cost other states much time and effort, and through the 
interstices or inadequacies of which crime and fraud penetrated. C orporations from 
established m arket economies could enter into ownership or commercial relation­
ships within those Länder with foreknowledge of the protection available. Such 
predictability—so im portan t for investm ent—was also assured, for exam ple, of tax 
regimes and profit convertibility. Against such gains m ust be set the overmetic- 
ulous nature of Federal legislation, created over the years in response to  specific 
problems in business and general activity in the West, and the cost to the Eastern 
enterprises of consultancy, legal and other services involved in adap ta tion  to  the 
new practices. The almost overnight availability of W estern financial services had
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its advantages— as shown by the chaotic and unruly banking situation  in transitions 
elsewhere— but has been criticized for a dominance which minimised the flexibility 
th a t profound economic restructuring required. It also brought “house banking” 
(Hausbankbeziehung), the long-term value of which is controversial. The Federal 
G overnm ent, however, complemented bank credit for small and m edium  enterprises 
through the KfW “development banking” programme.
After the Treuhand
A year after the end of the Treuhand, four characteristics can be subjected 
to  a t least a prelim inary evaluation: the effects on employment, the beneficiaries 
of property transfer, valuation and sales procedure, and corporate governance.
Unemployment in the Eastern Länder remained in 1995 not only much higher 
than  in the W estern Länder, but high in relation to other C entral and Eastern 
European sta tes, as Table 2 shows. Indeed in all the transition  economies the high 
unem ploym ent was exceeded only in Poland, Slovakia, A lbania and the former 
Yugoslav states. The trade-off was of course th a t labour “shake-out” has, together 
w ith the heavy resource flow from West Germany, enabled the workplaces th a t 
rem ain to assure the East Land economy as a whole the near-reatta inm ent of pre­
transition  ou tpu t. As Table 2 also shows, among transition sta tes no other save 
Poland (which began transition a year earlier) had got within 10 percent of th a t level 
by 1995 s If a 9 percent increm ent, as experienced in 1995, is achieved in 1996, the 
pre-transition level will have been regained. Assurance of such high increm ents and 
the preclusion of any retrogression continues to depend upon the external resource 
addition. Moreover, such productivity and wage gains as ensue accrue only to 
“insiders” , widening the differential between those who are in work and those who 
are on unem ploym ent benefit or who have abandoned gainful em ploym ent. It is 
only a consolation th a t (due to federal support) the social safety net extended under 
the Eastern Land worker is higher in real terms than in other transition  states. 
Such better standards are no more than  would be expected from the differentials 
in aggregate per-cap ita  product as measured by purchasing power parity  exchange 
rates (again see Table 2 ) .9
A linked issue is th a t high unemployment ratios for long periods (in the 
Eastern Länder since 1992) inevitably bring a greater proportion of long-term  un­
em ploym ent (which the ILO defines as for one year or more). T h a t share was 24.4
8 As the  fu rth e r d a ta  in the  source to Table 2 show; on average the  CIS was 48 percent of 1989 
G D P in 1995 and  the  o th er E uropean transition  states, 88 percent.
9T he assertion here is merely th a t  both values are well below the E ast G erm an level: the  w riter 
has no t com pared the  ra tio  of social security benefit to per-capita  p roduct country-by-country, 
valuable as such research would be.
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
M. KASER: FLAW S IN T H E TREU H A N D  M ODEL 71
percent in 1992 and 30.7 percent in 1993. (Daten Report 1994, p. 100) A UK study 
of 5,200 unemployed has recently concluded th a t it is likely th a t “employers look 
on potential employees who have had 12 m onths unemployment as significantly 
less “employable” than their counterparts who present themselves for interview 
a t a much earlier stage in their employment history” . (Dolton and O ’Neill 1996, 
p. 397) Long-term unemployment im pacts m ost heavily on the less skilled, and 
lack of work itself precludes those involved from on-the-job skill enhancem ent.10 A 
study of labour m arkets in general suggests th a t beyond a certain point long-term  
unem ploym ent has little effect in holding down wage pressures (Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman 1991, ch. 9), while another on transition economies observes th a t 
“unem ploym ent rates well in excess of 20 percent...go far beyond levels which, on 
the experience of OECD countries, could be regarded as necessary for the efficient 
working of a m arket economy” . ( Jackman and Rutkowski 1994, p. 147) A nother 
survey concludes th a t the Eastern German rate would have been higher bu t for 
“active” labour m arket measures, which have taken 43 percent of labour-oriented 
spending: “active” measures have been “schemes for retraining, for prom oting oc­
cupational mobility, and for directly creating jobs” , while passive measures are 
“early retirem ent, part-tim e work, east-west commuting and m igration” . ( Fretwell 
and Jackman  1994, p. 174)
M ention has already been made of the promise of a share in the proceeds of 
privatization th a t was proffered, but could not be kept, towards the residents of the 
former GDR. Nearly all other transition countries have provided “vouchers” gratis, 
or a t a very low price, whereby citizens appropriated some of the equity created by 
denationalization: the argum ent was to endow them  with a vested in terest in the 
new system  and render the political and economic change irreversible. Hungary 
and Poland have taken a variant path: Hungarian citizens can obtain zero-interest 
loans to  buy privatization shares and Poles are able to invest their vouchers not only 
in enterprises, but also in holding companies adm inistered by specialized m anage­
m ent firms, mostly W estern-based. Most CIS states and Mongolia have provided 
concessions whereby managem ent and workers have preferential access to shares in 
their own enterprise, which has resulted in a high proportion of the new establish­
m ents being dom inated by “insider” owners. Insiders control four-fifths of Russian 
privatized firms and two-thirds of Mongolian; it is large also in Hungary, Poland 
(both  m anagem ent buyouts) and in Slovenia (worker buyouts). By contrast ju s t 
under a fifth of East Germ an firms went to m anagem ent buyouts, but they were 
on average smaller firms, and the commitments they made on investm ent and on 
labour were an even lower share. Although Federal law on M itbestim m ung applies 
and hence requires consultation on job protection once the enterprise is private, the 
new owners, being managem ent rather than workers put job  security low among
10Exam ined in EC E, Economic Survey oj Europe in 1994-199 5 , pp. 45-46, which does no t 
however have recent d a ta  for either E ast or W est Germany.
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priorities. Unlike in virtually every other transition-state  privatization, the G erm an 
population as producers gained no advantage such as they got as voucher-recipient 
citizens elsewhere. The case-by-case, non-voucher privatization in Germany, Hun­
gary and the second phase of the Russian procedure strengthens m anagem ent power 
in subsequent corporate governance.
It is in the decision-period on enterprise closure and restructuring  th a t the 
exclusion from consultation an d /o r equity of the pre-existing workforce is im por­
tan t. As sole and exclusive owner of the assets to  be disposed of, the T reuhand was 
under no constrain t of appeal (save of course on points of law or m aladm inistra­
tion). W orkplace bargains on productivity and labour practices and com m itm ents 
to  forgo current earnings in favour of corporate investm ent could have form ed a  first 
phase, a t least experim entally— the “breathing space for restructuring” to  which 
reference was made above. The Czech Republic experienced a mere 8 percent de­
cline in employment, between 1989 and 1995 (Podkam iner et al. 1996, p. 38), and 
has the lowest unem ploym ent rate of any transition state. Yet its capital stock 
was vintagewise older than , and its technical level about the same as, th a t of the 
GD R. In aggregate term s, the closeness of its G DP per cap ita to  the E ast G erm an 
suggest a sim ilarity of inherited structure  which contrasts w ith the difference in 
post-privatization experience.
As already noted, external investm ent has chiefly come from W est Germany: 
about one in ten T reuhand enterprises went to  non-G erm an owners, m ostly from 
W estern countries. A little  came from Russia and other transition  sta tes (including 
some of the  huge capital flight from the CIS— in toto estim ated for end-1995 at 
some $50 to  $60 bn). Foreign capital inflow into Eastern Europe has principally 
been direct investm ent until mass privatizations are completed: by m id-1995 over 
$23 bn had gone into Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary a t $10 bn the largest 
recipient, followed by $4 bn to Poland and $3 bn to  the Czech Republic) and $3 
bn into R ussia,11 but, with the organization of stock exchanges, portfolio invest­
m ent is increasing. At the upper extreme, foreigners account for 40 percent of the 
contracted investm ent after privatization in Estonia.
The Treuhand encountered some obstacles to  disposal from restitu tion  and 
environm ental obligations, but the determ ination of a selling price was the principal 
problem . As in other transition  states, the decontrol of prices and the abandon­
m ent of guaranteed paym ent for production rendered past earnings a poor guide 
to fu ture worth. A t the bottom  line is liquidation value—selling assets separately 
after closure and after paym ent of redundancy settlem ents— but in the m ajority  
of instances the price was by negotiation. In the case of a single offer, an au­
diting company was invoked. Hungary, Poland and Estonia have closely followed 
the TVeuhand practice, bu t in m ost CIS states the value of the fixed assets when 
last valued in the planning period was taken. In all countries, the “soft budget
11EC E, East- West Investment  News,  W in ter 1995, Table 1 (A lbania and  L atv ia  are  estim ated ).
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constrain t” and the lack of bankruptcy precedures had allowed sta te  enterprises to  
accum ulate considerable debts: these were vast in Russia (the equivalent of $24 
bn), but modest in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Indeed, in Poland 
nine out of ten enterprises were debt-free. The G erm an Debt Remission Regula­
tion (Entschuldungsverordnung) allowed debt to be rem itted if the funds could be 
applied to  restructuring or enhancing its competitiveness. The heavy costs which 
the Treuhand incurred in disposing of its saleable assets contrasts sharply w ith the 
experience of the Estonian Privatization Agency (E rastam isagentuur). T he la tte r 
took on the Treuhand as consultants (even its prospectuses were exact copies of 
the T reuhand’s) and was the sole transition sta te  also to  restructure sta te  enter­
prises before privatization, exacting from buyers, like the Treuhand, contracts for 
fu ture investm ent and employment. By the same date as the Treuhand closed, the 
Estonian agency had privatized 80 percent of sta te  enterprises outside transport 
and utilities bu t secured $65 mn investment guarantees and 24,400 jobs, while still 
obtain ing proceeds of $98 mn. It seems unlikely th a t the level of Soviet-installed 
technology in Estonia was better than th a t of East Germany: the im plication is 
th a t the T reuhand’s valuations and price remissions were rather generous to  buyers. 
I t m ust, nevertheless, be modified by consideration of the  strength  of dem and for 
the sales: Carlin a ttribu tes the weakness of Western investm ent offers to  uncer­
ta in ty  in general— the sell-offs were at a time of world recession12— and the loss of 
East G erm any’s one preferential and experienced access— the Comecon and Soviet 
m arkets. (Carlin 1994, p. 151)
If the debt to be borne by the German taxpayer and the pan-European re­
cession to  which it contributed are “water under the bridge” , an acute issue for 
the fu ture is the form of corporate governance. In the eight countries listed in the 
tables of this paper, all bu t the Balkan states have well passed the half-way post in 
share of G D P already in the private sector. ( EBRD  1995, Table 2.1) In the term s 
introduced by Albert (1991) Germany is in the “solidaristic” mode (or “stakeholder 
economy” in current British political discourse); the Czech Republic has taken the 
“individualistic” path; and Russia has created its own style of “collectivistic” op­
eration. (Kaser 1995, pp. 184-193) Much more research is needed to determ ine the 
relative influences of “stakeholders” or “social partners” in the typical Eastern  Land 
firm, bu t a  prelim inary consideration suggests th a t neither banks nor employees are 
undertaking the function they have come to perform in the W estern Länder. De­
spite the fostering of “development banking” , there is evidence th a t medium-sized 
privatized and newly-established firms are not securing adequate finance. Com m er­
cial banks, acting as agents for the development banks, are seen as balking a t risky 
ventures, even if the risk premium is high; especially among knowledge-based firms, 
a lack of physical assets to serve as collateral deters bank support. More gener­
ally, the influence of banks over management, minimizing the role of shareholders,
12 A po in t also m ade, in te r alia, by K öhler (1996).
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appears to inhibit a firm ’s access to international equity-finance m arkets.13 W ith 
respect to labou r’s influence on decision-making, persistent high unem ploym ent in 
the Eastern Länder has not rendered wage negotiations more flexible to  continued 
productivity  differentials compared both with the West and internationally. This 
effect of a nationwide m aintenance of industry unionization would have been, and 
could still be, countered by profit-sharing schemes enterprise by enterprise, which, 
as already noted, could have raised the domestic rate of saving. The Russian “col- 
lectivistic” model was intended to bring some such incentives after privatization, 
but has been v itiated  by contrary objectives among nomenklatura  m anagers and 
speculative or dishonest newcomers. The displacement of those who m anaged en­
terprises under G D R sta te  operation in favour of im ported W estern m anagem ents 
precluded significant penetration by either of those groups, bu t seems to  have in­
troduced more of the  “individualistic” than  the “solidaristic” model. T he evolution 
of corporate governance in the coming years must be one of the m ost im portan t 
constituents of the political economy of unified Germany.
References
A lbert, Michel. 1991. Capitalisme contre capitalism. Paris: Seuil.
Bos, D ieter. 1993. “P rivatization  in E ast G erm any” . In: T anzi, V ito (ed.) 1993. Transition to 
market.  Studies in fiscal reform.  W ashington DC: IM F.
C arlin , Wendy. 1994. “P rivatization  and deindustria lization  in E ast G erm any” . In: E strin , Saul 
(ed.) 1994. Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Longm an.
Dempsey, Judy. 1995. Financial Times,  14 February.
D olton, P e ter and  O ’Neill, Donal. 1996. “Unem ploym ent du ra tion  and the  re s ta rt effect: some 
experim ental evidence” . Economic Journal,  Vol. 106 (M arch).
EB R D  Transition report 1995.
Fretwell, David and  Jackm an, R ichard. 1994. “Labor m arkets: unem ploym ent” . In: B arr, 
N icholas (ed.) 1994. Labor markets and social policy in Central and Eastern Europe: the 
transition and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University P ress for the W orld B ank  an d  th e  LSE.
von Furstenburg , G. 1995. “Overstaffing as an  endgam e and  prelude to th e  econom ic collapse in 
E astern  G erm any?” Communis t  Economies and Economic  Transformation , Vol. 7, No. 3.
H aendcke-H oppe-A rndt, M aria, Keren, Michael and  Notzold, G unter. 1992. “T he currency union 
an d  th e  econom ic road  to  G erm an un ity ” . In: Keren, Michael an d  Ofer, G u r (eds) 1992. 
Trials of transition. Economic reform in the fo rm er  communist  bloc. Boulder: W estview 
Press.
Mallet, A. J. Hughes an d  M a Yue. 1994. “Real ad justm en t in a  union of incom pletely converged 
economies: a n  exam ple from  E ast an d  W est G erm any” . European Economic Review,  
Vol. 38 (Decem ber).
Hoffm ann, L u tz . 1994. “E ast G erm any in  tran s itio n ” . Jo in t Econom ic C om m ittee of the  US 
Congress. East-Central European economies in transition.  W ashington DC: US G overn­
m ent P rin tin g  Office.
13T his sum m ary of the  O E C D ’s annual report on the  G erm an economy is taken from  The  
Economist,  2 Septem ber 1995.
Acta Oeconomica !,&. 1996
M. KASER: FLAWS IN TH E TREU H A N D  M ODEL 75
Informationsdienst des Insti tuts der deutschen Wirtschaft  (IW D ). Different issues.
Jackm an, R ichard and  Rutkowski, Michal (eds) 1994. “Labor m arkets: wages an d  em ploym ent” . 
In: B arr, Nicholas (ed.) 1994. Labor markets and social policy in Central and Eastern  
Europe: the transition and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press for th e  W orld B ank 
and  the  LSE.
K aser, Michael. 1987. “T he economic dimension” . In: M oreton, Edw ina (ed.) 1987. Germany  
between East and West.  Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press.
K aser, M. 1994. “D aten  und  Fakten zu r Aufgabenerfüllung der T reu h an d an sta lt” . Berlin: T reu­
han d an sta lt. December.
K aser, M ichael. 1995. “Privatization  in the CIS” . In: Dyker, David (ed.) 1995. Challenges fo r  
Russian economic reform.  W ashington DC: Brookings Institu tion .
K aser, Michael. 1996. “C entral Asian economies since independence” . In: Allison, Roy (ed.) 
1996. Political and economic challenges in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Transcauca- 
sus. W ashington DC: Brookings Institu tion .
Köhler, C laus. 1996. “T he privatisation of the  E ast G erm an economy: the  role of th e  T reuhand­
an s ta lt” . In: Frowen, Stephen and Hölscher, Jens (eds) 1996. The German Currency  
Union of 1990: a critical assessment.  London-New York: M acmillan.
Layard, R ichard, Nickell, S tephen and Jackm an, R ichard. 1991. Unemployment: macroeconomic  
performance and the labour market.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
L ipschitz, Lesley an d  M cDonald, Donough (eds). 1990. German unification: economic issues. 
W ashington DC: IM F.
M arsh, David. 1995. Financial Times,  6 March.
M ayer, T . 1992. Borrowed prosperity: medium term outlook fo r  the East  German economy.  Lon­
don: G oldm an-Sachs In ternational. May.
M O C T -M O S T :  Economic Policy in Transition Economies.  1995. Vol. 5, No. 4.
N orm an, Peter. 1996. Financial Times,  22 February.
Podkam iner, Leon et al. 1996. Transition countries: economic developments in 1995 and outlook 
fo r  1996 and 1997. Research R eports, No. 225, February. Vienna: W IIW .
Pom fret, R ichard. 1996. Asian economies in transition.  C heltenham : E dw ard Elgar.
Schrettl, W olfram. 1992. “T ransition w ith insurance: G erm an unification reconsidered” . Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy,  Vol. 8 (Spring).
Sinn, H. W . an d  Sinn, G. 1991. Kalts tart.  Tübingen: Mohr.
Sinn, Hans-W erner. 1995. “Staggering along: wages policy and  investm ent su p p o rt in E ast G er­
m any". Economics of Transition,  Vol. 3, No. 4.
S ta tistische B undesam t, D aten  R eport 1994.
Tanzi, V ito (ed.) 1992. Fiscal policies in economies in transition.  W ashington DC: IM F.
Veen, H ans-Joachim  and  Zelle, C arsten . 1995. “Growing closer together or d rifting  ap a rt? ” Ger­
man Comments.  No. 39 (July).
Vehse, Wolfgang. 1994. “P rivatization  G erm an style” . In: W eichardt, R einer (ed.) 1994. Priva­
tization in N A C C  countries: defence industry experiences and policies and experiences in 
related fields. Brussels: NATO.
Acta Occonomica 4S, 1996
^ y i»  •







Tij|ijii i jn m  '-&*$&*.
..y«tfA hl .'ajgJÜ&i t> iiiifiifcwi»«^t»»Tft- ^ lw(fc^-|iwa>
íífg^saM ftrv1 ■ - %»M£S?í0$b*
. « J M k TÍvJ E
h ím 1«  n<i ifci^i a  itT* ni • .>m~J ^
y  j . T .,.^ .. r - r  ^fnt|f r igt, ^ ^ r 'i firi‘iii'irn T r i j
j  .m i jiirn»i i| l  i ’’.«pi i #  jn w r f ’ i i>jj<li i | p i i i ; ‘ w w  ^ iff iiff ip ^ y o r ^ j r ] —
Acta Otconomica, Vol. 48 VV- 77-96 (1996)
ON THE HARD ROAD TO REINTEGRATION: THE 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKETS
M. SIMAI
T he article  is searching for answers to  a  num ber of questions re la ted  to  th e  pa rtic ip a tio n  
of th e  form er socialist countries in the  global economy, including e.g. such  as follows. Are the  
in stitu tio n a l a d ap ta tio n  and ad justm ent efforts in the  transition  economies efficient an d  conducive 
for th e ir  in tegration  w ith the  global m arkets? W hat are the  im plications of th e  changes, for the  
global trad ing  system , an d  for the  different groups of the countries? It is also analysing  th e  
ex ternal policy responses: how the increasingly com petitive global m arket system , th e  norm s 
of which are set by strong  business groups and  powerful s ta te s  is reacting  to  th e  changes, and  
w hat are th e  consequences of the  responses of the  m ain  p artners in  different functional areas, 
p a rticu larly  in those, which are directly influencing th e  m odernization  process in th e  transition  
economies.
On the concept of reintegration
There are different dimensions related to the participation of any given coun­
try  in the global economy—e.g. historical, geographical, economic, political, na­
tional security, institu tional and cultural. These dimensions are in terrelated  through 
the interaction of a number of internal and external factors, including geographical 
location, size, na tu ra l endowments, development level, economic structu re , politi­
cal and institu tional patterns, and the competitiveness of the respective countries. 
Among the external factors, some of the most im portan t ones are: the rates and 
p a tte rn s of global growth, the dom inant position of global (or regional) regulatory 
regimes and institu tions (which comprise a framework influencing the relationships 
between the participants in the act of exchange), the patterns of com petition in 
the m ain m arkets, the role and interests of transitional corporations wanting to 
integrate particu lar countries in their global production and m arketing system, 
and the degree and the influence of the interconnections between the m arkets for 
goods, capital, services and labour on the countries concerned. These factors are 
not constan t and their fluctuations reflect, on the one hand, the diversity of the 
m arket system, and on the other the transform ing place and role of the countries in 
the global markets as price-takers or price-makers. The integration of any country 
into the global economy is a dynamic process, influenced by the changing interests 
and needs of the partner countries. Dynamism implies also such factors as the 
self-generating character of the cooperation with other countries through positive
T his p ap er is based  on research work carried  ou t by th e  au th o r on th e  p a rtic ip a tio n  of th e  
form er E u ropean  socialist countries, C hina and  V ietnam  in th e  globed economy.
0001-6373/96/$5.00 ©  1996 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
78 M. SIMÁI: TRA N SITIO N  ECONO M IES
interactions or constraints, and re trea t and even disintegration which may be the 
result of losses suffered by countries due to  external factors. This in itself implies 
the sim ultaneous presence of favourable and adverse factors and trends, and coop­
erative and conflicting relations in the global m arkets for all countries. Those sta tes 
which are on the m argins of the global m arkets, or are newcomers to  the dom inant 
processes of the system  face more problems than those “established” participants. 
For the transition  economies in the 1990s the following are especially im portant: 
the growth and structure  of world trade, the factors determ ining the a ttitu d e  of 
capital m arkets, the strength and dynamics of com petitors, and the policies of those 
in ternational organisations which may play a crucial role in prom oting in tegration 
in the broader global and regional cooperation system  by enshrining them  into their 
framework (particularly  significant is the European Union).
Taken in a narrow sense, the process of integration into the global economy 
in institu tional term s includes the introduction of rules and regulations. These 
influence the political-institutional framework of cooperation in the world m arket 
as well as national legislation. In economic term s integration involves the estab­
lishm ent of different relationships through all the economic ties created by trade, 
capital flows and m igration between the integrating countries. It is also influenced 
by the policies and practices of the external partners. The changes in the character 
of relationships between countries and their in terpenetrations in economic, political 
and cultural term s is also a long-term  process. In this process the different actors 
(i.e. civil society, governments, firms and international organisations) react to the 
needs and changes with various speed and intensity. There are m easurable elements 
of integration but there are also aspects which are less “tangible” .
In fact, integration or reintegration are not quite the precise words for char­
acterising the changes in the former socialist countries’ participation in the world 
economy. In a broader understanding every country in the world is p a rt of the 
global economy.1 The former socialist countries were part of the global economy 
bu t their domestic institu tions and the patterns of their in ternational economic 
relations practically isolated them  from the global m arkets.2 This was probably
11 define the world economy as the totality of global production, consumption and exchange 
activities undertaken by microactors working within the national economies and/or the world 
market. They are conditioned and interconnected, both within nations and internationally, by di­
verse and increasingly globalized markets (in goods, capital, technology, labour and information). 
They are influenced by the economic policies, international agreements, and other actions of var­
ious national macroeconomic and international organizations that manage cooperation regimes. 
The world economy comprises different sets of relations which are themselves special systems, 
regulated by the market and by cooperation regimes. Economic relations are the media for in­
terdependence and competition. Spillovers of economic shocks and crises are communicated and 
transferred by them.
2The transition to the socialist system (which took place some decades ago) also played a crucial 
role in shaping the participation of China and Vietnam in the global economy and resulted, in 
many ways, in similar institutions and policies to those of the European socialist countries; this
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the  largest economic group in human history, so far, to  “drop ou t” from  the global 
m arket system  for geo-strategic and systemic reasons. External economic relations 
were largely subordinated to national and bloc security interests. The institu tions 
of the centrally planned economic system developed a strong bias against external 
economic relations; furtherm ore, the economic policies of the countries reinforced 
the inward-looking character of the development process. In fact, the new economic 
foundations of nationalism  were established or strengthened during those years in 
all the countries of the bloc. While their economic interactions w ith the rest of 
the world reached a “nadir” in the 1950s, they were for the m ost p a rt isolated 
from the integrating forces of global capital and technology flows. T he la tte r has 
restructured the global economy during the past 40 years. The strategic consider­
ations of the W estern countries also contributed to the isolation of the East from 
new technologies and favourable trading conditions and institutions. The emer­
gence of the “T hird  W orld” and the detente process in the 1960s introduced forces 
and m echanisms which gave rise to  stronger economic interactions between the for­
mer socialist countries and the rest of the world. Economic relations between the 
C entral and Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union also becam e more in­
tensive. However, the institu tional development of their cooperation regime lagged 
behind those functioning in the m arket economies. Efforts to  harm onise their eco­
nomic development through a planned international division of labour basically 
failed, even though some elements of specialization emerged between them . (Simai  
1990, pp. 61-108) W hile the reform measures in some countries introduced certain 
instrum ents of a m arket economy, their movement towards a more organic inte­
gration, or reintegration into the global markets, only became possible after the 
systemic changes of the early 1990s, and these are still incom plete.3 The systemic 
changes have themselves been affected by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. New countries have emerged, the m ajority  of which 
in the past had no independent or autonom ous relations w ith the rest of the world. 
For these countries participation in the international system implies the establish­
m ent of institu tions for independent statehood, and the redefinition and redirection 
of their external political and economic relations. The politics of reintegration are, 
of course, fundam entally im portant for all the countries in the region, but they are 
also significant for all their trading partners.
could be seen th e  economic role of the  s ta te , the  subord ination  of ex ternal economic re la tions 
to na tio n a l priorities and  plans, and  the  separation  of prices an d  exchange ra te s  from  th e  global 
m arket trends. T here  were also im portan t differences, particu larly  in th e  case of C hina which, in 
its in te rn a tio n al economic relations, developed a num ber of original p a tte rn s  and , in  certa in  areas, 
g reater flexibility th a n  th e  Soviet Union. A fter th e  political split w ith the  USSR, C hina did no t 
have th e  sam e “s tra teg ic” trea tm en t by the West concerning constrain ts on technology im ports.
3 In my in te rp re ta tio n , a  socio-economic system  is defined by th e  character and  developm ent of 
the  in stitu tio n s , p a tte rn s  and  forms of ownership, the  incentives and  th e  sources of inform ation 
for the  m ain  economic actors.
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The political dimensions of reintegration
The political process is a m ajor factor in the reintegration for it creates new 
realities, interactions and channels for com m unication w ith the rest of the world, 
and also w ithin the countries. The disintegration of the Eastern  Bloc and the 
Soviet Union brought about im m ediate and radical changes in the economic and 
political relations of the former socialist countries. The C entral and Eastern Eu­
ropean countries in itia ted  the dissolution of the W arsaw pact and the CM EA and 
this m arked not only the end of the era of Soviet hegemony in the region, bu t also 
form ulated new goals in security and in political and economic partnersh ip  w ith the 
W estern part of the continent. One of the main aims for most post-socialist coun­
tries is m em bership in the European Community. Germ an reunification and the 
re-establishm ent of the Russian sta te  created new realities not only in the  evolving 
new European power structure, bu t also in the reform ulation of the interests and 
policies of m any countries. The most outspoken and active in this context was 
the Visegrad group, which was the first to form ulate the issues in practical terms:
i.e. how to enter NATO and the European Com m unity as fast and as sm oothly as 
possible. They also institutionalised their cooperation. The political changes have 
brought about changes in the self-image of the respective countries as well as the 
perception th a t other countries have about them. In this context the evolving new 
Russian identity  becam e probably one of the most difficult and contraversial issues 
for the Russians, as well as for the outside world. Will Russia consider itself as 
a  continuity of the Soviet Union in geo-strategic term s? To w hat extent Russia 
will be dem ocratised and integrated into the global m arket system ? W ill Russia 
accept its new geo-strategic position as the “final word” or will it try  to  restore its 
sphere of influence (not forgetting th a t Russia no longer has direct frontiers w ith 
her former allies). A belt of independent states, large enough to  be more than  
ju s t a trad itional “buffer zone” , has been interposed between W estern Europe and 
Russia. T his belt has pushed Russia far away, geographically, from  C entral Europe, 
even with the new alliance between Belorus and Russia. W ill the former allies of 
the Soviet Union be integrated into a new European security s truc tu re  through 
NATO? No unam biguous answer can be given to  these im portan t questions in the 
mid-1990s. T he integration of Central and Eastern Europe into a new credible 
security s truc tu re  may not be an easy and immediate step given the absence of 
im m ediate external dangers and lack of a clearer perspective on the new identity 
of Russia.
T he in ternal dimension of the political changes has involved political plu­
ralism , the establishm ent of credible dem ocratic institu tions (sim ilar to  those in 
the W estern countries), and dem ocratization. These aspects are closely related to  
the fu ture of the international relations of the countries, their relations w ith the 
W estern world, and m embership of European institu tions. They are not merely 
dom estic issues. D ém ocratisation, including the honouring of hum an rights, is also
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a condition for receiving external assistance during the transition . Sustaining and 
strengthening democracy in this region also requires strong external, in ternational 
guarantees, in a region w ithout strong democratic traditions and with a long his­
tory of nationalism , xenophobia and intolerance. Nationalism in a region lacking 
dem ocratic and liberal traditions, and in an environm ent of social problems and 
economic difficulties, when placed alongside a historical heritage of hatred , forced 
assim ilation, and oppression, can easily become explosive. I t could endanger the 
stability  of the whole European continent. Ethnic problems and m inority issues 
in the region could be further aggravated by the evolving social problem s charac­
terised and which are connected to  the transition. One m ust remember th a t the 
two world wars of this century started  in C entral and Eastern Europe (including 
the Balkans), and in the 1990s the longest civil war since 1945 has been waged. 
The violent nationalism  and chauvinist policies in certain countries have resulted 
in serious conflicts and global tragedies. W hat is more, these have been used in the 
com petition between certain great powers in order to  gain control over the region, 
and in their policies of “divide and rule” .4 In the past C entral and Eastern Euro­
pean countries were situated  in the traditional buffer zone between great powers, 
and such conflicts have played catalytic roles in precipitating the two world wars of 
our century. In the mid-1990s, the region is not apparently a stage for sim ilar great 
power confrontation. Most of the countries in this geo-strategic zone are interested 
in avoiding any return  to a buffer zone position. Potential tensions and conflicts 
in the region may be internationalised however, through new forces or through the 
trad itional special interests of one or another regional power. Strong institu tional 
guarantees are needed in this region of the world in order to avoid a repetition  of 
the past.
In this context, it is a very im portant factor and an im portan t external asset 
for the sustainability  of democracy th a t, a t least for the tim e being, there are no 
external d ictatorial regimes in Europe which could support the domestic extrem ists 
in the C entral and Eastern European countries. The world of the 1990s is not the 
world of the 1920s or 1930s. The USA is strongly com m itted to  the support of 
dem ocracy and hum an rights on a global scale. There are no d ictatorial regimes 
am ong the great powers in the West. Today, G erm any is a strong dem ocratic 
s ta te  in a dem ocratic European system. The O rganisation of European Security 
and C ooperation, NATO, the European Union and the Council of Europe are all 
im portan t in ternational regional agencies for sustaining and strengthening democ­
racy. Of course, a key issue will be the future trends of dém ocratisation in Russia,
4The most important sources of international instability in the 1990s are rooted in ethnic 
Problems. Russia now has twenty-one republics within its framework. In Central and Eastern 
Europe there are domestic ethnic problems practically in all states, giving rise to many sources of 
tension. The domestic sources of instability are the deteriorating standard of living, the increase 
of poverty, and the high levels of unemployment.
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which is the m ost im portan t power in the eastern part of Europe. She has “inher­
ited” m ost of the economic, research and development, and m ilitary potential of 
the former Soviet Union.5
The fu ture of democracy depends in the final analysis on the degree of pop­
ular support. This is also a long term  issue. The first five years of the  transi­
tion process have been accompanied by very severe social costs. Unem ploym ent 
sta tistics from the region are not reliable enough to reflect the actual em ploym ent 
situation . In Russia, for example, workers are kept on in factories and paid very 
low wages, even in those cases where the capacity utilization is below 50 percent. 
From a working-age population of more than ‘220 million in the region— while the 
number of officially unemployed has been put at “only” about 10-12 million— the 
underemployed may be as much as 30-40 percent of the to tal labour force. The 
deterioration of the employment situation and the downgrading of skills are im ­
p o rtan t and unfavourable characteristics everywhere. People’s living standards are 
declining, while social insecurity, unem ploym ent and poverty are rising. H yperinfla­
tion has underm ined economic life in a number of countries and, together w ith the 
increase of unem ploym ent, contributed to the impoverishm ent of a large segment 
of the population. From a to tal population of close to  400 million, the num ber of 
poor has increased from 8 million to more than  58 million. ( World Bank  1994) The 
high hum an costs of the changes and the adverse experiences of a significant mass 
of the population with the new regimes has exacerbated already serious political 
challenges for the often very fragile dem ocratic institutions. This has fuelled popu­
lar discontent, xenophobia, ethnic tensions and political extrem ism  in many of the 
former socialist countries.
5 R u ssia ’s economic consolidation requires extensive in ternational cooperation  an d  political 
stability . She has strong in terests (which may also converge with the  in terests of o th er successor 
s ta te s  of the  Soviet Union) to susta in  close economic and  in certain  cases security  cooperation  
w ith the  o th er republics. T he CIS (Com m onw ealth of Independent S ta tes) has been conceived as 
the  key in strum en t of th is cooperation. Russia has a  strong  in terest to  hold together, as m uch as 
possible, those areas of the  form er Soviet Union where large R ussian m inorities reside. R ussia will 
certain ly  p ro tect the  in terests of these m inorities and  use them  to susta in  as m uch influence as 
possible (there  a re  ab o u t 25-30 m illion Russians living outside R ussia in various C om m onw ealth 
s ta te s). Indeed, R ussia will susta in  its  efforts to hold all the  C om m onw ealth republics to g eth e r for 
s tra teg ic  purposes. R ussia’s prim ary  security concerns will be focused w ithin its  frontiers. It will 
be concerned w ith blocking secessionist trends. Russia m ight also engage in  territo ria l d isputes 
w ith  some form er republics an d  some po tentially  expansionist Islam ic powers in  th e  region. She 
will also susta in  certa in  in terests in C entral and E aste rn  E urope. In th is con tex t, there  a re  experts 
who pred ic t th e  revival of certa in  trad itiona l factors re la ted  to  th e  cu ltu ra l heritage of pan-Slavism  
or religious affinities. Following a long trad itio n  R ussia will m ain tain  a  relatively s tro n g  arm y  for 
dom estic  purposes, prestige, and  regional security. T his s trong  m ilitary  capacity  will rem ain, for 
some tim e, very im po rtan t in R ussia ’s political relations, particu larly  w ith form er m em bers of the  
Soviet Union.
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Liberalization, competitiveness and the socio-economic realities
Five years, or even a decade, is too short a period to  evaluate the successes 
and failures in those processes of transition which are guided mostly by long term  
forces of change. The evaluation of the integration of the countries on the hard and 
bum py road to the global markets is in itself a highly complex task which cannot 
be related to  any ideal model, or to  the specific goals set in a comprehensive pol­
icy docum ent in quantitative terms. There were, in fact, no models and in most 
cases there were no specific measurable goals except, maybe, the speed and degree 
of privatization. This goal was seldom related, even in general term s, to  m odern­
ization, increasing economic efficiency, and the better satisfaction of needs. The 
partic ipation  of the new countries in the global economy, under the new conditions, 
has required the sim ultaneous establishm ent of institu tions and organizations for 
developing international, political, and economic relations, and for s ta rting  cooper­
ation with old and new partners. The tasks were very sim ilar to those which faced 
the new developing countries a few decades ago. There were, however, im portan t 
differences. One of them  was the continuation of economic relations between the 
m etropolitan countries and their former colonies. Political decolonisation itself did 
not im ply im m ediate changes in economic relations. In the case of the former social­
ist countries their m arkets collapsed too. The collapse of the Eastern m arkets had 
an im m ediate influence on those who participated in them  as well as on external 
partners.
The former socialist counties are re-entering global m arkets shaped by strong 
forces of globalisation, with fragile institutions, and with very lim ited com peti­
tive advantages. The main force in the global markets differentiating between the 
countries and influencing global income distribution is com petitive power. The 
com petitiveness of a national economy is shaped by a num ber of in terrelated  ac­
tivities, undertaken simultaneously a t different levels and by a num ber of actors: 
macroeconomic policies and national institution-building by governments, specific 
sectoral policies (particularly  those related to infrastructure), science and technol­
ogy, education, trade, microeconomic activities by firms (depending on m anagerial 
skills), and correct strategies in the field of innovation, production, m arketing, 
sourcing and sales. Such inherited problems as weak innovative capabilities, the 
lack of relevant experiences in management and marketing, the poor trad itions of 
entrepreneurship, and a number of new difficulties created by the transition  process 
do not allow optim istic hopes for an easy, harmonious and sm ooth path  w ith re­
gard to  the transition  economies’ reintegration process to the global m arkets. These 
m arkets are characterised by intense com petition, shaped by fast technological and 
structu ra l changes. The process will be uneven by countries and economic sectors.
F irst, the level of development of the respective transition economies is a 
decisive factor which determ ines the niches and segments of the m arkets for their 
exports, and the patterns and technological level of foreign direct investm ents. The
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strength  of this factor is often forgotten or neglected in the discourse about the 
reintegration process.6 The institu tions and patterns of com petition of the global 
m arket system are shaped mostly by the strong industrial countries and corpora­
tions. Global com petition has become more intense in the 1990s and so too have the 
results of slower global growth. The redrawing of the map of the global economy 
according to  the new international division of labour— mainly through the entry  of 
new powerful countries and firms— has created new com petitive pressures, partic­
ularly in those segments of the global m arkets where the former socialist countries 
are also searching for opportunities. The strategic interests of the transnational 
corporations in the region are also ra ther mixed and often ambiguous. In certain 
cases they want to in tegrate certain industries of the former socialist countries into 
their in ternational production and m arketing system; in other cases, their goals 
are confined to  obtaining new markets for their products, through acquisitions, 
and crowding out local competitors. The early experiences w ith this main global 
s truc tu re  may of course be rather limited and it is difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions about the future in this context. There are also differences between the 
countries, shaped by their policies, and by the attractiveness of their hum an and 
natu ra l resources.
Second, the new regimes in the transition economies have had to  face w hat 
have in many ways been unprecedented institution-building tasks. Several sys­
temic changes have happened in the different countries, both pre-war and within 
very recent history. For example, the East European countries, which becam e part 
of the Soviet sphere of influence after the Second World War, had to  dism antle 
the m arket system  which had been operating before the Second World War and 
build the institu tions of central planning and the one-party system . T he systemic 
changes after 1990 represented the first time when a dem ocratic, political, and 
m arket-based capitalist economic system had to be built from “above” by political 
initiatives and instrum ents in a large group of countries. The role of the s ta te  had
6T he division of E urope into a  m ore developed W est, an  underdeveloped E ast, w ith  a  p a rtly  
developed centre in betw een, has a  long history. T he Iron C u rta in  followed, m ore or less, along 
those lines. W hile th e  gap betw een the E ast and  the  W est narrow ed som ew hat in  certa in  ind i­
cato rs, especially in  hum an resource developm ent, and  the  Soviet Union achieved a  fragile parity  
in th e  defence-related areas, th e  m odernization  efforts of th e  com m unist e ra  failed to  develop 
in te rnationally  efficient an d  com petitive economies. T heir problem s in th is con tex t becam e acu te  
in an  e ra  of global changes, shaped  by profound technological transform ation  and  in tense com pe­
tition . T he im pact of th e  trad e  an d  o th er strategic restric tions im posed on those countries were 
also stum bling  blocks in th e  upgrading of their economies. At th e  sam e tim e, th e  new form s of 
in teractions in finances, especially through heavy borrowing from the W est, b u ilt s tro n g  un ila t­
eral dependencies for a  few E ast European countries. Since the  1960s, the gap in th e  level of 
developm ent increased no t only between the  W estern industrial world and  the E ast, b u t certain  
form er developing countries in Asia perform ed m uch b e tte r  in the  global economy than  the  form er 
socialist countries. T his is tru e  even in those niches of the global m arket in agricu ltu re , industry , 
and  services, where the  socialist countries enjoyed some com petitive advantages.
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to  be transform ed. They had to  initiate profound structu ral changes in the m ain 
redistribution system s. New adm inistrative structures had to  be built w ithin some 
countries which inherited disintegrated structures of the state. The task  had to  be 
im plem ented rapidly because the institu tional changes were necessary both for the 
domestic transform ation and for the countries’ participation in the global m arkets 
as m arket economies. Since the beginning of this period the new governm ents have 
not been able to combine the domestic institution-building and macroeconomic 
stabilisation tasks with the measures related directly to the im provem ent of in ter­
national com petitiveness.' The new institutions and government structures in a 
num ber of countries were shaped more by copying the patterns of more developed 
m arket economies than by the domestic conditions and needs. External advice as 
well as domestic political struggles and m isunderstandings have resulted in great 
diversity in the effectiveness of new institu tions and the influence they have so far 
had on integration into the global markets. (Simai 1994, pp. XX-XXI)
During the first five years of the transition, privatization, m arketization and 
liberalization have been the m ost im portant catchwords. L iberalization8 has been 
the basic guideline for macroeconomic policy “um brella” measures, directly influ­
encing sim ultaneously the changes in the functioning of the transition  economies 
and their relations with the rest of the world. There have been several sources 
of encouragem ent and pressures for a rapid liberalization process. One of them  
was the need for changes in the dism antling of the institu tions of central planning. 
The advocates of the new regimes turned, in most of the countries, against public 
ownership, controls, regulations, sta te  monopolies and subsidies. They considered 
these features to be the adverse consequences of the communist regimes. T he state- 
owned enterprises, the m ajority of which had in the past strong vested interests in
7T h e  process of C h ina’s and  V ie tnam ’s rein tegration  into the  global m arket differs greatly  
from  those of the  form er E uropean socialist countries. F irst of all, the  political background of the 
re in teg ra tion  process of the  form er Soviet Union, and  its  form er C entra l an d  E as te rn  E u ropean  
pa rtn e rs  has been the  collapse of the  socialist regimes and  the  dism em bering of the  key power of the 
bloc. In  C hina, the  gradual opening of the  economy to  the rest of the  world has been developed 
as an  in tegral p a r t of the  reform  measures, undertaken by the  po litica l regim e, advocating  a 
socialist m arket economy. Second, in th e  form er E uropean socialist countries, th e  en try  of world 
m arket forces into th e ir  national economies was underpinned w ith th e  hope th a t  th ere  would 
be an  acceleration  of dom estic m arketization. In the  case of C hina, since 1978 a  num ber of 
m easures have been in troduced  for ex ternal opening, originally w ith m odest goals; these have 
tried  to  increase outw ard  orientation  for the  growth of export earnings and  to allow m ore extensive 
technology im ports. T h e  influence of world m arket forces on the  dom estic econom y of C hina, as a  
consequence of the  opening, is also growing b u t the  effect is m uch slower a n d  has h ad  a  m uch m ore 
lim ited  influence on the  functioning of the  dom estic economy them in th e  tran s itio n  economies 
*n E urope. In certain  areas, however, it is qu ite  substan tia l. Overseas-funded com panies, for 
exam ple, accounted for 40 percent of C h ina 's  foreign trad e  in 1995. T he em ploym ent im plications 
° f  these firms are very im portan t, particu larly  in the  eastern  coastal areas.
8In m any cases in its  neo-classical tex tbook understanding.
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protectionism , lost their bargaining power in the new era. Their leaders were, by 
and large, discredited and in order to  save their positions they rem ained silent.
Liberalization and the introduction of free m arket policies have ajso been most 
im portan t in establishing new contractual relationships with the B retton  Woods 
institu tions. These have included deregulation of the price system, abolition of 
subsidies, sweeping reforms in public expenditures, privatization, encouragem ent of 
foreign direct investm ents and the liberalization of the foreign trade mechanisms. 
Many W estern economic advisers have suggested th a t fast liberalization could be 
the key remedy for curing all the economic ills of the transition  countries, including 
the rapid improvement of their export potentials. Yet the assum ptions of the 
advisers were based more on m ainstream  theories than  on practical experiences. On 
such foundations, for example, it was thought th a t, regardless of their structu ral 
im pedim ents, the opening of the previously closed economies would result in an 
increase in exports in exchange for increased im ports. It was presum ed th a t new 
export sectors would expand and as the result of the im port com petition certain 
inefficient sectors would be reduced in size. They predicted, of course, th a t  there 
would be winners and losers and, due to the costs, differences between the industrial 
countries and the former socialist countries. However, they also suggested th a t the 
winners would soon com pensate for the losers.
A nother im portan t source of pressure for liberalization has been the need for 
foreign direct investm ents, and not only for the liberalization of entrepreneurship, 
capital movements, prices and exchange rates, but also for im ports.
The combined result of the strong pressures for liberalization was histori­
cally unprecedented speed in opening up many of the former socialist countries. 
T he movement has been uneven— as between countries and over tim e— and it has 
revealed the s truc tu ra l weaknesses of the countries. The differences between the 
respective countries have not only been due to the variations in the degree of the 
domestic institu tional changes, but also because in the size of the domestic m arket, 
and in the stability  of the political system . Liberalization in a m arket system  can be 
sustainable in the economy of a given country if it is sufficiently com petitive. Com ­
petitiveness also requires adaptive efficiency, the postulates of which—particularly  
in middle-level economies— may be in conflict with liberalisation. The greater the 
difference between the recent past and the degree of liberalisation, the greater the 
im pact of the measures on the transition  economies, particularly  on em ploym ent 
and incomes. The liberalisation process has resulted the rapid bankruptcy of many 
firms (which depended on the different forms of protectionism  and subsidies in the 
past). However, the process has not really stim ulated the establishm ent of more 
com petitive firms. The abolition of im port quotas and the increase of im ports has 
brought more consumer goods to shops, in many cases at the expense of crowding 
out the local producers, or a t the expense of the consumers by the creation of new 
monopolies and higher prices. The expected advantages of im port com petition have 
so far not m aterialised.
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There have been some im portant achievements in fulfilling the institu tional 
requirem ents of global market integration. In a few states a comprehensive legal 
framework for the m arket system has been institu ted  in some crucial areas, such as: 
property  ownership and legal title, forms of incorporation, mergers and acquisitions, 
laws related to foreign direct investm ents and international business in general, and 
regulations concerning intellectual property rights. All these features a ttem p t to 
correspond with the norms of the industrial countries (i.e. they are in the framework 
of the European Union). In other areas there has been a staggered progression 
tow ards th a t goal. A new banking system, involving foreign interests, has sta rted  
to evolve and stock exchanges have been established in the m ajority  of the transition  
countries and foreign participation in these is increasing.
I t is too early to  draw firm conclusions about the influence of measures re­
lated to  the participation  of the economies of the former socialist countries in the 
global m arkets. The different types of flows, like foreign direct investm ents (FD I), 
the trade of goods and services, or m igration, are not influenced by the sam e factors 
and measures. Im portan t progress has been made in the field of foreign exchange 
policies. As a result of these measures a few transition  economies have been able 
to introduce convertibility within a rather short period of time. The liberaliza­
tion measures have had a favourable influence on foreign investm ents, the stock of 
which has increased rather quickly, from less than  USD 1 billion in 1990, to  above 
USD 22 billion in 1995 (invested in about 55,000 foreign affiliates). T his was dis­
tribu ted  am ong the countries in a highly unequal way, reflecting also the degree of 
“m icrointegration” into the global market system achieved by any given country. 
( UNCTAD  1995, pp. 99-103) This represented about 1 percent of the global stock 
of foreign direct investments. Most of the foreign investm ents were takeovers or 
acquisitions. An increasing proportion of FDI has been instrum ental for the  inte­
gration of the given firms into the global production system  of the TN C. In m any 
cases however, the aim  of the acquisition was entry into domestic m arkets. As a 
result of liberalisation measures, the strong com petitive position of W estern firms 
is felt in practically all im portan t segments of the market.
A nother im portan t change which has taken place in the field of capital flows 
has been the growth of FDI from the transition economies in the O ECD  and neigh­
bouring countries. This process may have a great influence in the future. In tegra­
tion into the global market system  implies simultaneously “inward” and “outw ard” 
in ternationalisation of the respective economies. The greater the outw ard in terna­
tionalisation through exports (but particularly through foreign direct investm ents), 
the easier it will be for the countries to adapt to the needs and patterns of the global 
m arkets.
The process of reintegration through trade flows has been more contraversial 
and it has been influenced by a num ber of factors. Trade volumes have reflected 
declining external and domestic demand and shrinking ou tpu t. The growth of the 
G D P has been decelerating since the 1970s. Between 1985-89 it was 2.9 percent,
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but between 1990-94 it had dropped to  - 9 .8  percent. (U N  1994; 1995a) According 
to  my calculations, during 1991-94 the to ta l cum ulative value of G D P loss in the 
former European socialist countries was about USD 1,200 billion— th a t is, close to 
40 percent of their ou tpu t. Industrial and agricultural ou tpu t declined very quickly 
due to  the collapse of the Eastern markets and the crowding out effect of im ports 
and the shrinking domestic m arket. The ou tpu t and income loss was sim ilar to th a t 
in the USA and Germany during the G reat Depression of the 1930s. T he share of 
the former European socialist countries in global production declined to  about 5 
percent, in 1994 (from about 11 percent in 1984). In per cap ita  term s in 1984 
they stood a t about 36 percent productivity of the industrial m arket economies, 
in 1994 at around 20 percent. In 1987-89 their share in world exports was 7.6 
percent, but it had fallen below 3 percent by 1993-1994. The exposure of the  former 
socialist countries to the world m arket forces brought to  the surface all the deeply- 
rooted s tru c tu ra l weaknesses in their economies. Their combined term s of trade 
deteriorated  by about 10 percent between 1990-94. The im ports of the Central 
and Eastern European transition  economies declined at a slower ra te  th an  their 
exports and G D P between 1990-1995, resulting in large current account deficits. 
T heir cum ulative current account deficit was USD 32.6 billion between 1990-94.9 
T he regional d istribution  of exports and im ports has changed radically. In the 
case of m ost of the former republics of the Soviet Union there has also been a sharp 
decline in im ports. The territorial restructuring of trade relations is a result of bo th  
political and economic factors. The share of former socialist countries in exports 
contracted from 49 percent in 1988 to about 20 percent in 1994, and their im ports 
from 49 percent to  22 percent.10 In the case of the former Soviet Union the share 
of the former socialist countries in exports declined from 36 percent to 21 percent 
and in im ports from 38 to 18 percent. (UN 1995b, p. 233) There was a fast increase 
in the share of the industrial countries, both in exports and im ports. There are 
of course great differences between the countries in all these indicators and also in 
economic perform ance. However, only one or two countries could m anage to  tu rn  
the adverse trends by 1994.
In the light of the structu ral and human problems of the former socialist 
countries, there is very little disagreement today th a t the region’s transition  pro­
cess will take a much longer tim e than was originally anticipated by m ost politicians 
and observers. It is also becoming increasingly evident th a t neither privatization, 
nor the o ther pillars of the transition to  a m arket economy-—like the liberalization 
of in ternational transactions— are sufficient guarantees themselves for the estab­
lishm ent of internationally  com petitive and efficient economies. In the 1960s the
9C alculated  by the  a u th o r on the  basis of U NCTAD  (1992; 1994) and  UN (1995a) d a ta  and 
projections.
I0T here  was some revival of m utua l trad e  between the form er socialist countries in 1994, b u t 
w ith increases in im balances.
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leaders of the Soviet Union put an emphasis on the goal of catching up w ith the 
industrial West w ithin a historically short period of time. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development in its 1995 report raised this issue in the context 
of the transition  economies and suggested th a t the Central and Eastern European 
economies m ust grow by 7 percent a year for 30 years to catch up w ith O ECD  coun­
tries. ( The Economist 1995) The catching up issue is, however, a ra ther complex 
one. T he countries would need the successful im plem entation of more far-reaching 
domestic and international measures than the present ones. For instance, there is 
a need for increasing investments in production, human resource developm ent and 
infrastructure in order to accelerate economic growth and implement structu ral 
changes. This is not possible w ithout much greater external assistance than  has 
been received during the first five years of the transition.
The new East in the global market
The external support of the transform ation process in these countries— m ean­
ing sim ultaneously the consolidation of democracy, economic and political m odern­
ization and the integration into the global economy under new foundations— is the 
greatest challenge for Western countries in the 20th and probably a large p a rt of 
the 21st century.
Redefining relations with a country or a region is of course not a new issue in 
the practice of in ternational relations. The shaping of the future of relations w ith 
the former socialist countries has raised different issues and has been form ulated in 
different ways in the USA, in the European Union, in Japan , and in the developing 
countries. Yet even in the W estern world, in general, there are different dimensions 
of the problem related to  security, business relations, and hum anitarian  assistance. 
An im portan t and interesting dimension is the future relationships w ith past ad­
versaries. This is the third tim e this century th a t W estern powers have had to 
face such a dilemma: w hat policies should they pursue? In 1918-19 isolation, and 
political and economic weakening was the favoured policy choice in the context of 
Germany, the key adversary power, and neglect or punishm ent for the rest. The 
end result was the Second World War, and the keenest advocates of this policy had 
a very high price to  pay. After the Second World War the recovery of the former 
enemies was a vital question for the security interests of the West and the strongest 
power of the era accepted its high costs. This was, of course, m otivated by the fear 
of communism and the Soviet danger. The outcome of this policy was not ju s t the 
stab ilization  of W estern Europe and Japan , but the emergence of the two other 
com peting centres of the global economy, the European Union and Japan , and the 
relative decline of American power. In the light of all th is some experts raised the 
issue of whether the W estern support to the former socialist countries, especially to
Acta Oeconomica 4$, 1996
90 M. SIMÁI: TR ANSITIO N ECONO M IES
Russia, would not result in similar problems: i.e. new com petitors. This dimension 
of the argum ent has gained strength in the post-Cold W ar situation .
During the first years of the new Russia the dilem m a of w hat should be the 
guidelines for fu ture relationships with Russia—efforts for its weakening, m arginal­
ization and isolation or helping it to build itself up as a new dem ocratic power— has 
not been solved in the policies of her former opponents, especially the USA.
After the first half decade of liberalization and openness, m ost of the former 
socialist countries in Europe are increasingly realising th a t as they are becom ing 
more closely in tegrated  into the global m arket system  they are becom ing not only 
more and more dependent on international actors, traders, investors and corpora­
tions bu t also on the two key international prices of the m arket system: i.e. interest 
rates and the exchange rate. These are imposing new pressures and new disciplines 
on them  which were unknown in the past. They are increasingly feeling the rewards 
of sound policies, bu t even more the penalties for policy errors. W hen confidence 
in their policies declines, not only do the external resources dry up bu t there is a 
rapid increase in the flight of capital. The high rate  of inflation and the loss of con­
fidence in local currencies have resulted in the dollarization or “D -m arkization” of 
the economies, especially in a number of former Soviet Republics. Due to structu ral 
and institu tional weaknesses the bargaining power of the former socialist countries 
has been dim inishing in m ultilateral institu tions and in the b ilateral fram eworks as 
well.
As a result of the diverse economic consequences of the changes—on the dif­
ferent sectors of the economies and on the firms— w ithin the countries new lobbies 
are emerging. Some of the new entrepreneurs are asking for special p rotectionist 
m easures while others want not only the liberalization of exports bu t more incen­
tives for exporters. Certain foreign firms are also looking for fast re tu rns on the 
invested capital (risk-justified, ultra-high profits) and monopolistic positions in the 
shrinking domestic m arkets. There are also problems w ith the access to  external 
m arkets. Their former partners are not too eager to  give easy free trade  or other 
concessions to  each other, as they now consider each other more as com petitors 
than  partners. More of the traditional product categories in which they may have 
had certain  com petitive advantages to  W estern m arkets belong to  regulated or 
protected groups.
Toward which world?
There are a number of questions in the second half of the 1990s which emerge 
in connection w ith the reintegration of the former socialist countries into the global 
m arket system. These questions are no longer academic ones. The early expe­
riences of the European transition  economies concerning the character, the level,
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the m ethods and efficiency of W estern policies and assistance have raised certain 
concerns and questions about the future. The former socialist countries in Europe 
have been basically "price takers” in the world economy. W ith the exception of 
the role of the former Soviet Union in the markets of certain commodities (like oil, 
nickel or diam onds) the overall influence of the transition economies on the m arkets 
of goods has been very small, and it has been even more m arginal in the case of 
the capital m arkets. Will the policy-induced approaches to  the transition  process 
gradually fade and be replaced by profit m otivated approaches? Is the  support 
of the integration of the former socialist countries into the global m arket system  
an issue which is im portan t and high enough on the agendas of the industrial na­
tions? Are there sufficiently strong specific political interests and m otivations in the 
m ain W estern countries for helping effectively the transform ation and the consoli­
dation process in the East? Are the ways in which the W estern countries address 
the problems correct and relevant? Will there be sufficient additional external re­
sources available for the purpose (additional in the sense th a t they will not cut the 
assistance for the developing countries) of helping the transition  economies to  be 
in tegrated  into the global economy with a higher level of perform ance? Some of the 
doubts are also based on the historical experiences of the developing countries and 
their difficulties they will have integrating into the global economy after political 
decolonisation. In this context another source of concern is related to the way in 
which the potential gains and the actual costs of the process—in term s of trade, 
FDI, jobs, and com petition—will be distributed between the unequal partners in 
a global m arket system  which is influenced mostly by the short-term  interests and 
the structu ral m arket power of such actors as the transnational corporations?
The most im portan t countries which are usually considered as key exter­
nal partners of the transition countries are the W estern European countries. The 
large-scale m odernization of the C entral and Eastern European countries and the 
successor sta tes of the Soviet Union offer unique opportunities for the m ember 
countries of the European Union. This is because of their geographic vicinity and 
historical ties with the region. Some political figures from other regions of the world 
suggest th a t the West European countries should therefore bear the external costs 
helping the transition  economies.
M embership in the European Union is considered by many former socialist 
countries as the critical factor which will determine the future successes and failures 
in im plem enting the domestic tasks of the transition, and also in the development 
of new interactions with the rest of the world. The perform ance of the European 
Union is also looked upon as an im portant proof of the capabilities of the W estern 
world. Is it able to accom m odate a much greater number of sta tes of increasing 
diversity in economic capabilities, interests, and actions, in a ra ther exclusive club 
of countries?
There is a very interesting correlation between the sharing of the costs of assis­
tance and benefits in trade relations for this dem onstrates the role of the European
Acta Oeconomica 48, 1996
92 M. SIMÁI: TRA N SITIO N  ECONO M IES
U nion.11 The figures, however, concerning the benefits for the former socialist 
countries may be misleading. A large part of the much talked about assistance 
rem ains “com m itm ent” only. I t also should be mentioned th a t they still reflect 
clearly the critical and growing role of Germany in the region. The d istribu tion  of 
the real disbursem ents has also been criticised by certain experts— nam ely 80-90 
percent of these have been frittered away unproductively through high paym ents 
to W estern advisers, institu tions and firm s.12
T he political future and the economic integration of the transition  economies 
into the global market system  has, indeed, created opportunities, bu t there are 
also new challenges to Western European business interests, countries, and to  the 
regional integration process in Europe. At this early stage the scope of the prob­
lems and challenges are more visible than  the economic opportunities. The fear of 
mass im m igration and potential armed conflicts in the Eastern p art of Europe may 
stim ulate different measures for supporting the transition  process. These might 
prom ote the m odernization and integration of the transition  economies into the 
EU. There is, however, agreement among the experts th a t there are great differ­
ences among the present m embers of the EU concerning the volume of assistance 
to, and the tim e span of, the integration of the potential member states. There 
are also increasing doubts about the speed and degree of their m em bership in the 
European Union, even in the case of those countries which have im plem ented sub­
stan tia l institu tional changes and liberalisation measures. A more or less general 
consensus has developed which believes th a t, while consolidation can be achieved 
only as the result of domestic efforts and changes, favourable trad ing  conditions and 
resource transfers are indispensable factors in the process. However, th is consensus 
is not necessarily supported by sufficiently effective practical measures. In practical 
term s, for example, m ost of the currently exportable goods of the countries in Cen­
tral and Eastern Europe fall into the category of “sensitive” im ports to W estern 
E urope and North America, and are covered by different forms of protection.
Among the main W estern partners of the transition  economies, the USA has 
already played a very im portan t role in prom oting their integration into the global 
m arkets through a m ultiplicity of channels and instrum ents. There is a m ajor
11 My calculations, based  on the  trad e  an d  assistance com m itm ents shares for th e  first 4 year 
of th e  trans ition , revealed the  following facts: the  share of the  m em ber countries of th e  E uropean  
C om m unity in assistance com m itm ents has been close to 75 percent an d  in  to ta l exports 64 
percen t. T he share  of G erm any was alm ost 60 percent in assistance com m itm ents and  close to 
one-th ird  in exports . T he share of the USA was less th an  10 percent in assistance com m itm ents 
an d  ab o u t 12-13 percent in exports. Ja p a n  had  a  4 percent export share  an d  a  3 percen t share 
in com m itm ents.
12 “T ransform ation in C entral, E astern , and  South-eastern  E urope”— docum ent of th e  In ter­
n a tio n a l Conference 17-19 June  1994, In s titu te  for Developm ent and  Peace, D uisburg, p. 53. 
A no ther critical analysis of W estern assistance to  the  transition  economies in E urope s ta te d  th a t  
ab o u t only one-fifth of the  prom ised assistance had  actually  been disbursed. ( The Phili-p Morris  
Insti tute.. .  1994, pp . 70-80.)
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difference in this context between the policies of the USA towards, respectively, 
C hina, V ietnam , Russia, and C entral and Eastern Europe. W ith regard to  Russia 
and C hina, national security considerations still play an im portan t role, albeit of 
a  different nature than  the earlier situation. Economic factors are more im por­
tan t in the policies of the USA toward C entral and Eastern Europe. The original 
idea of the Bush adm inistration was, in the context of the transition  economies, 
th a t it would be the American private sector which would play the leading role in 
the m arketization process through FDI, trade and technology exports. The coun­
tries would be assisted by government funds, technical assistance and advice in 
institution-building as well. In the early 1990s the adm inistration  of the USA en­
couraged the advisory, the m anagerial and the funding role of the B retton  Woods 
institu tions. USA private investments grew very fast in China. By 1994 their stock 
in C hina was over USD 6 billion (Far Eastern... 1995, p. 55) (the USA was the 
second largest investor, after Hong Kong). The volume of USA private direct in­
vestm ents in C entral and Eastern Europe, and in Russia, taken together, was still 
below th a t figure. The early ideas of the USA adm inistration were very optim istic. 
Some key experts of the Bush adm inistration anticipated a rapid and successful 
transition , based on broad popular support. They also expected th a t the debt of a 
num ber of Eastern European countries would be “grown out of” by a fast increase 
in trade. Five years after the beginning of the transition  process in Europe, it is 
evident th a t the role of the USA remains below the expectation of the countries; 
however, in China, the USA, as a source of capital and as a trading partner, has 
proved to be extrem ely im portant.
The developing world comprises one of the most contraversial and critical 
areas of the “external environm ent” of the reintegration of the former socialist 
countries into the global m arkets. This p art of the world itself occupies a very 
special place in the m arket system . Due to similarities in development levels, and 
also stru c tu ra l and institu tional weaknesses, many of the developing countries have 
faced similar problems in the past in the global economy (which the former socialist 
countries suffered earlier and are still struggling with). (China itself is, of course, 
a developing country, but the analysis of its political and economic ties with the 
former socialist countries in Europe and with the other developing countries is not 
a subject of this study.) The collapse of the Soviet Union influenced the global 
position of the developing countries in many ways. In political term s they lost 
some of the bargaining power which they had in a world divided into two hostile 
blocs. W ith the disappearance of the “Second W orld” , the “T hird  W orld” as a 
concept lost its justification. This change is not ju s t of symbolic im portance. Some 
of the developing countries lost an im portant source of assistance and political 
support as the result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the 
North does not need the South any more as a proxy or ally in the Cold W ar 
conflicts. A number of factors, such as non-alignment, which united the South in 
the Cold W ar, lost their earlier strengths. In economic term s, the asym m etries
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in interdependence between the North and the South were not only Cold W ar 
related. The minerals and agricultural commodities of the South became much 
less im portan t for the industrial world because of the struc tu ra l changes brought 
about by the new technological revolution. Economic interests and factors will 
play a much more im portan t role not only in the future N orth-South relations, 
bu t also South-East relations. The cheap qualified labour from the former socialist 
countries, and the export potential of these countries (especially the com m odity 
exports) mean increasing com petition with many developing countries. There is 
also com petition for external resources, foreign assistance, and FDI. A t the same 
tim e some of the former socialist countries, especially Russia, are guided their own 
economic interests and they are m aking new efforts to increase m utual trade  with a 
num ber of developing countries. This is particularly in Asia, where the continuity 
of relations from the Soviet era is supported by m utual interests. The relations 
between Russia and China are likely to become more significant, as they will be 
based more on economic interests, rationality  and complem entarity. The success 
of the consolidation of the former socialist countries and their integration into the 
global economy may, of course, open im portan t opportunities to  m any developing 
countries, providing the la tte r with new markets and investors.
An im portan t conclusion, which may be drawn from the external dimensions 
of the transition  process and the reintegration of the former “second world” to  the 
global m arket system , is th a t the whole process should be much higher on the 
global agenda, both in political and in economic term s, than it is today. Some 
experts even suggest th a t if the industrial economies of the West are increasingly 
able to  transfer a m ajor p art of the costs of adjustm ent to the “Second W orld”— 
as they already have to the “T hird  W orld” of the South—th e  Second W orld will 
be “th ird  worldized” . ( Frank 1993) The former socialist countries would not only 
require, of course, easier m arket access in areas where they are more com petitive, 
bu t also more assistance in development. This requires massive inflows of new 
technology, expertise and capital under more equitable conditions in order to  gen­
erate more quickly a new structure  of activities, capacities and in teractions so as 
to produce more com petitive goods. All these would dictate a faster restructuring  
of the economies, w ith adjustm ent and tem porary sacrifices on both sides. Even 
so. Eastern European countries often argue th a t they have already m ade im portan t 
sacrifices in their adjustm ent to the new m arket system  in term s of closing down 
inefficient firms, unem ploym ent, and austerity  programmes.
Issues such as easier access to  W estern m arkets and financial resources, the 
easing of the debt burden, technical assistance with institution-building, and tech­
nological m odernisation would require more concerted, and b etter harm onised ex­
ternal and domestic efforts. The failure of these efforts to establish m odern, efficient, 
economies and dem ocratic societies in the East would be a tragic loss not only for 
the people of those countries, but for the whole of hum ankind. I quote the warn­
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ings of Vaclav Havel, the President of the Czech Republic, who wrote about the 
poten tia l consequences of the transition  for the West:
it seems to me that the fate o f  the so called West is today being decided 
in the so-called East. I f  the West does not find a key to us, who were once violently 
separated from the West (with no great resistance on its part), or to those who 
somewhere far  away have likewise extricated themselves from communist domina­
tion, it will ultimately lose the key to itself. I f  for  instance, it looks passively on 
at “Eastern” or Balkan nationalism, it will give the green light to its own potential 
nationalism, which it was able to deal with so magnanimously in the era of com­
munist threat. I f  it closes its eyes to the post-communist ecological catastrophe, it 
will sooner or later bring on its own ecological catastrophe, and ultimately a global 
one. I f  it does not learn from our experience about where human pride can lead, 
the hubris of people who invent a rational utopia fo r  themselves and try to create a 
paradise on earth, i f  it persists in its anthropocentric understanding o f  the earth, it 
will bear the consequences itself, and so will the whole world. I f  its own consumer  
affluence remains more important for  it than all the foundations o f  that affluence, 
it will soon forfeit that affluence.”
Politicians often use doomsday prophecies. Still, I agree w ith President 
H avel’s warnings, bu t I would also add th a t in the absence of urgent strategic 
interests and considerations the reintegration process of the former socialist coun­
tries will take place increasingly according to the value judgem ent of the global 
m arkets, which recognise m ost of all competitiveness. In this respect, the outcom e 
of the process will increasingly depend on the success or the failures of their do­
mestic policies, actions and initiatives. They will have to devote more a tten tion  
to  relations with the “near abroad” . The internal socio-economic problem s of the 
W estern countries, including unemployment, slow economic growth, the high de­
gree of public debts, the aid fatigue of the population, and com m itm ents to  the 
developing countries will most probably weaken the feeling of responsibility and 
solidarity towards the transform ing East. In other words, the “honeym oon” with 
the system ic changes is fading. In the second half of the 1990s however, there is still 
tim e for “corrections” and for the development of effective policies to  support the 
transform ation process in an integrative way, on basis of the m utuality  of interests 
and gains.
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ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF PROTEST AND 
TOLERANCE
B. GRESKOVITS
In E ast-C en tra l E urope there  is no obvious reason why the  economic tran sitio n  should no t 
continue in  an  increasingly stable dem ocratic  environm ent. T his sta tem en t is re la ted  to  th e  s tru c ­
tu res , regim es and  political in stitu tio n s of the countries concerned. T hese facto rs should help  the  
citizens of th is region to endure w ith tolerance the  economic hardsh ips th a t  a re  concom itant to 
transform ation . Even large sectors of th e  population  which are unfavourably affected by  transfo r­
m atio n  ten d  to channel th e ir opposition to the reform s in to  non-violent “p ro tes t” (for instance, by 
voting down the government a t election tim e a n d /o r  transferring  a  p a r t  of their working capacities 
to  th e  black economy). T he relatively long period of tolerance which has becom e evident should 
enable a  process of consolidation to take place bo th  in the  economy and  in politics."
T he present study addresses the following questions:
—  W hy are the economic reforms of the post-com m unist countries taking 
place in a political environment th a t is more peaceful than  th a t found by researchers 
in Latin America, and how does this fact relate to researchers’ negative expectations 
w ith respect to  the future of East-C entral Europe?
—  W hat role can the differences between the respective political dynam ­
ics of the two regions play in social and economic structures, political systems, 
institu tions and organizations?
—  W hat are the similarities in the structures, institu tions and situation  
of the two regions th a t may result, or have resulted, in actual similarities  in the 
political and economic development of Latin America and East-C entral Europe.
We shall confine ourselves to  discussing the following questions:
Why has there been less political instability and violence in the first five years 
of transition in East-Central Europe than in several countries o f Latin America  
during the radical economic austerity programmes, despite the economic crises and 
the tensions that accompanied the reforms, and contrary to expectations?
To be more precise, the subject of this study does not focus on the relatively 
peaceful nature of the transition in 1989-90—rather, it examines the issue of why 
it has been peaceful since then. W hat are the argum ents suggesting th a t there 
are no reasons to  expect violent political upheavals in the East-C entral European 
region? W hat explains the fact tha t, only a few years after the collapse of commu­
nism, com m unist successor parties have been returned to government in dem ocratic 
elections in several countries of the region?
’ T his p ap er is based on the  theses of a  Ph . D. d issertation  defended a t the  H ungarian  Academ y 
of Sciences on 12 April 1996.
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The reader is probably familiar with opinions th a t in terpret the course of 
events in this region on the basis of analyses of the situation  and a ttitu d es of elites. 
I do not challenge the im portance of theories th a t focus on the role of elites, b u t my 
purpose here is to  complement them  with further observations which concentrate 
on the societal aspects of these processes.
What are “poor democracies” like? Or, in other words: how are the respective 
models o f  the new democracies influenced by the fact that in East-Central Europe— 
ju s t as in m ost of the Latin American region— the process of démocratisation has 
been going on amid economic crisis, radical transformation of social stratification, 
declining living standards, and the shrinking role of the state?
The question being pu t here does not ask whether democracy is in general 
com patible w ith transition  to  a m arket economy; instead the question has been 
form ulated in the following way: w hat type of democracy can evolve in the East- 
C entral European societies given the economic difficulties?
Why have populist political forces so far  failed to come into government in 
East-Central Europe despite certain forecasts? More exactly, why has a populist 
economic turnaround not taken place in any of these countries, even though this 
m ethod of direct political mobilisation has been repeatedly used in Latin America?
I consider these questions intriguing because, between 1990 and 1996— apart 
from the extrem ist parties— nearly all the parties (including some successor parties 
which a t the outset were certainly handicapped) have had the opportunity , serving 
in governm ent in turns, to  dem onstrate their governm ental and economic ideas. 
A further question follows: to what degree is it justified to predict a left-wing 
tu rn ab o u t in economic policy now th a t the communist successor parties have been 
returned  to  governm ent a t democratic elections? W hy is the E ast-C entral European 
scenario so different both from w hat many observes forecast and from th a t which 
followed in Latin America? I a ttem pt to answer these questions below.
1. There are differences in the two regions with regard to  the s tru c tu ra l causes 
of the dangers which th rea ten  the political and economic reforms; this is in term s 
of bo th  their social and economic im portance and other characteristics.
2. As a consequence, in East-C entral Europe the condition have favoured such 
forms of opposition to  transform ation which—both  in the economy and in politics— 
allow for a longer period of tolerance towards the unfolding and consolidation of 
reforms.
3. The structu ra l conditions of “tolerance” are complemented and s tren g th ­
ened by the following com ponents, (attached to  the political sphere):
—  there are differences in the political regimes of East-C entral Europe and 
the “rebellious” countries of Latin America;
—  there are differences in the two regions in term s of style of government 
and reform tactics;
—  there are marked differences in the two regions in term s of in ternal condi­
tions for political institu tions and organizations; the la tte r is especially valid w ith
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respect to  the character of relations between political parties, the professional or­
ganization of the business community, the trade unions and other organisations of 
civil society;
—  finally, there are differences in the two regions in term s of economic sit­
uations, and also with regard to the regions’ respective a ttitudes to  the outside 
world.
In the rest of the study I put forward my answers to these questions and also 
some predictions for the future.
Social structure and politics
Research which has centred upon the peaceful transform ation of Eastern Eu­
rope has given specific attention to the historical m om ent of seizing power peacefully 
in 1989-1990, and the related theories have dealt with the role of the elites. A com­
parison w ith Latin America has two advantages: it helps us understand  why the 
transform ation has continued peacefully in subsequent years, and the comparison 
enables us to  augm ent the theory of transition with societal aspects.
T he explanations given below are based on two premises:
According to the first premise, the presence of certain structural character­
istics and institu tional conditions promotes— and their absence hinders— the re­
peated  and forceful effects of certain types of th reats to  reforms.
According to  the other premise, the effect of such th reats is also influenced by 
w hether or not the various groups of the losers of the reform process have a chance 
to express their opinions and urge changes. There are struc tu ra l, institu tional and 
other preconditions for the freedom to choose which m ethods to use in order to 
express discontent. Below I will compare the two regions on the basis of these 
premises.
It is characteristic of East-C entral Europe th a t, in contrast to  Latin  Am er­
ica, the  structural risk factors  of violent political actions are of a  relatively lower 
im portance. Some of the phenom ena characteristic of Latin Am erica are not found 
in East-C entral Europe. These Latin American phenom ena include extrem e differ­
ences in income, poverty characteristic of the Third  World, very fast urbanisation, 
large areas of destitu te  and volatile m etropolitan slums, and the trad ition  of polit­
ical violence based on recurrent coups and popular riots.
Hence, it follows th a t in East-C entral Europe m ajor groups of society have 
apparently  greater reserves fo r  survival. Therefore, there is less compulsion to 
resort to  the m ost precipitate and radical forms of protest. These groups are 
apparently  less prepared to indulge in such actions to halt the reforms or a t least 
ward off their unfavourable consequences. In East-C entral Europe the risk of riots 
and other violent opposition to  reforms is ra ther low. From a structu ra l point of
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view, this may explain why it has been less likely th a t—in contrast to  events in 
Latin  America during the 1980s—riots and dem onstrations, including looting and 
casualties, will disrupt transition  in East-C entral Europe.
It is true th a t impoverished people, who can barely eke ou t a hopeless ex­
istence and lack sufficient reserves of “tolerance” , are to be found in the post­
communist region. However, their situation is different from their Latin  American 
counterparts in th a t they are not numerous and are more isolated. .Thus there is a 
much smaller likelihood th a t they might a ttem p t to  organise political action.
These groups lack sufficient reserves to be tolerant but they also lack the 
resources (numerical strength and organisation) for  radical protest. Despite being 
without reserves, they are destined to be tolerant. As alternatives, they either make 
a living in the black economy or they have to  wait until the next elections when 
they may vote against the reforms.
Poor people in East-C entral Europe are occasionally without the influential 
allies needed to make their protest effective. Popular discontent over IM F policies in 
L atin  Am erica involved large-scale dem onstrations. These were successful because, 
a t a crucial m om ent, the relations of the organisers— who came from civil society, 
the institutionalised political system and the trade unions— were not m arked by 
rivalry and exclusion but a desire to  find allies and coordinate action.
W ith  or w ithout coordination protest action either does not take place at all, 
or is doomed to  failure. It can be argued th a t the political dynam ics of the economic 
reforms are more balanced in East-C entral Europe than  in Latin Am erica because 
the relationship of the potential organisers of protests are characterised (owing to 
the transitional character of their position) by the absence of solidarity and co­
operation, the search for  monopoly situations and defence of the status quo.
This point about organisational and institu tional features also has a strong 
influence on the forms and intensity of the ways in which the various strata of  
workers can assert their interests. Even though the organisation of workers in 
East-C entral Europe is usually higher than in Latin America and the trade  unions 
have a controlling position in strategic sectors of the economy, in East-C entral 
Europe strikes do not have to be reckoned with as a serious potential th rea t to the 
political process.
One of the reasons for this is th a t, initially (with the exception of Poland), 
few of the East-C entral European trade unions had the sufficient prestige to  a ttra c t 
support for a strike, and they looked a t one another as rivals. Later on, the  road to  
radical forms of collective action was blocked by the fast deteriorating living condi­
tions and the ever higher ra te  of unemployment. (Poland is not an exception in this 
respect.) A nother reason may be th a t, when seeking to  restore their tarnished pres­
tige, trade  unions have tended to prefer the strategy of co-operation with company 
m anagem ents, ra ther than  starting  risky open conflicts in the workplace.
This has an explanation which is partly  structural: as a consequence of the 
dom inant role of public property the members of the m anagem ent in sta te-run  com-
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panies are more prepared than private entrepreneurs to resolve workshop conflicts 
by exerting pressure on the sta te  in co-operation with the trade unions.
Consequently, in East-C entral Europe— partly  for s truc tu ra l, in stitu tional 
and organisational reasons— the workers, too, have to  be more to leran t vis a vis the 
reforms, difficult as they are, than  in the “rebellious countries” of Latin  America. 
Even though workers’ organisations hope th a t participation  in lobbying will be 
successful, they still make money on the side in the black economy, or they wait for 
the opportun ity  to express their p rotest over the reforms a t the next elections. All 
these factors help to make their a ttitude  more conductive to  balanced progress and 
the political dynamics of the reforms are rendered more peaceful than  the respective 
cases in Latin America in the first half of the 1980s.
A nother factor making the political dynamics of East-C entral Europe more 
balanced is th a t, in this region, the proportion o f  elderly people and rural residents 
in the respective populations is much higher than  in Latin America. These people 
have very limited freedom of choice as far as the forms of protest against reforms 
are concerned. As a rule, elderly people rarely ever take part in riots, organised 
uprisings, and mass dem onstration; if for no other reason, this is due to their age 
and frail health. They cannot go on strike in order to express their discontent 
for they are usually out of work. In most cases, they are not wealthy enough to 
oppose the reforms by capital flight. Even if they a ttem p t to lobby for b e tter 
living conditions they have to  depend on the help of other people, often those with 
little  influence. Members of the rural society are often in a similar position: they 
rarely go on strike because they lack the organisations for such an action, and 
they are unable to bring about “effective” revolts because their settlem ents in the 
countryside are too scattered.
It is for these structu ra l reasons th a t the above groups have no o ther alter­
native bu t to  be to lerant. The only “weapon” left for them  is the casting of a 
vote against the economic reforms which they hold responsible for their growing 
burdens.
It can be concluded from these considerations th a t in E ast-C entral Europe it 
is elections which form the principal political method of protest against the reforms 
(reforms which are believed to  bring about social hardships). Paralysing uprisings, 
dem onstrations ending in violence, hunger strikes and industrial strikes have not 
played a part in the transition in East-Central Europe. Hence it follows th a t in 
E ast-C entral Europe the structurally  determ ined and typical dangers to apparently  
risk-laden reforms are much more “program m ed” by the calendar of elections. This 
is not so in Latin America. The reason for this is not th a t citizens in East-C entral 
Europe have more confidence in the new achievements of democracy than citizens 
in Latin America. Instead, in East-C entral Europe the poor, the workers, the 
elderly and those living in the countryside (who, taken together, account for the 
greater part of the population) form the political basis for involuntary tolerance in 
relation to the economic reforms. On the other hand, and due to the sam e factors,
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it is mostly stru c tu ra l and partly  institu tional influences in E ast-C entral Europe 
elections which are much more im portan t as potential threats against reforms. This 
is not so for Latin America.
The political a ttitu d e  of the populations of East-C entral Europe tends to sub­
s tan tia te  the criteria of economic reforms realised under dem ocratic conditions, as 
defined by Przeworski: "... all groups must channel their dem ands through demo­
cratic institu tions and abjure other tactics. Regardless of how pressing their needs 
may be, the politically relevant groups m ust be willing to subject their interests to 
the verdict of dem ocratic institutions. They m ust be willing r.c accept. f}efea t and to 
wait, confident, th a t these institu tions will continue to  offer opportun ities the next 
tim e around. They .must adopt the institu tional calendar as the tem poral horizon 
of their actions, thinking in term s of forthcom ing elections, contract negotiations, 
or a t least fiscal years.” (Przeworski 1991, p. 180.)
The political management of economic reforms
I t goes w ithout saying th a t the social reception and political dynam ics of 
the  economic reforms are not affected solely by the dangers th a t are em bedded 
in the  economic and the social structure. Any conflict th a t arises in the wake of 
protests and opposition is a form of interaction. The dimension of a conflict, and 
its duration and direction depend not only on the people who sta rt it and use it as a 
th rea t, but also on those people who are challenged. When in Latin Am erica there 
was popular unrest in protest over the conduct of the IMF, the party  challenged 
was, w ithout doubt, the state. Given the facts th a t in East-C entral Europe the 
post-com m unist s ta te  still wields trem endous weight and authority  and paternalist 
a ttitu d es have hardly been superseded, society has a good reason to  th ink  th a t the 
s ta te  has an enormous responsibility for all th a t happens to the economy or the 
living conditions.
Evidently, in interactions th a t characterise the political dynam ics of reforms, 
the o ther pole, the sta te , must not be reckoned with as a merely passive actor. The 
s ta te  is not confined merely to  responding to the th reats th a t endanger its reforms. 
On the contrary, its characteristics, its a ttitude , shrewdness, action preferences, 
choices and tactics exert a massive influence on whether or not there are protest 
against the reforms.
Two types of the s ta te ’s tactics and strategies related to  reform seem to 
be relevant: the bureaucratic organisational and oppressive measures, which often 
precede or go together with the reforms; and the compensation granted for the 
genuine or assumed victims of the reforms.
As for the a ttitu d e  of the sta te , it is an im portan t precondition of tolerance 
th a t m ajor social groups should have the will to wait and it should be worthwhile for
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them to wait. This criterion was brought nearer to realisation in the course of the 
transform ation of East-C entral Europe during the early 1990s ra ther than  it was 
with the radical reforms of Latin America in the 1980s. W hile in the “rebellious” 
countries of Latin America the adjustm ent of the national economies was often 
started  by regimes of an au thoritarian  nature, democracy is one of the m ain aims 
of the E ast-C entral European countries. In Latin America, those protesting against 
reforms did not have the opportunity  to express their discontent a t the polls and 
thus were more prone to apply violent m ethods. In East-C entral Europe going to 
the polls is already a universally accepted form of protest in the political system . 
Analysts have therefore to  be familiar with this tra it of the political regimes in this 
region if they wish to  know the cause of East-Central European tolerance.
A t the same time, reformist regimes in Latin America and elsewhere in the 
T hird  World, (including the democratic ones) have often resorted to pre-em ptive 
bureaucratic  organisational and repressive measures like the extension of presiden­
tial powers, rule by government orders, applying violence against the parliam ent, 
the establishm ent of special committees, cabinets and presidential advisory bod­
ies to assist the work of influential economic policy decision-makers, reorganising 
the s ta te  bureaucracy, disbanding bureaucratic power centres which oppose gov­
ernm ent policy, secretiveness, shunning consultations w ithin the bureaucracy and 
w ith representatives of capital and labour, capitalising on disunity between the pro­
fessional organisations, and ignoring or repressing various forms of protest. Some 
of these measures have also been applied by governments in Eastern Europe while 
im plem enting reforms during the transition from communism to m arket economy. 
However, in East-C entral Europe such measures have lessened the im portance of 
bureaucratic sabotage as a potential weapon against reform.
The activities of the political m anagem ent which have helped to  im plem ent 
economic reforms have not, of course, been confined— neither in E ast-C entral Eu­
rope nor in Latin America—to repressive measures th a t have sought to neutralise 
collective action against reforms. Compensation has been one of the alternatives 
to the above m easures. W hile in Latin America compensation, if it was used at 
all, was only given after public disturbances related to the IM F-inspired measures, 
in the early 1990s in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary com pensation often 
accom panied or even preceded reforms as part of the stabilisation package.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely th a t prelim inary agreements and com pensation 
would certainly have prevented public disturbances over the IM F-inspired m ea­
sures in Latin America. However, it seems probable th a t the agreem ent signed in 
E ast-C entral Europe with regard to tem porary m oratoria on strikes and on g ran t­
ing m odest com pensation, were timed well so as to ensure th a t political tolerance 
related to  the reforms in this region should rest on yet another pillar.
R eturning for a moment to the structu ral conditions of “tolerance” , the afore­
said tra in  of thought enables us to argue against the view th a t dem ocracy may be 
dangerous for the transform ation process going on in East-C entral Europe. It is
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regularly alleged tha t, owing to the newly won democracy, decision-makers are 
showered with numerous impossible dem ands by social groups. A t an earlier pe­
riod such groups were devoid of the right to  voice their opinions. O thers allege th a t 
democracy may help th a t sort of politician to  achieve power who will then sacri­
fice (for his or her political aspirations) the countries’ economic interests. A ttention  
needs to  be draw n to another aspect of democracy, which the above argum ents over­
look. In East-C entral Europe democracy has made it possible to  avoid a situation  
in which economic and social demands might develop into devastating explosions 
and be channelled in a predictable manner.  These political conditions have not 
done harm  to  the economic reforms in East-C entral Europe—instead, they have 
prom oted the transform ation of the respective economies. T hus they have a whole­
some effect, in the same way as the structu ra l and institu tional conditions in this 
region have v irtually  compelled the populations to be to lerant towards the reforms.
If the prospects of the reforms really do face any danger in East-C entral Eu­
rope, the source of the danger is not to  be found in politics but ra ther in uthe 
economy” . The main th reats to reforms may be those forms of opposition in which 
economic a c to rs -w h o  represent companies with intertw ined ownership, and m an­
agem ent and interests which often co-ordinate their actions—attem p t to  thw art the 
reforms. Furtherm ore, the typical th reats to reforms in East-C entral Europe— much 
more so than in Latin America— are program m ed according to the rules of tolerance 
and have, in addition to  political causes, structural and institu tional causes which 
can influence economic attitudes. In East-C entral Europe, the typical and dom i­
nan t economic forms of opposition of the groups whose situation is unfavourably 
affected by the reforms do not tend to be direct and impulsive bu t ra ther ones 
whose effects are only felt in the medium term . Thus in E ast-C entral Europe those 
opposing reforms prefer lobbying, raising loans w ithout cover, abusing m onopolistic 
dom inance of power in order to transfer massive am ounts of capital abroad. Even 
though the danger of a large number of people engaging in the black economy may 
assume “L atin  Am erican” dimensions, its harm ful effects can only be felt in the 
m edium  term .
There can be tradeoffs between the various types of th rea ts  to reform. There 
have been several occasions in East-C entral Europe when the possibility for pre­
cip ita te  forms of resistance, which posed a direct challenge, were transform ed into 
th rea ts  of a delayed effect. In other words, the possibility of strikes, dem onstra­
tions or other forms of protest were converted to lobbying, engaging in the black 
economy, or voting for parties th a t oppose reforms. In E ast-C entral Europe such 
tradeoffs also strengthen tolerance as a form of response to reforms.
Due to  the fact th a t the sizeable and influential groups who are unfavourably 
affected by the reforms tend to  express their opposition in delayed forms owing 
to s tru c tu ra l and other factors in the economy and in politics, the consolidation 
of reforms can enjoy longer grace periods. Therefore, in E ast-C entral Europe the 
reform ist governments enjoy the chance to make plans for  longer terms, even in
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cases when the measures involved are time-consuming and hazardous. As a conse­
quence, the interplay of politics and economy policy in East-C entral Europe offers 
more room for manoeuvre in the process of dém ocratisation and allows the m arket 
reforms to  progress along a stable path.
In East-C entral Europe the casting of votes a t elections is the m ost popular 
political type of th reat to reforms involving austerity measures. However, voting 
has another consequence. W henever a new occasion for voting arises (in a sched­
uled or unscheduled m anner), the period of tolerance may be shortened, the span 
of tim e for forward economic planning may be reduced and there is an increased 
risk th a t the vote of protest will retard or bring to a halt certain reform measures, 
or indeed the whole process of reform. W henever voters have the chance to  ex­
press their protest a t the polls, reforms may become key and sensitive cam paign 
issues. In the cases of referenda, of presidential elections or of votes of no confidence 
th a t bring down governments (and held between scheduled general elections), the 
chronological rhy thm  of democracy may be speeded up; in fact, the entire demo­
cratic calendar may be restructured. This explains why we consider the struc tu ra l 
approach to  the complexities of political dynamics to be so limited, and why we 
regard it as necessary to  extend our analysis to  the country-by-country character­
istics of political institutions, patterns, the relationship between governm ent and 
parliam ent, and the internal set-up and tactics of the government.
Viewed from a structu ral point of view, it is a tenable proposition th a t in East- 
C entral Europe the main political danger to reforms which involve social hardships 
are the protest votes. Provided this observation holds true, political parties, along 
with governments, are the principal actors in the political dynam ics of reforms. 
Extraordinary  political im portance is gained by political parties due to the fact 
th a t they are— also for structu ral reasons—more effective vehicles for the expres­
sion of opposition to reforms than are other organisations. This conclusion poses 
interesting questions for further analyses. First of all, w hat have political parties 
themselves done to  employ their dominance over other organisations of political 
im portance, and how have they used their influence?
The case of Hungary shows th a t in this country they have done a lot to a t­
tain  these goals. Since the beginning of the transition, a t times of social or political 
conflicts, the political parties and other institu tional representatives of democracy 
have usually closed their ranks. They have shown themselves to  be com m itted de­
fenders of the sta tu s  quo whenever the various professional organisations or civilian 
organisations (which were excluded from having a control over economic policy) 
have attem pted  to reorganise the political and institu tional system.
Even if the conduct of the political parties has often been defensive and ex­
cluding, it has to be adm itted th a t it has promoted the consolidation of democracy 
because it has encouraged the process of learning the rules of democracy. W ith  th a t 
conduct the political parties have contributed to the process in which the transi­
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tional society has been able to get over the chaotic, “fluid” sta te  of im balance (in 
fact, faster than  some observes would have predicted).
Characteristics of the East-Central European democracies
It is probably easy to accept the argum ents related to  the consolidation of 
the political system. However, there is a more difficult question: W hat kind of a 
regime, what kind of democracy is striking roots in Hungary?
It is, first of all, a democracy which has occasionally been built with other 
than democratic methods: exclusive and secretive negotiations between m em bers of 
the elite, as well as covert pacts and agreements.
It is a poor democracy which som ewhat contrasts with the expectations a t­
tached to  the change of regime. For economic reasons it is unable to  satisfy the 
dem ands of the social groups which have long been neglected, however justified the 
dem ands of the la tte r are.
Consequently— as far as the control of economic policy and related political 
aspects are concerned— this democracy has marked exclusive characteristics. Using 
the term s of Acuna and Smith  (1994), we could describe it as a dual democracy. 
The balance of a dual democracy is based on the alliance concluded by the sta te  
elites and a strategically im portan t minority of the opposition, the com pensation 
with political and m aterial means of the minority, and on pushing the rest of the 
population to  the periphery.
At this point, the theory which is based on the analysis of the elites should be 
com plem ented with societal aspects. W hen the regime set out on a course of dual 
democracy, the sta te  elites started  to share the selective decisions and the exclusive 
measures concerning the persons and proportion of those to be excluded, and the 
measure and m ethod of their exclusion. The sharing was done with those forces 
whom they chose to be involved in the exercise of power.
In this connection, it is justified to  look at the issues which always arise 
whenever the various types of democracy are analysed. Were not those who drew 
the dem arcation line between those to be involved in the exercise of power and 
those to  be excluded from it too rash and too ungenerous? It can be said th a t the  
sta tu s  quo th a t has been m aintained has not excluded from the exercise of power 
unjustifiably large groups of people. Is the regime suitable for allowing the “liberal 
com ponent of dem ocracy”— i.e. those connected to basic freedoms— to unfold?
To complement w hat has been said so far, let us m ake it clear once again 
th a t in the evolving new regime, the elections, which is the dom inant— and for 
the m ajority, only available— mode of expressing opinions and influence, have been 
institutionalised w ith striking speed due to the s tructu ra l, in stitu tional and organ­
isational appara tus which has been set in motion.
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In East-C entral Europe even the political dynam ics of the rejected economic 
reforms is affected prim arily by the rhythm ic and predictable a lternation  of toler­
ance. The occasions of dem ocratic protests make it easier to  explain how communist 
successor parties have been able to come to power in several countries o f  the region 
only a few years after the collapse o f communism.
The explanation which confines its a tten tion  to the political elite lays em pha­
sis on particu lar historical aspects of the transform ation and the ways in which the 
elite of the  former regime was affected by the changes. It is valid to  argue th a t in 
E ast-C entral Europe the transform ation has been of a negotiated ra ther th an  of a 
revolutionary character. As a consequence, former elites have not been elim inated. 
Hence it follows th a t the intact elite of the former regime rem ained re-electable 
for the subsequent cycle of elections. Moreover, the nostalgia for full em ploym ent, 
stable prices and social security for all also helped the post-com m unist elite in 
several countries of the region to score a decisive victory at the elections. Based 
on w hat has been said so far in this study, these argum ents can be com plem ented 
by explanations emphasising the societal aspects. In East-Central Europe, the ab­
sence of radical, direct and emotional protest actions on the one hand, and the 
dramatic shift of democratic political confidence and support between the opposing 
political poles on the other, form  the two sides of the same coin. The more valid 
the sta tem ent which says th a t the societies of East-C entral Europe are “destined to 
tolerance” in periods between the elections for structural and institu tional reasons, 
the greater is the am ount of pent-up animosity which originates from grievances 
caused by the reform, and this may be unleashed on election day. The more eco­
nomic hardships the people have to endure with tolerance, the stronger the citizens’ 
desire to punish in a democratic manner a t the polls by dismissing those they hold 
responsible for their losses. It is largely due to the factors which bring about social 
tolerance, explored above, th a t the political parties have proved to  be more efficient 
than  the trade unions and the other organisations and movements of civil society 
in translating  economic grievances into the language of political protest.
As a result there is a strong demand for political parties who are the m ost 
su itable for mobilising people to protest against reforms. T h a t dem and is so strong 
th a t already, during the first five years of East-Central Europe’s history after the 
collapse of communism, in most countries of the region the a ttrac tion  of such parties 
repeatedly been exem pt from prejudices arising from voters’ ideological likes and 
dislikes. The dem and for parties which seek to  enlist votes of protest has been 
so keen th a t nearly every actor of the emerging party  spectrum — initially even 
the post-com m unist parties, which started  with a serious handicap— has had the 
chance to try  and tackle, in a position in government, the extreme difficulties of 
transform ation into a dem ocratic m arket economy.
One of the possible offshoots of this is th a t the governm ents dom inated by 
post-com m unist parties in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary or elsewhere may receive
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the same devastating dem ocratic punishm ent if they fail to handle successfully the 
problems of economic transform ation which confronted their predecessors.
Finally, if it is assumed tha t the political parties in East-C entral Europe are 
indeed the most im portan t vehicles of the process which transform s discontent over 
the reforms into protest and results in democratic support for those dem anding 
changes, the essential question arises: to w hat extent are the reforms themselves 
influenced by the ideologically-tainted economic ideas of the various parties?
The economic policy pursued in East-Ceniral Europe hardly reflects the ideo­
logical preferences of those who have provided its outlines and who are implementing  
it. In this sense, it seems to be rather colourless. For the tim e being it seems th a t 
whoever comes to power in the region is, on the whole, bound to  continue the 
same economic policy—as approved by the in ternational financial organisations 
and supported  by the European Union—which has compelled those aggrieved by 
the reforms to dismiss a t the elections the incum bent governing parties.
The reason for this is th a t the unfavourable macro-economic conditions and 
the strict international rules of the game have reduced to a m in im um  the room fo r  
political manoeuvre and thus the direction of economic policy is not the subject of 
choice. The influence of politics has not been entirely neutralised by the economic 
crisis and in ternational obligations. Nevertheless, as far as economic issues are 
concerned, the influence of politics is confined to a relatively narrow area— namely, 
w ithin an economic policy approved by consensus. The austerity  of the situation 
ham pers the realisation of even those principles of economic ideology with which 
the actors in the political arena traditionally associated themselves during their 
public perform ances before the voters. In fact, even the economic program m es of 
the strongest political parties—as set out in their election m anifestoes— are ra ther 
similar. Yet even if they are not, the necessities of economic policy a t governm ental 
level block the way for anyone to  act as a “maverick” .
In view of these circumstances, in East-C entral Europe— contrary to  the ex­
pectations of certain observers—populist economic episodes of the Latin American 
type are unlikely to occur. Moreover, the dominance of economic austerity  over pol­
itics is reflected both by the absence of populist episodes and the fact th a t economic 
policy is only to  a small extent m anipulated for election purposes.
The macro-economic indicators of transform ation in E ast-C entral Europe 
show no sign of either “opportunistic” or “party  political” cycles. I t has not been 
the case in any of the countries of the region th a t, after the elections, inflation and 
economic growth have shown a tendency to decline and unem ploym ent grow while, 
as new elections approach, employment and the growth rate increase. Instead, each 
of these macro-economic indicators move up or down on their own, independently 
of the governm ental terms: recession has been the order of the day for four to five 
years; it has gone rather deep during the past four years, and there have been no 
signs of any decrease of unem ploym ent. Even though galloping inflation has been 
curbed in several countries (although not everywhere), it is still ra ther high. The
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coming and going of various parties leaves little  im print on the economic indicators. 
Instead, parties of the m ost various political and ideological character, which keep 
changing places in government, have carried out with more or less success the same 
economic policy measures of stabilisation and adjustm ent.
It can be concluded th a t the mere fact th a t post-com m unist parties have in 
some countries come to  power does not justify the fear of the im m inent dom inance 
of economic populism  and of the occurrence of irrational economic adventures. On 
the contrary, for the politicians of East-C entral Europe, including those of left-wing 
and the populist views, will probably have to wait until the next phase of economic 
recovery before they become able to  reorient economic policy in accordance w ith 
their ideological and political preferences.
The other conclusion is th a t in East-C entral Europe the m ost typical weapon 
employed against the reforms—i.e. the democratic vote of protest— does not seem 
to be efficient. Tim e and again, the voters vote down the parties associated with 
economic policies th a t severely afflict their interests, only to witness the re tu rn  of 
the sam e economic policies under the banner of other parties.
The central thesis of this short study is th a t the citizens o f  East-Central Eu­
rope are destined to profess tolerance in the phase of the hardships of transformation  
fo r  structural, regime-related and institutional reasons. The involuntary tolerance 
of the societies of this region are— as Hirschman would put i t— a “credit with lim­
ited m aturity”, but because the period of tolerance is longer, it will probably be easier 
to remedy the situation than in Latin America. It is impossible to tell whether or 
not the protracted period o f  tolerance will, ultimately, be long enough. However, 
the fact that it has not come to an end yet strengthens the arguments o f  those who 
say that East-Central Europe will not be “Latin Americanised’’. In other words, 
the chances are greater than might be expected for  economic transformation to take 
place in East-Central Europe in parallel with a process of increasingly consolidated 
démocratisation.
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ECONOMICS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE
P. KNIRSCH
Even several years a fte r th e  beginning of transition  from  the  collapsed com m unist system s 
to parliam entary  dem ocracy and m arket economy it cannot be convincingly s ta ted  th a t  econom ists 
have been able to  con tribu te  to the  fundam ental system ic change. In sp ite  of th e  doubtless 
successes of economics in the ex post facto  analysis of economic processes of various social system s, 
econom ists’ intellectual efforts have only been satisfactory  to  a  lim ited extent.
Since economics failed to deliver scientific foundations of a  sound economic policy, tria l 
and  e rrp r and  in tu ition  have apparently  been m ore useful in shaping economic policy th an  the  
con trad ic to ry  views of respected  economists.
Econom ics canno t disregard the  necessity of developing consistent an d  universally valid 
exp lanations th a t  do no t con trad ic t each o th er and discovering the  reasons of conflicts betw een 
existing theories. Taking th is approach would also m ake it  easier to  determ ine those conditions 
u n d er which it is ap p ro p ria te  to  apply various theoretical explanations.
The collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe in 1989-90 was also 
accom panied by the breakdown of the economic system s existing in the respective 
countries of the region. After the collapse, two of the main economic aims in all the 
countries concerned were th a t social ownership of the means of production should 
largely be replaced by private ownership, and in the place of directive planning the 
m arket mechanism should be allowed to dominate. S tructural disproportions which 
had their origins in political dogma were to be abolished and foreign trade was to 
be opened up so th a t a place could be found in the com petitive structures of the 
world economy.
The aims of economic transition, briefly outlined above, were virtually  the 
same in all post-com m unist countries and their basic ideas were not difficult to 
interpret..1 W hat was less clear and what varied from country to country was the 
idea of how to realize those aims. For economics, law, politics, sociology, and even 
philosophy, the transform ation presented itself as a historically unique scientific 
task: in seven (in 1991) countries2 (am ongst them  the huge Soviet Union), with 
a to ta l of about 500 million inhabitants and dem onstrating a  range of economic
1 T his m ay a t least be said ab o u t the  beginning of the  transform ation  process. Due to  the 
hardsh ip  connected w ith the  economic transition , and  with the  pa rtia l revival of com m unist ideas, 
nowadays one can h ear some doubts abou t the necessity of such a  com plete change in the  econom ic 
system .
2 25 countries have em erged since the  collapse of the  Soviet Union and  Yugoslavia and  the 
p a rtitio n  of Czechoslovakia.
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standards from medium to high, social orders which had lasted for between 40 to 
70 years were to  be changed fundamentally.
T he transform ation process relates to all spheres of life. It calls for solutions 
from all fields of the social sciences. However, this little  essay deals only w ith some 
reflections on the changes being a ttem pted  in the economic systems. There is no 
doubt th a t in the East and the West this topic has inspired many economists to offer 
some advice or a t least make some comment. Nevertheless, five or six years after 
the beginning of the transform ation process, today it cannot be convincingly sta ted  
th a t economists have been able to show politicians the best way to accomplish 
this fundam ental system  change, nor has economic science developed a general 
theory for the system  transform ation. In all East European countries the systemic 
change is being carried out using trial and error procedures. So far, econom ists 
have offered several variants, s tarting  out from the “shock therapy” through to  a 
slower, gradual process. (Lavigne 1995; Sponger 1994) Here, the intention is not 
to try  and analyse all the different experim ents, but rather to  discuss generally 
whether or not contem porary economic science is capable of really contributing to 
the im plem entation of the aspired systemic changes.
As the economic transition  in Eastern Europe has set as its general aim  devel­
opm ent into a m arket economy, perhaps it. needs to be asked if western economics 
can possibly explain the m arket system .
Economic science as an independent branch of the social sciences is relatively 
young—it goes back ju s t over 200 years. During these two centuries a num ber 
of economic theories have been developed in order to explain the forms taken by 
society’s efforts to satisfy needs adequately and to  distribute the results of eco­
nomic activity. However, these intellectual efforts have only been satisfactory to 
a lim ited extent: economic science has been of great significance insofar as it has 
drawn atten tion  to  social weaknesses in a capitalistic system based on an industrial 
economy. It has thus provided impulses for changing the interpersonal d istribution 
of goods and services and has helped to improve the economic situation  of large 
segm ents of the population, especially of wage earners. Economics has in itiated a 
continuous evolutionary process of change in the capitalistic countries of the West, 
and the s ta te  has also contributed increasingly to  im plem enting such change by 
means of its social policy, as well as by means of direct intervention with regard to 
the d istribution  policy. At the same time, the sta te  has created a framework for 
the redistribution struggles which regularly arise between enterprises and employ­
ees (organized in trade unions). Such struggles have also had a significant influence 
on social change under capitalism  up to the present time.
It should be noted that, economic science has not only provided impulses for 
the process of social change under capitalism  described above, bu t has also always 
tried to explain the functioning of the system  as a whole. In fact, it could be argued 
th a t its influence on improving the system, increasing its overall efficiency, elimi­
nating  m alfunctions, and preventing waste, has been much less significant than  its
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influence on social change. It is true th a t numerous theories have been developed 
to explain specific phenomena, but for the most part these theories have provided 
widely differing and sometimes totally contradictory explanations and have usu­
ally represented ex post facto  a ttem pts to explain a concrete situation . Repeated 
attem p ts  have been made to formulate a “general theory”— a claim occasionally 
made in well-known book titles— but. such a ttem p ts have by no means been widely 
accepted. Instead, they have tended to reflect differences of opinion am ong various 
schools of thinking, and they have not been genuinely capable of form ulating or 
explaining longer-term economic changes in the system as a whole.
Up until now, economic science has been unable to offer a generally accepted 
explanation of how individual economic systems function or how they function in 
comparison with each other. Yet such an explanation would be the basis for a sci­
entific approach to the problems of the transform ation process in Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, during the course of its development W estern economic science has 
provided argum ents for changing the overall system. In this connection, the fact 
th a t it has pointed out obvious defects or problems in the functioning of economic 
system s or could explain them  in part, was im portant. In addition to  the social 
problem s already discussed, the following problems have been addressed in partic­
ular: the intensity of economic activity in the business cycle; the lim its of the price 
mechanism  as a coordination instrum ent, including the creation of monopolies and 
insufficient allocation of funds for the needs of society as a whole ( “public goods” ); 
full em ploym ent, m onetary value and foreig.i trade equilibrium as problems of eco­
nomic stability, closely associated with business cycles in particular; and problems 
associated with achieving economic growth in order to improve satisfaction of needs.
These m ultifarious a ttem pts at explanation undertaken by economic science 
have tended to arrive a t the overall conclusion that a functioning economic sys­
tem should not only be influenced by free enterprise based on private ownership of 
the means of production and m arket coordination of individual economic processes 
(the “laisser-faire” principle or the “free play of m arket forces” ); they have also 
pointed out th a t the sta te  should be involved in establishing the legal framework 
for this system , and should provide means for corrective intervention through its 
economic policy (particularly  with regard to social problems). It is well known 
th a t views vary greatly about the extent to which the sta te  needs to intervene or 
whether such intervention is even compatible with a market economy. Such views 
are based more on ideological conviction than on scientific proof. They range from 
argum ents for a m inimum of economic policy-making, (which still includes consid­
erable government intervention in a modern Western economy, as could be seen in 
the cases of Thatcherism  and Reaganomics), to those stressing the lim iting of pri­
vate ownership of the means of production by nationalizing sectors of the economy 
or enterprises, and by employing nondirective government planning ( “indicative 
planning” , “planification” ) in addition to market relations. Views about the appli­
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cation of direct and indirect economic policy instrum ents within the framework of 
a  basically capitalistic economic system  are equally diverse.
Today, it can be seen th a t all developed industrial countries have mixed 
economic system s in which private ownership of the means of production is subject 
to  various degrees of lim itation. Although the m arket mechanism continues to 
be the most im portan t instrum ent of coordination it is supplem ented (or even 
replaced) in many areas by specific economic policy measures (when these measures 
are coordinated, this can be described as central planning—it is only a question 
of terminological convention). The European Union’s Common A gricultural Policy 
(CA P) probably serves as the clearest example, but. in West European countries 
coal and steel, energy supply, transport and communications, com m unity services, 
the m onetary and credit system are all subject to the particular influence of the 
s ta te , i.e. its economic policy. Even so, it is striking to see how effective m arket 
coordination continues to be.
It is true th a t economic science, by studying the problem s associated with 
the functioning of a  capitalist economy, has helped to  identify the areas where 
government needs to  form ulate an active economic policy. However, it  is fair to  say 
it would have been possible to  identify these areas by using common sense even if 
no scientific findings were available. The investigations carried out by economists 
have certainly m ade many complicated relationships more understandable and, 
a t least in some areas, the scientific foundations of economic policy have been 
expanded enormously (compared to  sixty or seventy years ago). Despite this, I 
think it is obvious th a t, with regard to  very im portan t questions, economic theory 
has not been capable of developing a reliable foundation upon which economic 
policymakers can base their decisions. This is not m eant as a reproach, bu t simply 
as a sta tem ent th a t there is som ething lacking. After all, a national economy 
is enormously complex and, in view of the lim itations to which hum an thinking 
is subject, economic science can explain only a few aspects of past and present 
situations. In this connection, the real reason economics is often so isolated from 
reality lies in the inevitability of the ceteris paribus condition, which sounds highly 
scientific to  the layman.
The social significance of economics is clearly limited by the restrictions on 
the applicability of its theories, and by the lack of any connection between the the­
ories and reality. The knowledge available today shows no signs th a t this s ituation  
has changed or will change. C urrent economic science can offer only a lim ited basis 
for m aking decisions about im portan t economic problems like the transform ation 
of economic system s. The weakness of economics is also obvious, for instance, with 
regard to the search for policies for reducing or elim inating unem ploym ent in m ost 
W estern industrial countries. Furtherm ore, economics has produced no concrete so­
lutions for cyclical fluctuations, inflation, long-term  deficits or surpluses in national 
budgets and foreign trade— all of these being areas where tria l and error or in tu ­
ition have apparently  been more useful for economic policy than  the contradictory
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views of respected economists. From an international point of view, the problem s 
m entioned above are in reality of a quite local nature; however, when considering 
the continued existence or satisfactory development of the developing countries, 
overcoming their population or nutritional problems or even solving the problems 
posed by their foreign debts we are looking at issues which represent much greater 
challenges to  economic scientists. The social changes th a t have necessarily unfolded 
as capitalist economies have undergone continuous development have created global 
problems.
In dealing with the la tter worldwide economic doctrine varies considerably 
due the respective ideas of the neoclassic, neoliberal, and (neo-)historic schools of 
economic thinking. Over the past few years the “New Economics” has tried to  take 
into consideration ecologic points of view and has focused on the need for changes 
in hum an behaviour. In several ways these theories may be partially relevant for 
the system ic change in East Europe. Yet we should not forget th a t in the former 
socialist countries a different economic way of thinking dom inated, m ainly based 
on Karl M arx's economic ideas (even though he himself s tarted  out from the works 
of the classic school). There can be no doubt tha t, from a historical point of view, 
M arx is a particularly  im portant 19th-century scholar, but his significance is due 
less to the economic theory he developed than to the emphasis he, more than  m ost 
“bourgeois” economists (and actually there were no others a t the tim e), placed on 
the social problems of capitalism  in his time.
Given this assertion, it seems to be worth considering if M arxian economics, 
which economists in the post-socialist countries are more familiar with than  they 
are w ith the western schools, can provide insights for the economic policy-makers 
who are trying to  solve the problems of the systemic transform ation. In the past, 
the applicability of M arxian economics for economic policy was greatly limited by 
the extrem ely one-sided orientation of economic science in connection w ith M arxist 
teaching in the Soviet Union, and also in the smaller socialist countries of Eastern 
and C entral Europe following World War II.
In contrast, the pluralistic approach of Western economics does include at 
least the potential for falsification of a theoretical assertion. T h a t approach to 
M arxist economic theory which defiantly gives all M arxist thought (as it was in­
terpreted  in the Soviet Union) a monopoly on the tru th  and which dom inated 
economic science by reducing it to Political Economy—at least, in the publications 
of the S talin era—seems to have nothing which could provide a theoretical basis 
for the new economic system.
During the Stalin era the Soviet economic system was set up and developed 
on the basis of trial and error. The economic policy measures of this period can 
best be characterized as a policy of intervention on a case-by-case basis. Like m od­
ern capitalism , the economic system which emerged by adopting using this highly 
Pragm atic approach was a mixed system , although the em phasis was reversed. In 
other words, the means of production were owned prim arily by the s ta te , while the
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extent of private ownership was much more limited, and in fact it varied am ong the 
individual socialist countries. Centralized government planning with a hierarchi­
cally organized economic adm inistration formed the predom inant control system, 
but at the same tim e market mechanisms were retained in areas in which there were 
large numbers of economic units (e.g. distribution of consumer goods to households, 
allocation of labour). (Brus  1961)
After S ta lin ’s death the restrictions imposed on Soviet economists were cer­
tainly eased, bu t it is only recently th a t they have been able to move freely away 
from the scholastic argum entation which they had been accustomed to  for so m any 
years. However, it should be m entioned th a t as early as 1955 there were serious dis­
cussions in the socialist camp about some of the more im portan t problem s posed by 
the Soviet-type economic system. These discussions centred on issues such as the 
law of value, price form ation, the efficiency of investm ent, and foreign trade. From 
about 1962 (E. Libermann ), more began to be written about the general functional 
weaknesses of the overall system and the ways to overcome them. Discussion of 
this last issue had been preceded by discussions in Poland in 1956 (0 .  Lange , and 
slightly later W. Brus  in particular) and in the former G D R in 1957 (F. Behrens , 
A. Benary). Once the debate came out into the open the problems presented by 
the functioning of the Soviet economic system — usually reduced to  the system  of 
central planning— as well as proposals for reforming this system began to dom inate 
much of the economic discussion and the economic policy activity of the socialist 
countries. This discussion was particularly intensive duriug the 1960s (e.g. discus­
sion of the New Economic System of Socialism in the GD R in 1962, in the Soviet 
Union in 1965, in Czechoslovakia in 1964-1969, and in Hungary sta rting  between 
1966 and 1968), and it intensified again during the last decade of the Soviet system  
(in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union starting  in 1979 and especially after 
1986).
On the whole, these discussions about economic reforms were more closely 
linked with economic policy than  is the case with W estern economic science. How­
ever, there is unfortunately no indication th a t the discussions resulted in special 
advantages with respect to  systemic efficiency. In this respect a reality-oriented the­
ory for the socialist economic system was lacking, and so there was no foundation 
for the theoretical preparation of economic reform. The num ber of reform propos­
als (which continued to employ M arxist terminology as a m atte r of form) increased 
in an inverse proportion to  their respective values as decision-making aids for eco­
nomic policy. Furtherm ore, many reform proposals prepared by econom ists were 
subject to  political and ideologic lim itations, or a t least they m et with resistance 
from conservative circles.
Before 1990, discussions about economic reform and a ttem p ts to incorporate 
reforms into economic policy tended to favour greater decentralization of decision­
m aking and also more scope for coordination through m arket forces. On the whole 
reform program m es tended to put more emphasis on private enterprises in agricul­
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ture, in the small trades, and in the service sector. Such trends were by no means 
consistent, but it is a fact th a t the societal significance of economic science in the 
socialist countries increased continuously, even if unevenly, after 1956. Discussions 
about economic reform gradually came to include a much wider range of ideas and 
these ideas also became more open. Yet having said all this, the contribution made 
by economic science in socialist countries continued to  be ju s t as unsatisfactory as 
in the West.
It seems th a t these observations lead to a rather pessimistic conclusion: W est­
ern economics offer a wide variety of sometimes highly intellectual explanations 
th a t, however, are quite isolated from reality. Furtherm ore, except for establish­
ing very elem entary relationships, such explanations were not able to  develop a 
generally accepted theory which could be applied to  a variety of systems. In the 
past economic science in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe claimed th a t 
M arxism-Leninism itself represented an all-embracing general theory. However, 
this dogm atism  was really lim iting in its effect and it became even more so as the 
socialist economic system  continued to develop. Thus the apparent possibilities 
for m aking a reality-oriented contribution to the theoretical basis of the system  
being established or developed were in fact little more than  wishful thinking. In 
neither the capitalist system  nor the socialist system has an adequate theoretical 
foundation for economic policy been form ulated which can be of lasting help in the 
transform ation process in Eastern Europe.
Experience so far indicates th a t there is not much reason for being optim istic 
about possibilities for creating a theory applicable to the change of economic sys­
tem s in Eastern Europe. In the first place, it seems reasonable to question whether 
research on such a complex subject can even lead to detailed findings th a t are gen­
erally applicable— i.e. findings th a t can be used as a basis for economic decision­
m aking in a variety of situations. In my opinion, economic theory (a t least in 
the foreseeable future) will only be able to provide highly abstract and generally 
theoretical analyses and thus will serve as basic research— which is by no means 
a disgrace. As a basis for economic policy, economic theories will always have to 
be applied to  a concrete situation or tested in order to see if they are valid under 
the respective circum stances. Regardless of whether or not economic theories are 
of practical use, it is necessary to develop consistent and universally valid explana­
tions th a t do not contradict each other, and also to discover the reasons for conflicts 
between existing theories (e.g. logical errors or, probably more common, differences 
in the assum ptions m ade). Taking this approach would also make it easier to  deter­
mine those conditions under which it is appropriate to apply the various theoretical 
explanations.
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PENSION REFORM: CALCULATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
M. AUGUSZTINOVICS-B. MARTOS
This article is a contribution to the ongoing debate about the reform of the pension system. 
Its peculiarity lies in the fact that it does not rely merely on verbal reasoning, but also on 
calculations carried out using new methods. It analyses the characteristics of the current pension 
system and its likely course in the future. In then examines the goals that apparently need to be 
set and the possible options of the reform in the light of, and in comparison with the above. The 
conclusions are based on demographic, economic, social and individual factors.*
Motives, goals, m ethods
T he resolution passed in 1991 by the Parliam ent outlines the following three- 
pillar perspective for the transform ation of the pension system:
1. basic flat-rate s ta te  pension,
2. work pension based on employment and obligatory contribution paym ent,
3. voluntary supplem entary insurance.
A few voluntary m utual insurance funds have been created in the  m eantim e 
covering the scope offered by the third pillar. However, nothing has happened to  
advance the fortunes of the first and second social insurance pillars. Nevertheless, 
given the effect of distressing financial deficits, the reform of the pension system  has 
come to the fore and it has been publicly declared th a t it is an extrem ely im portan t 
and urgent factor of the reform of public finances. However, w ithout a sound 
technical preparation the reform cannot be carried out, and yet this preparation 
requires several years of work.
Naturally, our raw calculations cannot be presented as a complete solution to 
the problems. However, our methodological results may be utilised in laying the real 
technical foundations for the reform, while the results of our calculations have led 
to certain qualitative conclusions which might be recommended for consideration 
in the— often heated—conceptual debates.
Our calculations relate only to  the first two pillars cited above. Only m anda­
tory forms are taken into account when indkating  the num ber of pillars. Voluntary 
private insurance is of course a possibility open for everyone, bu t it is not considered 
to be one of the pillars of the social insurance pension system.
‘ T he first and  th e  fourth  p a rts  of th is article  represent th e  jo in t work of th e  au thors; the  
second p a r t  was w ritten  by M ária  Augusztinovics, while the  th ird  is th e  work of B éla M artos.
I he research activ ities which form  the basis of the  article were supported  by the  N ational Scientific 
Research Fund (T O I8196 and  T006921). More detailed calculations are included in a  collection 
of papers by m any au th o rs  ( IC E G  1995).
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A pension system m ust fulfil two functions and its social acceptance (i.e. 
being judged to be fair) is generally based on meeting the— partly  contrad ictory— 
requirem ents of both.
One of the functions of the pension system  is to  share among individual citi­
zens the risk underlying an early death or long life, as this risk essentially influences 
the result and possible utilisation of the savings underpinning an old age income. 
As a risk-sharing community, the pension system  m ust be based on insurance prin­
ciples. Generally, such a system is regarded as fair if it strictly  links the pension 
benefits to  the contributions paid during the earning age, and if everyone is provided 
with benefits until the end of their life (depending on their respective contributions 
paid-in during their earning age). This kind of fairness is also economic rationality , 
as this is w hat prom otes savings for pensions and protects society against individual 
short-sightedness. The application of this criterion of fairness is m ade possible by an 
old m athem atical discipline— actuarial m athem atics— and traditionally  processed 
sta tistics in the form of m ortality tables.
The o ther function of the pension system is to provide the m eans for old 
age living to a level and proportion th a t are deemed socially acceptable. I t must, 
therefore, meet the requirem ent of social solidarity , and this can be achieved by 
means of redistribution only. However, there is no technically adopted set of tools 
for m easuring social acceptability, (and this is also why this term  has become the 
subject of futile debates which provide no definite answers). In our study we a t­
tem pt to measure the social acceptability of the pension system. We can s ta rt by 
sta ting  th a t one of the im portan t tasks (perhaps the most im portan t task) of the 
social insurance pension system  is to continue the flow of work income achieved by 
the insurees during their earning age. This is valid despite the fact th a t the propor­
tion of the closing wage and the starting  pension— i.e. the replacement rate—will 
be different for everyone because the size of the pension will also be influenced 
by other factors. Our second assum ption is th a t we consider the wage differen­
tials which actually exist to be such th a t their extent is accepted by the society. 
Consequently, the inequality” of closing wages can and should be transferred to  the 
initial pension income. T hus we can measure the social acceptability of the pension 
system  by exam ining the difference between the inequalities of work incomes and 
pension incomes. In general, the greater the difference between the two inequali­
ties, the less socially acceptable the pension system. In an ideal situation  the two 
inequalities are the same, or a t worst the pension income only falls slightly behind 
th a t of wages. In adopting this concept we have already stepped on a sounder 
basis: much has already been w ritten about m ethods for m easuring inequalities of 
incomes. (A good sum m ary is provided by Kakwani (1980).) Often the necessary 
income sta tistics are also available.
Insurance and solidarity principles cannot be clearly separated (although it 
is frequently assumed th a t they can). However, the current H ungarian pension 
system  still labours under the influence of the events of the past several decades and,
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w ithout going into detail, it can be said th a t the insurance and the redistribution  
functions have been hopelessly and confusingly mixed. Neither of these functions 
operates on an acceptable level, and the system is neither rational nor fair. T his is 
why the initiative to contem plate a separation of the two functions is not illogical 
and it is also apparent in the conception of the two-pillar reform. This would assign 
the solidarity, redistribution task to the basic pension, and the insurance function 
to the work pension. However, we are not. convinced th a t this really requires two 
pension system s operating in parallel. The methods we have elaborated and the 
results of our calculations suggest th a t the relation between the two functions can 
be clarified w ithin one single social insurance system.
It is even more debatable as to whether it is wise, in the case of a two-pillar 
solution, to  transform  the work pension system  into m andatory  private insurance 
and to assign its managem ent to non-profit funds or commercial insurers. The 
reasons quoted in support of this option do not s ta rt from the tasks related to 
the pension system —rather, the aim  is to uplift the economy w ith the help of the 
pension system. The idea is th a t this kind of reform increases the willingness to 
make savings, it also raises the aggregate savings rate, and these savings appear on 
the capital m arkets in order to  finance the investm ents being m ade in the economy 
and to  induce economic grow th.1
In our research we tried to make our calculation m ethods suitable for all 
options: i.e. it should be able to  quantify both single pillar and two-pillar reforms, 
w ithin the la tte r embracing pay-as-you-go and funded work pension system s.
It is our conviction th a t well-founded conceptual conclusions can be arrived 
a t on the basis of such a parallel—i.e. in the framework of com parative studies. 
Our assum ption was th a t, regardless of the option chosen, the reform should meet 
the following fundam ental requirements:
1. it. should create direct links tha t are clear and can be calculated by every­
one, between the contributions paid during a career, and the benefit th a t can be 
collected as a pensioner;
2. thus, with the personal financial interest, it should prom ote the paym ent 
of contributions on the one hand, and a delay of retirem ent on the other;
3. for individuals, it should provide ample room for free decisions determ ined 
by differences between personal careers;
4. the new pension system  should be stable, it should adap t well to  economic 
cycles and expected demographic fluctuation, and it should be able to  finance itself 
through the correctly determ ined contribution rates.
If the work pension rem ains within the scope of social insurance, then both the 
single and the two-pillar solution can be made to comply w ith the requirem ent th a t
1 T his is th e  assum ption which underpinned the m uch advertised  pension reform  in Chile ( Cor- 
ta z i r  1995), the  in troduction  of 401/K  pension saving accounts pam pered for such a  long tim e 
by econom ists in th e  U nited  S tates ( Paplce et al. 1994), and  the  ordering of m an d a to ry  private  
savings (superannuity ) in A ustralia  ( Rosenman  1993).
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the “old”pensions (i.e. those determ ined before the new rules came into force) could 
be in tegrated  into the new system, possibly w ithout changing the respective levels. 
If the work pension takes the form of funded private insurance, then naturally  the 
above goal is invalid because it would inevitably split the contribution paying and 
the pensioner communities into “old” and “new ones” , and this s ituation  would 
rem ain for many decades to  come.
It is obvious th a t all the versions we have considered are based on available 
da ta . Our calculations were made at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995; 
the d a ta  for 1994, and in certain aspects for 1993, were not known a t th a t time. 
However, we th ink th a t from the point of view of the long term  future, one or 
two years’ changes are not critically significant. It is much more im portan t th a t, 
given the lack of elaborated and quantified reform proposals, we had to determ ine 
the m ajor param eters of certain reform versions ourselves, applying more or less 
a rb itrary  assum ptions. In this we do not expect anyone to consider any of our 
versions as his own in the usual “number war” which custom arily precedes the 
elaboration of reform proposals. However, certain trends appear so powerfully 
th a t they will probably prevail under other param eter values and assum ptions with 
regard to  details.
Our considerations and calculations are restricted to  the old age pension sys­
tem . The high and increasing num ber of disability pensioners is a serious problem, 
bu t it requires a different solution. In our view, the future of the  old-age pension 
system  can be realistically assessed only if it is trea ted  as a clearly separate entity.
In the second part of the article we present m acrosim ulation calculations 
which run until the end of the next century. A t first they assume an unchanged 
pension system , and then they are linked to different reform versions. The sim ­
ulation examines the relation between the aggregate pension expenditure and the 
aggregate contribution base. Its goal is to  explore the trends which determ ine the 
macro-level financial (dis)equilibrium of the pension system; we neglect all details 
which cannot be decisive from this aspect. The very long tim e horizon may seem 
unusual although it has the same im portan t role as th a t of the headlight m ounted 
a t the front of a car: namely, we have to  be able to see far ahead in order to steer 
well over the next few metres. Referring to the pension system , the next few metres 
mean decades.
In the th ird  part we deal with the determination of individual pensions, con­
necting the benefit with the contribution a t the level of the individual— i.e. issues 
related to the so-called “pension form ula” . We examine the difference between the 
inequalities of work incomes and those of pension. We provide m ethods for elabo­
rating  and sustaining a  differential th a t is socially acceptable, for connecting and 
separating  the insurance and the redistribution functions in a  clear and fair way, 
and for integrating  old pensions into new system.
In the fourth  p art of the article we form ulate conclusions th a t can be draw n 
separately and jo intly  from the two types of theoretical experim ents.
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Macrosimulation for the next century
First we present the simple model which served as a basis for the calculations. 
(Readers who do not like formulas may skip the whole of this part, except the last 
paragraph  where we define the term s effective and actuarially correct contribution 
rates.) It is prim arily w ith the help of these two term s th a t we present the results 
of the calculations with dem onstrative charts instead of tables of long tim e series. 
(As far as the relative interest factor defined in the formal description of the model 
is concerned, in this article we discuss versions where u =  1— i.e. according to  the 
golden rule of economic growth, the interest rate is equal to the nominal growth 
rate of average gross wage selected as numéraire.) Then we exam ine the effect of 
dem ographic and economic factors, while in fact leaving the basic features of the 
curren t pension system  unchanged. This will be followed by the single pillar and 
the two-pillar systems with one version for each.
A simple model
The task of the model is to provide aggregate indicators which characterise 
the cross-sectional and longitudinal (dis)equilibrium  of old-age pension insurance 
w ith the possible simplest means. The characteristics of average pension insurance 
for one cohort in one calendar year are the elementary data, and we do not go 
in to  the deeper details. We do not characterise the cohort by gender, nor by social 
groups; we also neglect differences in the sta te  a t the beginning, m iddle and end of 
the year.
Demographic bases. In contrast to usual demographic practice, by x  we indi­
cate the year of birth  and not the age. Let bx be the num ber of b irths in year x, 
m x j  be the m ortality  ra te  in year j  of the cohort born in year x, and T  the highest 
possible age. Then the number in year t of those born in year x  is:
t
¡X,t =  bx m x , j )  X  =  t -  T , . . .  , t .  (1)
j  —X
Furtherm ore, let K  be the first age year of the earning age and N  be the 
lowest age lim it of retirem ent. The L f  is the population of active age in year t and
L f  is the total number o f  years of active age of the cohort born in year x:
t - K  x + N - 1
¡■?=  £  ' «  L - =  E  <2 >
x = t - N + l  t = x + K
Acta Oeconomica 4^, 1996
124 M. A U GUSZTINO VICS-B. MARTOS: PEN SIO N  R EFO R M
and similarly, L f  is the population of retired age and is the total number of 
years of retirement of the cohort born in year x:
t - N x + T
(3)
i = x + / V
From the above, f t  is the cross-sectional demographic dependency rate in year 
while fx is the longitudinal demographic dependency rate in year x.
(4 )
The economic environment. Preparing an economic prognosis or even a sce­
nario  for decades would be a hopeless and unreasonable venture. Therefore, we 
select the actual average nominal gross wage of active earners for numéraire , i.e. 
the un it of calculation, and we denote it with i/)t for the ¿-th calendar year. If we 
express a flow of income in this unit, then we will refer to  this w ith the a ttr ib u te  
relative. We do not need any assum ption about the future developm ent of the 
num éraire, as we do not wish to quantify forint am ounts of indefinable purchasing 
power, bu t proportions only.
For determ ining the longitudinal categories we will also need the procedure 
called relative discounting. Therefore we introduce the following definitions:
In the description of the model we might keep the relative interest factor 
varying over time. However, in the quantification we would once again be forced to 
make unreasonable long term  prognoses. Therefore, in harm ony with the general 
practice in the literature, we introduce a single stationary assumption of the model:
Let us look a t the present value in t of a flow y(_ n =  xj)i_ n yt _ n having taken 
place in t — n:
X, =  i/’i / V ’f - i  -  1 
Pt
the growth rate, 
the interest rate, 
the relative interest factorUt — (1 +  pt )/( 1 +  Aj)
ut — u for all t. ( 5)
Vt-n(t) =  fpt-nyt-n(l +  Pt-n + l) ■ ■ •(! +  Pt),
however.
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V’t - n  — V’i / ( l  +  ^ l - n  + l ) - - - ( l  +  A(),
and so
yt- n(t) = rJ>tVt-nun , (6)
where yt - n u n is the relative present value in t of the relative flow yt _ n ( th a t is its 
present value expressed in term s of
Elementary data. proportion of retirees in year t born in year x to
those still living in year t\ this is what characterises retirement behaviour. irx t  is 
the replacement rate of their average relative starting  pension, and this is w hat 
determ ines the proportion of their previous work income replaced by the pension. 
The num ber in t of those retiring from the cohort of x is and their to ta l relative 
pension is p Xit (x =  t — T , . . . , t — N ).
$ x , t  — ^ x , t ^ x , t  f i x , t  =  l x , t ^ x , t  ■
The total number in year t of pensioners born in year x  is:
t t i
zx,t -  $x,i IJ (1  -  mxj )  =  lx,t ^ 2  oJx.i, (8)
i = x + N  j = i  i = x + N
the to ta l relative and absolute pensions of the cohort of x  are:
P x .t  =  lx , t  ^ r . i ^ x . i  P x . t  =  V'iPr.t (9 )
i= x + N
We should note th a t relative starting  pensions (determ ined earlier) are also 
m ultiplied by average wage in By this, we assume th a t pensions are indexed by 
actual wage indices w ithout lower and upper limits. Thus the proportions between 
pensions and the average wage, as well as between individual pensions, rem ain 
unchanged.
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If dx t  is the number of elderly people who were not eligible for a pension, 
then the num ber in t of the active earners above the age limit born in x  is:
ax ,t =  lx,t — zx ,t — dXtt x  = t - T , . . . , t -  N  ( 10)
Let A t be the dem and of the labour m arket for active earners in year t. Then 
the to ta l number of active earners of active age from the cohort born in year x  is:
ax ,t = At  E ;= t - r a x ’</.,, x = t -  N  + 1 , . . .  , t  — K .  (U )
T he num erator of the fraction determ ines the num ber of active earners below 
the age limit from the labour dem and and from the number of active earners of 
retirem ent age (i.e. indirectly from the retirem ent behaviour). The quotient is the 
participation rate of those of active age. and this is the average we apply to all 
cohort of active age.
From the cohort born in year x  the to tal number of those inactive below the 
age lim it is lX:t -  aXit. From among them  gX:t is the number of “paying” inactive 
ones, who pay pension contributions (or someone pays for them ). If h t is the average 
(actual or im puted) income of the “paying” inactive individuals as a proportion of 
the average wage of active earners, then the to ta l relative and absolute contribution 
bases in t of the cohort of x (x  =  t -  T , . . .  , t  — K )  is:
Qx,t — htgXit </x,< =  lptQx,t  ^ ^
Aggregates and (dis)equilibrium. The cross-sectional aggregates are produced 
by simple addition, while for the calculation of longitudinal (lifetime) aggregates 
we utilise form ula (6).
t - N
P i  =  4' t  V l -
r = t - T
x+ r
Px = * ,+ T  £  P -r X +T"‘
t = x  + N
(13)
Pt is the absolute while P* is the relative aggregate pension expenditure in t. 
P x is the absolute while Px is the relative life pension of the cohort x (present 
value a t the end of the life cycle, of the to ta l pension collected through whole life).
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t - K x + T
Qt -  i ’t Qr.t
(14)r= t  — T t= n + N
Qt
Qt is the absolute, while Q t is the relative aggregate contribution base in t\ 
Q x and Q x are, respectively, the absolute and relative life incomes of the cohort 
born in x, and they serve as a contribution base (i.e. present value a t the  end of 
the working career of the to ta l income gained in the course of the life career).
Given the pension and the contribution base, the equilibrium  or its absence 
depends on the contribution rate applied. It is obvious th a t the balance of income 
and expenditure of the pension fund in t is the difference between the contribution 
base m ultiplied by the rate and the aggregate pension expenditure; while the her­
itage of the cohort born in x is the difference, a t the end of the working career, 
o f the contribution base multiplied by the actual rate and the present value of 
the pension. These could be calculated in many versions, with arbitrarily  selected 
contribution  rates. However, we get a much clearer picture about the economic 
characteristics of a pension system  if we determ ine the effective contribution rate 
Ht which is variable over time. This would ensure cross-sectional equilibrium  (zero 
balance) in each year. Moreover we define the constant actuarially correct rate fix . 
It creates longitudinal equilibrium  (zero heritage) for a given cohort:
The effective and the actuarially correct contribution rates are the synthetic 
indicators of all pension systems, as they depend on all the param eters considered. 
They do not depend, however, on the interests forming the contribution rate in 
practice. T hus it shows from the true, economic aspect how much contribution  in 
the active age is necessary in order to ensure an old age living. The level of the 
la tte r is determ ined by the replacement rate, cross-sectionaliy and longitudinally, 
respectively.
The demographic bases
Here we present variants of the calculations where we have assumed th a t both 
the num ber of births in 1993 and the age-specific m ortality rem ain constan t in the 
future. O f course, this is not a forecast but it is the sim plest point from which to
Pi — Pt/Qt H x  —  P x  /  Q x (15)
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s ta rt (given th a t nowadays nobody can give a reliable prognosis of the real changes 
in fertility and m ortality).
On the basis of the above assum ption the population will become stationary  
by the end of the next century, i.e. its number and age structu re  will stabilise a t 
a level which corresponds to  current m ortality conditions. Also following on from 
this, s ta rtin g  from the year 2070, the calculated pension system  indicators will 
also settle  down and become constant on a certain level. Of course, this is not a 
prognosis either, bu t the presentation of the levels which correspond to  the current 
birth and mortality conditions. Differences and fluctuations occurring in the first 
half of the next century will not stem  from the present, bu t from the past— i.e. the 
20th century history  of births and mortality.
It is a well known and widely discussed fact in the in ternational and the 
H ungarian lite ra tu re  th a t the population due to  retire according to  the current age 
lim it will considerably increase in two waves in the next century— namely, in the 
decades of 2010 and 2030. This is when the large cohort born in the fifties—i.e. 
the Ratko children here and the baby-boomers in the West, as well as the large 
num ber of their children born in the seventies— will retire. Raising the age limit 
would not change this situation, but it would postpone the period of culm ination 
by a few years.
T he literature  which forecasts the collapse of pension system s suggests th a t 
these large cohorts will not be able t.o accum ulate enough for their own retirem ent, 
as in the current pay-as-you-go system  they only have to support the current sm aller 
pensioner cohorts. Unfortunately, I have never checked this belief numerically, and 
have even avocated it myself (Augusztinovics 1993)— although it is not true, at 
least certainly not in Hungary.
T h ousands Percentage
T------- 1------- 1------- 1------- 1------—r*-
1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 Y ear
- r*
2090 Y ear1940 1970 1990 2018 2040
Number of births 1890-1990 Demographic dependency rates
Fig. 1
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T he current retired cohort were not born directly before the baby-boom  co­
horts, bu t in the first half of the 20th century. On the left hand side of Figure 1 
it can be seen th a t up until 1930, with the exception of the 4 years of the first 
world war, the number of births was much higher than  a t the respective peaks 
of the fifties and the seventies. In addition, the current pensioners lived the first 
half of their life path  in the m idst of a rapid fall in juvenile m ortality. In other 
words, compared to  their predecessors, a relatively high proportion of their number 
reached the beginning of retirem ent. However, from the middle of the  sixties the 
im provement in the m ortality figures stopped. The average life expectancy a t the 
age of 60 is practically the same today as it was in 1960. To pu t it shortly: the 
num ber of to d ay ’s pensioners is relatively large, yet this fact perta ins no t because 
they live long, bu t because their cohort was large a t birth .
On the right hand side of Figure 1 the curve m arked by ¿40  shows the 
longitudinal dependency rate of the actual 40-year-old generation (indicator / ¡ _ 4o 
for all /)• The curve marked by C R  shows the actual cross-sectional ra te  ( / ( ), which 
is already higher, and will certainly remain higher in the first, three quarters of the 
21st. century than the longitudinal rate. In Hungary the situation is already now 
such th a t is expected elsewhere after 2010 only: i.e. the proportion of the elderly in 
the population is higher than the weight of old age in the life path  of the cohort. In 
the current pay-as-you-go system  those currently of an earning age “support” not 
less, bu t more pensioners per capita on average than the num ber they will have in 
their age cohort “to  be supported” .
T he above have far-reaching consequences from the aspect o f the possible 
transform ation of the pension system: the cross-sectional effective contribution 
rate  (¡¿t) is much higher and will remain higher until the second half of the next 
century than the actuarially correct rate (¿tx ) of the cohort around and younger 
than  the age of 45. If we switched to a pension system  where those of an active 
age have an actuarially correct burden, then in the coming decades fluctuating, but 
always considerable cross-sectional deficits should be expected.
The economic activity
It is worth m aking some brief comments on our first discarded calculation. 
Here we did not determ ine the number of earners of an active age in the way given 
in form ula (11), bu t according to general practice we retained the participation  
ra te  a t the level of 1993. Thus, not only the actual num ber of pensioners depended 
clearly on demographic trends, but also th a t of active earners and those classified 
as inactive. However, this produced rather non-sensical results with respect to  both  
the m edium  and the long terms.
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In the m edium  term — i.e. from 1993 to 1999— the number of active earners 
increased continuously each year in accordance with the dem ographic facts, as the 
number of individuals in the cohort of earning age is currently increasing. A t the 
sam e time, we know th a t the actual number of active earners has been falling since 
1993 and will continue to fall with all probability until at least 1996.
In the long term — i.e. from 2000—the number of active earners s ta rts  to  dive 
according to this calculation. This trend continues until the middle of the critical 
decade of 2010, and it then falls back to  3.5 million. Then, by the m iddle of the 
century, it  reaches the lowest point with hardly 3 million active earners. In reality 
there is no reason for the absorption capacity of the labour force to  follow the 
dem ographic trend. The num ber of active earners does not have to  decrease merely 
because those of earning age are fewer. If the dem and for labour is higher, more 
can work and the num ber of unemployed falls.
This calculation made us realise th a t another general assum ption in the lit­
erature  of pension reforms is also erroneous: demographic trends do not definitely 
determ ine the num ber of “supporters” (i.e. the earners). Under the current activity  
rates the economies of today have— and indeed leave— huge labour force reserves 
under-utilised. This happens in developed economies because they are developed, 
while in underdeveloped economies it is because they are underdeveloped. If this 
reserve is absorbed because of the demographic facts, and if instead of the presence 
of young unemployed people we can talk about the dom inance of young earners, 
this could be advantageous both socially and economically. Therefore we rejected 
the simple assum ption of a constant activity rate, and in the variations to be pre­
sented here we do not calculate the number of active earners from the participation  
rate, bu t arrive a t it from the outside, according to  form ula (11).
We assumed th a t from 1993 until 1996 the num ber of active earners will 
continue to fall by 100 thousand annually, (today we know th a t in 1994 it decreased 
by more than  150 thousand people); then until 1999 it will increase by 100 thousand 
people annually in a sort of “restoration period” . We examined three variants for 
the next century, where from 2000 onwards the num ber of active earners:
A'o rem ains constant a t the level of 1993 when reached again,
A'i increases by one percent until 2016,
A"2 increases by two percent until 2010.
In the A'o version the participation rate increases in the first decades of the 
next century, (as the number of those of active earner age falls). However, it never 
reaches the 87.8 percent of 1985. The A'i version “h its” this lim it in 2016 and A'2 
reaches it by 2010; from then on we determ ine the num ber of active earners with 
the constant activity rate according to the demographic facts.
In all three versions the retirem ent behaviour and the replacem ent ra te  which 
characterise the pension system  were kept a t the level corresponding to  the base 
year 1993. T he m ajor indicators of 1993 are th a t, a t the age of 56, 55 percent
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of the cohort’s had retired, while a t the age of 61 the corresponding figure is 95 
percent; accordingly, at the other ages the proportion of retiring individuals is 
insignificant. The relative starting  and average pensions are noticeably levelled, 
and to  a  significant degree; between the ages 56 and 70 the relative pensions of the 
different ages hardly differ and where they do it is no more than  4-5 percentage 
points. The inequality of pensions is much lower than  the extent of both the 
actuarially  justified and the socially acceptable levels.
The changes in the effective contribution rate in the three versions are shown 
in Figure 2.
Percentage
1993 2010 2030 2050 2090 Y ear
Fig. 2 E ffective con tribu tion  ra tes in the varian ts o f econom ic activ ity
It should be noted that:
1. In 1993 the effective rate was 24.6 percent, which is much lower than the 
legal 30.5 percent. The explanation for this is th a t a) a  considerable p a rt of the 
legal contributions was not collected, and outstanding claims continued to  increase; 
b)  yet the contributions received exceeded pension expenditure, but the surplus of 
the Pension Insurance Fund was used to finance non-pension benefits instead of the 
s ta te  budget.
2. In the course of the “restoration” period (forecast as due to take place 
after 1996), the effective rate falls slightly below the level of 1993, and it reaches it 
again only in the pessimistic A'o version—namely, in the demographically critical 
decades of 2010 and 2030. The effective rate in the A'i and A 2 versions, merging 
in 2016, never reaches 25 percent.
3. In the second half of the 21st century, after the dam ping of the birth  
fluctuations of the 20th century, the effective rate quickly reduces and stabilises a t 
a level below 21 percent.
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To summarise: we do not even get close to  the legal 30.5 percent, although in 
these variants we left all param eters of the pension system  unchanged. This means 
th a t there are in fact considerable reserves here. The legal rate could be reduced 
considerably if the legal contribution was collected and the further burdening of 
the pension system  w ith other social policy tasks was discontinued. Such tasks 
should be dealt with by other areas (for example, unem ploym ent should not be the 
responsibility of the pension system).
T hus those assum ptions which hold th a t “it is impossible to  finance this 
pension system  in the long term ” are unfounded. (This is also the conclusion Bod 
came to  (1992).) This is why the reform should not be seen as an a ttem p t to  prevent 
a sort of perm anent financing crisis, but rather as a positive move to  elim inate the 
functional disorders of the system.
However, if the retirem ent a ttitu d e  changes— either through an aggressive 
increase of the age limit or the introduction of incentive system s—the distribution 
of economic activity among the generations will be affected. As we have seen, over 
the next few decades the number of active earners will depend on the absorption 
capacity of the econom y’s labour m arket, and on the dem and for labour; it will not 
be influenced by the num ber of people who will retire. If more elderly rem ain in 
their em ploym ent, there will be less workplaces for young and middle age people.
Among others this is the “bagatelle syndrom e” which is neglected by the 
“brief” of the World Bank on Hungary (Issue Brief 12, “Simulation of an Eastern  
E uropean transition” , p. 339-341) in the volume Averting Old Age Crisis (W orld 
Bank 1994). Beside several other shock therapy measures, it is assumed here th a t 
no one will retire from 1996 to  2002. Then, w ithout further argum ents, it is sta ted  
th a t as a consequence of this the G DP will increase. Naturally, this la tte r could 
only come true if the H ungarian economy was currently struggling to  cope w ith 
a lack of labour and early retirem ent was the only obstacle to the increase of the 
GDP.
T he various proposals to increase the age limit considerable in their num ber. 
In order to  examine the consequences of these proposals we pu t the simple ques­
tion: w hat would happen if the women’s age limit were to be increased to 60 from 
1996? (We assumed th a t this would not change individual attitudes, for everyone 
would escape to retirem ent as soon as possible— i.e. a t the age of 61— and thus 
same proportion of the cohort would be in retirem ent as now.) As m ight be ex­
pected, this solution implies th a t miracles will occur with the financial balance of 
the Pension Insurance Fund. The current deficit would disappear im m ediately in 
1996 as, through five years, alm ost 60 thousand people less would retire each year 
than  is the case a t present. By 2000 the effective contribution rate  would decrease 
by 20 percent and even the periods which are critical from the dem ographic aspect 
would hardly count any more: in the assum ption being considered here, even in the 
worst years the ra te  does not rise above 22.6 percent. The effects on the different 
generations are shown in Figure 3.
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Thousands
Fig. 3  N um ber o f pensioners and those in active  between the ages o f 19 and 60
At the assumed lowest level of employment, in 1996, among the 19-60 age- 
range group the num ber of inactive people reaches the num ber of pensioners, which 
would seem to be an unprecedented phenomenon in itself. (Nevertheless, we know 
th a t th is actually happened in 1994.) After th a t, in variant A'o, the num ber of young 
and middle-age inactive people decreases continuously— at the beginning due to the 
im proving opportunities for employment, and later due to the dem ographic trend. 
In contrast, in the version m arked with N  (where we assumed a rise of the women’s 
age limit for retirem ent), the num ber of pensioners falls by alm ost 300 thousand in 
a few years, but the number of inactive people of earning age exceeds the number  
of pensioners until 2012. So the “support burden” is not reduced for anybody; 
instead of pensioners, it is young and 50-60-year-old “inactive” people who m ust 
be supported . Is this advantageous? Is this reasonable? This question far exceeds 
the apparently  more pressing problem of the pension system . In fact the former 
requires a comprehensive, long term  social and economic solution.
One-pillar reform
This reform achieves both the insurance and the redistribution functions 
w ithin a single pay-as-you-go type social insurance system. The individual pension 
would consist of two components. The part which can be called “work pension” 
is actuarially  fair, and it corresponds to the work pension system  of the two-pillar 
case. The pertaining tax /subsidy  system, on the other hand, functions as the basic 
pension system  of the two-pillar case—namely, it brings about redistribution, and 
a m oderation of inequalities. The individual always possesses accurate inform ation 
on how his actual pension is built up from these components.
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T his pension form ula and the corresponding methodology will be discussed 
in the following section of the article. Here, from the aspect of economic effects, the 
only im portan t thing is how relative starting  pensions change. We link the indi­
vidual to  the macro-level by the simplified assum ption th a t those who are one year 
older have worked one year more; thus the inequality of starting  pensions becomes 
age-specific and m anageable in the cohort-based macro calculations. Demographic 
and economic factors are taken into account in the same way as in variant K o-
We assume th a t from 2000 onwards the lower lim it or eligibility to receive 
a pension will be 57 years, for both men and women. Â? 'h e  Sami’ n t^e  relative 
starting pensions change—namely, they become clearly progressive depending on 
the circum stances of the retirem ent. Those who are older and who have therefore 
paid a greater contribution will enjoy benefit for a shorter time, and for th is reason 
they will get a higher starting  pension. However, this higher level would not be to 
the actuarially correct extent, for the inequality is m oderated by the tax /subsidy  
system . For example, in case of somebody retiring a t the age of 65, the sta rting  
pension would be— ceteris paribus—42 percent higher; a t the age of 70 it would be 
as much as 80 percent higher than  at the age of 58.
Given the age-specific replacem ent rate, the average pension level depends on 
a single external param eter, which is used to “calibrate” relative sta rtin g  pensions. 
T his param eter was selected so th a t the starting  pension of those retiring at the 
age of 64 should be identical with the average pension of 64-year-old people in the 
curren t system.
We assume th a t the effect of all this would be a fundam ental change in 
retirement behaviour, and this is made possible by the protection provided by the 
labour law to workers who have reached the lower age limit. Around the lower 
lim it, the effect of the low starting  pension will be th a t a smaller num ber will opt 
for retirem ent: 8 percent of the cohort at the ages of 58 and 59 respectively. Also, 
few will rem ain in employment after the age of 65: 16-17 percent only. Thus, the 
weight of retiring—so called the “age centre”—shifts to between 62-63 years old. 
N aturally, we imagine th a t the change of behaviour will be gradual. In the year 
of the reform there will be 14 transitional cohorts, whose members will be partly  
retired; the others will slowly adap t to the new rules, bu t certainly in a different 
way from those who will “grow old into” the new system .
N aturally, this is pure presum ption w ithout empirical bases. In the course 
of the preparation of a real reform the expected reaction of the eligible parties to 
the changing starting  pension scale should be assessed using a num ber of different 
m ethods, among others with micro-simulation and a comprehensive public opinion 
poll. Param eters for the average pension level can be determ ined arbitrarily , but 
not on the basis of narrow-minded fiscal considerations. Social agreem ent is needed, 
given th a t a  higher pension level involves a higher contribution rate.
Despite the gradual nature  of adap ta tion , the num ber of pensioners falls 
considerably in the first decades of the 21st century. This is partly  because we have
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Fig. 4 E ffective  con tribu tion  rates. O ne-pillar reform  or an in crease o f  the  w om en ’s age
lim it
excluded the retirem ent of women aged 56-57, and partly  because the financial 
incentives deferred retirem ent prevails from the outset. It is worth noting th a t from 
2004 the number of pensioners is lower than  in the variant involving an increase of 
the women’s age limit, discussed above. The effective rates of these two versions 
are shown in Figure where they are compared with the basic version Ko', we 
have m arked the curve of the single pillar reform with R i.  We can see th a t in the 
reformed, uniform  pension system the effective rate is rapidly reduced. Even in the 
decades critical from the demographic aspect it hardly increases above 20 percent, 
while in the second half of the 21st century it stabilises below 17 percent. This is a 
reasonable reform involving incentives which enable individual choice after the age 
of 57 both  for men and women. It also produces a “b e tte r” result in the long term  
when com pared with an abrupt and im m ediate increase of the age limit, which 
finally does not influences individual behaviour.
Naturally, the decrease in the number of pensioners affects the num ber of 
inactive people of earning age in the same direction, but more powerfully than  the 
adm inistrative increase of the women’s age limit; consequently it requires the same 
considerations. I t should be noted, however, th a t this prevails only from the year 
2000 and the num ber of inactive people never exceeds the peak of 1996.
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Two-pillar reform
T his reform achieves the redistribution and the insurance functions in two 
system s operating in parallel. Solidarity is provided for by the basic pension sys­
tem, so the inequalities of the work pensions need not be m oderated by taxes and 
subsidies. This will be discussed in more detail in the th ird  part of the article. 
We link the macro-level to the individual level w ith the same assum ption as th a t 
applied in the one-pillar case. Demographic and economic assum ptions are also 
identical w ith those of the basic variant Ko-
We assume th a t after reaching the age of 65 everyone would get a basic 
pension, independent of earlier activity, income and any other factors. The am ount 
of the basic pension would be 30 percent of the actual average wage. The source 
of the basic pension would be the basic contribution paid by everyone between the 
ages of 19-65. This would have no “rate” in the stric t sense of the word as it is 
not connected to the work income expressed by the average wage. Expressing its 
ex ten t as a ratio  of the average wage we still get a sort of rate, and we can exam ine 
it respectively in its cross-sectional effective and actuarially correct versions.
Several versions are possible for the collection of the basic contribution. In 
my personal opinion individual, civil obligation would be very desirable. Someone 
else should pay for those who are unable to pay in the absence of personal income: 
the spouse with a nice income, the army, the office caring for the jobless, in the 
final case the municipality. In this case the society would be much more sensitive 
to the problem  of “inactive people” , for paym ent should be m ade here and now  not 
only for their present living, but also for future pension. This burden should not 
be shifted to  future earning generations. According to other opinions the source 
of the basic pension should be the personal income tax. This is prim arily because 
in this way solidarity among generations would be represented. Moreover, the 
personal income tax  has its own income base and this is wider than  the work income. 
However, the way in which the basic contribution is collected and its d istribution  
or redistribution am ong individuals are in fact not relevant from the aspect of our 
calculation— th a t is, its aggregate am ount corresponds to the alternative degrees 
discussed earlier.
The work pension is the benefit provided by the m andatory  pension insurance 
system  for those who have been active earners; its source is the work contribution. 
After reaching the age of 57 the insurees can decide freely when to commence receipt 
of this benefit; for the sake of simplicity here it is assumed th a t this happens before 
the age of 71. Naturally, the individual proportions of the starting work pension 
(determ ined a t the given age) depend on the previously paid contribution; bu t, on 
average, the age-specific proportions are actuarially strictly fair. T his involves a 
quite strong progression according to age: under identical conditions, the sta rting  
work pension at the age of 66 would be twice the am ount of th a t a t the age of 58, 
and at the age of 70 it would be three times the am ount.
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T he level of the starting  work pensions can again be regulated by one pa­
ram eter: namely, the replacement rate (the ratio  of the work pension to  the last 
received wage) should be 70 percent in the case of som ebody retiring a t the  age of 
70. Thus, for those working until the age of 70 the to tal am ount of the basic and 
the work pensions together would provide a  replacement ra te  of 100 percent.
Since the starting  work pensions are actuarially strictly  fair, in the long term , 
and in a m ature  insurance system, retirement behaviour is practically of no con­
sequence for the insurer. (At whatever age people retire, the  proportions of the 
s ta rting  pensions result in zero pension heritage by the end of the lifetime of the 
cohort.) However, when a reform is introduced, in the short term  it does m atter 
whether many or few people retire immediately due to the effect of the reform. 
Here we have reckoned th a t the strong progression of the sta rting  pensions drives 
m ore people to  continue work than in variant R \ . In other words, in the short term  
we have assumed a very advantageous effect.
T he reform enters into force in 2000. The appropriate p a rt of the pensions 
determ ined until 1999 would also be re-qualified as the basic pension, while the 
rest would be taken further as “old work pension” w ithout changing its level. For 
the economic estim ation of the “new work pensions” we assume th a t in the  new 
system  the average members of the different cohorts acquire eligibility to  a work 
pension which is proportional to  their career activity rate. (This ra te  is the num ber 
of years lived as an active earner between the ages of 19-57, in proportion to 
the to ta l num ber of years lived in the same period of life.) The work pension is a 
form of insurance exclusively for active earners. Consequently, the ra te  of eligibility 
strongly depends on economic activity (i.e. the opportunities for em ploym ent). The 
la tte r varies over tim e and thus affects different generations differently.
Percentage Percentage
The basic pension system The work pension system
Fig. 5 E ffective and ac tu aria lly  fair con tribu tion  ra tes
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Figure 5 shows the actuarially  correct and cross-sectional effective contri­
bution rates of the two systems. The correct rate of the basic contribution is 6.1 
percent, th a t of the work pension is 9.5 percent, the to tal of the two is 15.6 percent. 
This is much less than  the approxim ately 21.4 percent which is the correct ra te  in 
the current pension system. The reason for this is th a t, altogether, this double 
system  provides lower aggregate and average pensions than  the earlier system , as 
the basic pension sta rts  a t the age of 66, while for those younger the work pension 
provides ju s t a fraction of the final replacem ent rate.
N aturally, the demographic fluctuation expected in the next century will 
prim arily affect the basic pension system. As can be seen in Figure 5 the two 
m axim a of the effective contribution rates can be expected 10 years later th an  in 
the curren t pension system , as it is the population older than 65, and not 55, which 
is affected.
Com plex dynam ics prevail in the social insurance work pension system  as this 
system  itself comprises two subsystems: the higher “old” (i.e. determ ined before 
the reform) and the lower “new” work pensions (coming in the wake of the reform). 
The previous ones will, of course, slowly run out, while the la tte r ones will slowly 
increase. Approximately, until 2010 the reduction of the higher old pension vol­
um e will dom inate. Therefore there will be a situation in which the effective rate 
suddenly falls, and then it will increase alm ost as suddenly. However, dem ographic 
fluctuation will not leave this system  unaffected either: if actuarially correct rates 
are applied, considerable cross-sectional deficits will occur until the m iddle of the 
next century.
However, if the new work pension works as a funded private insurance it will 
s ta r t to  live a life which is completely independent of the old pensions. Therefore, 
the new work ‘pension system  has to  be considered on its own. On the left hand 
side of Figure 6 we can see th a t in the course of the 21st century contribution in­
come rem ains practically on the same level because, according to  our assum ption, 
the num ber of active earners is unchanged. On the other hand, pension expendi­
tures increase slowly, as a t the beginning there are many more contributors than 
retirees in the new system. Therefore, im portant cross-sectional surpluses occur, 
and considerable assets are accum ulated in the m aturing phase of the new system.
Of course, this system cannot avoid demographic effects either. It can be seen 
on the left hand side of the chart th a t the current cross-sectional balance incurs a 
deficit in between the two periods th a t are critical from the dem ographic aspect. 
On the right hand side of the chart we can see th a t the assets accum ulated in the 
m aturing  period survive this shock easily: although they fall, the assets rem ain 
positive and later even increase slightly. It is a fact th a t m ature, funded system s 
react b e tte r to  dem ographic shocks than  pay-as-you-go systems. However, there 
are two problems:
T he first problem is th a t funded systems survive dem ographic shocks by 
disinvesting in the critical period. In other words, they withdraw capital from the
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Fig. 6 T h e  new funded work pension  sy stem
capital m arket ra ther than continuing to contribute to it. The effect of this is th a t 
the aggregate savings rate is exactly the same as if the Pension Insurance Fund or 
the s ta te  budget had a deficit.J
The second problem is th a t if the “new” work contributions are capitalised 
from the beginning of the reform, then there is no coverage or resources for the 
“old” work pensions. Still, these pensions must be paid unless we expect the people 
affected to  live on air and nothing else. It is the sta te  which should pay, for in the 
“old” pay-as-you-go system the sta te  pocketed the contributions paid a t th a t time 
by the now “old” pensioners. If, therefore, the sta te  raises taxes it then destroys 
the favourable effect of the lower contribution rate. If not, will go into debt. The 
right hand side of Figure 6 also shows the sta te  debt incurred due to  the paym ent 
of “old” work pensions. The literature often mentions the implied state debt hidden 
in pension promises— here this becomes transparent.
The compound result is of course negative, as this is where the same effect 
settles down. It would appear as current deficit, in the pay-as-you-go system  under 
an actuarially  correct contribution rate. The pension asset accum ulated in the 
“new” system is smaller than the sta te  debt generated by the “old” system; the 
capital m arket feeding the economy does not win, but loses, ju s t as it would lose
2T his concern has already appeared  in the  lite ra tu re  concerning US 401/K  accounts. (SheibeT 
and Shoven  1994, Wayne  1994).
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in a pay-as-you-go system . The sta te  budget loses even more as interest is payable 
upon old pensions financed from credit and this sta te  debt survives even after old 
pensioners have all died.
The point of individual pensions
The socially acceptable system
In the first p a rt of the article reference was made to  the fact th a t all pension 
system s necessarily have a part which adapts fairly from the actuarial aspect to  the 
period of (service) tim e covered by the contribution paym ent and the wages forming 
the basis of the contribution levying. This part is called the work pension, w hether 
it is ju s t one com ponent serving as a calculation basis in a one-pillar system , or a 
separate pillar of a m ulti-pillar system. However, the inequality of the work pensions 
exceeds—several tim es— the inequality of work incomes (wages). This is because 
the inequality of years of service, and perhaps even th a t of different life expectancies, 
adds up to  the inequality of incomes. This has to be counterbalanced since this 
system  will be socially acceptable only if the inequality of pensions eventually comes 
close to  th a t of work incomes.
In order to be able to discuss this numerically, it is necessary to choose an 
indicator from those available for measuring income inequalities. Following the 
exam ple of Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), we have applied the indicator called 
decile ratio. In this people are arranged according to the size of their income, and 
the lower and the upper 10 percent are removed from the set. The ra tio  of the 
highest and lowest incomes of this truncated set is called the decile ra tio .3
As an example let us examine how the requirem ent of social acceptability  
prevails in our current system. According to the wages counted, the decile ra tio  of 
new pensioners enrolled in the course of 1992 was 2.8, while th a t of their s ta rting  
pensions was 2.48. In the same year the inequality of all (old and new) pensions 
was only 1.8. So while starting  pensions are still close to the socially acceptable 
proportions, over time the inequality becomes unacceptably low. From this we can 
draw the conclusion th a t the task of m aintaining the socially acceptable inequality 
of pensions is ju s t as im portan t for any pension reform as the fine-tuning of the 
rules for determ ining new pensions. The la tte r can be modified after a certain  tim e 
if they result in disproportionality, bu t nothing can be done w ith a system  dam aged 
over a num ber of decades and distorted with ad hoc “im provem ents” ; it m ust be 
left as it is.
3T his incom e inequality  ind icato r complies w ith D a lto n ’s postu late : i.e. the  add ition  of identical 
(positive) am ounts to the  incomes reduces the  inequality.
Acta  Otconomica 1996
M. A U GUSZTINO VICS-B. MARTOS: PEN SIO N  R EFO R M 141
There are several ways to  get from the work pension to the (socially accept­
able) final pension (from now on the am ount “pocketed” will be referred to as the 
pension w ithout any adjective). One way is: to  correct the work pension through 
taxes and subsidies. We will term  this proposal the one-pillar system. The other 
way is to  introduce the basic sta te  pension in addition to  the work pension. This 
is how we get the iwo-pillar system. Supplem enting the single pillar system  with 
one elem ent of the two-pillar one, we get the one-and-a-half-pillar system.
The starling pensions and the point system
The proposal to renew the system of pension determ ination aims to reach 
four, interconnected goals:
—  it should make it clear for the insurees (during the period of their active 
insurance paying-in) w hat eligibility they acquire through the insurance and w hat 
they lose if the contribution is not paid upon the whole income. T his is in contrast 
to the paym ent of taxes, where no personal interests are involved.) The clarity of 
the new pensions is im portant, especially in the one-pillar system  where it is more 
difficult to  distinguish the various components;
—  the work pensions should meet the requirem ents of both  actuarial fairness  
and social acceptability;
—  it should be possible to carry out the transition from the old system  to 
the new one in a couple of years;
—  a t the tim e of introduction of the pension reform it should be possible to 
transfer those who retired according to  the old system  into the new one w ithout 
any perceivable change in their pensions. There should not be two parallel system s 
which carry on together for decades.
In order to meet these requirem ents simultaneously we found a “m agyarised” 
version of the point system, introduced in Germany in 1992, to be suitable (de­
scribed by Rác:  1992 and Réti  1995). This choice is also explained by the common 
(Bism arckian) roots of the Hungarian and the G erm an social insurance systems, 
as well as the search for a solution th a t complies with European system s. (Euro­
pean conformity does not exist in this field for there are many system s am ong the 
respective countries. However, compared with the US system  or with the system s 
created speculatively for developing countries, our system  is still European.)
A condition for the introduction of the point system  is to have an individual 
registration of the insurees for many years back and to record the years covered 
by their insurance, (th a t is, the service period) as well as their wages which serve 
as a basis for contribution determ ination (th a t is, the contribution base). We can 
consider ourselves relatively lucky since the basic d a ta  are available from about 
1988. We can collect such details if and when funds become available. Given th a t 
the reform can hardly enter into force before 2000, by then we will have series of
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d a ta  on twelve years, which we find acceptable as a m inimum. Therefore, from  now 
on and w ithout fu rther anticipation (just to fix ideas) we will consider 1 January  
2000 as day X , the day the reform is introduced.
The point system relies on wages and service times which serve as the bases 
for work pensions. These will be discussed below. The system  is optionally supple­
m ented w ith the consideration of the retiring age (i.e. age reached a t retirem ent). 
T he tools for this are the age bonus and malus points. From now on the one-pillar 
and the two-pillar system s will be discussed separately. F irst we discuss fully the 
one-pillar system  and then return to the two-pillar system.
Pension formulae in the one-pillar system
The point system  relies on the following, partly  undefined term s, and unex­
plained relations (about which more will be said later).
Terms related to the active insurance period preceding retirement:
—  annual points,
—  registered period and service period,
—  life points =  (S  annual points) x (service period : registered period),
—  retiring age and age bonus/m alus (optional),
—  work points =  life points ±  age bonus/m alus, (bu t non-negative).
Terms related to the period of retirement following the beginning o f retirement
(see formulae in the Appendix)
—  forint m ultiplier,
—  work pension =  work points x forint m ultiplier,
—  subsidy/incom e tax,
—  pension =  work pension ±  subsidy/tax .
Insurance history of the individual: annual points and life points
The insurance history of individuals sta rts  with the levying of the contribu­
tion. After th a t, all the periods when the contribution was paid and the individual 
contribution base (wage) was recorded are considered as registered periods. In ad­
dition to this, the service period also includes the period for which contribution  
was paid (i.e. before 1988), bu t the contribution base was not recorded.
In each year of the registered period we divide the individual contribution 
base (wage) of the insurees by the national average wage calculated in the same 
way. The ratio  is called the annual point. Here details are not given about what 
m ust be considered in relation to the contribution base, bu t it is im portan t to  note 
for later th a t pre-tax wages will be taken into account. It should also be noted
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th a t we do not deal w ith the accounting of fractional years either. Of course, 
the annual points of individual insurees can be calculated in the course of the 
following year only when the average is known. Then, annual points are entered 
into the records and the insurees are notified in writing. In this way everyone 
can keep a record of his accum ulated points. By com paring annual wages to  the 
average wage as a numéraire , it is possible to add the wages of different years 
w ithout having to  struggle w ith interest rates and discounting, for in a pay-as- 
you-go system  contributions are not capitalised. Thus the accounting of the points 
m eets the  requirem ents of clarity as well as actuarial fairness.
At retirem ent all the annual points gained up to the point of retirem ent are 
added. In the  case of those who do not have any service period from before 1988 
in addition to  the registered period (and a t some tim e all new pensioners will be in 
this category), the to tal am ount of annual points gives the num ber of life points. 
However, now and for a long tim e in the future service years before 1988 will also 
have to  be counted. This could be done by saying th a t “each year counts as one 
poin t” , bu t it complies better with the principle of actuarial fairness if we project 
the average of annual points back to  the to ta l service period. T he above form ula of 
life points serves this purpose. We would gladly replace it by another form ula if we 
could find a b e tte r m ethod of estim ation for individual wages before 1988. (Here 
we do not deal with the case in which someone acquired eligibility to  a pension in 
the past, but does not have enough registered years.) As a favour, periods w ithout 
em ploym ent (e.g. child rate, training) can be included in the registered or service 
period, if someone pays the relevant contribution.
Naturally, those retiring in '2000 might have a m axim um  of twelve registered 
years. T his num ber will then increase year by year. W hen the num ber is high 
enough, it will be wise to modify the system  by ignoring the same num ber of best 
and worst years for the calculation of the average. This would protect the insurees 
and the insurer from the inclusion of catastrophically bad and ou tstandingly  good 
years.
Retirement age, life expectancy, age bonus, work points
W ith regard to  the age lim it of retirem ent, especially w ith respect to  women, a 
Political game has been going on for years and we do not wish to join this. Therefore 
our proposals related to this subject can be disregarded— thus the current age limits 
can rem ain or be changed in the old way. This is one of our reasons (others will 
be discussed later) for qualifying our relevant proposal as “optional” ; even if it is 
•■ejected, this does not prevent the im plem entation of the other elem ents of our 
conception. In our proposal there is no positive or negative discrim ination between 
the sexes, although the social acceptability requirem ent favours women.
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In our current system  two thresholds must be crossed in order to acquire 
eligibility for a pension: the age limit and the minimum lim it of service period 
(and both m ust be met separately). In contrast we suggest th a t these two criteria 
be combined— namely, a t a lower age a longer service period should be required for 
eligibility. For this, the medium  value of the retirem ent age should be determ ined. 
As an example, let it be 64, and then a zone to the left and right from this, 
say between the ages of 58 and 70. A required m inimum service period would 
correspond to the medium value (say 15 years). This would also prevail over the 
m edium  age of retirem ent. However, for early retirem ent, below the m edium  age 
the requirem ent increases— for example, by 3 years for each missing year. Table 1 
shows the com binations of retirem ent age and -service period necessary to be eligible 
for a pension.
Table 1
The age o f retirement and the service period
R etirem ent age R equired service period







64 and  over 15
W ith this we have only solved the issue of the age of retirem ent from the 
aspect of the pension eligibility, but have not provided incentives for those who 
have become eligible for retirem ent to keep on working. In the case of those who 
retire younger, the present value of the expected pension flow (discounted to  the 
m om ent of retirem ent) is, ceteris paribus, higher than  for those who take th is step 
a t an older age. This related to  the issue the longer life expectancy. Those who 
delay retirem ent not only pay the contribution for longer (and this is honoured by 
further annual points), but also renounce one or several years’ pension income, and 
in the spirit of actuarial fairness the insurer m ust return this by increasing the work 
pension. A ctuarial fairness requires th a t the expected present value of the  work 
pension flow (for example in the 64th year of age) be independent from the age of 
retirem ent.
As has been mentioned earlier, we consider this part of our proposal optional 
(and thus dispensable). In other words, we are willing to  renounce actuaria l fairness 
a t th is point. Thus, three solutions present themselves, and we do not have sufficient 
d a ta  to  qualify one of them  as the best. The choices are the following:
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—  to leave the retirement age out of consideration (version zero). The fol­
lowing argum ents can be mentioned to support this solution: 1. the prom otion of 
continued work may be useful in the years of upswing, bu t during a recession it 
would increases the surplus on the labour m arket i.e. create unem ploym ent; 2. it 
is useless to  encourage the employee if the employer has a counter-interest; 3. the 
expected effectiveness of the proposal is difficult to estim ate; 4. the difference of life 
expectancies would increase the inequality of work pensions and too drastic subsidy 
and tax  rates would be needed to counterbalance this;
—  to take the retirement age into consideration in an actuarially fa ir  way 
(fair version). The main argum ents in favour of this solution are: 1. a t least the 
work pension should rem ain theoretically pure and therefore be less influenced by 
actual political interests; 2. it has been proved th a t inequality would increase a t 
an unpleasant ra te  as a consequence of the fair version; 3. employers can be m ade 
interested in keeping the elderly employees who are able to work and discouraged 
from forcing early retirem ent;
—  to apply bonus and malus rates lower than the fa ir  ones (interim  version). 
In this case, the argum ents for and against are the same, but the good and the bad 
effects are m oderated.
Table 2 
Bonus and malus points
D enom ination Zero Fair In terim
Annual bonus points 0 4 2
Points gained 64-70 6 30 18
A nnual m alus points 0 -1 .5 0.75
Points lost 64-70 - 6 - 1 5 -1 0 .5
T he effects of the three versions are shown in Table 2, where the num bers 
of annual bonus and m alus points clearly indicate the effect of the retirem ent age. 
We arrived a t the correct version by—for the sake of sim plicity—calculating the 
average of the necessarily different correct points of the various ages. We sta rted  by 
considering the six-year average of the bonus points and the m alus points separately. 
T hus the bonus/m alus points have to be added purely (with their sign) to  the life 
points. However, the six years’ figures for gain/loss points include the effect of the 
change in the num ber of service years considering a person of average wage.
Com paring the figures of Table 2 with the fact th a t the num ber of life points 
falls generally between 15 and 70, we can see how cruel the fair version is. I t can 
also be seen in this definition th a t the extent of the prize and the penalty  does 
not depend on the number of life points one has. Technically, a m ultiplicative 
solution (like the G erm an one) could be elaborated instead of the  additive age 
bonus; however, this would increase inequality in an even more direct way.
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Even so, the age bonus/m alus rates, irrespective of their actual extent, cannot 
be considered perm anent forever. W ithout injuring acquired rights these rates may 
change at any tim e according to the sta tus of the labour market: they can be 
increased when there is an upswing and decreased, even to zero, during a recession. 
Under the current perm anent recession we would not be surprised to  see few people 
voting for this elem ent of our proposal. However, those contem plating pension 
reforms should contem plate the prospects of fifty years, not five.
F ount multiplier and work pension
Let us recall th a t the number of work points is the algebraic sum  of the life 
points and the bonus/m alus points. These, however, cannot tu rn  negative, even 
after the deduction of the m alus points. We get the starting  work pension by 
m ultiplying the work points by a forint m ultiplier. Yet while the num ber of work 
points differs individually (albeit remaining the same right through the period of 
pension), the forint m ultiplier is the same for everyone even though it changes w ith 
tim e (in line with the forint). Thus we managed to separate the proportions (i.e. 
the inequality) of work pensions— which cannot be tam pered with afterw ards— from 
the general nom inal level of pensions. The la tter can be adjusted to the nom inal 
value of average wages, i.e. to the economic situation. Yet while we are getting 
from the work pensions to pensions, a few more factors appear.
F irst of all, we calculated th a t value of the forint multiplier w ith which the 
average of the pensions starting  in 1992 would rem ain the same under the new 
system  (disregarding age bonus). The m ultiplier resulted in approxim ately 3,500 
forin ts/w ork points annually. Otherwise, the size of the forint m ultiplier as deter­
mined by the stage a t which we want to set the replacement rate (for the  average of 
new en tran ts) or the pension ration (for the old ones). There always exists a forint 
m ultiplier value which creates a tem porary equilibrium , and it can be calculated if 
the d a ta  are available, even if such calculation is by no means straightforw ard.
From the work pension to pension: subsidy and tax
On the path  leading from the work pension to pension the first step is the 
income tax  to be levied on work pensions. Although it m ight seem socially insen­
sitive to  present “poor pensioners” with an income tax bill, the proposal intends 
to deduct the income tax not from the pension, but from the—some m ight say 
fictitious— work pension. The la tte r has been calculated linearly (i.e. w ithout the 
stric t digression which a t present burdens the service period and wages).
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Marios (1994) dem onstrated th a t the nominally not taxable pensions are in 
reality  after-tax  incomes where the deduction was perform ed according to  twice 
the tax  rate  of active people. Thus pensioners, who are often considered as being 
dependent on society, bear a double public burden, albeit invisibly. According to 
our proposal they would pay tax  ju s t like all other citizens having an income. (We 
have defined the pension as after-tax income.)
Against the taxation of pensions reference should also be made to  the  in­
creasing adm inistrative burden: should all pensioners fill out a tax  declaration? 
Those who have other incomes should, just as now. The income of the others could 
be arranged as simply as it is now, with the declarations being subm itted  via the 
employers, and managed by the Pension Paym ent A dm inistration (PPA ). We will 
revert to  the clearing of accounts between PPA and the tax  adm inistration  later.
In 1992 the contribution base (closing wages) of new retirees showed a decile 
ra tio  of 2.8, while their calculated work points and work pension was 6.9. The 
effective marginal income tax  rates were as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Tax rates





If we do nothing other than apply this tax table on the work pensions of 
1992, then approxim ately 200 thousand forint will remain after tax  from the 240 
thousand forint work pension of the ninth decile. The approxim ately 35 thousand 
forint work pension of the first decile falls in the 0 percent bracket, so it does not 
change. Finally the inequality of the work pensions would be reduced from 6.9 
to 5.7. T his is still unacceptably far from the 2.8 inequality of wages, compared 
to which it should be lower ra ther than  higher. The miserable 35 thousand forint 
of the first decile expresses better the prevailing absurdity, although it is difficult 
to recognise due to the abstract presentation. The solution we suggest is th a t, 
in addition to  the work pension, a subsidy depending on the extent of the work 
Pension should be paid to those entitled to low work pensions. In order to  achieve 
this:
—  the same authority  which determines, and from time to  tim e modifies, the 
tax rates and the corresponding income brackets (this is the Parliam ent now) should 
determ ine the income lim it below which the work pension should be supplem ented 
with  a subsidy. This will be the lower boundary of the bracket of the 0 percent tax
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rate; this may be equal to  the upper boundary, bu t preferably it will be lower than  
th a t;
—  a t the same tim e the m arginal rate of subsidy should also be set. The 
m axim um  subsidy corresponding to  the (perhaps fictitious) zero work pension is 
equal to  the m inim um  pension. The am ount of the subsidy is calculated using the 
following formula:
subsidy =  (lower boundary of the 0 percent bracket — work pension) x rate.
We get the pension by deducting the tax  from, or adding the subsidy to , the 
work pension. (A m ulti-bracket m arginal subsidy rate  is also possible. To date 
there is no need for th a t, a t least according to our calculations.)
Continuing the previous arithm etic example: let the lower boundary of the 
0 percent bracket be 90 thousand forint, (it should be taken into account th a t the 
upper boundary is 100 thousand forint!), and let the rate of subsidy be 67 percent. 
T he m inimum pension and m axim um  subsidy corresponding to the zero work point 
is: 90 x 0.67 =  60 thousand forint. In the subsidy zone the pension goes up to 90 
thousand forint (this is w hat those having 26 work points get); then up to  100 
thousand forint the pension equals the work pension. Above this, the work pension 
is taxed. According to  our calculations almost 35-40 percent of those who becam e 
pensioners in 1992 would receive a subsidy, 10 percent would fall in the 0 percent 
bracket, and 50-55 percent would pay tax. The 35 thousand forint work pension of 
the first decile would be supplem ented with (90 — 35) x 0.67 =  37 thousand forint 
subsidy, so the pension would be 72 thousand forint. Finally, through the taxation  
and the subsidy, we achieved a situation  in which the inequality of the pensions 
dropped to  200 : 72 =  2.78, coming close to the 2.8 inequality of closing wages.
Figure 7 shows the work pension (full line) and the pension (do tted  line) 
p lo tted  against the work points, in accordance with the d a ta  of our num erical 
exercise. W ith  respect to w hat follows, it is an im portan t feature of the function 
th a t it increases strictly  monotonically all along its dom ain of definition, so it 
can be inverted. The detailed formulae and the param eters corresponding to  the 
num erical exercise for both the work point-pension function and the pension-work 
point (inverse) function can be found in the Appendix. We can get the diagram  of 
the inverse function by projection to the 45° straight line.
By calibrating the param eters a situation  can be achieved in which, at least 
a t the s ta rt, the to tal of new pensions would be almost equal to th a t of the  work 
pensions— i.e. from the deducted tax  advances the Pension Paym ent A dm inistration 
would be able to  cover the am ount of subsidy to  be borne by the s ta te  budget a t 
the final claaring of the accounts. Seemingly, the social insurance system  lacks 
the coverage for “grossing” high pensions; in fact, th is is com pensated for by the 
transfer of the burden of the subsidy for low pensions to  the sta te  budget. Later 
a balance (th a t can be m anipulated) can occur in favour of any of the parties, but 
legislators will always have enough “power” to be able to  sustain the “break-even” 
situation.
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Pension (thousand Ft)
Fig. 7 Pension  as a  function  o f w ork po in ts
Until now we have not mentioned the issue of the health insurance of pen­
sioners nor the source of the insurance premium. A lthough the eventual decision 
concerning this issue changes the nom inal size of the system  param eters, here it is 
not necessary to go into detail.
Transferring old pensions to the new system
We want to  fit the old pensions into the new system  in order to  leave the 
actual pensions of day X  unchanged (or if we— the s ta te— are rich enough, we 
can increase them  evenly in order to  improve the public m ood). Then for each 
insuree we calculate th a t number of work points ( implicit work points) according 
to the param eters determ ined in the new system which would generate the actual 
pension.4 They are informed of the la tter, and then from the day of receiving this 
inform ation each element of their pension (work pension, subsidy, tax  advance,
4T his is where we use the  inverse of the  pension function m entioned above. T he inverse is no t 
defined for pensions lower th an  the  m axim um  subsidy. To these we assign 0 work p o in t (instead  of 
a negative num ber of points). According to the  1992 d a ta  this would have resu lted  in an  increase 
° f  1000 forint m onthly  for 3 perm ille of the  pensioners, w ith a  cost effect of less th a n  5 m illion 
f°rint annually.
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their m ethod of calculation and param eters) would be calculated and disclosed 
in the sam e way as for new entrants. From this moment all differences between 
the handling of old and new pensions would disappear: there would not be two 
system s to  consider for decades, until the previous one disappears. (N aturally, the 
difference between the level of the pensions would not disappear, for this would 
not be a free lunch as in the way th a t the system transfer is.) This great openness 
would also generate tensions. Old pensioners have already feel the unfairness. In 
the possession of the new d a ta  they could even estim ate the extent of this inequity.
Transition period, indexation, technique o f  modification
A few transitional years m ust be inserted between the old and the new system s 
to avoid hurting  the vested interests of those who retire in this period. They must 
be given the option to choose the old rules. This requires special a tten tion  in 
handling the delicate issue of the age limit. It is obvious th a t this duplication, 
which may effect the determ ination of the starting  pension and the eligibility to  a 
pension, should disappear in a few years.
We do not have much to say about regular annual indexation either, which 
now effects the forint multiplier only. In our view the principle of following the 
average wage should be sustained. At most, the retroactive m ethod should be 
improved and, m ost of all, the adjustm ent should be made autom atic. It is not 
reasonable for this adm inistrative issue to become the subject of political debates 
twice a year.
T he modification of the param eters related to taxes is a different issue. Ob­
viously, the tax  rates and, similarly, the subsidy rate could be changed in acts, but 
au tom atic  valuation rules should be applied on the relevant income brackets. How­
ever, this already trespasses across the boundaries of a proposed pension reform.
In our proposal we have not dealt with the allowances of the dependants of 
pensioners nor with the pensions of survivors. It is obvious th a t these paym ents 
should be included in the point system. W hether, in addition, their current rates 
should be changed can be decided later, after the fundam ental issues have been 
cleared up. The issue of disabled people is more complex. Below the age lim it they 
are provided for not within the pension system, but the health insurance. However, 
their switch to the pension insurance system will certainly raise some questions, 
the answer to  which is not ready yet.
The two-pillar and the one-and-a-half-pillar systems
The introduction of the two-pillar system (the basic pension) serves the same 
goals and principles th a t we presented at the beginning of the chapter and one goal
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more. T he basic pension is also a tool for providing for the elderly, irrespective of 
whether someone has acquired the eligibility to  receive a work pension or not. This 
is a quite dem ocratic institution: bankers and dogcatchers, heads of the mob and 
policemen, m ental specialists and their patients would get the same am ount from 
the s ta te , whose territory they live on, provided they are old enough. T hus the 
basic pension constitutes a formally separate system  from the respective aspects 
of the rules for financing and eligibility. Besides, from many points of view the 
two pillars should be viewed as two components of a single system. They fulfil 
certain  social functions together and therefore society will judge them  on the basis 
of their jo in t effect. The extents of the basic pension and the work pension cannot 
be decided independently of each other. This is only because of the m acroeconom- 
ically unquestionable common fund (G D P), but also because they m ust meet the 
requirem ent of social acceptability jointly. As regards the expected social reception, 
subsidising the rich from public funds will create widespread aversion.
The advantages of introducing the basic pension appear in the field of social 
policy. C urrently, a  considerable part of the social policy expenditure serves to 
support those of the elderly who are in need, as well as the families providing 
for them . The determ ination of eligibility is uncertain, and its adm inistration 
and organisation are clumsy. M unicipalities would be happy if the basic pension 
could free them  from a t least a part of this burden (even if they had to renounce 
some money). Another kind of favourable effect would be enjoyed by the system  
of work pensions, which will become considerably simpler as it becomes clearer. 
Finally, the two-pillar system  is backed by the fact th a t this solution is operated  
successfully in several W estern European so-called welfare states. I would explain 
its favourable domestic reception in 1991 (by the Parliam ent) as being due to  the 
la tte r consideration. However, I consider it is not the task here to form ulate a 
m oral-political opinion for or against the two-pillar system , bu t to consider how it 
can be im plem ented, w hat are its disadvantageous consequences and to w hat extent 
they can be averted.
If the true goal of the two-pillar system were to  help old people in need 
who are outside the social insurance (and not a carrot dangled in front of us to 
lead us to the privatisation of social insurance), then this previous goal could be 
achieved by a small modification of the one-pillar system. It is in this light th a t the 
one-and-a-half-pillar system  is conceived. We have nothing else to  do other than  
extend the subsidy— which corresponds to  zero work point (60 thousand forint in 
our num erical exam ple)— to those who have not acquired eligibility to  receive a 
work pension, bu t have reached a specified higher age, e.g. 64 years. From the 
other aspects everything could remain as it is in the one-pillar system , except the 
service year requirem ents, as shown in Table 2. A new table should be prepared 
instead bu t the argum ents and details will not be discussed here.
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Basic pension formulae, dilemma of the age limit
If, as we have assumed, we want to operate the basic pension in the framework 
of a point system  too, then it is wise to determ ine its extent also in points ( basic 
points). Hereby we ensure th a t this component moves along the work pension in 
tim e and th a t the actual forint m ultipliers are the same. So the num ber of basic 
points and the sta rting  value of the forint m ultiplier are closely dependent on the 
s truc tu re  of the work pension; therefore our first task is to  examine in w hat way 
the work pension component of the two-pillar system  should differ from th a t of the 
one-pillar system. Two relevant formulae need to be taken into account:
basic pension =  basic points x forint multiplier,
pension =  basic pension +  work pension.
Com pared to  the previous pension formula, it is clear th a t the basic pension 
stepped into the place of the subsidy and tax in the case in which som ebody is 
eligible for both.
W ith respect to  the work pension we suggest the following changes:
—  the requirem ent of a minimum service period m ust be neglected. This 
was necessary only to  restrict eligibility to claim a subsidy. So, in the two-pillar 
system , everyone who has ever been insured and becomes eligible by age will get 
a work pension in accordance with the number of work points. The la tte r may be 
very low or, due to  the age m alus, even zero;
—  the age bonus/m alus rem ains an optional elem ent of the work pension. 
T he fair version has again a quite distorting effect, but even the m alus part of the 
in terim  version is questionable, as we will see.
Here we stop for a numerical detour as we continue the exercise of the one- 
pillar system . Let the number of basic points be 26. As the average num ber of 
the work points is 35, the forint multiplier must be reduced to the proportion  of 
35:61 so th a t the average pension rem ains the same. (The average is in terpreted  
by calculating it only for those receiving a work pension, and this includes all of 
them .) T hus the forint m ultiplier changes from 3500 forint to  2000 forint, and the 
value of the basic pension is 26 x 2000 =  52 thousand forint. T he la tte r can be 
com pared with the 60 thousand forint minimum pension of the one-pillar system . 
T he first decile’s pension is 72 thousand forint (as earlier), while th a t of the ninth 
decile is (70 +  26) x 2000 =  192 thousand forint (instead of 200 thousand forint). 
T he decile ra tio  is: 192 : 72 =  2.67; although it has diminished it is still socially 
acceptable.
From this calculation it is clear th a t in the two-pillar system  it is much 
sim pler to create pensions of proportions sim ilar to those of the one-pillar system , 
preserving the linearity of the work pension, elim inating the complex subsidy and 
tax  system , and reducing the pension contribution by approxim ately 40 percent.
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(And, as there are no miracles, the tax  burden is also forcefully increased.) All this 
sounds quite acceptable, but there is a problem which has not yet been mentioned.
It is a quite general opinion th a t, also due to  the cost effects, the age limit 
of the basic pension should be considerably higher than th a t of the work pension. 
Yet then the possibility of a flexible age limit for work pensions disappears. It is 
impossible to imagine the introduction of a pension system  where an individual can 
retire a t the age of 58, but then for 6 years he must make a living on a fraction of 
the final pension, the work pension, and wait for his income to rise when he reaches 
the age limit of the basic pension. This system excludes those who do not have 
o ther incomes from the beginning of retirem ent until they reach the age lim it of 
the basic pension.
It is possible th a t there exists a method for bridging the period between the 
two age limits; however, I have not found any solution which could fit into any of 
the two pillars w ithout contradictions.
If the work pension rem ains w ithin the scope of social insurance, then the 
inclusion of the old pensioners into the new system  and the ad justm ent of the forint 
m ultiplier can be solved equally or even more simply than  in the one-pillar system . 
T hus there is no need to  discuss them  again. Among the former pensioners those 
who have not yet reached the age limit of the basic pension may have to  wait 
a few years until their enrolm ent, bu t this delay is not really disturbing. If the 
work pension system is managed in a funded private system, then, of course, the 
possibility of fitting old pensioners into the new system  disappears. In fact, in the 
funded system  there is no pension formula. In this system  the pension am ounts 
to  w hat is covered by the assets accum ulated on an individual’s account until the 
point of retirem ent. In a lucky situation  this may be large, bu t it could also be 
very small.
Conclusions
We have to recall th a t, due to  the absence of elaborated reform proposals, 
our calculations, w ith the exception of the basic data, are based on arb itrarily  
specified assum ptions and param eters. W hat we have presented here may be only 
a m inor exercise for future, more detailed calculations and “effect studies” . These 
will require thorough and persistent team  work, w ithout which the in troduction  of 
a pension reform would be a jum p into nothing.
Despite this weak point, we have tried to  throw light on some of the funda­
m ental relations which will also prevail under other specifications of the assum ptions 
and param eters. These are w hat we try  to sum m arize now.
The proportion of elderly people in the population is higher than the weight 
° f  old age in the life path of the cohort. This is already a fact now and it will re­
main so for the greater part of the next century. Therefore the effective contribution
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rate necessary for the cross-sectional balance of the pension system  is higher and 
th is will not only be persistent through the decades— albeit w ith fluctuations— but 
will rem ain higher than  the actuanally correct rate. This would ensure longitudi­
nal balance (zero heritage) along the pension path  of the cohort. T his cannot be 
changed by the adm inistrative increase of the age limit nor by the financially pro­
m oted, spontaneous increase of the age centre. This is because longer contribution 
paym ent periods and shorter retirem ent periods reduce bo th  rates.
Under such conditions there are two ways to sustain the stable self-financing 
of a social insurance pay-as-you-go pension system:
1. the actually applied contribution rate should strictly  follow the effective 
ra te— i.e. it should change year by year (this is how the G erm an pension system  
operates for example). The advantage of this is th a t it enables “fine tun ing” , but 
the disadvantage is th a t it unfairly disfavours or favours the different active cohorts, 
as a t a certain tim e they m ust pay more or less, depending on the dem ographic 
fluctuations generated 60-80 years earlier;
2. in a period which is relatively favourable from the dem ographic aspect, 
the legal ra te  is fixed at a higher than  necessary level. Thus, cross-sectional sur­
pluses are generated and this enables the stockpiling of reserves in preparation for 
dem ographically critical periods (this is the practice in the social security system  
in the USA). The advantage of the procedure is th a t the legal ra te  can be left un­
changed through a long period and the load on successive generations is even. On 
the o ther hand, it is a disadvantage th a t even the m ost thorough calculations may 
be wrong with respect to  fu ture mortality. Moreover, w ithout constitu tional guar­
antees, the ruling government m ight be tem pted to seize such a ttrac tive  reserves 
for its own purposes.
A funded and actuanally correct pension system  cannot have recourse to  the 
first m ethod, bu t it does not need it either. W hen the system  m atures, it then 
behaves autom atically according to the second system . The difference is th a t not 
only a small bridging reserve, but also the whole pension asset accum ulated in the 
m aturing  phase cushions the effect of cross-sectional deficits.
In the demographically critical periods, from the aspect of the economic con­
sequences, there is no difference between either of the two system s, or the two 
forms of financing. According to the first procedure the higher contribution fi­
nances current consum ption— i.e. it reduces the possibility of accum ulation; the 
second m ethod, w hether in the framework of social insurance or private insurance, 
involves the w ithdraw al of previously invested capital, which has exactly the same 
effect.
Thus it is self-delusion to hope th a t any transform ation of the pension system  
may, in the 21st century, elim inate the im pact on pensions of the dem ographic 
fluctuation resulting from the m ortality  and birth  history of the 20th century. There 
exists no num ber of pillars or financing forms which could overwrite the laws of 
demography.
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However, the pension system  depends not only on demographic, bu t also on 
economic changes, it has to adapt to  them  too. Through a few more decades the 
num ber of active earners “sustaining” pensioners will depend not on the demo­
graphic trends or the number of pensioners, bu t on the labour absorbing capacity 
of the economy. We may adopt any other assum ption in this regard; bu t under the 
given assum ption it will always be true th a t the reduction of the num ber of those 
who are retired— whether by raising the age limit, or by financial incentives— will 
either reduce the employment opportunities of young and middle aged people, or 
increase the elderly population dependent on social care. Therefore, all proposed 
pension reforms th a t neglect the interrelations between the pension system , the 
labour m arket and the social relief system  are irresponsible.
Even if the awaited economic restoration actually takes place and em ploym ent 
moves from its current unprecedented low rate, future cyclical economic fluctuations  
still have to be reckoned with. The pension system  cannot be immune from these 
fluctuations unless it applies a type of autom atism  which keeps proportions and 
not absolute levels stable.
In the Hungarian pension system the average pension level has been grad­
ually decreasing over several decades in comparison to  real wages. The Swedish 
pension system  has encountered serious problems because, in contrast, it preserved 
the real value of pensions with price indexing. This carried on in Sweden even 
through a long period of recession when real wages were decreasing. Both distor­
tions cause considerable changes in the income proportions between the different 
generations. However, the financial and social stability  of a  pension system  can only 
be m aintained if the generations suffer together in a recession and benefit together 
in an upswing. All this can take place w ithout perm anent legislative debates and 
negotiations in order to reconcile conflicting interests.
In this article we have used the current average gross wage as numeraire— i.e. 
as a general un it of calculation. This is not a mere technique, and it is not one of 
the usual tricks th a t a model builder uses to  facilitate his or her task. I t is true, 
though, th a t we have avoided making unfounded assum ptions about the future 
developm ent of the G D P or other economic indicators. However, this cannot be 
done when designing a real-life, future pension system , for the stability  of the la tte r 
must not be made vulnerable from the s ta rt due to uncertain forecasting stun ts. All 
the key elem ents of a pension system — i.e. the measure of claims acquired by paying 
the contribution , the starting  pensions, and the m aintenance of already determ ined 
Pensions— m ust be determ ined on a relative basis, in term s of the current average 
wage.
W ithin  the scope o f  social insurance, from this aspect there is no difference 
between the one-pillar and the two-pillar system. In both cases the relative calcula­
tion can be performed, the income proportions between the generations can be pre­
served and, if necessary and possible they can—occasionally bu t not frequently— be 
corrected.
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Also, no fundam ental difference can be made between the two system s with 
respect to which one is better for meeting the requirements of social acceptability. 
As far as the calculations in-the third part reflect the real proportions, it turned out 
th a t the desirable inequality of individual pensions can be reached in the one-pillar 
system  by applying the tax rates applicable to other incomes and a single m oderate 
subsidy rate. The same proportions can be reached in the two-pillar system  too, 
in such a way th a t the basic pension reached almost the same size as the m inim um  
pension in the one-pillar system. The postulated  linearity of the actuarially  fair 
work pensions could have been preserved in both cases.
In the case of a privately managed capitalised work pension, however, the 
relative calculation is technically impossible and the m aintenance of the income 
proportions between the generations is not a goal. The absolute level of individual 
annuities depends on the contribution paid through the earning period and the 
return  on the investments. At the age of retirem ent all these are factors rooted 
in the past, and the level of the pensions cannot be harm onised w ith the actual 
income level of active generations. This may seem attrac tive  to  self-confident young 
people who believe th a t they know this to  be the way in which to make a b e tter 
deal. However, from the social aspect a wealthy pensioner class next to  a young 
pauper class in a recession is ju s t as undesirable as elderly poor mass on the fringe 
of a boom ing society.
Finally, an im portant factor affecting the social acceptability of a pension 
reform lies in the possibility of connecting the past and the future. We have proved 
that, in the scope of social insurance the old and the new pensioners can be inte­
grated immediately in the uniform system, whether it be a one-pillar or two-pillar 
system . A lthough this does not help the relative financial s ta tu s  of old pensioners 
in com parison w ith the new pensioners or the active generations, it a t least prevents 
further deterioration of this relative situation. Thus it is impossible to  squeeze the 
old and the new pensioners separately, or to  tu rn  different groups of pensioners 
against each other.
In contrast, proposals prom oting the capitalisation of the m andatory  work 
pension generally do not bother about those who are already retired (or who will 
retire soon) when the reform enters into force. Som ething will happen to them , 
and this has always been the case. This approach projects two system s operating 
in parallel over several decades. One of them  is ju s t developing, and therefore it 
requires special a ttention , and the other one is dying out, so it requires no further 
a tten tion .
To pu t it more correctly, it requires a tten tion  inasmuch as it represents a 
burden to public finances, so the reduction of its costs must be accelerated. We 
have proved that, if such an unfair acceleration does not take place then the resulting 
sta te  debt exceeds the capital accum ulated in the funded system; the capital m arket 
does not win and the s ta te  loses. If the acceleration is carried out. cruelly, then 
the generations already retired or close to retirem ent will pay for the new capital
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accum ulation, although they have amply contributed to  the resources of a long 
grow th period.
To summarise: in the case of a two-pillar system  the capitalisation of the 
mandatory  work pension and its private managem ent are not suggested. The qtio- 
ta tion  of Latin American examples does not prove its assumed positive effect w ith 
regard to  revival of the economy. At the same tim e its individual, social and bud­
getary  consequences seem clearly negative. We are certainly not against voluntary , 
supplem entary private savings. These are desirable and should be encouraged, but 
not a t the expense of the taxpayers or as a charge on social insurance.
In the scope of social insurance the two-pillar system is favoured by its relative 
simplicity and greater clarity. However, the fact th a t the general availability of the 
basic pension would probably m oderate interest in so-called “self-provision” , the 
acquisition of eligibility for a work pension speaks against it. The dilem m a of the 
age lim it centres upon the following: during the period between the optionally 
selected age to  s ta rt to  collect the work pension and the age lim it of the basic 
pension, the work pension is not sufficient to  make a living. T his can be seen 
as an even greater problem. If an acceptable proposal to  solve the dilem m a of 
the age limit is not elaborated, then the intention to preserve the uniform social 
insurance system , coupled with the positive moral effect of taxing and subsidising 
work pensions, turns the scale in favour of the one-pillar system .
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Appendix
(to the section “The point system of individual pensions”)
Notations:
i: index o f a  bracket
x : num ber o f work poin ts
y : annual am ount o f pension
<t>: forin t m ultip lier (3500 fo rin t/y ear)
m ,: lower b oun dary  o f work p o in ts ’ bracket i
p , : lower boun dary  o f pension bracket i
c,\ slope o f the ith  line segm en t (7 ; =  ct_ 1 )
b,: ¿/-intersect o f the ¿th line segm en t (/?; = b, x  7 ,)
The pension as a function of work points:
y = c,4> x  + b1,  if m , < r < m ,  + j ,  1 =  1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 .
B racket index Work poin ts’ Ci bi Pension bracket
(0 bracket (thousand forint)
1 0 -  25.7 0.33 60 6 0 -  90
2 25.7 -  28.5 1.00 0 9 0 -1 0 0
3 28.5 -  57.1 0.75 25 100 -  175
4 57.1 -  142.9 0.65 45 175 -  370
5 142.9 - 0.60 70 370 -
e work point as an (inverse) function of the pension:





7« A Im puted work 
poin ts’ bracket
0 0 - 6 0 0.00 0 0
1 6 0 -  90 3.00 180 0 -  25.7
2 90 -  100 1.00 0 25.7 -  28.5
3 100 -  175 1.33 33 28.5 -  57.1
4 175 -  370 1.54 69 57.1 -  142.9
5 370 - 1.67 117 142.9 -
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The critical values of the pension function  
(thousand forin t/year)
Number of work 
p o in ts
S ingle  (one and 
w ork pension
a h alf) p illar sy stem  
pension
T w o-pillar sy stem  
w ork pension  pension
N o eligib ility 0 0(60) 0 52
0 0 60 0 52
1 0  ( 1s t  decile) 35 72 2 0 72
26 90 90 51 103
29 1 0 0 1 0 0 57 109
35 (average) 1 2 2 117 70 1 2 2
57 2 0 0 175 114 166
70 (9th  decile) 245 2 0 0 140 192
143 500 370 286 338
180 630 458 360 412
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FROM QUOTAS TO HARD CURRENCY 
Company views on the post-Soviet barter period 
at the beginning of the 1990s*
ZS. BORSZÉKI
T he so-called “b arte r period” a t the  beginning of th e  1990s was th e  resu lt o f special c ir­
cum stances. B a rte r  con tribu ted  to th e  survival oj international trade am ong th e  transitional 
econom ies in an  era  when in te r-sta te  relations were shaken by political facto rs an d  the  p a in  of 
change h ad  upset established inter-com pany connections. It follows th a t,  w ith  th e  developm ent 
of norm al trade , th e  role of b a rte r  will revert to being marginalised an d  th e  exchange of goods, 
as of necessity, will be replaced by the  use of m odem  financial in strum en ts. However, in the  
conditions of the  so-called “W ild E ast” , ne ither the  tendencies nor th e  requ ired  du ra tio n  of th is 
process are  clear-cut. T h is article  aim s to record certain  general features of w hat can  be called 
th e  post-Soviet o r CIS (Com m onw ealth of Independent S ta tes) b a rte r  period. It is based  on a  
series of interviews conducted  am ong a  num ber of companies. A ctual experiences have enabled 
us to  analyse th e  underlying causes of the  b a rte r  period as well as to exam ine the  factors behind 
th e  red uction  in significance and the  falling ou t of fashion of counter-trade deals.
It is widely believed th a t following the collapse of COM ECON barter was a 
“necessary evil” in the trading practices of East European countries and as such 
was merely a temporary phenomenon. Its popularity was basically due to  the fact 
th a t financing opportunities were rather narrow between 1991 and 1993. This was 
because the CIS countries lacked a banking infrastructure and easily accessible 
sources of hard currency, which itself was generally in short supply.1
In this tex t the term  “barter” is used for all deals (linked deal, counter deal, 
repurchase deal, exchange of goods, com pensation, contingency agreem ent, etc.) 
(Törzsök  1993) where the parties effect financing by part or full com pensation of 
the value of the goods, or provide financing via counter provision of o ther goods, 
irrespective of the num ber of participants in any particu lar deal.
B arter turnover is not truely reflected in customs sta tistics since it is not 
obligatory to  provide the coding for the types of deals on the custom s certificate.2 
The tangible segment o f barter turnover  is decreasing year by year. This was con­
firmed by companies during the interviews which were carried out. It is due to  the
*The s tu d y  th a t  th is a rticle  is based on was m ade with the  su p p o rt of th e  N ational Social 
Sciences Research Body (949 /94 /E )
1 It was no t only in the  CIS a rea  th a t  b a r te r  existed. However, m ost of th e  b a r te r  was under­
taken w ith th a t region in the  period of tim e under exam ination. P ro d u c ts  received from  Poland 
lr> b a r te r  trad e  often  proved unsellable. However, Slovak barte rs were p o p u lar and  often  provided 
'terns d irected  to  CIS countries, such as canned goods, knitw are and footware.
2 See research work undertaken by Agnes Nagy.
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fact th a t partners in CIS countries can more or less readily obtain hard currency 
and licences a t present, whereas previously either one or the other was difficult to 
obtain . For these and other reasons, there is simply not much point these days for 
companies to  engage in the tiresom e processes of barter trade.
We can only assume th a t the remaining barter sphere, as with the early phase 
of barter, is a ra ther muddy area of foreign trade and th a t, due to  its “maffia” na­
ture, barter is today even less tangible than  a few years ago. T hus real inform ation 
about barter turnover is quite significant. The significance, however, is not merely 
the result of the “excitem ent” and fog surrounding it.
B arter as a form of financing is not likely to  peter out fully and finally, 
although both statistics and empirical experience clearly show th a t by and large the 
special barter trade among the CIS countries belongs to the past. Its disappearance, 
however, is not complete and is on shaky ground. Barter in certain fields is still a 
m eans of trade.
Due to  various imbalances in the post-Soviet economies and the variety of 
their problem s in the supply of goods and financing, it is difficult to draw final 
conclusions—-anything can still happen, even reversals. The commodity and cur­
rency m arkets may evolve in such a way th a t barter becomes advantageous due to 
the appearance of a relative glut of goods which can be sold in response to  a trad i­
tional dem and for trade in these goods. A t the same tim e there is a local shortage 
of hard currency and an insistence on dealing with the same partners. However, 
the dem and for barter could never reach the level it was in the special “barter 
period” a t the beginning of the 1990s. It was a period th a t can be described as one 
which witnessed the “privatization” of the commodity turnover of in ter-sta te  quo­
tas. C entral organisation fell into disarray when previous entities ceased to  exist, 
albeit certain personnel remained in place.
A t th a t tim e barter trade was vital to transition. Barter m aintained relations 
otherwise destined to cease, m aking up for w hat was absent in order to continue 
trading. In disorganised trade barter thus provided an elem ent of consistency and 
becam e the m inimum resource necessary for survival or indeed for the appearance 
and strengthening of new, upcoming organisations. It follows th a t barter has lost its 
im portance with the birth  of new economic and social structures. Barter, however, 
is varied. W hat is petering out, as normal trade relations are formed, is so-called 
“enforced barter” (though, of course, it is still too early to  describe relations in 
the CIS m arkets as “norm al” ). Yet barter may still be required even when hard 
currency is available.
B arter is a living form  o f trade and, however strange it may seem, it is even 
used in the West. Therefore, research into barter trade is useful, despite the final 
(or maybe tem porary?) disappearance of the CIS barter era. There is some point 
in the exchange of goods, even under modern trade conditions, because it is money- 
sparing and can be made m ultilateral with relatively simple accounting using the 
trad ing  house form. Barter is im portan t not only because it still exists in certain
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spheres of CIS trade, but also because it is prim arily non-monetary accounting in 
this p art of the world and it will not take a back seat for a long time, given the 
existing interest rates and conditions of export financing.
It is also timely to take a look a t barter since W estern brokers specialis­
ing in the trade have appeared in Hungary. The first such specialised barter 
com pany—a jo in t venture in Hungary of A ustria’s B arter-C learing-International 
(BCI) network— began operations in September 1995. In addition, the necessity of 
conducting agreements on a non-m onetary basis has even been raised on a sta te  
level (SAAB project). The current barter deals, however, are very different from 
the legendary deals of the CIS barter era, considering their level of profit and indeed 
extra-profit, their character, economic content and background m otivation.
Companies th a t could be traced via customs barter sta tistics were not very 
willing, to  say the least, to provide information about this activity. This reflects the 
fact th a t the area in question touches on the “invisible” sphere and approaches the 
category of, i f  not entirely “black”, then the “grey” economy. This is supported by 
the fact th a t a large number of companies which had engaged in significant barter 
trade in 1994 could not be traced a t the end of 1995, either on the basis of the 
official address list or via the telephone book.
It m ost cases barter exports and im ports are incorrectly recorded on paper 
and in the statistics. The arrival of barter goods may often only be confirmed if 
checking quantities and values reveals a very unreal price per unit. Furtherm ore, 
if one or more foreign parties are involved, one or all sides of the trade may not 
appear in the H ungarian statistics.
Traders are unwilling to label deals as barter partly  due to  lack of under­
standing of the m atter, and partly  so as not to generate the interest of the customs 
authorities. Experience shows th a t w hat differs even to  a m inor extent from norm al 
business deals will inevitably a ttrac t the atten tion  of the authorities. Barter has 
clearly interested the authorities, especially in the period of legendary profits, i.e. 
in 1991-93.
The method
The inform ation is based on the experiences of the companies questioned and 
thus reflects only a small part of reality. Real barter turnover involves immense vari­
ety. T he interviews allowed us to look at characteristically different entrepreneurial 
circum stances, which, with some exaggeration, could well be called separate types. 
Although the whole range was impossible to cover, the reports given are instructive, 
while m aintaining the incognito s ta tu s of the companies. T hus this article employs 
the following m ethod: the individual stories themselves are published with some 
comment in the belief th a t the pieces of the mosaic will finally make up a few 
decisive elem ents of a ra ther colourful picture.
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The participants
T he m ost simple form involves barter between two partic ipan ts on the basis 
of complete com pensation, but since bringing this into being involves searching for 
a partner, which is not easy, further participants usually join in.
So-called “tri-partite  barter” involves the participation of a third party  on 
either the im port or the export side. The m ajority of CIS barters were doubled 
on the H ungarian side; in most cases the user of the im ported product was not 
the exporter. In classic cases, the counter lot was generally supplied by the foreign 
producer, who also received the Hungarian commodities.
If the receiver of these CIS goods was not the H ungarian exporter, then  either 
a H ungarian com pany or a foreign, usually A ustrian or Germ an user, stepped into 
the business. In such cases, any of the three parties— the exporter, the H ungar­
ian /W estern  im porter, or the CIS supplier— could take the initiative.
A th ird  party  m ost often joined in where the exporter who wanted to  place a 
H ungarian com m odity on the CIS m arket (e.g. a large Hungarian enterprise with a 
trad itiona l in terest in the old Soviet m arket) searched for a partner who would 
receive the counter goods. One particu lar type of large state-ow ned company 
was closely interested in CIS im ports due to  their raw m aterials content (chemical 
plants, ore users, energy im porters, etc.). These were the ones who often looked for 
domestic partners whose products for exports were in dem and in the CIS. Experi­
ence shows, however, th a t in m ost cases it was often a W estern m ediator or broker 
who skimmed the special profit of barter. The interest of the Hungarian party  was 
largely determ ined by the sales opportunities on the blocked market.
If the export and im port sides of barter were separate then accounting was 
very varied, depending on the degree to which participants were working on their 
own account or on commission. Accounting could have been in hard currency or 
forints and risks and profits varied widely according to the natu re  of the power 
relations.
Since in 1993-94 W estern businesspeople were not at hom e on the CIS m ar­
kets, and since Hungarians often played a m ediatory role in the barter im port of 
cheap, large volume bulk goods, much of the turnover appeared as re-export on the 
im ports side.
T he goods reached the W estern buyer often w ithout reloading and repacking 
and avoided both  H ungarian customs and customs statistics.
A fourth, fifth and other parties often joined in the barter deal. T he medi­
a to r s )  of a barte r chain may have formed a whole chain themselves. From then 
on the route of the commodity, VAT accounts and export subsidies could not be 
traced by an outsider.
Between 1991 and 1994 both small and large entities, lim ited companies and 
state-ow ned large enterprises participated  in barter if they wanted to  sell on the 
former Soviet market,. Both producers and businesspeople took part in barter, yet
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there was a surprising difference between the small and the large companies. Not 
all the small companies were clever and were thus unable to  take advantage of 
the existing opportunities. However, among the large enterprises questioned there 
was not one—and it cannot be accidental—which would have used this struc tu re  
for anything more than sales (for example, gaining outstanding profits), although 
a t th a t tim e a lot of profit could be made in this business. The large companies 
partic ipating  in barter joined in to m aintain their presence in their old m arkets and 
it was enough for them  to find a third Hungarian party  to receive the raw m aterials 
arriving as paym ents for the exported goods (medicine or buses in the case of some 
of the enterprises questioned). On these occasions the business was concluded at 
world m arket prices due to the fixed price of the Hungarian counter goods.
The business philosophy of a small unit was often completely different. Of 
course, among them  there were some whose prim ary interest was also to sell (for 
exam ple, a d istributor of dental laboratory units, a producer of fish feed, or a 
telephone network installer). While the special profit of barter proved to  be a 
fortunate  side product, it did not really m otivate the business in the beginning. Real 
barter traders were, however, moved by the business itself. These entrepreneurs 
tried to  m atch every pair for exchange where money was to be found and they traded 
with everything. The opening of sudden opportunities for this special business 
a ttrac ted  them  w ith its extra profit during those three or four years.
The participation  of banks raises a separate problem. A lthough a t the tim e of 
in ter-sta te  agreem ents accounts held by banks were used, as the period of prom pt 
collections ended. Banks (losing their initial enthusiasm while sim ultaneously be­
coming aware of the risks) withdrew from barter trade before they had really got 
in to  it. The principle reasons were the lack of readiness and lack of ability of 
the banks to  take and bear risks, and the low level, or in many cases the non­
existence of banks in the CIS. Practising businesspeople often complained of the 
non-functioning of the banking infrastructure. In many cases they blamed the fail­
ure of possible business deals on precisely this. Although Western companies in 
barter often agreed to search for partners in principle and agreed to organise the 
accounts, they were not able to solve the problems of barter in this field because 
they were afraid of doing. This was because they did not have a network of contacts 
in the CIS countries a t the time.
One feature of the barter era was th a t business deals were executed with 
primitive methods: the truck left and came back, it was unloaded and loaded 
w ithout using a forwarder or insurer, a t own risk and with the weaker p a r ty ’s 
advance delivery. The la tter was the Hungarian party  in the 1980s and generally 
the CIS party  between 1991 and 1994. This fact made small firms lacking large 
capital prefer this form. The size of the transport was determined by the firm ’s 
risk-bearing strength  and skill, as well as its working capital. After 1993 even CIS 
partners would not supply in advance w ithout guarantees, and this was one of the 
reasons for the decline in barter turnover.
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Characterisation of the CIS barter era
T he barter wave of the 1990s was the product of a specific period. B arter 
existed before 1991 and it has existed since 1994. The four-year period between 
1991 and 1994, however, can be described differently from the preceeding and the 
present years.
B arter today is the privilege of a few. It is no longer an easy option for new 
traders and “knights of fortune” trying to make money nor can it be the touchstone 
of their enterprising ability and courage. It is not the “gam e'' o f m an”  as it was 
earlier.
The deals of this era were different from the barter deals of the 1980s. They 
were quite different from the direct exchange of goods which characterised the ear­
lier in ter-sta te  quotas, and also different from the barter agreem ents of companies 
in the COM ECON era a t the end of the 1980s. These antecendents are, however, 
very im portan t because they involved stability for  the participants when there was 
no other way of maintaining relations.
T he national economic significance of the barter era, therefore, was to  en­
sure the continuity of inter-com pany relations in a m arket which was extremely 
im portan t and decisive for the H ungarian economy: in effect it was a vehicle fo r  
the change of system in trade.
As w ith every transitory  form ation, it also displayed all the anomalies of a 
confused era. The barter trade which today survives to  a lesser extent bears the 
m arks, albeit in a mature way, which differentiate this special, characteristically 
“W ild E ast” type of natu ral exchange from “civilised” , m odern trade.
T he m ost im portan t features of the barter era were as follows:
—  natu ra l exchange with the concom itant exclusion of money circulation 
and its institutions;
—  neglect of the product characteristics and quality standards of the ex­
changing pairs;
—  exclusion of specialist services participating  in the technical execution of 
trade  (forwarding, insurance, financing, d istribution of risks, etc.);
—  trust;
—  good or occasionally outstanding profits;
—  com plicated transactions stim ulated by profits, large volumes and natural 
chain relations;
—  the overlapping of legality and illegality with the aim of taking unlim ited 
advantage of domestic preferences and loop-holes in the regulations;
—  obtain ing the rights to the disposal of typical barter com m odities irre­
spective of w hether the resources necessary for this are available;
—  a trend towards the crim inalization of barter trade.
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Roots of the CIS barter era
A com pensation deal is usually concluded if one party  is interested in ob­
taining goods at the other party 's  disposal. In this case the products are comple­
m entary. They are related to each other in some vertical line of production, or 
they feature in a specialised trad e r’s range of goods (they may be semi-finished 
or finished goods an d /o r may increase the range of goods). If barter is not used 
prim arily  to  facilitate the supply of vertical needs or to take advantage of financial 
or o ther com parative advantages, but is something dictated by necessity, it is char­
acterised from the s ta rt by a potential to disappear when the original determ ining 
circum stances cease to  exist. This is w hat happened with the CIS barter deals.
In reviewing the following companies, we will take a look a t some other, even 
m ore im portan t issues.
Inter-state quotas
The system  of agreements with regard to the exchange of goods was common. 
P artic ipants were familiar with it and it was an obvious necessity for them  to 
m aintain the turnover of various pairs of exchange adjusted to their needs.
One company was among the first to obtain the right to conduct foreign 
trade on its own behalf. Although it was known as a user of textiles, it had already 
traded in various commodities, such as canned food and wheat, and it had stable 
relations on the Soviet m arkets. It conducted barter deals from the middle of the 
1980s because its Russian partners could not pay. A t first it was possible to  include 
the counter goods in the quota, but later these deals were concluded separately. In 
this situation , its partners were always happier to pay with goods, but in tim e the 
H ungarian company also insisted on barter.
According to one m anager of a trading company, machine industrial firms 
used to  account for 80-90 percent of industrial exports because the m ajority  of 
these exports were part of a network of deals. Today, in his opinion, exports have 
slackened because there is no sta te  coordination. In the past, Hungarian machine 
industry products, backed by s ta te  credit conditions, were com petitive and thus 
were exported to  places such as Libya or Brazil. In ter-state quotas were secure.
Many of the companies questioned, particularly  the large ones or the small 
ones closely connected to  the large ones, spoke about the former in ter-state quotas 
with some nostalgia. The deals were looked after by the sta te  and they involved 
the use of bank accounts.
One H ungarian manager commented:
“The loss of m arkets for Hungarian bus manufacturing  was partly  caused by 
the s ta te  spectacularly w ithdrawing from the companies. Meanwhile Turkey, for
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exam ple, in its  trade w ith CIS countries has m anaged to  arrange th a t a p a rt of its 
gas and oil im ports is counter-balanced by the supply of buses. This is also true 
for the Czech Republic, albeit to a lesser degree. In addition, the Czechs are 10-15 
percent cheaper than  us due to subsidies. South Korea has also appeared on the 
CIS m arket and in no way can we compete w ith their credit arrangem ents. The 
m inistry  under László Pál tried to  introduce some sta te  organisation, bu t it resulted 
in failure. True, the m inister signed an agreement in Moscow, bu t it doesn’t  work 
in practice. The M inistry of In ternational Economic Relations under Kádár  d idn ’t 
want to  see commodities balanced against commodities, while the current m inistry 
doesn’t have any preference in this area. The Czech are in a better position since 
the s ta te  h asn ’t w ithdraw n from companies so clearly as is the case w ith us.”
“B arter may be used w ith V ietnam  or China, bu t w ithout the support of 
banks or the sta te  a small firm cannot penetrate such m arkets. W hat would be 
required is sta te  barter agreements copying the old in ter-state quota  arrangem ents. 
However, GATT bans these, yet bilateral exchange could still be organised using 
the m ediation of banks. M inistries should get involved in organising som ething 
since several post-CIS countries will be unable to  conduct norm al trade  for some 
tim e and our products are needed there as much as we need theirs. Small trading 
companies are unable to finance the stocks and the organisation on their own. 
Singapore has been able to  set up a semi-nationalised trading house— we should be 
able to  do som ething sim ilar.”
Lack o f  hard currency
In 1991 when, from one m om ent to the next, the Soviet budget could not 
provide enough hard currency for the republics, barter became an obvious form of 
m aintain ing trade relations.
“B arter came about because the Russians were insolvent” , says one U krainian- 
born businessman who, as sales executive of a Hungarian company, trades mainly 
with his native country due to  his knowledge of the m arket there. “As the situation  
improves, so barter decreases. Traders were suddenly faced with a free m arket. This 
was one of the reasons for barter since businesses were scared of trade— they were 
no good at it. Old Russian traders were not really businesspeople, bu t bureaucrats 
who handled affairs. They knew each other but were afraid of others. They were 
the ones who had an interest in barter. They established private companies but 
d idn ’t know anything about business or means of paym ent apart from b arte r.”
“At th a t tim e licences d idn ’t exist. In the beginning they paid w ith raw 
m aterials, but they realised quite early th a t such goods could be sold for hard 
currency in the West. A t th a t tim e the m ajor shortage was not in hard currency,
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bu t in licences. The biggest participants in barter still engage in it, though they 
are much richer than  before.”
In 1992 the Soviet Union collapsed and its largest m arket, Russia, banned 
barter. In 1993 barter was again allowed, but was taxed. Finally, in 1994 barter 
further declined for various reasons which will be discussed later.
Permanent exchange parters
B arter contacts, which started  in the mid-1980s, mainly ceased to  exist w ith 
the disintegration of COM ECON and the changes in the partner companies— 
however fruitful they had been. This in itself signalled th a t barter is a business 
based on trust, which is always related to certain persons. I f  the latter fo r  some 
reason disappear (for example, due to the disintegration of a former nationalised 
enterprise), the deal is over. The well-oiled system in most, barter arrangem ents is 
a stabilizing factor.
One wholesale company questioned owes its existence and development to a 
Soviet barter deal. Its only starting  product was a type offish feed called “T etra” , 
which could not be sold in the West. However, it sold well in Moscow shops due to 
its low price and its quality.
In the period 1987-90 when barter existed, the partners were identical and 
turnover value quadrupled. The counter product was also fish feed, which the small 
com pany would have been unable to purchase for dollars. Several com pensation 
possibilities were available— dried fleas , crab, other anim al feed, e tc .—and the com­
pany, which was involved in the pet wholesale business, needed to  utilise them  all. 
T he com pany developed steadily due to  this very peculiar barter.
“P roducts are special, partners are lasting and reliable, the counter lot is given 
and everyone has an interest in the business which generates significant profits” , 
noted a representative of another company. “The m ajority of partners get involved 
through personal contacts and not by chance. In this profession everyone knows 
everybody , therefore risks are not too big.”
"Experience shows that, to conclude a deal with people you know is difficult 
but it 's  possible— with people you don 't know i t ’s easy, but you shouldn’t. The old 
hands have already got what they want, don’t want, to rob you and are b e tte r at 
it.” (According to the interviewee, this also holds true for Hungary.)
“We supply telephone network equipm ent (im ported from the West) to  the 
CIS and in exchange workers from there (actually ethnic Hungarian from the Sub- 
C arpath ian  region) go to Arab countries where they work alongside Hungarian 
engineers and technicians. Our barter arrangem ents with Slovakia are of a sim ilar 
nature  only in reverse—our experts go to Slovakia and products from there are 
Used or d istributed by us.”
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In the case of raw m aterial/m anufactured  product exchange it is easy to find 
partners and m aintain perm anent contacts, and thus barter is an obvious option. 
This type of relation is usually fair and allows for risk-free business practices. How­
ever, it was difficult to track down examples of vertical barter am ong the larger 
companies questioned since setting this up did not become a strategic aim, even in 
the CIS barter period. Although the empirical evidence is not sufficient to gener­
alise fully, it can be sta ted  th a t the period in question was characterised more by 
spontaneity  than  any form of dem onstrable strategy.
“The pharmaceutical works experienced its most difficult period in 1992. We 
d id n ’t go into barter directly ourselves at the time, since it was easier to partic ipate  
in o thers’ barter deals. We did have our own barter deal once, in 1993-94. It was 
coordinated by our Moscow representative office by com paring the supply of and 
dem and for basic m aterials on the p art of the factory and the republics. In exchange 
for some medicines, we m anaged to  obtain from Ukraine some basic m aterial which 
we had previously purchased from Scotland.”
The exchange pairs
There were both typical and special barter items. Cheap Soviet raw m aterial 
im ported in large volumes was the most commonly traded com m odity in exchange 
for H ungarian foodstuffs and consumer goods.
“Large quantities of different types of raw m aterial would come in— cotton, 
wool, crude oil, plastic, m etals, logs or sawn tim ber, or part-m anufactured goods. 
In exchange consumer goods were nearly always sent— clothes, foodstuffs, wheat, 
flour, canned goods, knitware, textiles and footware.” The company developed its 
wheat business such th a t it set up its own warehouse for the purchase of corn. It 
still m anages this on its own account and deals in large quantities.
T he company had fairly large deals in oil— 50-60,000 tonnes on each occasion 
a t a value of HUF 200-300 million. “In oil circles th a t ’s nothing, still it was big 
business for us. Very simply, it was done within a few hours. You only had shift the 
papers around and results appeared nicely. It doesn’t  happen these days because 
the old contacts are gone.”
“If there’s a profit of two fillers we’ll do it, risking a lot. The lack of expertise 
has som etim es caused problems, bu t i t ’s not characteristic. M eat and tinned vegeta­
bles, clothes, footware, knitware, wheat, flour and corn can be sold by anyone-—you 
don ’t need a lot of expertise. We used to deal in these goods exclusively with barter, 
but no longer. We still export wheat, flour, pasta  and corn if required, because you 
can ’t stop from one m inute to another due to the lack of subsidy. And we used 
to im port non-ferrous m etals and semi-precious stones— and we could do it. There 
were times when profits were very low, but we never experienced losses.”
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“In 1991 it was easy to find counter goods—several item s could be obtained 
for buses. Half of these goods could be sold on the domestic m arket, the o ther half 
was sold to A ustria. Domestic sales did well as others could not obtain  the goods. 
Com m odities like cotton, anti-freeze, salt, coal and ore were easy and cheap in the 
former Soviet Union, and exports were not tied to licences. There were some special 
counter goods, too, like bicycles, paper, garlic and sardines. We got involved with 
a  wide range of things then, because the factory had to sell.”
At the s ta rt of the 1990s pharmaceuticals were still a strategic commodity. 
They could have been easily exchanged if the factory had used barter a t th a t time. 
In 1992 the Hungarian company appeared to have lost the m arket, bu t later it 
m anaged to  gain some ground with hard work.
In 1992 Vnieshekonbank owed USD 48 million to  the industry. Half of th a t 
was owed to  the factory in question. The dominance of H ungaropharm a was lost 
a t th a t tim e. Old traders no longer purchased goods and new ones had no t yet 
appeared. Turnover dropped both  on the domestic and the m ost im portan t CIS 
m arkets, where, due to the outstanding debt, the will to supply was absent, while a t 
the same tim e dem and was low since im ports were no longer centrally coordinated. 
All these factors resulted not only in disappearing trade, but also in the near 
disappearance of the pharm aceutical plant itself a t the peak of the barter era in 
1992.
A lthough the dem and for medicine in the CIS countries continued to  exist 
and several Hungarian companies recognised the opportunities presented by phar­
m aceuticals exports, tri-partite  barters to the tune of USD 20-30,000 could not 
make up for tens of millions of dollars of lost exports. At th a t tim e much of the 
barter involving pharm aceuticals was conducted by foreign (G erm an, Swiss and 
Finnish) brokers, who thereby creamed off the profits. At least ten percent of all 
pharm aceuticals exports sent to CIS countries in 1993 was handled by W estern 
brokers. A lthough the products of the H ungarian company were in dem and, the 
company on its own had not been able to obtain the hard currency w ithout W estern 
partners.
In barter it is not only goods th a t can be exchanged for goods, since goods for 
services can also be exchanged, or even services for services. In these cases the deal 
is stim ulated  by the necessity to export or maybe the different pay levels of the two 
countries. W ith the above-mentioned pharm aceutical company, the partner in the 
CIS may organise an exhibition or engage in m arketing in exchange for medicines. 
The telephone installation company sold sent goods in exchange for services. One 
trading com pany did some m arketing for a G erm an partner in exchange for repair 
technologies or reconditioned spare parts.
One barter, which is currently underway and which will extend into 1997, is 
valued a t approxim ately HUF 200 million and is part of a one-and-a-half billion 
forint deal. The company has already supplied the telecommunications equipm ent 
to U kraine and in return U krainians will participate in installation work in Arab
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countries for four years. The m arket could bear much more than  this, bu t the 
H ungarian owner (which enjoys a monopoly in telecom m unications) is not really 
interested in the U krainian m arket and in fact the business came about alm ost 
independently  of the owner.
A U krainian-H ungarian jo in t venture regularly participates in tenders of oil- 
producing countries. I t often wins installation contracts in which the H ungarian 
com pany is a partner. The la tter supplies W estern goods necessary for the instal­
lation and the U krainian workers do the installation on location. The A rabs pay 
in dollars and W estern im ports are financed from tha t. No goods enter or leave 
Hungary itself.
Reasons for decline—in general and in particular
The decline of barter turnover is a general tendency , according to both sta tis­
tical d a ta  and empirical evidence. A part from the norm alisation of bilateral trade, 
it is explained by factors of both a domestic and foreign nature. The trade  in large 
volume products, w ith its a ttrac tive  super-profits, has become overrun by “mafia” , 
whereas the less profitable barter has “found its place” .
Besides the political changes and the effects of transition  in the former Soviet 
Union, central measures directly affecting trade have also played a role (e.g. the 
banning of barter, then later taxing it).
B arter turnover started  to  fall sharply in 1992 due to  the deteriorating eco­
nomic situation. P roduction dropped and partners found it difficult to  offer goods 
for exchange.
“Former textiles partners have disappeared; big factories stopped working. 
For exam ple, our Belorussian jo in t venture was idle for half a year. We always sold 
yarn— not now. Living conditions have become so bad th a t people can only afford 
to  buy food. Our jo in t ventures are operating at a loss, continuously using up their 
assets.”
A nother reason for the absence of export goods is the over-valuation of the 
rouble with respect to  the dollar and to the purchasing-power parity, which draws 
the goods to  the domestic market.
“T he rouble exchange rate is absurd in Russia. A dollar is worth 7000 roubles 
a t the m om ent, bu t it should be at least 10,000. Russian raw cotton costs two 
dollars on the world m arket, for example. If i t ’s sold on the domestic m arket the 
seller can convert the price to three dollars. Therefore the producer is not interested 
in exports. W hat happens is th a t we export goods there for dollars. They want 
to  keep goods in the country for the time being, a t least th a t ’s the case with basic 
textile m aterials.”
Besides the above, several explicitly trade factors  have affected business deals 
adversely. A few im portan t factors are discussed in detail in the following.
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Changes in the CIS commodity markets
W here there is demand for Hungarian goods, any shortage of such goods 
creates m ultiple price increases and thus the increase in free, hard currency sales 
have changed the strategy of CIS businesspeople.
T he company dealing in animal feed used to  buy crab for roubles worth HUF 
300 and re-exported it to  the West for HUF 500-550. The profit am ounted to 
10-15 percent. Today the Russians export it themselves for hard currency a t a 
value of HUF 1000-1500. Custom s duties can somehow be avoided in barter, but 
purchases for hard currency are taxed and subject to customs duties, so it is no 
longer economical.
In recent tim es both  the organisation of trade and trade policy have changed 
significantly in the former Soviet Union. The distribution of goods used to  take 
place via a  single central channel. W hen th a t went, all the com ponents of sales 
changed. T he new regulations began to take effect as early as 1993 and in the 
bigger cities many people were replaced. New wholesalers appeared, new sales 
channels opened and working capital is now also available in some places. The old 
system  of connections changed to a new type of system based on confidence and 
interest. The peculiarity of selling in the post-Soviet m arket is th a t the further 
away a town is from Moscow, the more difficult it is to discover the interest-related 
connections.
The popularity of barter in these countries is lim ited since the profitable 
barter goods are difficult to obtain. A new, special right to  certain export goods 
has evolved, which represents a type of sales monopoly. The maffia often holds the 
monopoly, or sometimes foreign capital does. West European companies have built 
close connections with m anufacturers and monopolised the sales of certain products 
in W estern Europe. Typical barter goods require licences.
“W hat grows or is produced there is taken out of the country by them . We 
quit. They pay better, finance the economy better” , complained one interviewee.
“A region, for example, may have had the right to  sell copper in return  for 
H ungarian medicines, but the commodity is no longer at the region’s disposal. 
It is the factory which can dispose of the copper and it will say it doesn’t need 
medicine, but som ething completely different—perhaps an assembly line. T h e re ’s 
a new wholesaler, but the factory won’t sell the goods to  it either, because only 
the “select” may trade in such items. On th a t market, where there are too many 
regulations and only a few have au thority  over “strategic” goods, barter is a dying 
practice.”
"W ith  the bus barter the buyer is a public transport company or the local 
au thority  which the company comes under. The factory providing the products 
in re tu rn  may be only very indirectly interested in others getting  vehicles for its 
products. The opportunities for direct exchange are slim and trad ing  buses can be 
undertaken only w ithin a limited circle. A city with a population of one million
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would need 50-100 buses to a value of USD 5-6 million. Given the value, goods 
in exchange would mean raw m aterials, prim ary m aterials, ore or m etals and their 
m arket is quite regulated in the former Soviet Union today.”
T he central licence requirem ent for raw m aterials reduced the possibilities 
for bartering  buses because the goods were no longer available to the Hungarian 
m anufacturer's usual connections. Low-value sales added together could not com­
pensate for what was lost. It proved impossible to m aintain the earlier level of 
exports using either barter or hard currency. The regional or republic m anage­
m ent in charge of free goods obtained and sold the raw m aterials on the basis of 
confidence. I t no longer purchased buses in exchange, but food, clothing and other 
general consumer items. The circle of buyers has specialised and narrowed to  towns 
and public transpo rt companies, where experts are involved in purchases.
Changes in the financing systems in the CIS republics
In the hey-day of the barter era the factories themselves purchased goods in 
return  for their products. However, since 1995 the currency supply is realised in 
a  form of tax  system — the factory pays tax  to the town and the town purchases 
goods in exchange for the dollars it has obtained by changing a part of the tax. 
Im m ediate cash paym ent is dom inant both in Hungary and in the former Soviet 
republics. These days, H ungary’s crawling peg system of devaluation also stim ulates 
prom pt paym ent. Among our examples, one company (the telecom m unications 
firm) insisted on advantageous term s of payment.
“Everyone pays in advance. Long-standing partners may be able to pay by 
transfer later, but i t ’s rare. Supply w ithout prom pt paym ent has disappeared. We 
insist on receiving a t least half of the invoice value in advance. The rest should be 
paid in 15 days, bu t actually it usually takes 30-40 days.”
“You can obtain our kind of goods only for cash. In 1995 H ungarian mills 
sold flour only against prom pt cash. They d idn ’t accept bank transfers because 
prices of corn were changing so fast th a t the tim e taken to  effect a bank transfer 
was too long.”
Special import limitations; changes in purchasing policy
Buses were no longer exem pt from im port, customs and tax  duties in 1993. 
The exem ption was reintroduced for public transport companies a t the end of 1994, 
bu t by then the regulation had already reduced purchases. Im port lim itations grew 
for o ther products, too.
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“Today i t ’s not dem and but licences th a t lim it sales in the pharmaceuticals 
industry.  A copper producer may ask for medicines in exchange, bu t they will not 
get the licences. A general im port licence for pharm aceuticals, a domestic d istri­
bution licence and a separate licence for each transpo rt are required. O btain ing a 
licence through the official channels takes several months. We have had a consign­
m ent warehouse for two years, bu t our partners have been unable to ob tain  the 
general licence... Pharm aceuticals suppliers in the provinces find their way around 
the non-official channels in Moscow w ith difficulty. There is a one million dollar 
lim it, which is not much for a serious wholesaler. As soon as he gets one licence he 
has to s ta rt lobbying for the next. A trader who deals in everything from prim ary 
m aterials to medicine requires so many docum ents th a t they may cause paralysis!” 
The direct exchange of goods has also fallen due to changes in the Hungarian 
supply.
The fall in the competitive nature o f  Hungarian goods
The vulnerability of H ungary’s traditional industrial struc tu re  was based on 
the fact th a t the m ajority of products were m anufactured as a specialisation w ithin 
COM ECON, were developed for the vast Soviet m arket, were produced in enor­
mous quantities and were unsellable in developed m arket economies. T he barter 
which followed the in ter-state agreements was ended by the im port com petition 
which opened up with purchases for currency in the CIS m arkets. Medicines have 
been mentioned, bu t others such as bus production and the machine industry were 
similarly affected.
“Hungarian pharmaceuticals have lost their costs advantage because W estern 
companies launch their products at introductory prices, below the domestic ones. 
We also had to compete with cheap, poor quality medicines from India, Turkey 
and Cyprus. In 1992-93, when anybody could export to CIS m arkets w ithout any 
licence, plenty of “con-m erchants” appeared and made huge profits. A lthough the 
la tte r have been squeezed out because of quality considerations, the price compe­
tition resulting from Western im ports has injured Hungarian medicines.”
After 1990 trade with Russia changed. People left partner companies and 
set up their own businesses. A type of “adoration of the West” also began. W hen 
new Hungarian entrepreneurs wanted to  establish a jo in t venture they could barely 
com pete with W estern firms, which sometimes gave away cars as presents or pro­
vided other advantages. This is how the company dealing in anim al feeds lost its 
Moscow m arket.
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The winding-down of domestic industry
Companies squeezed out every product th a t could be exported for the last 
tim e in 1992. The winding-down of Hungarian industrial companies began in 1993 
and was completed in 1994. Industrial exports decreased and dem and for im ports 
increased resulting in a severe balance of paym ents deficit. Reducing production 
capacity was sometimes accompanied by liquidation of the sales organisation.
T he export of machinery, equipment and spare parts and the im port of related 
technologies decreased considerably with one company we questioned, since its 
supplier factories (Láng Machinery Works, Industrial Equipm ent and M achinery 
Works and the former Pest Regional Machine Factory) either went into liquidation 
or now m anufacture goods not up to  export standards.
Bus sales m ight have been easier if overseas representatives of the bus com­
pany had been better. However, in 1993 the bus company already had significant 
problem s and due to  financial cuts organisations abroad had to be reduced. The 
technical staff were recalled and a year later, when no results had been achieved, 
the business staff followed. The company m aintained trade representative offices 
only in Moscow, Saintpetersburg and the Ukraine. Local personnel were appointed 
to  replace those who had been called back. The idea was to  introduce incentives 
based on results, but the outcom e of it all was rather ambiguous.
The increasing financial problems o f  domestic producers
Since the Russians do not supply in advance, neither m anufacturers nor busi­
nesspeople have sufficient working capital to finance exports in large volumes. At 
the same tim e, if they offer H ungarian supplies in advance they run various risks. 
E xporting  for hard currency is much simpler. Re-exporting is no a lternative be­
cause of the financing obstacles. Export credits do not exist in practice, because 
banks are unwilling to  shoulder the risk. There are few bank connections w ith the 
form er Soviet republics apart from Russia because there are few banks. A lthough a 
H ungarian party  could give guarantees for the advance supply of the foreign party, 
th a t would further reduce profitability, which has already suffered a lot. Producers 
have som etim es tried to apply complicated solutions to these problems, but w ithout 
much success.
Given the financing problems of bus exports, sales were to be connected to 
items required from CIS countries, provided the H ungarian im porter (perhaps re­
exporter) financed the business. The aim was to conclude an annual block contract, 
w ith an occasional price check. Only small companies w ith personal contacts got 
involved. The m ajority  had been earlier involved in m anufacturing. T he counter 
item  is usually wood. The problem, however, is th a t normally the lots are small, be­
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ing the equivalent of one or two buses. Dunaferr was the only large firm w ith which 
it was possible to cooperate in practice. Large im porters such as M ineralimpex or 
MOL (the H ungarian oil company) have no interest, in the direct exchange of goods 
as they can realise be tter prices using cash turnover.
The difficulties of finding a partner
It has become increasingly difficult to find business partners since old trade  re­
lations have disintegrated, enterprises have changed, the private sector has emerged 
and the Soviet Union has fallen apart.
“Since they began calculating everything in dollars and nearly every retailer 
buys on his own account, there are no serious wholesale exchange partners. In the 
small animal feed trade i t ’s the maffia th a t rules OK!”
The cleverest among those we interviewed, a tiny pic. located in the em pty 
headquarters of a former large company, does business in everything th a t promises 
profit. Previously they had their own man abroad bu t the old contacts disappeared, 
as w ith the o ther companies. “If you want to  do business today you have to  visit 
the enterprises there and bribe the new managers, otherwise it is impossible to 
buy or sell.” The com pany’s three top executives are continuously travelling to  the 
CIS republics on the basis of the information they receive from their representative 
office.
Since Western businesspeople have ventured into the CIS the m ajority  of sales 
have been conducted in hard currency and barter has become rare. One specialist 
barter com pany operating in Hungary also made no a ttem p t to  spread its network 
in the CIS. The biggest problem obstructing the use of their services is th a t they 
are forced to  insist on the purchase of West European goods in order to keep the 
account.
A specialist barter company from Munich contacted the bus factory, bu t it 
would have involved price increases of approxim ately 10 percent in both directions. 
The factory assembles the buses from part units and changing the suppliers is rather 
difficult given the existing complicated system  of specialisation.
T he factory set up a barter team  to increase bus sales a t the end of 1992. They 
launched a heavy campaign of advertisem ents and circulars in d istan t republics 
and cities, then delegated their own people to industrial centres and capitals to 
dem onstrate the products. The results were rather mixed, bu t there may have 
been some subjective reasons for this.
The biggest obstacle to increasing the export of dentistry units is th a t part­
ners cannot be found to  take the offered counter products. A ten-fold export volume 
could have been achieved if someone had taken on these goods. M etal plates, which
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seemed sure of a m arket, were offered by a small town in the Urals, bu t no buyer 
was found.
Subjective reasons
T he businesspeople interviewed mentioned the following as being am ong the 
subjective reasons— lack of business expertise; weak H ungarian business activity  on 
location; traders leaving their jobs following the transform ation of commercial or­
ganisation, resulting in the lack of concrete expertise; change in the ow ner’s a ttitu d e  
or indifference following privatisation; lack of people speaking foreign languages; 
and “adoration” of the West. Most of these factors characterise the Hungarian 
parties as much as those in the CIS.
“Hungaropharma was not on top of things because of problems of a subjective 
natu re  as well as faulty evaluation of the situation. They d idn’t th ink th a t the 
Soviet m arket would collapse. They ju st thought there would be some tem porary  
confusion. It was a t this tim e th a t they did away with the barter section, dismissing 
the employee who dealt in barter. In the pharmaceuticals factory  there was only 
one person dealing with Soviet relations at the departm ent of former “socialist” 
exports. He couldn’t cope with discovering the new patterns despite the fact th a t 
those on location were also on the lookout for new contacts. The factory could only 
export if it accepted the initiatives of a third party .”
The risks of barter deals
Any product on the CIS m arket is quoted at world m arket prices, yet this does 
not make trading easier in this part of the world. The supplied goods are sometimes 
not up to  the level of the samples. Delivery dates are unsure and unreliable. If the 
seller takes on delivery, he may not obtain the means of transpo rt, the licence, etc.
T he professional hospital planners and dentistry  experts were com petent per­
haps in domestic m atters. T h a t lim itation of experience would have represented 
a disadvantage in norm al times, so it was a miracle th a t the company stayed on 
its feet in the confused conditions of the transition  period. B arter did not produce 
any profits— it was too com plicated and more expensive than  they had thought.
T he company supplied 20-25 dentistry  units to the CIS m arket. Seventy-five 
percent of the deals involved barter. Given the problems, it now tries to effect sales 
for hard currency. The th ird  party  to the barter was the Hungarian buyer in the 
CIS republic and it was he who got the deal underway. The story is as follows:
The Perem arton Chemical Works (PVV) wanted to purchase copper sulphate. 
Its Russian partner wanted dental surgery and laboratory equipm ent in re turn . On
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paper this m eant three business deals: the im port of copper sulphate for PVV, the 
dentistry  company supplied PVV, and the la tte r paid in forints and exported any 
additional dentistry  m aterials for hard currency. Calculations were m ade in dollars 
w ithout using banks.
This adventurous barter lasted four years. Then Perem arton went bankrup t 
and could not pay for the counter goods. They tried to sell the copper sulphate for 
a year, during which tim e the owner in Moscow changed and the new one delivered 
the product w ithout a concrete buyer. W arehousing caused packaging losses and 
deterioration in quality.
Meanwhile the dentistry company was organising the lot for delivery with 
huge physical and financial sacrifice. The Moscow partner found a Hungarian buyer 
for the copper sulphate, but by then, in the game of “w ho’s responsible for w hat?” , 
delivery costs together with quality and quantity losses am ounted to  HUF 2 million. 
The company had to take on a half a million forints of this as well as g ran t half 
a y ear’s delay for paym ent for the delivered goods. One and a half years was not 
enough for the factory in the CIS to be able to complete preparations for receiving 
the equipm ent. In addition to the loss due to deteriorating m aterials, significant 
warehousing costs were also incurred since a laboratory and its equipm ent designed 
for special requirem ents could not be sold to someone else. The original quotation 
was long out of date, but no price rise could be effected.
A fter Perem arton, the chemical industry passed the company from one place 
to another. An unsuccessful a ttem pt was made with TVK. Then it concluded four 
barter deals with the Ongotrade company of BVK, which im ported prim ary m ate­
rials in exchange for dental and laboratory equipm ent. The company delivered in 
forint accounts. The goods were delivered, as suggested by Ongotrade, in line with 
the consignm ents sent in lots from Russia to BVK. It was always the U krainians 
or the Russians who got advance deliveries. All this was comfortable and risk-free, 
bu t the profit, if any, was not realised by the dentistry  company. Each deal was 
delayed, partly  due to internal BVK problems and partly  due to deficiencies in 
receiving the goods. There was always a delay of 2-3 m onths between delivery and 
accounts being sorted out, so profits were lost mainly because of devaluation.
The same company also concluded some business with M etrimpex. Lada 
spares were im ported in exchange for dental equipm ent. Yet once the car factory 
accidentally sent an invoice am ounting to the domestically accounted value; how­
ever, M etrim pex did not complain, so it received HUF 6 million less than  the con­
tracted  value. The difference between the domestic Russian price and the am ount 
the accounts stipulated  was 45 percent.
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Methods of risk reduction
Avoiding advance delivery
In the 1980s Hungarian advance delivery was still normal.
“It was always us who delivered before the other p a rty ” , one wholesaler re­
calls, “although it was never higher than 10-15 percent in quantity. We avoided 
risks by starting  with small consignments and, depending on how the goods in re­
tu rn  were delivered, we increased the exported quantity  on a m onthly basis. The 
Russians were always slightly in debt, but it was insignificant, partly  because they 
were all right as partners and partly  because we are a small concern and we don’t 
run high risks— although they still owe us half a million forints. However, we 
couldn’t avoid delivering in advance because one professional team  faced a state- 
owned company and our partner couldn’t have legalised the deal w ith the centre 
otherw ise.”
Between 1992 and 1993 the Russians were willing to  deliver in advance in 
exchange for customary, suitable Hungarian goods. Thus the financial burden of 
exports was born by the barter im ports. This facilitated the participation in barter 
of small companies which otherwise would not have been able to  finance the usual 
quantities.
“We im ported it, sold the goods and made a profit. Then we bought what we 
wanted, exported it, made a profit again and used their money for m onths. They 
found it hard to find a realiable partner, so it was OK for them , too. There were 
tim es when they had several hundred thousand dollars over here. Som etim es we 
were unable to sell the goods and we were the losers. Sometimes we financed them , 
but th a t w asn’t usual. The counter goods were bought only when delivery was due. 
We mainly chose counter goods (such as textile products, suits or food) which could 
be purchased quickly and d idn ’t require either warehousing or working cap ita l.”
Interest in barter changed after 1993 and barter deals would have been diffi­
cult to  conclude w ithout H ungarian advance deliveries.
“E very th ing’s changed there in recent years. Everyone is scared. They all 
want the other to  deliver first. The old hands have left and set up their own 
companies which lack capital. They can do som ething only if we deliver in advance.”
A nother company recently tried a barter deal am ounting to USD 50-60,000. 
Half of the required H ungarian food was delivered and the offered polyam ide gran­
ules in exchange were awaited. The aim was to  sell the la tte r after delivery. Since 
dem and had previously been large for m ilitary purposes, it was not thought it would 
be difficult to sell two or three wagon loads of the goods. A ttem pts were made, 
both at home and abroad but the product, although first-class, could only have 
been sold a t a loss due to price cuts which had taken place in the m eantim e. The
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deal showed a m inimum profit on the export side and a 15-20 percent loss on the 
im port side. Deliveries had to be stopped to see if the partner would pay.
In 1995 the same company hardly bought any goods on the CIS m arket, al­
though it still exported products there. It sold H ungarian goods and W estern m a­
chine parts with a m inim um  profit, taking advantage of the fact th a t the Russians 
could not pay cash in advance to the German or A ustrian machinery m anufactur­
ers. The company delivered because of old contacts and gave credit of one or two 
months.
Bank guarantee
W ith inter-state barters prior to 1991 (including quotas w ith Turkey, Greece 
and other developing countries) a bank kept records of bilateral deliveries, and also 
recorded private commercial barter agreements. The N ational Bank of Hungary 
took the risk and provided the guarantee to  the Foreign Trading Bank. Since 
these “barter deals” were organised by the Foreign Trading Bank, dem and could 
be m atched w ith the product range of different companies.
A t the beginning of the 1990s H ungarian banks were m aking a ttem pts to  keep 
accounts. They concluded agreements with individual republics, bu t these never 
functioned in practice. (Lamberger 1992) One agreement between Commercial 
Bank of Hungary and a bank in Moscow survived the longest, but the turnover 
recorded on the account barely reached USD 8-10 million.
“A bank is needed if delivery by the partner cannot be relied on for some 
reason. For example, one business connection had ju st started  with a cable export 
to Ukraine and the value of the consignment was large. Information was required 
regarding which Ukrainian bank guarantee was worth obtaining. We were given 
valuable advice, the deal was concluded, although profitability decreased som ewhat 
due to the increased costs. Since everything went smoothly, later on the bank 
guarantee was no longer required.”
H ungarian banks no longer participate in the turnover— they do not shoulder 
the risks. They are prepared to work with a few banks in Moscow, but know little 
about others far away. For the time being they are reluctant to  accept a guarantee 
or tru st the readiness for paym ent of these new banks, even in the case of cash 
deals. In m ost cases they are not prepared opening a letter of credit w ith o ther 
banks and accept only cash transfers.
“According to the latest tender, buses should have been sold to Vilnius with 
a five-year credit and to the value of USD 6 million. The Czechs were able to  take 
on a five year credit. We couldn’t because no H ungarian commercial bank would 
have accepted the guarantee of a bank there for five years.”
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Businesspeople in some cases are inclined to accept their p a rtn e r’s bank guar­
antee, but it would be a legal nonsense. Such a guarantee could not be effected in 
case of non-paym ent because the m atter is correctly an inter-bank affair.
The pharmaceuticals factory  would be willing to open a factory in the Far 
East, given the guarantee of a local bank. Since no Hungarian bank would back the 
deal, the factory either does it itself or does not open the warehouse. The partner 
factory does not have sufficient working capital itself to  have a trustw orthy foreign 
bank to  guarantee the deal for them.
T he low opinion which companies have of banks is general and widespread. 
The companies we questioned did not use banks because they did not regard them  
as suitable for their activities (they are too careful, have no idea w hat is going on, 
are expensive or slow, they hinder or prevent deals, were common responses).
The sources of barter profit
W hen turnover was calculated in roubles, the “world m arket price” was never 
m entioned in connection w ith barter deals. There was a huge “re-evaluation” op­
portunity in the rouble-dollar exchange, which remained for a few years in the 
period of transition  to  a free currency. However, these opportunities were not used 
by everyone to make super profits.
Com pensation took place according to  a special calculation, using a jointly- 
formed accounting price in one of the really honest barter deals which took place 
at the end of the 1980s. “If there was a higher-than-expected profit gained from 
the sale of the im ported product, the Russians got the exchange goods a t a cheaper 
price. The volume was managed according to a five-year contract whereby we 
checked the prices and the range of goods every year. Rouble faced forint w ithout 
a bank. We d idn ’t  use hard currency as a guide for exchange purposes— we d id n ’t 
know then th a t it d id n ’t meet the legal regulations on currency at the tim e.”
T he main benefit for companies which sold their goods virtually  exclusively 
to eastern m arkets, and whose existence basically depended on COM ECON, was 
that they could maintain the level of sales.
“The Russians couldn 't get over the shock th a t there w eren’t enough buses 
while public transpo rt was deteriorating. Barter was good business, even when we 
had to  stick to world m arket prices in exports.”
“We supplied machinery spare parts in exchange for raw linen and cotton 
waste. Deliveries were determ ined according to how the counter product and li­
cences could be obtained. The barter was initiated by the Russians and organised 
by a perm anent representative office with changing partners. It was the opportunity 
to effect machine industry exports th a t a ttrac ted  us and not the higher-than-average
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profit.. T hat is why we took on the painful process of selling the goods that, were 
delivered in re tu rn .”
Barter profit did not primarily originate in the difference between “calcu­
la ted” and "real” prices, although there could be huge profits in th a t. Barter 
provided the only possibility of development for several small H ungarian compa­
nies. Those deals did not produce profits counted in millions, bu t the results were 
not negligible either. Alongside the fish food barter, the case of the com pany spe­
cialising in dentistry  exports can be mentioned here.
Prices per unit in barter deals are different from hard-currency prices due 
to the character of the business. Gaining a m arket for, and selling the goods 
received in exchange involves real ex tra  costs, especially when a m arket is depressed. 
Over-invoicing, however, sometimes surpassed all im agination. Special “accounting 
prices” helping to make up unit prices which lacked any relation to reality and which 
were intended to hide profits and to obtain preferences th a t foreign trade offered.
“In 1991 one company (not us) im ported linen from Ukraine and sold sports 
shoes. The two sides could be balanced if a pair of shoes am ounted to one-and-a- 
half dollars. You can imagine how much the company m ade on the linen if such 
prices had to be put down. This doesn’t happen any more. Prices have shot up so 
much there, th a t they are higher than in the West!”
A Slovak telephone post would have cost HUF 10,000 in normal trade. In 
barter it was no more than HUF 6,500. The difference derives from the different 
pay levels in the two countries. No way would we conclude deals a t world m arket 
prices! Everyone does well—we share the profit!”
Since re-export, frequent in barter, was not seen by the H ungarian authorities, 
price manipulation  was relatively widespread. The size of the invisible barter sphere 
was increased by the dubious opportunities to make super profits, not to  mention 
the significant lack of business expertise a t the time.
One com pany had a barter deal which alone made a profit of a hundred million 
forints. Super profits were made with the re-export to the West of m etals and other 
bulk products from the CIS. “This frequently occurred, especially when the origin 
of the goods could be cleverly masked with repackaging and reloading. A large 
part of an im ported consignment could be re-exported. Copper and alum inium  
m anufacturing waste, spare parts for aeroplanes, dism antled m ilitary equipm ent, 
good quality m etals, etc. were easy to sell in W estern Europe. Some custom s duty  
was added, which we paid and got back when we exported the goods. Previously 
the im ported goods d idn ’t  officially enter the country but were stored in customs- 
free zones, thus saving expenses. There were times when the consignment was sent 
abroad as transit goods, but transit was much more expensive compared to un­
loading, warehousing and loading onto another means of transpo rt for forwarding. 
This can no longer be done.”
Trade in foodstuffs, significant in barter, was also a source of high profits due 
to the H ungarian regulations.
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In 1996 one company exported a large quantity  of flour in barte r before the 
subsidy was w ithdraw n. “The price of flour sharply rose in the two m onths the 
contract had to be fulfilled. Then the HUF 14 per kilo subsidy was w ithdraw n 
w ith the stroke of a pen and even the valid, signed contracts were not taken into 
consideration. The final consignments made a loss, but some profit was m ade on 
the whole deal. We couldn’t have anticipated what was going to happen. In a 
norm al regulatory environm ent it 's  absurd to  withdraw subsidies from one m inute 
to  the next.”
Various forms of manipulation were widespread in obtaining export subsidies. 
I t can only be assumed th a t VAT abuse was probably an everyday phenom enon in 
this field.
“If there was some cunning aspect to  a barter deal it was always related to  
a subsidy. They d idn ’t say th a t the goods were som ething different, bu t th a t the 
price was different—especially when the subsidy was due for a certain am ount of 
dollars. W ith  barter it was easy to  say th a t what is one is not one, bu t one-and- 
a-half. A litre of wine could not be priced at USD 4, bu t 10-15 percent could be 
added and no one noticed. This could be done even up until quite recently. Last 
year a subsidy was paid for natu ral measurements, i.e. kilogrammes. Really, the 
price per un it d idn’t m atter. If nothing but the subsidy was gained on the business 
then it was worth it, though we got it later as the consignm ent was first sent out 
and the paym ent for it came in. The application for subsidy was only m ade then 
and it took 2-3 m onths to get, but it was still worth it. It worked like VAT. Both 
VAT and custom s duty were paid back, bu t customs was more difficult because the 
accounting was more com plicated.”
It was partly  large quantities and partly the prices and invoices adjusted to 
domestic financial bridges (customs, export subsidy) which produced the profit. 
M aximum profit obviously resulted where customs duties were low and export sub­
sidies were very high. The duty was repaid in the case of re-export. Exchange 
p roducts m ade it possible to apply the old business rule of buying cheap and sell­
ing dear. This was especially true a t the beginning when few W estern businesses 
acted as brokers due to  their lack of knowledge of the m arket. In the late 80s and 
early 90s the clever ones made money on both the import and the export side of  
barter. Later on it was satisfactory if ju st one side of the barter was profitable. 
Profitability  fell sharply partly  because more players were involved and partly  be­
cause the supply of products th a t could be exported from the CIS was gradually 
decreasing.
“T he advantage can be seen—money, unlike with a le tter of credit, need not 
be tied down and a bank doesn’t have to  be paid. Two percent in terest can be 
saved a m onth with this, and with no bank charges and an average two m onths 
execution the saving is 3-5 percent. A m odest profit gained on the deal can be 
added, and if both parties can obtain  credit on the goods because the connection 
is good then the price m argin may even reach 20 percent.”
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“T hen there were the export subsidies and VAT refunds on foods. The paper­
work can say one thing, bu t w hat was loaded on the lorries was a different m atter... 
Or take the oil. Most of it came in barter. Metal or alcohol— there’s so much profit 
on these goods th a t out there i t ’s only the mafia th a t deals in them . They w on’t 
let anyone else near.”
“We could have done it financially in such a way th a t we under-invoice on 
both sides in order to save on customs and other duties, bu t it could not be done 
because of our partners out there. The licences had to show the exported quantities 
in lots. A pproxim ately 10 percent could have been gained due to  the bureaucratic 
adm inistra tion  in those countries and for th a t it was not worth risking under­
invoicing.”
“If we’re talking about subsidised goods, the recipe is under-invoicing for 
here and over-invoicing for out there. The profit will be a t least 50-60 percent and 
should the partners cheat on each other the maffia appears and shoots. Huge sums 
of money are moved and clients often do not know w hat they are letting themselves 
in for. Various items im ported in exchange for H ungarian canned goods could be 
included here.”
A few words about present barter deals
Four segments of the rem aining barter turnover a t the reduced level seem to 
be present:
a) criminalised raw m aterial barter deals— nothing is known about them  ex­
cept for their existence;
b) barter relations formed in the CIS barter era which seem to be lasting for 
some reason;
c) exchange deals for m oney-sparing purposes and executed by specialist 
W estern barter companies keeping the accounts;
d) in ter-state quota  deals.
Even w ithout any detailed analysis of these types of barter it is worth publish­
ing some interviewees’ doubts and comments about the future. The two com m ents 
below also present a suitable ending—they express the fact th a t in barter w hat 
may happen is “all or nothing” .
“In ter-sta te  barters bear a greater significance, for exam ple the SAAB deal. 
But the Swedes will not purchase their exchange item s here, even if the lists or 
agreem ents induce H ungarian products, for example buses. They will find quality, 
price, etc. excuses. There was a contract signed in Moscow. The Moscow City 
Council m anaged to  compile the list for exchange goods, still nothing came out of 
in the end.”
“Barter trade with us am ounted to over USD 50 million in 1991 and was 25, 
15 and 7 million dollars in 1992, 1993 and 1994 respectively. It came to only USD
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2-3 million in 1995. There is reorganisation going on and the trade section will 
also be transform ed. Privatisation is underway and the buyer will determ ine w hat 
happens to the barter team . They may remain, since many businesses do alright 
with deals of USD 2-3 million... But they may not!”
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REVIEWS 
HUNGARY’S EXPORTATION AND EXPORT TRENDS 
EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF PRODUCT MIX
A. K. SOÓS
The intention of this article is to provide the reader with some insight into 
the recent past, current trends and short term  prospects of H ungary’s foreign trade 
endeavours. Under the expression “recent past” I am referring to the period around 
1990 (certainly nothing will be said about exports conducted before 1988); by “short 
term  prospects” I am referring to mere generalities of export trend predictions pro­
jected  into the next two or three years ahead, a t the most. I would like to  m ention 
here th a t, ju s t like the custom ary sound practices and a ttitudes of other govern­
m ents towards mercantilism , my analysis will mostly extend to  exports dissected 
into groups of countries and groups of products.
One of the most obvious and drastic changes connected with H ungary’s ex­
ports is their change of direction. Up until 1988 some 51 percent of H ungary’s 
to tal exports were directed to the (at th a t time) socialist countries; w ithin this 
to ta l about 27 percent went to the Soviet Union. By 1992 trade w ith the E ast had 
dropped to  23 percent of the 1988 level, followed by a m arginal increase to  ju s t 
above 24 percent of the to tal trade of Hungary.
It is quite obvious th a t the single, most im portan t factor concerning the 
drastic decline of H ungary’s economic performance is directly a ttrib u tab le  to  the 
sudden decline in trade with the former socialist countries. Even though this is 
difficult to prove adequately by an appropriate set of sta tistical da ta , it is not too 
difficult to imagine the im pact th a t such drastic curtailm ent of export sales made 
on the Hungarian economy. Of the enormous drop— am ounting to 11.9 percent of 
H ungary’s G D P in 1991— a mere 2.5 percent could be a ttribu ted  to  the loss of trade 
with the former socialist countries. It is obvious th a t other factors also contributed 
to H ungary’s considerable decline of G DP in 1991, such as a drop of G D P in the 
previous years due to the decline of trade with countries east of Hungary. Likewise, 
an im portan t factor leading to H ungary’s decline in G D P m ust have been the drop 
of im ports of inexpensive raw and base m aterials in 1991. Yet another factor was 
th a t some companies, particularly those which were previously highly dependent 
on eastern exports, were either forced to curtail their production quite drastically 
or were forced into liquidation.
Considering the future, it can safely be stated  th a t the previous high level 
of eastern trade will never be fully restored. Árpád Hasz, a Hungarian M arxist- 
Leninist economist, once expressed th a t when the socialist revolution is victorious
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□  Developing countries
■  Industrial countries outside 
Europe
■  ECC (EU) countries
H Former socialist countries
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A ustria , F in land  an d  Sweden are included in the  “EEC  (EU) countries” group  in  th e  period 
1989-94 too.
Fig. 1 Commodity pattern of exports by groups of countries
in the advanced capitalist states this event will bring about social-economic changes 
such th a t the western type of industry would no longer suit the new, evolving 
social-economic circum stances. As a direct result of this, it would be necessary to 
restructu re  the entire socialist industry. In fact, the reverse came true. No socialist 
revolution took place in the W est— instead a capitalist “revolution” is sweeping 
through the East. Yet, Hasz was right in one respect, because the old economic 
structu res of the east have, indeed, collapsed and ceased to exist. Entire, previously 
substan tially  im portan t industrial bases have had to  close premises in Hungary. It 
suffices to  refer to H ungary’s high series bus m anufacturing, for instance; this alm ost 
entirely relied on the large scale orders placed by Gosplan of the Soviet Union via 
a cash on delivery arrangem ent. At the tim e G osplan’s ideal trade constitu ted  
large, single orders pu t for items, such as buses—presum ably suitable for climates 
as different as those of the arctic circle and sub-tropical regions respectively. There 
are m any economists who still think there are ways and means to explain and 
to  reverse H ungary’s economic clim ate and they search for ways to  revive eastern 
trade, to  some extent a t least. One of the fundam ental problems and the essentially 
true explanation for the situation  is th a t investment endeavours have drastically 
declined in Russia and the CIS countries in general. Yet, one must go a step further
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and th ink more realistically along these lines and also realise th a t the cash paym ent 
system  is unlikely to return, even if a decision is carried by the CIS countries to 
place substan tia l orders for buses with Hungary sometime in the near future. Future 
exports and, hence in our example, the ou tput of the bus company will very much 
depend upon the ability of the bus m anufacturing company to provide and sell 
goods on credit. Thus the previous comfortable cash paym ent system  is unlikely 
ever to  re turn . From this it follows th a t it is most unlikely th a t the previous large 
series bus m anufacturing will ever return. Some of the economic decisions in Russia 
and the CIS countries, ju st like anywhere else, are now passed down to a lower level 
of decision-makers. Each city, each township, or each county will now place orders 
for public transpo rt vehicles th a t they see best suited and fit for their own purposes 
and requirem ents. They are likely to shop around the globe and select the brand 
which they think will suit their purposes the most and may even require special 
changes and alterations (as stipulated in their future orders). This indicates th a t 
the m ajority  of the old m arkets have well and truly gone— “vanished into thin 
a ir”— and will never be regained by Hungary. Their places have been taken by 
new, more com petitive markets.
A closer look a t Hungarian exports directed to, and conducted w ith the CIS 
countries (and Russia in particular) reveals th a t H ungary’s exports to Russia in­
creased slightly in 1995, while H ungary’s exports to  CIS countries increased even 
more in th a t year.
Billion USD Change to the previous year
Fig. 2 Exports directed to the CIS countries and Russia
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On the other hand, this relatively rapid 15 percent increase of exports took 
place a t a tim e when the value of the U.S. dollar was falling and it lagged behind 
the annual average 21.5 percent increase of Hungarian exports. This means th a t 
H ungarian exports to the east have, relatively, declined even further.
By dissecting H ungarian exports directed to the CIS countries in order to  look 
in more detail a t individual countries, it becomes clear th a t H ungary’s exports to  
some of the CIS countries—such as the M oldavian Republic, The U kraine and the 




□  CIS countries ■  Russia □  Ukraine ■  Kazakhstan
□  B elorus D M o ld a v ie n  Rep. O U z b e k  Rep. » L a tv ia
Fig. 3 Exports to the CIS countries (percentage change)
In elaborating this analysis further it m ust be added th a t the Jan u ary -Ju ly
1996 figures show th a t in this period H ungary’s exports to Russia increased by 10.2 
percent (against the annual average 5.2 percent increase of H ungary’s exports in 
the sam e tim e period), while H ungary’s exports to the o ther CIS countries seem to 
have declined slightly in the same tim e period.
T his signifies th a t the apparent overall trend of H ungary’s exports to Russia— 
which show a regular decrease— might not hold true at all. In actual fact H ungary’s 
exports appear to fluctuate quite substantially. The next two or three years will be 
v ital for Hungary because, presumably, considerable economic turn-up and growth 
may be experienced in these countries over the next few years.
H ungary’s exports to the other former socialist sta tes appear to have in­
creased a t a higher ra te  than  H ungary’s to tal increase of exports. H ungary’s total 
exports to  the former socialist states constituted 13.6 percent of the to ta l im ports 
of these countries in the first seven m onths of 1996. Com pared to  exports of the 
corresponding seven m onths of 1995 this was an increase. This sam e trend seems
Acta Oeconomica 1996
REVIEW S 191
to have persisted unequivocally and consistently in more recent m onths. This 
may have been brought about by the beneficial effect of the regional free trade 
agreem ent— i.e. the CEFTA Agreement—concluded between the Czech Republic, 
the Slovak Republic, Poland and Hungary. Rom ania and the Slovene Republic 
are not. members of CEFTA. In the respective cases of these two countries gen­
eral trends of rapid and substantial export growth by CEFTA with them  seems to 
show some reversal of the results of previous years. Due care m ust be exercised 
in judgem ent since H ungary’s export growth is by no means due to the CEFTA 
Agreement alone. For example, it should not be construed th a t the sudden decline 
of H ungary’s previously rapid growth of exports directed to the Slovene Republic is 
entirely due to the fact th a t the Slovene Republic is not yet a full CEFTA member. 
A closer look a t H ungary’s exports directed to Rom ania against the previous year 
figures shows th a t there has been a decline. However, this is due to  one single 
factor alone— namely, the occasion of a single, large volume export order of cereals 
delivered by Hungary in 1994. In fact, H ungary’s exports to Rom ania increased by 
70 percent in the first seven m onths of 1996, indicating a substan tia l and continu­
ous increase, regardless of the one-off cereal export. It stands to  good reason th a t 
the apparen t decline of H ungary’s exports (by 17 percent) to  the Slovene Republic 
com pared to  the same period a year before, is rather difficult to  in terpret. However, 
it seems m ost unlikely th a t this is due to  the fact th a t the Slovene Republic is not 
yet a mem ber of CEFTA. It is obvious th a t the volume of trade between CEFTA 
mem bers is, undoubtedly, on the increase in the long term , albeit w ith periodic, 
short-range surges and decreases following each other.
As far as H ungary’s trade deficits with the former socialist countries are 
concerned, Russia appears to be the only country in the region with which Hungary 
has accum ulated a substantial trade deficit, while a trade surplus is discernable in 
the respective cases of the rem aining former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
This same pattern  remained and continued to persist in the first seven m onths of 
1996, w ith one m ajor difference: H ungary’s negative balance of trade of USD 588 
million accrued with Russia (and a further trade deficit m ust be added to  the tune 
of USD 83 million realised with The Ukraine). Hungary has a trade surplus of USD 
220 million with the rem aining former socialist countries.
A few words need to  be said on the topic of trade with the developing coun­
tries. H ungary’s exports directed to the developing countries constitu ted  8.6 per­
cent of H ungary’s to tal exports in 1988. This figure has dropped consistently until, 
in 1994, it was down to 3.9 percent. In 1995 it seems to have dropped further, 
down to 3.6 percent in the first seven months of th a t year. By the end of this 
year this figure could stabilise but it could decline further. It is highly probable 
th a t the m ost obvious single reason behind the decline of H ungary’s exports to 
the developing countries lies in the fact th a t many of the large size Hungarian 
sta te  export agencies have either been restructured or wound up. These business 
entities were not replaced by other, financially sound companies willing to assume
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higher business risks. O ther factors of lesser im portance which possibly contributed 
to  this decline are the financial difficulties experienced by some of the large size 
state-ow ned m anufacturing enterprises and suppliers. The decline in the volume 
of exports to  third world countries is particularly true w ith respect to  countries of 
N orth Africa and the Near East. On the other hand, it appears th a t Hungary has 
m anaged to  m aintain a tiny, bu t firm foothold on the Far East m arkets. H ungary’s 
exports to  the Far E ast have never really been substantial. This is a m ost unfortu­
nate  situation  as far as Hungary is concerned, particularly  in view of the fact th a t 
the most dynam ic economic growth anywhere in the world is taking place in the 
Far East region. H ungary's volume of trade with this region is still small.
In cases of the developing countries and the CIS countries trade credit, in­
surance provisions, economic diplomacy and so on, all constitute im portan t consid­
erations requiring the involvement of the state. Likewise, considerable efforts are 
required to a ttrac t capital from the Far East. It is not likely th a t H ungary’s trade 
will increase to any substantial extent with the Far East in the near future. How­
ever, it is believed th a t it would be possible to  a ttrac t capital and induce capital 
inflow into Hungary from the Far East. This is w hat happened in the  case of the 
United States. The volume and value of trade between the two countries are not 
all th a t impressive, although the capital inflow from the United S tates to  Hungary 
is, in fact, quite substan tia l. This should eventually generate greater trade between 
the two countries.
H ungary’s exports to  the countries of the European Union am ounted to  62.8 
percent of H ungary’s to ta l exports in 1995. This means th a t the EU is H ungary’s 
num ber one trad ing  partner by far. Yet it is a statistically  difficult task  to  ex tract 
m eaningful figures to  dem onstrate growth of trade until a decision is m ade about 
how to dissect and group these countries and how to account for the recent increase 
of m em bership of the European Union. By ignoring the new member sta tes of the 
European Union for statistical reasons, the growth of exports to the 12 countries 
am ounted to 17.0 percent in the period between 1991 and 1994. This represents a 
higher rate of increase of exports than  H ungary’s to tal growth of exports of 7.3 per­
cent. in the same period. O ther factors should also be duly considered concerning 
the above tim e period. For example, in 1993, in the first year following H ungary’s 
signing of Associate M embership w ith the EU, H ungary’s trade was effected most 
unfavourably. H ungary’s exports to  the EU declined in 1993 by more than  22 per­
cent, while im port grow th was 6.5 percent in the same year. Hungary experienced 
the sam e effect as Portugal, Spain and others following their entry into Europe as 
full mem ber states. T hus the abolition of customs and tariff barriers m ust mean 
increased com petition, m anifesting itself in reduced exports and increased im ports. 
In H ungary’s case this was exacerbated a t the time (i.e. held back H ungary’s ex­
port grow th potentials) because it coincided with an economic slum p in the EU. 
Hungary m ust be prepared for the possibility th a t the same thing m ight happen 
again in the future (i.e. when Hungary atta ins full m em bership sta tu s  of the EU).
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T hus for all practical purpose all trade barriers will be abolished. In accord w ith 
the current Associate Membership Agreement all tariffs will be abolished prior to  
H ungary’s entry to  the EU; however, the customs procedures will be abolished only 
upon en try  in to  the EU. This is, as far as Hungary is concerned, likely to  result 
in an im m ediate increase of im ports. This possibility should be considered and 
reckoned with.
Let us return now to the analysis of recent trade figures. Following the un­
favourable trade trends from H ungary’s point of view in 1993, figures indicate th a t 
in 1994 both H ungary’s exports and im ports grew at around the same rate. This 
resulted in a proportional increase of the trade deficit. The deficit reached USD two 
billion in 1994 bu t dropped to  USD 1.5 billion in 1995. The expectations are th a t 
H ungary’s trade deficit will shrink further in 1996 (USD 809 million a t present). 
Based on first half-year trade figures for 1996, perhaps it is possible th a t H ungary’s 
trade  deficit could decline by a further USD 0.5 billion. The above trend is encour­
aging, particularly  when one considers the great im portance and weight of the EU 
for Hungary as far as its to tal trade is concerned. H ungary’s trade with G erm any 
requires a special mention because it represents about half of H ungary’s to tal trade 
with the EU (if we also include the trade realised between the two countries via 
the free trade zone also). (W ith respect to free trade zones, due caution is required 
since these free trade zones came on stream  relatively recently and their current 
perform ance is not yet possible to compare with previous years’ figures simply 
because no previous figures exist.) H ungary’s trade with G erm any has increased 
in com parison with the rest of the EU countries in spite of the economic slump 
th a t has been experienced in Germany. Given the possibility of an upswing of the 
economy in Germany, Hungary can be mildly optim istic about the future in this 
respect.
Now I would like to  tu rn  to the trade product mix.
Im ports of raw m aterials, interm ediary products, machine and equipm ent 
parts have increased into Hungary since 1993. This is in line w ith the increase of 
H ungary’s G D P following reversal of the slump in the G D P in 1993. M any crit­
ical com m ents have expressed th a t H ungary’s production structu re  is all wrong, 
m eaning th a t Hungarian production is excessively m aterial, and thus it is im port- 
dem anding. I would like to  place doubt on these critical comments. This is by no 
means unusual. Since the entry of international and m ultinational companies into 
Hungary solid evidence exists th a t the m ajority of the increase of raw m aterial and 
com ponent im ports into Hungary are directly due to the activities and interchange 
of such products flowing from one country to another, exchanged between various 
branches and plants of the same international company. It is necessary to  take a 
closer look a t how m any new companies have been established on either side of the 
respective borders of A ustria-Hungary. The typical division of labour shows th a t 
some of the more refined m anufacturing processes are carried ou t on the A ustrian 
side of the border while the less refined and more labour intensive jobs are carried
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Fig. 4 Import by main commodity groups
ou t on the Hungarian side. Such arrangem ents appear increasingly more “fashion­
able” , popular and make perfect economic sense. (These are the very companies 
which exert considerable pressure and lobby the relevant Hungarian government 
institu tes and offices, trying to persuade H ungarian officials to accelerate the cus­
tom s procedures in order to perm it more easy entry and exit of goods, interm ediary 
products and parts across the border on a daily basis.)
One form of division of labour is the often, understandably, criticised contract
work.
T he figure above shows the extent of the im portance and weight of contract 
work according to  the various branches of industry (expressed as gross value and 
thus including the value of the m aterial an d /o r the interm ediary product). In the 
light industries this figure is substantial, with a similar discernible increasing trend, 
particu larly  in the field of machine industry. C ontract work could be construed as 
being useful to Hungary. It contributes to  technological increases and contributes 
to  em ploym ent. On the reverse side of the coin the disadvantages are th a t tech­
nological im provement is derived from sources external to the country. A nother 
disadvantage is the inevitable higher extent of dependency and uncertainty of the 
H ungarian economic units which take part in the business. A th ird  disadvantage 
reflects the low and suppressed wages and salaries paid to Hungarian employees. 
It would not only be possible, but, indeed, desirable to reduce this dependency 
and give greater independence to the economic units engaged in contract work. 
It is ra ther short-sighted to be critical of this situation; instead, greater a tten tion  
should be paid to finding out w hat factors hinder such moves. Two factors seem 
to constitu te  m ajor im pedim ents. These are: the insensitivity, the “could not care
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Fig. 5 Weight of the gross value of the outwards processing in the various branches of
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less” a ttitu d e  of the owner (in the m ajority of the instances the sta te) of these 
economic units; secondly, the lack of capital to do som ething about this situation. 
One obvious solution would be to enhance and accelerate the processes of privati­
sation. This would virtually  force the given economic unit to  act like an economic 
unit should in the circum stances of a true market economy.
Once again, as far as the product mix is concerned with respect to  exports, 
it appears th a t a discernible trend exists. This indicates an increase in the export 
o f raw m aterials, interm ediary products and machine parts, while the export of 
m achinery and equipm ent is tending to decline.
However, the situation  is not as bad as it seems. A closer look shows th a t the 
increase of raw m aterial exports represents a smaller proportion of the to ta l— i.e. 
the m ajority  of the increase is due to increased exports of interm ediary products and 
m achine parts. This is prim arily due to increased trade w ithin the same company 
across borders, as a m atter of division of labour. For example, Belgium ’s exports 
are almost 10 times higher than those of Hungary. This is, obviously, also due to 
m ovem ent of enormous volumes of interm ediary products and parts across borders. 
Hungary seems to be heading in the same direction and there is nothing wrong 
with th a t.
It is not a favourable development th a t machine exports have declined. How­
ever, several explanations may be given for this phenomenon. It is obvious th a t 
the advantages flowing from joining the European Union, as far as Hungary is con­
cerned, is least likely to manifest itself in increased exports of finished machinery 
an d /o r complete vehicles. These advantages are more likely to be expressed in 
term s of increased exports of interm ediary products and machine parts. T he As­
sociate Membership Agreement forged between the EU and Hungary includes pro­
13* Acta Oeconomica 4&, 1996
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Fig. 6 Export by main commodity groups
visions for halting  and punishing dum ping practices and preventing o ther m arket 
disturbances. The export and im port of items such as raw m aterials, interm ediary 
products and parts, particularly  within the same company, however, is least likely 
to  disturb  the existing m arket than the export of items such as finished products, 
machinery and equipm ent. In Hungary this is reflected in the general re tardation  
in the expansion of enterprises producing for exports. This is especially true in 
the case of companies m anufacturing complete finished products. Instead, produc­
tion concentrates more on partly  finished products and this is likely to  continue at 
least un til Hungary becomes a full member of the EU. Still, economic progress can 
be achieved by m anufacturing and exporting a greater proportion of interm ediary 
products and machine parts in a framework of division of labour. In o ther words, 
th is type of production should not be regarded lightly.
T he main user of interm ediary products and machine parts  is, naturally  
enough, the m achine industry. Investm ent in the machine industry seem to be in­
creasing a t a rapid rate and is contributing substantially to  export growth. (Note: 
the value of investm ents in the machine industry am ounted to  a 61 percent increase 
on the previous year in 1995, followed by a further increase of 6 percent in the first 
six m onth of 1996.) One of the favourable economic trends in Hungary includes 
a production ou tp u t increase of 12 percent in the period January  to June 1996. 
(It should be pointed out, however, th a t in spite of the fact th a t exports of m a­
chinery and equipm ent appear be increasing at a higher ra te  than  H ungary’s to ta l 
exports, a  certain caution m ust be exercised because exports from the tariff-free 
zones are not, as yet, indexed. However, if exports from the tariff-free zones are 
also considered the increase in machine exports would still probably be in excess 
of 10 percent. W ithout a shadow of doubt, however, the curren t trends pertain ing
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to the H ungarian machine industry, and machinery exports as a whole, m ust be 
regarded as encouraging. The orders placed for machinery in June this year, for 
instance, well exceed the level of orders put for machinery in 1995.)
Expectations with regard to exports covering next year, or the next cou­
ple of years, are by no means likely to be determined by exports of machinery 
alone. In addition to machinery exports H ungary’s textile exports in general, and 
to  the European Union in particular, are most substantial. Nevertheless, in spite 
of favourable current trends this industry is facing enormous com petition. It must 
also be realised th a t the contract work performed by H ungarian economic units 
involved in the textile and the clothing industries, as a rule, do not represent high 
value, high quality categories.
The ability to com pete largely stems from the low levels of wages and salaries 
in Hungary. In the long run there is no room for optim ism  with respect to  the 
H ungarian clothing and textile industries—at least not in the next couple of years. 
Similarly, the co-operative contacts previously fostered in the chemical industry 
and the pharm aceutical industry also seem to have declined. Some prospects of 
grow th do exist for the chemical industry in the next couple of years, bu t this 
is unlikely to be m atched by prospects of growth in the pharm aceutical industry. 
In the absence of substantial investm ent in these two industries no substan tia l 
increases are likely to be realised. Unlike the machine industry, the chemical and 
pharm aceutical industries are unlikely to a ttrac t investm ents necessary for growth. 
T his may be due to the fact, a t least to some extent, of either late—or the absence 
of—privatisation of these industries.
Given the analysis, what are the prospects in the short term ? As far as the
1997 year is concerned there is not much point in making any prognoses a t the
m om ent. For 1997 the best source of information is a study of the sizes of incoming 
orders received to  date. Indeed, the value and volume of incoming orders in the 
m anufacturing and processing industries in July exceeded the levels of the previous 
year by 6.2 percent (the la tte r year itself had a substantial increase of 37.9 percent 
over the corresponding figures for the previous year). The best approach seems to 
be to  quote the volume of exports realised in 1996 (an increase of 8 percent till end 
of Ju ly ), expressed in term s of volume of trade. This is because the expression of 
volume lends itself for ready extrapolation, as distinct from expression in m onetary 
term s. The reason for this is th a t, in the la tte r case, it is not possible to  predict 
the exchange rates, barter ratios for the following year.
As far as the two-directional cross section analysis of exports is concerned
it would serve a good purpose to concentrate our a tten tion  on double digit pre­
dictability  only. In the analysis concerning the CEFTA countries the weight of this 
group of countries is highly likely to increase further, and will probably exceed 10 
percent growth. However, there is a possibility th a t it could exceed the 10 percent 
m ark quite substantially  particularly since the entry of the Slovene Republic to  the 
CEFTA  is im m inent, while the entry of Romania is highly probable. By casting our
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eye on the product mix the most spectacular increase in a particu lar category of 
export is likely to be achieved and realised by the H ungarian machine industry and 
the vehicle industry; this includes increased exports of interm ediary products and 
exports of parts. Increase of exports in these two industries will alm ost certainly 
exceed the 10 percent benchm ark in 1997. Based on the incoming orders received, 
none of the other H ungarian industries are expected to  achieve exports exceeding 
10 percent in 1997. As far as the rest of the decade is concerned it is unlikely th a t 
H ungarian export growth will exceed 10 percent in more than  one or, perhaps two 
of the rem aining years of the decade. This must mean th a t from the point of view of 
the Hungarian economy, and Hungarian exports in particular, no spectacular rapid 
grow th is expected to  take place. Instead growth, certainly at first, is likely to  pick 
up a t a slow rate. Later on, this will perhaps accelerate, helped by the realisation of 
some of the ideas expressed a t different forums. This would provide opportun ities 
to discuss such topics as investm ent incentive provisions, further liberalisation of 
trade and the economy, accelerated privatisation processes, and more favourable 
external economic conditions. In this way further progress can be anticipated.
THE WEIGHT OF BLACK TRADE AND BLACK SERVICES IN 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
I. BÖC-M . KLAUBER
The authors assess the percentage of the black economy in term s of its share 
in household spending, and the assessment is based on responses to a questionnaire. 
The responses indicate th a t the proportion of non-registered shopping expenditures 
as a percentage of the registered spending is 16 percent, while in the range of the 
assessed services the proportion of non-registered spending is 69 percent. Along 
with the changing of the system  and with the expansion of the conditions of the 
m arket economy the dimensions of the hidden economy have also expanded to  a 
considerable extent. However, this is not prim arily a result of the m arket economy; 
the m arket economy has only provided new opportunities. Since the expansion 
of the black economy has been generated by inflation and by over-taxation, any 
repression of the black economy would most probably be easier through the elimi­
nation  of the circum stances th a t stim ulate it (i.e. over-taxation and high inflation), 
ra ther than  through increased application of adm inistrative and police actions.1
1 T his article  has been w ritten  on the  basis of a  study  in H ungarian  by Im re B óc-M átyás 




K opint-D atorg Inc. has been conducting research on various segm ents of the 
black economy. According to  our findings, retail trade, household services and for­
eign currency transactions linked to  tourism  are of outstanding significance in this 
context. In the course of a process of d a ta  collection from the population— carried 
ou t by TÂ R K I between 27th November and 8th December 1995—non-registered 
purchases were included as elements of the shadow economy. Non-registered pur­
chases refers to those purchases th a t occurred in the street, in m arkets, from “ad 
hoc” sellers, in retail shops— and all w ithout the sellers giving receipts or vouchers.
Em pirical d a ta  were collected from the users (consumers) and these d a ta  
directly perta in  to the phenomenon in question. The surveys were based on ques­
tionnaires in which consumers were asked about certain limited segm ents of the 
m arket of consumer goods and services. The results of the empirical research were 
not combined with the economic background and therefore they were not suitable 
for drawing conclusions which can be viewed as valid a t the level of the macro 
economy. Given the results of our surveys, the main objective of this study  is to 
estim ate the weight of the black economy using proportions and volumes th a t can 
be in terpreted  at the level of the national economy, and th a t are characteristic of 
non-registered goods and services.
The G D P generated in the black economy can, as revenue, be m ost readily 
realised in the form of cash through the black trading of goods and services. Our 
research suggests th a t any a ttem p t which expects to reduce the black economy 
quickly and noticeably by a policy of economic restriction is over-optim istic. In 
our view reduction can only be achieved in the long run, through substan tia l tax  
cuts and through concerted action, supported by the society as a whole, against 
the black economy.
We considered markets to  be the main venue for black trading, bu t with re­
spect to foodstuffs, a significant portion of the traditionally legal trading of goods 
is also carried out in markets and thus we were not capable of realistically evalu­
ating the black trading involved with this group of goods. Consequently, we forego 
detailed estim ates concerning foodstuffs, but for the sake of providing a complete 
picture, such d a ta  will be included in the summary tables.
T he proportion of the black economy is substantial in the area of enjoym ent 
goods (i.e. alcohol, tobacco, coffee— ATC for short) and in th a t of goods which are 
subject to excise duty. Despite the tightening of excise control the black economy 
never stops looking for (and finding) new ways to avoid the controls. In the to tal 
turnover of tobacco products the black economy is estim ated to represent between 
15-20 percent, while in the turnover of alcoholic beverages the figure is 20 percent.
om y” (K opin t-D atorg  1996). T he study was prepared on assignm ent by the  P rim e M in iste r’s 
Office.
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T his results in a  tax  loss of some HUF 1J-18 Bn (HUF 8-10 Bn in the case 
of tobacco products and HUF 6-8 Bn in alcoholic beverages).2 The two m ajor 
channels of black trading involve the smuggling into Hungary of counterfeit brand 
products, and the pretended exporting of locally made cigarettes which are then 
re-im ported for illegal sale in Hungary.3
As a result of increases in the taxes on tobacco and alcoholic beverages— 
which came into effect on 1 January, 1996—about tw o-thirds of the price of cigarettes 
is tax . Tax rises of this nature proved to be a failure in 1994, they resulted in a 21 
percent drop in sales in 1995, and owing to these tax  increases the m arket continued 
to  con trac t.4
Following the introduction of the strip  stam ps (duty seals) counterfeit strip 
stamps appeared in the m arket. Domestic finished goods are also faked.5 P a rt 
of the  excise duty  increase implemented in 1996 is “pocketed” by the producers 
of spirits, bu t it is still a question as to  whether the tax  rises will result in an 
increase of tax  revenues or it merely facilitate the expansion of the black economy. 
According to experts the tax  loss due to black trading in the m arket of spirits is 
HUF 10 Bn, in the tobacco m arket it is HUF 6-10 Bn, and in the wine m arket it 
am ounts to 1-1.5 B n.6
Besides the HUF 13 Bn of taxes paid by the brewing industry, there are 
“home breweries” which are difficult to control. According to estim ates they failed 
to pay in alm ost half a billion H U F .1 The tax content of the beer price is over 70 
percent and beer’s share of the black m arket is a t least 30 percent; the tax  loss in 
1995 has been estim ated a t HUF 10 Bn.8
According to Nestle the black economy in connection w ith the confectionery 
industry— w ith the black trade of coffee included— makes up about 30 percent of 
the to ta l turnover.9 Nestlé reckons th a t around 20 percent of the coffee m arket, 
with a to ta l of HUF 20 Bn in turnover, is realised in the black m arket. This 
is because the custom s duty, the 20 percent excise tax , the 25 percent VAT and
2 Napi Gazdaság, 10th June , 1995.
3 T he black trad ing  in a rea  of c igarettes has reached a  level which has p rom pted  m anufacturers 
to  resort to  dem onstrative m easures. For instance, th e  Pécs Tobacco Factory, in o rder to b reak  
black trad ing , reduced its prices—from M arch 1995— by up  to  H U F 10 w ith regard  to  its  m ost 
p o p u lar p roducts. T he factory also in tended to  use price-cutting  to  p u t  pressure on the  governm ent 
to m ake it ad o p t m ore efficient m easures against the  black economy, since th e  facto ry ’s own policy 
also results in a  drop  of tax  revenues for the s ta te . Even so, the  revenue loss of th e  factory  was 
ab o u t twice as large as th a t  of the s ta te  ( Világgazdaság, 3rd M arch, 1995).
4 Népszabadság, 16th Novem ber, 1995.
1 Népszabadság, 13th Decem ber, 1995
6 Népszabadság, 5 th  January , 1996
7R. Sz.: Home breweries difficult to control, Népszabadság, 16th Novem ber, 1995
8 Népszabadság, 7 th  December, 1995
9C ustom s du ty  cu t against the  black economy („Feketegazdaság ellen vám csökkentés” ), 
Világgazdaság , 16th A pril, 1996.
Acta  Oeconomica 4&, 1996
REVIEW S '201
the strip  stam p pu t up prices to unreasonable levels. Even in smaller shops there 
are products priced 30-40 percent lower than local products, and these may have 
originated from illegal sources. Nestle cannot compete w ith such a situation  and 
so it intends to  w ithdraw from the coffee roasting business.10
One of the characteristic m ethods of black trade is when the principal of the 
forwarder certifies customs clearance with a counterfeit stam p. This is done for the 
forwarder, on the basis of the T1R card, a t the points of loading. This is prim arily 
worth risking in the case of products with high tax contents (e.g. cigarettes, spirits). 
W hen a t a later stage it turns out th a t the T IR  card of the forwarder has been 
abused by the principal, the company involved in the deception disappears or is 
m ade to  go bankrupt (but the goods would already have been sold a long tim e 
before). In such cases the foreign customs authorities s ta rt proceedings against the 
forwarder, innocent though he has been. On a lorryful of cigarettes the custom s 
duty  of DM 2 million can be “saved” . This sort of m anipulation started  back in 
1992 and was spotted for the first time in 1993, when the docum entation for the 
goods which arrived through the border and the docum entation for those cleared 
were found to  be different.11
Purchase of manufactured goods
According to  the results of the questionnaire survey, non-registered purchases 
account for a significant portion of purchases, but the percentage thereof strongly 
varies by commodity group. We assessed the percentage of cases in which the sellers 
in retail shops had not given a receipt, and the case examined was the sale of used 
clothing items. According to the results of the survey no receipt or voucher had 
been issued in 11 percent of the purchases of clothing items in small retail shops. 
The respective figures were 7 percent fo r  purchases of other manufactured goods in 
shops, and 32 percent o f  the cases of shops selling used clothing items.
We assumed th a t the share of non-registered turnover varies by com m odity 
group and so we assessed this proportion within purchases in shops, by com m odity 
group. 23 percent of the to tal expenditure on clothing items  was spent on goods 
bought in the street or m arkets from ad hoc sellers and another 2 percent was 
spent on used articles. Non-registered purchases accounted fo r  27 percent of the 
total turnover of clothing items. Most of the non-registered turnover is accounted 
for by products bought from ad hoc sellers, in streets and in m arkets. In the 
underw ear category this share is close to 40 percent while in the case of overwear 
it is near to 30 percent, and in the case of shoes it is alm ost 22 percent. Given the
10Népszabadság, 27th Decem ber, 1995
11 G ábor Ferencz: Tax-free im porta tion  using a fake stam p  („V ám m entes ham is pecsétte l” ) 
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U nderw ear 38.1 27.1 2.5 34.4 0.4 0.0 100 37.0
Overwear 36.9 34.6 4.0 24.7 3.8 0.9 100 29.6
Shoes 47.0 34.2 3.3 18.5 0.3 0.0 100 21.8
Cosm etics, parfum es 57.4 28.8 0.8 13.7 * * 100 14.5
D etergents 54.5 34.9 0.8 10.6 * * 100 11.4
Sports goods, toys 47.9 37.4 0.3 14.7 * * 100 15.0
Tools 57.2 35.1 2.0 7.7 * * 100 9.7
P lastic-, glassware 52.4 38.0 0.6 9.6 * * 100 10.2
Video, audio  cassettes 76.1 18.7 0.5 5.2 * * 100 5.7
B atteries 43.7 48.3 2.0 8.0 + * 100 10.0
C D ’s 53.9 44.3 4.0 1.8 * * 100 5.9
*No such  answer applicable to  industria l articles
lower ■prices o f  non-registered goods, the volume percentages must be even higher 
than the value percentages given above. If it is agreed th a t black m arket prices are 
a t least one-third lower than  legitim ate ones, the sta tem ent may be ventured th a t 
over half of the underwear purchases, almost half of the ready-m ade clothing items 
and abou t one-third of all pairs of shoes sold are procured in the black m arket.
T he survey, on account of the lim itations of the questionnaire m ethod, only 
reveals the non-registered purchases of end-users. Non-registered trade, however, is 
not limited to retail trading fo r  it accompanies each of the phases o f  the course of  
the commodity : i.e. from the producer, or crossing of the border, from the im porter, 
through wholesale and retail trading, to the customer. Indeed, the goods may cross 
sectors several times, from registered into non-registered, and back.
The aim  of retailers is to avoid paying the various taxes. For them , it is 
im m aterial which goods they sell w ithout issuance of certificates. Their prim ary 
target is to find the largest volume of goods, the illegitim ate selling of which results 
in the saving of the largest volume of taxes, w ithout a ttrac tin g  the atten tion  of 
the tax  authorities. In their procurem ents they often mix up legal and illegitim ate 
sources, and in selling they also a lternate  in the giving of a receipt or not. Having 
sta ted  this, the source and the course of most of the goods may be traced, or at 
least estim ated.
In the case of underwear the legitim ate and the illegitim ate goods are, in the 
m ajority  of cases, not distinguishable. The m ajority  of the items come from  the Far 
East or Turkey; these cannot bypass customs on account of their large volume and 
low unit value. However, in the customs docum ents the price indicated is rem ark­
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ably low, or the goods and the volumes are declared false. This is indicated by the 
fact th a t the prices of underwear items sold in markets are lower than the realistic 
procurem ent price plus customs duty plus VAT. Accordingly, a certain quantity  
of the underwear stock th a t are customs cleared and sold with a receipt include 
“black” elements. Even underwear items include smuggled goods in the classical 
sense of the term  ( “im porting stuff in the luggage” ). For instance, belonging to 
the la tte r category is the Romanian underwear sold in streets and m arkets by il­
legitim ate vendors. W hen all things are considered, in the case of this com m odity 
group (similarly to  the case of clothing items) the results o f  the survey can only be 
regarded as the lower limit of the non-regislered trade turnover.
In the case of ready-made overwear items, the assumed high proportion of 
non-registered local production is a new element, in comparison with underwear. 
In this category the portion of Chinese and of used, bulk items is high.
In the category of shoes Italian, Turkish and Chinese goods dom inate non­
registered trade, but again, there is a high percentage of Rom anian “luggage im ­
p o rts” .
With regard to the other manufactured articles considered in the  research 
56 percent of to tal sales is purchased in large stores, 33.5 percent in small shops 
and 10.5 percent from street and m arket vendors. Accordingly, the share of non- 
registered trade is also less significant than it is in the case of clothing items, the 
la tte r being a mere 12 percent.
The non-registered turnover of parfumes and cosmetics  accounts for some 15 
percent of the to tal turnover. Counterfeit an d /o r smuggled parfumes and cosmetics 
th a t do not m eet domestic health standards account for a substan tia l p a rt of this 
15 percent.
Of the turnover of detergents some 11 percent is black, most of it being m anu­
factured in Hungary. It is put into circulation by the m anufacturer or the wholesaler 
in a legitim ate form, accompanied by vouchers. The retailers then transfer some 
of this stock to vendors selling w ithout receipts, a t prices which are even lower 
than the procurem ent price plus VAT. In this way their profits are hidden. The 
gains of such transactions are realised through re-claiming VAT on the ostensibly 
unprofitable business.
The commodity group comprising sports articles and toys is highly diversified 
and the share of non-registered trade is relatively high here, being about 15 percent.
In the category of dry batteries (non-registered trade indicated as 10 percent) 
there are brand names and no-names as well, and there is some “im port in the 
luggage” . The non-registered trade results in a loss of, respectively, VAT, customs 
duty and also the environm ental product charge.
The 6 percent share of non-registered trade of CD s is a m odest share, even 
w ithin the commodity group. This product is still som ething of a luxury item  in 
Hungary, and those who do own a CD player are not m otivated to  buy on the black 
m arket.
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Some 6 percent of the turnover of construction materials and fuels  showed 
up in the  research as non-registered. In 1995 short supplies of certain construction 
m aterials were observed and this also contributed to certain distributors favouring 
buyers who did not want receipts. However, purchase w ithout receipt also occurs 
in a situation  of over-supply as well for then the constructor cannot or need not 
charge (book) the costs of construction. It m ust also be noted th a t the survey was 
limited to household procurem ents, therefore it did not cover public and institu ­
tional procurem ents th a t account for a substantial portion of the turnover of this 
segment.
We performed a separate survey of procurem ents and issuance of receipts 
for certain manufactured goods, the black turnover of which we assum ed to  be 
significant.
Table 2
Share o f non-registered purchases o f certain m anufactured goods (percent)
Black sales as a 
percent of the  
num ber of 
purchases
Portion  of value of 
p roducts sold in the 
black m arket as a  per­
cent of the  to ta l turnover
Average black m arket 
price as a  percent 
of th e  legitim ate 
m arket price
W rist w atch 41.3 23.1 45.5
G old, silver jewellery 20.8 11.5 51.8
(Pocket) calculator 38.7 14.3 32.8
In 1995 over 40 percent of those who bought a wrist watch were not given 
a receipt, or a certificate of warranty. Since all wrist watches are im ported it can 
be assum ed th a t there is a good deal of smuggling. The average price of wrist 
watches sold in the black m arket is somewhat less than half of the price charged 
in legitim ate shops (HUF 1,596 as opposed to HUF 3,510). As a result of the 
price difference, those buying w ithout receiving a receipt accounted for a far lower 
percentage in term s of HUF spent (23 percent), than  their portion  in term s of 
watches bought. This, however, does not mean th a t the price levels in the black 
m arket were significantly lower than those for watches sold accompanied by receipt, 
since it can be supposed th a t there are a lot of cheap, poor quality and, in some 
cases, counterfeit goods sold in the black market.
Over 20 percent of those individuals who had bought precious metal jewellery  
reported th a t they had not received any receipt a t all upon procurem ent. Since in 
the legitim ate shops only the sale of hallmarked goods is perm itted , it is assumed 
here th a t the non-registered purchases were, in the m ajority  of cases, m ade up of 
goods smuggled from Turkey, Greece or Serbia. These watches had been illegally 
sold for a fraction of the legitim ate Hungarian price. The average price of jewellery
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bought in the black m arket is hardly over half th a t of illegitim ate goods. However, 
this does not allow conclusions to be drawn concerning price levels, since the survey 
indicates the average price of the total purchases. A t any rate, it is clear th a t the 
value of black trading accounts for some 12 percent of the to ta l turnover of this 
category.
Almost 39 percent of the turnover of the m arket of pocket calculators is re­
alised in the non-registered sphere. The proportion of the black m arket in term s 
of value accounts for only 14 percent of sales. This difference indicates both th a t 
prices are lower in the black m arket, and th a t this is where the m ajority  of the  poor 
quality bulk goods are sold. All of these goods come from the Far East, therefore 
it is likely th a t there are a lot of smuggled goods among the to ta l stock.
W ith regard to durable consumer goods, according to the results of the survey, 
the buyers were given certificates of warranty in about 78 percent of the cases. The 
question pertain ing to the certificate of warranty was asked in order to  find out 
som ething about the frequency of illegitimate sales. The frequency varied by item. 
In the cases of articles where there is a significant difference between the local and 
the foreign price (e.g. computers, V CR’s, radiophones), the percentage was higher 
than  in the case of those commodities (e.g. washing machines, microwave ovens) 
where the prices charged locally are not, or only a little higher than  the prices at 
which such com m odities are available abroad.
In the turnover of entertainment electronic goods (e.g. television set, radio­
phone, Walkman, VCR) the sales in the black m arket, and w ithin these the sales 
of smuggled goods, account for quite a high percentage. A lthough households are 
well supplied with these articles, the rate of replacement is quite high due to  obso­
lescence.
It seems th a t the decline of the living standards does not restrict the m arket 
of precious m etals, since the acquisitions here serve the aims of profit retention. The 
share of the illegitim ate trade of gold jewellery in Hungary is estim ated to  represent 
40 percent, according to  traders involved. However, the survey only proved a small 
portion of this figure.
The taxes and other payables on imported gold am ount to about 150 per­
cent. Therefore traders bought gold from the National Bank of Hungary and then 
exported it— mostly to Italy. It was then processed and re-im ported as lease work 
for sale. Taxes could be saved and substantial profits could be m ade in this way. If 
more gold was im ported in the form of jewels than exported unprocessed, the tax  
gap between the significantly lower foreign price and the higher local price could 
be earned, as a further substantial profit.
The proportion of illegally im ported artefacts made from gold is extremely 
high from countries where gold is inexpensive. Since there is no H ungarian hall­
m ark on such goods these are hard to sell. Therefore, smuggled goods are more and 
more frequently sold with a counterfeit hallmark. The authorities have confiscated 
some 20 kg of gold jewellery with fake hallmarks over the past three years. Nev-
Acta  Oeconomica 48, 1996
206 REVIEW S
Table 3




Weishing m achine 5.9
Television 11.6




Sowing m achine 50.0
H eater 13.6
F urn itu re 21.0
Perco la tor 35.0
H and m ixer 37.5
M ultifunction  m ixers 7.7
T oaster 30.0
R adiophone 37.5
W alkm an 22.2
CD player 25.0
O ther electrical appliance 13.7
D urable consum er goods, to ta l 21.6
ertheless, according to estim ates, the volume sold illegitim ately was several times 
more. According to the head of the controlling departm ent of the Institu tion  for 
the Verification of Precious Metals the only efficient means of reducing the level of 
counterfeiting would be to lower taxes on gold so th a t these taxes approxim ate to 
the European levels. A reduction of taxes would not only reduce black trade bu t it 
would also increase the revenues of the treasury .12 This has been tried in Slovenia 
where taxes on precious m etals were cut for a year, on a tem porary basis. The 
traders of precious m etals undertook to pay the difference if the revenues of the 
treasury  declined over th a t period. They did not have to  pay, but the legitim ate 
traders re-gained their m arket and the sta te  got its revenues.13
12Zoltán  Gaál: „Ham is fémjel az arany ékszereken” (Fake hallm ark of gold jew ellery). Magyar  
Hírlap , 14th M arch, 1995.
13 Népszabadság,  22nd May, 1995; Népszabadság , 15th Decem ber, 1995
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Services
Alm ost half (42.5 percent) of the respondents used technical services w ithout 
asking for a receipt. The non-invoiced portion of such services, however, only 
accounted for about 30 percent of the total expenditure on these services, of which 
the tips accounted for 1.4 percent. The la tter related prim arily to services provided 
and accompanied with an invoice. This significant discrepancy indicates th a t, as in 
the case of other m anufactured articles, in this range the values of the non-invoiced 
item s tend to be far lower than those of the invoiced ones. This is also due to the 
fact th a t the users of such services charge these expenses to their businesses, on 
some account, and claim varranty on such services.
Table 4
Frequency of purchase of certain services, and the percentages in terms of non-registered
incomes (percent)
T ype of service Non-registered purchase 
as a  percent of the 
to ta l of procurem ents
P roportion  of 
non-invoiced 
value*
Peaks of the  
respective to ta ls 
of procurem ents*
R epairs of household appliances 32.5 28.8 2.5
Pain ting , wall papering 67.3 32.9 0.9
W ater an d  gas supplies, repairs of 32.9 10.4 2.0
E lectrical repairs 69.2 22.2 0.2
Bricklayers, jo iners 73.5 44.3 1.7
C ar repairs 32.9 19.4 1.0
Forw arding 45.0 46.2 0.8
Technical type  services, to ta l 42.5 29.5 1.4
H airdressers, beauticians 56.6 54.2 2.3
Shoe repairs 54.2 40.2 0.1
Laundry 10.3 23.8 0.0
Tailor 69.8 71.4 0.1
Personal services, to ta l 57.2 52.3 1.9
D entist 67.1 52.0 -
Physician, hom eopath 94.6 76.7 -
H ospital 96.9 95.8 -
H ealth  services, to ta l 89.3 62.9 -
T ra in in g /ed u ca tio n  services, to ta l 69.0 46.4 -
'N o t  weighted, scaled up  for a  whole year
T he proportion  of black services vis à vis household repairs (except for water 
and gas repairs) is exceptionally high, representing slightly more than tw o-thirds of 
to ta l turnover. The exceptions to this tendency indicate th a t the official regulations 
may restrict non-registered use of services.
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T he proportion of non-registered services in personal services is exceptionally 
high— with the exception of laundry services. The use of the services of hairdressers, 
beauticians, shoe repairers and tailors by the population is over 50 percent in term s 
of frequency. The proportion of tips, however, is negligible, and cannot even be 
found outside the categories of hairdressers and beauticians.
This indicates th a t where there is no receipt issued, from  the point of view 
of the custom er the tip is not separated from the rest of the am ount paid. This 
is especially true in the case of health services, the m ajority  of which are available 
free of charge due to  the provisions of the social security system .
The unofficial moneys given in exchange for health  care services were seen by 
the respondents not as tips bu t as gratuity  money for the service. Accordingly, in 90 
percent of the cases they report non-registered cash movements. This percentage 
was highest in the case of hospital care (96.9 percent), which am ounted to 95.8 
percent of the to ta l hospitalisation expenditures. An exception to the general trend 
is dental services, where registered paym ents account for one th ird  of the cases and 
only half of the costs of treatm en t go unregistered. This is an obvious sign of the 
fact th a t the m ajority  of dental services have been taken off the list of those health  
services which are free of charge.
According to  estim ates of the profession, tips in the health care services may 
am ount to  some 0.6 percent of the GDP, or HUF 13-30 Bn. No more than  about 
10-20 percent of these tips are sta ted  in the tax re tu rns.14
In some tw o-thirds of the cases the educational services were used w ithout 
asking for receipts. The prices of organised teaching/tra in ing  forms are far above 
the level th a t has developed in the non-registered m arket. This is indicated by the 
fact th a t about half of the expenditures fall into the non-registered category. The 
survey also revealed th a t, where a teaching m ethod does not require any special 
m aterial facilities (such as language teaching at home), the non-registered use of 
the service is far more extensive than  in cases where facilities are required, such as 
sports or use of computers.
T he survey did not cover financial services—e.g. banking, insurance— the 
frequency of which cannot be assessed using the questionnaire m ethod.
Macro-economic consequences
The d a ta  for each com m odity type obtained from the survey were scaled • 
up for a year’s period. However, before doing this the results were sum m ed up 
and weighted. The number of the sample was multiplied by the to ta l num ber of 
families. In this way the to ta l value of the assessed goods and services could be 
m acro-estim ated.
14 Nepszabadsag,  13th O ctober, 1995
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O ur estim ates of the black economy are prim arily aimed at establishing pro­
portions. T he actual development of the black economy can only be m onitored 
through repeated performance of empirical surveys of identical or very sim ilar m eth­
ods. I t is these surveys which can show the dynam ic of the changes of the propor­
tions of the  black economy in the various sectors of the economy. The d istortions 
of the results yielded by such repeated surveys (arising from the methodology of 
the survey) are identical. Therefore the results indicate changes w ith no significant 
distortions.
T he non-registered expenditures indicated by the survey include goods pur­
chased and sold fo r  the purpose of tax evasion, along with such services rendered 
fo r  payment o f gratuity money, tips and the whole of the turnover of the food sec­
tor. W ith  respect to  the last category, only a small proportion is seen as serving 
purposes of tax  evasion. This is because the obligation of agricultural producers to 
pay taxes and issue receipts is much narrower than  th a t of the rest of the actors of 
the economy.
In the m arket, the buyer occasionally receives a receipt, especially in units 
which operate  in m arkets as shops. Here, the range of the to ta l turnover was 
not assessed— i.e. car purchases, fuel purchases and, among services, residential 
construction and catering were not included in the questionnaire. The la tte r two 
item s would be very difficult to separate on the basis of the statistics. In the case 
of turnover included in the retail trade but not assessed, we assumed proportions 
sim ilar to those of the  assessed turnover. This has resulted in a slight d istortion of 
the final results.
The assessment of m anufactured articles does not cover the whole of purchases 
made. Q uestions were asked about m anufactured goods which have a higher than  
average proportion in the black economy. This has also resulted in some distortion 
of the results, bu t distortions in the opposite direction are also possible.
Using the proportions yielded by the survey we made an estim ate of the  non­
registered turnover not included in the assessed turnover. The basis of the estim ate 
is the assum ption th a t, as a result of the survey, we received relevant inform ation on 
the non-registered turnover of certain products. This inform ation also accounts for 
substan tia l sections of the black economy, and on the black use of certain services.
In order to calculate this, first the am ount of the 1995 turnover of the assessed 
com m odity groups had to be defined, within the to tal expenditures of households. 
This was calculated by projecting the 1995 turnover of retail trade at current prices, 
on the basis of the 1994 annual and the 1995 January  to November data . Also, we 
assumed th a t the to ta l range of the expenditures of households is better assessed 
by household sta tistics than  by a single questionnaire assessment. Therefore the 
struc tu re  of the registered sales turnover of the retail sector was calculated on the 
basis o f household statistics.
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Table 5
Estim ate of the assessed segments of the shadow economy, from  the aspect o f the
national economy
E xpend­ E stim ated E stim ated Breakdown E xpend­ Non-regis­
itu re registered non-reg­ of non-reg- itures, tered  tu rn ­
stru c tu re expend­ istered  ex­ istered  ex­ to ta l over as a  p e r­
of house­ itu re pend itu re penditures, HU F Bn centage of
holds HUF Bn HUF Bn by expendi­ th e  registered
percent tu re  group turnover
1 2 3 4 5(2+3) 6 (3 /2 )
Foodstuffs an d  ATC
net of catering 34.5 1.096 177 20.6 1.273 16.1
C loth ing item s 7.7 244 84 9.8 328 34.4
O th e r m anufactured
goods 29.0 920 256 29.8 1.176 27.8
R eta il tu rnover, to ta l 71.2 2.260 517 60.2 2.777 22.9
Services 15.5 492 341 39.8 833 69.3
T o ta l surveyed range 86.7 2.752 858 100.0 3.610 31.2
C atering 6.8 - - - -
R esidential construc­
tion  and  acquisition 6.5 - - - -
T o ta l 100.0 - - - -
Source: Household budget 1989-1991 (CSO 1993); R etail trade , catering  (CSO 1995/10); S ta tis ­
tical yearbook, 1994. (CSO 1995)
By breaking down the retail turnover (of the) main commodity groups in this 
way we developed the estim ated to tal values of non-registered turnover, using black 
m arket ratios. The same procedure was followed in the case of services.
In the  evaluation of the proportions it should not be forgotten th a t these are 
value ratios, which cover far larger volumes as a result of the lower prices prevailing 
in the  black m arket.
The estimated non-registered expenditures amount to 31.2 percent o f  the reg­
istered expenditures— i.e. shoppers spent about one-third of their respective total 
expenditures in the shadow economy in the assessed range of goods and services 
(compared to expenditure in the legitimate economy).
W ithin  the various main groups of expenditure the proportion of the non- 
registered turnover com pared to the registered turnover is between 17 percent and 
69 percent, and these figures show large differences. The survey revealed th a t in the 
case of food and ATC purchases, which account for the m ajority  of the expenditures 
of households, some 14 percent is non-registered, while over one-third of the  to tal 
“black expenditures” are on foods and ATC.
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Non-registered turnover is 34 percent and 27 percent of the m arkets of cloth­
ing item s and of miscellaneous industrial products, respectively; the shares of these 
groups are over 14 percent and 16 percent of the assessed non-registered turnover, 
respectively.
The proportion o f  non-registered expenditures compared to registered expen­
ditures is highest in the area o f  services (69 percent). Services are not linked to 
the movement of goods, therefore the possibility of tax  supervision is lim ited. As 
the share of services in to ta l expenditures is increasing—in line with world-wide 
trends—so too is there an increase in their weight within the shadow economy. 
T his trend is intensified by the fact th a t some of the formerly “free of charge” 
services in the Hungarian economy have been transferred into the range of services 
to  be paid for. According to  the survey, services account for about one-half of the 
to ta l assessed shadow economy.
T he shadow economy was already present in the Hungarian economy prior to 
the transform ation of the system. Indeed, even though its dimensions were smaller 
th an  those existing now, it may be said th a t under the conditions of a shortage 
economy, support came from the hidden economy. The la tter, in term s of its forms, 
differed from the existing one, as a m atter of course. A t th a t time it was not 
recognised th a t the hidden economy could be restricted by elim inating the causes, 
ra ther than  resorting to  adm inistrative means.
Along w ith the transform ation of the system, with the expansion of the m ar­
ket economy the dimensions of the hidden economy have also increased considerably. 
However, this is not prim arily a result of the market economy; w hat the m arket 
economy has done is to  provide new opportunities. The expansion o f the hidden 
economy is primarily a result of inflation and over-taxation. W ith the inflation of 
wages and other incomes (and the reduction of real purchasing power) the stra tu m  
of the society which can only ju s t make ends meet if it buys in the black m arket 
is increasing; over-taxation is a cause due to the fact th a t the high rates of VAT 
and personal income tax  make the gains of bypassing legal channels substan tia l and 
especially attractive.
Most of the G D P generated in the hidden economy is generated in the private 
sector. According to the already cited GKI study (calculations by Arvay and Vertes 
1994) th is proportion is almost 90 percent.
T he greatest part of the black economy is realised in m onetary processes. 
People are spending much more than  they earn, officially. This is also reflected by 
the generally acknowledged high proportion of non-registered turnover of the retail 
trade and services.
Legitim ate, illegitim ate and semi-legitimate activities are completely mixed 
up in the economy. They are inseparable in such a way th a t it is hard to  recognise 
the individual components. Although the choice of the m ethods selected and their 
characteristics may seem to be of an ad hoc nature, it is w ithout doubt im portan t
14 Acta Oeconomtca 4 1 9 9 6
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to  study  this segment of the real economy. This is w hat we have m ade an a ttem p t 
to  do.
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In Memóriám P r o fe s s o r  József B ogná r
The lifetime of Professor József Bognár stretched across one of the  m ost diffi­
cult and contraversial periods of H ungarian history. Born in 1917, in the last stage 
of the A ustro-H ungarian Monarchy, he grew up in the nationalist atm osphere of 
the 1920s and 1930s. As a student he joined the anti-nazi political groups and this 
brought him  into the movement of those people who actively fought for the demo­
cratic transform ation of Hungary before 1945. He was not merely a bystander or 
an analyst of events, but in many ways played and active role in influencing them: 
as the youngest mayor in the history of the Hungarian capital, as a m em ber of 
parliam ent for about 45 years, as a minister, as a deputy premier, as a university 
professor and as a scholar (who, until the very end of his life, rem ained an active 
researcher). Like many other well-known economists, József Bognár came to the 
field of economics from another field—from th a t of humanities; he moved to the 
academic world from the sphere of politics. He m aintained, however, his fundam en­
tally  political approach in economics, even after his decision in 1957 not to accept 
any high post in government. He understood better than many other Hungarian 
political figures or economists, th a t the role of external factors, in ternational po­
litical processes and global economic changes had a m ajor influence on Hungary. 
Therefore, in order to avoid complete and unilateral dependence, Hungary m ust 
understand  and form ulate clearly its national interests and goals, and always as­
sess its scope for manoeuvre in the complex web of the in ternational environm ent. 
As an econom ist, he was an open-minded pragm atist, who rem ained free from the 
traps of the  different economic and political dogmas. Bognár’s pragm atism  was 
based on his system  of values: first of all, humanism, democracy, a belief in hum an 
in terests and rationality. He was also a strong and devoted advocate of the interests 
of Hungary. He looked a t the different schools of thought from the perspective of 
their relevance, relations to  realities, and the soundness of their recom m endations 
for supporting  hum an interests. It is not easy to summarise the contribution which 
József Bognár made to the progress of economics. He firmly believed in the ne­
cessity of cooperation between the different scientific disciplines, and as a scholar, 
he introduced m ultidisciplinarity into his work. He probably did more than  any 
other H ungarian economist to show the complex interactions between political and 
economic processes, and internal and external factors in “real” , functioning sys­
tems. He explained and analysed the causes of the different socio-political conflicts 
which emerged in the process of changes related to  economic development. He also 
searched for ways and means to make such changes manageable. He revealed the 
p a tte rns of consumer behaviour in the system of central planning and he also in tro­
duced the idea th a t m arket research is indispensable, even in a centrally planned
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system . In his work —which in fact was the subject of his doctoral d issertation at 
the Academy of Sciences— Bognár emphasised th a t the system  of central planning 
and the scarcities created by it, may enforce certain consum ption patterns. How­
ever, in the final analysis, disregard (on the p art of planners) for the preferences 
of consumers and their deeply rooted habits is the main source, not only of the 
accum ulation of unsold goods, but also of popular dissatisfaction. As a political 
figure, scholar, and research m anager, he prom oted the opening of Hungary to  new 
ideas and diverse schools of thoughts in social sciences.
He s ta rted  teaching the “Economics of Internal Trade” at the Karl M arx Uni­
versity of Economics in 1951. A t th a t time he was a M inister of In ternal Trade. 
B ognár’s lectures introduced the critical analysis of H ungarian realities to the  me­
dia (which a t th a t time was dom inated by ideology and dogm atism ). I was one of 
the studen ts invited to  come and work with him  in carrying out em pirical surveys 
in the s ta te  trading companies. This was at th a t tim e a unique practice in the uni­
versity. As a m inister, he firmly (and in a few areas successfully) resisted pressures 
to  nationalise everything and he protected a number of small private ventures in 
services, and particularly  in catering.
W hile József Bognár was always interested in international relations and is­
sues, he had to  deal with them  directly and actively. W hen the m inistries of Internal 
and E xternal Trade merged he became responsible for both. As a m inister, he was 
a strong supporter of the ideas of, first, the Imre Nagy government in 1953. He 
was also a member of the second government of Imre Nagy, in 1956, during the 
H ungarian Revolution. After the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution, already as 
a full professor of the University of Economics, József Bognár became a member 
of the short lived C om m ittee on H ungarian Reform, chaired by the fam ous Hun­
garian economist, István Varga. Bognár firmly believed in the necessity and the 
feasibility of reforming the economic system. He was the co-founder of the Hun­
garian Economic Association, which was initiated mainly by the reform group of 
H ungarian economists. In the 1960s he was one of the initiators (and an active 
m em ber) of the group of those experts and politicians who elaborated the main 
ideas and program m es of the reform which introduced in 1968, under the nam e of 
the “New Economic M echanism” . He considered the reforms as instrum ents for 
the im provem ent of the living conditions in Hungary. He never agreed w ith those 
who dealt w ith issues concerning the reforms in isolation from  improvem ents in 
com petitiveness and the economic and technological perform ance of Hungary. He 
also understood— and in a way anticipated— the strong resistance to  the reforms 
by the Soviet Union, and also by some H ungarian politicians, yet he was convinced 
th a t the setbacks will be only tem porary.
In the early 1960s, the emergence of the “Third W orld” in the international 
system  directed the professional interests of József Bognár towards global develop­
m ent processes. He was probably the first person in the profession to understand 
the causes and the consequences of the similarities between the transform ation
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process in the developing and socialist countries. His first essay on the issues of 
developm ent and their possibilities and lim itations as a deliberate political and 
economic process, m ade him  known instantly  to  a num ber of im portan t leaders 
of the developing countries. In particular, he was im portan t to  those who were 
interested in the experiences of the socialist countries and in the  lessons which 
could be drawn from their successes and failures. One of those leaders, the African 
Kwame NK rum ah, invited Bognár to serve as an adviser and entrusted  him with 
the elaboration of the first five year plan for G hana. For this purpose Bognár 
brought together a small group of Hungarian economists, and the team , working 
with local experts, did a very good job. The plan became a long-term  strategic 
docum ent and it served as the foundation for the economic policies of a num ber 
of different regimes in G hana during the decades after 1963. The program m e’s 
recom m endations for self-sufficiency in food, the diversification of the economy in 
such a way th a t it would not need to give up the “cash-crops” of the country, the 
radical improvement of the educational system, and the better incentives for the 
farm ers are im portan t components of the policies even of the present government.
The experiences in G hana, and further work in Burm a, India, convinced and 
encouraged Bognár to “institutionalise” formally the research group which had 
dealt w ith the problems of the developing countries. This was not only based on 
his professional interests. He was convinced th a t the developing countries could 
become im portan t economic partners for Hungary and other countries. The Afro- 
Asian Research Centre of the H ungarian Academy of Sciences, established in the 
mid-1960s, became an internationally recognised institu tion on development issues, 
unique in its objectivity and rational approach in the former socialist countries.
In the late sixties, József Bognár became the President of the In stitu te  of 
C ultural Relations, a government agency dealing with the international cultural 
and scientific cooperation of Hungary, particularly with the W estern countries. In 
this capacity, he initiated the first fellowship exchange program m e with the United 
S tates, through the Ford Foundation, which facilitated the visits and studies of 
alm ost 300 Hungarian social scientists in the United States during the 1970s and 
1980s. A new form of international cooperation in social sciences, particularly  
in economies, and regular roundtable meetings between British and H ungarian, 
and U.S. and Hungarian scholars was also his initiative. This form of cooperation 
served as an example for other countries. The roundtables functioned for about 
two decades and involved alm ost 50 economists from both sides respectively.
Bognár was one of the first economists not only in Hungary, but also on the 
in ternational scene, who came to  the conclusion in the early 1970s th a t the oil price 
explosion was not ju s t a cyclical event, but it reflected m ajor, long-term  structu ra l 
changes in the world economy. He also understood th a t the changes required not 
only new policies in the field of energy, but also m ajor s truc tu ra l changes in the 
H ungarian economy and a much more profound knowledge about the in ternational 
environm ent of the country. Bognár’s initiative in helping to  establish the Hun­
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garian Council for the World Economy— a semi-governmental consultative body, 
w ith the participation  of leading government officials, government and academic 
experts— aimed to advise and influence the formation of the economic policy of the 
country. The establishm ent of the Institu te  for World Economics of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences in 1973, which was also his initiative, served as a background 
in stitu tion  for the Council. It also served as a new centre for non-partisan, objec­
tive research on issues vitally im portan t for Hungary: e.g. on the m ain trends in 
the world economy, the expected longer term  changes in the economy of H ungary’s 
m ain trad ing  partners, and the possible consequences of those changes for Hungary. 
He was the director of the institu te  for fifteen years.
During the 1980s he became the head of a group of economic advisers which 
was an im portan t and influential body for the support of the new reform efforts. 
After the systemic changes, he confined most of his work to  the In stitu te  and the 
Academy of Sciences. His most im portan t goal was to  help the adjustm ent of both 
the Academy and the Institu te  to the needs of the new era, and to save the valuable 
achievements of the intellectual life of Hungary. He m aintained special interests in 
the m ost im portan t global issues and he turned to study the problems of global food 
security. In this area he organised a small, interdisciplinary group for a research 
program m e ju s t before his death.
Professor B ognár’s m erits were recognised and honoured in Hungary, with 
his full m embership of the Academy, with S tate Prize and with an honorary doc­
toral degree from the B udapest University of Economics. He was also honoured 
internationally. In 1980 he was elected to  the membership of the Club of Rome; in 
1982 he becam e a member of the World Academy of A rt and Science; in 1983 the 
Social Prospect Academy honoured Professor Bognár’s achievements w ith m em ber­
ship. He was nom inated as a Special Fellow of UNITAR, and in 1985 he becam e a 
m em ber of the Council of the United Nations University.
W ith  the departure of Professor József Bognár Hungary has lost an ou ts tan d ­
ing scholar and a public figure of international im portance, and a great hum anist.
M. SIMAI
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B E K K E R , ZS.: Rendszerválság. Alkalmazko­
dási folyamatok a kelet-európai országokban 
1970-1990 között (System s in crisis. A d ap ta ­
tion  processes in E aste rn  E urope, 1970-1990). 
B udapest: A ula Kiadó. 1995. 309 p.
T h is book is a  highly valuable contri­
b u tio n  to  th e  em pirical research already done 
on ex-socialist countries. Drawing on a  very 
wide range  of facts, it com pares the  respec­
tive economic perform ances of four E ast E uro­
p ean  countries over a  period of 20 years. The 
aim  of th e  s tu d y  is to  throw light on th e  spec­
tacu lar collapse of the  socialist economic sys­
tem  an d  th e  problem s which have been inher­
ited  from  th a t  system . These problem s con­
tinue influence the  scope of our progress and 
th u s lim it ou r “freedom ” .
T he a u th o r has focused her a tten tio n  on 
th e  ability  (or inability) of the  form er social­
ist countries to  adap t; she analyses their in ap ti­
tu d e  for renew al w ith  th e  background of th e  cri­
sis an d  fall of the  socialist system . In fact, she 
is still vexed by the  problem  which m otivated 
h e r to  w rite  a  book 17 years ago (Növekedési 
utak, dinamikus pályák [Paths of growth, dy­
nam ic routes] B udapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi 
K önyvkiadó. 1978),—namely, w hat sort of eco­
nom ic stra tegy  m ay lead late-developing coun­
tries to  success. Research on th is topic sta rted  
in th e  mid-1980s, no do u b t influenced by the 
foreboding of an  inevitable fall; it tried  to  ex­
plore why th e  respective a ttem p ts  of social­
ist countries to  break ou t of th e ir plight were 
doom ed to failure. Such research m ay also of­
fer a n  answ er to the  obvious question of w hether 
i t  was w orth investing such an  am ount of en­
ergy in to  com parative research of the  social­
ist era. Yes, it definitely was. O ur only hope for 
progress is to  thoroughly analyze our past m is­
takes and  failures, to  get to  know th e  her­
itag e  we are  dragging ab o u t and  to  under­
s ta n d  w hat so rt of change in economic s t r a t ­
egy we need.
According to  B ekker's s ta rtin g  p o in t “rad ­
ical changes in th e  la te  80s h ad  been all b u t the 
end gam e of a  long-sim m ering process” . Re­
form s and  a tte m p ts  a t  ad ap ta tio n  were ap ­
plied as remedies for weak perform ance a n d  op­
erational troubles, Bekker says, b u t worsen­
ing perform ance and  shocks from  ou tside  led, by 
the  1980s, to  inoperability. B ased on these as­
sum ptions, th e  au th o r se ts ou t to  m easure and  
prove th e  worsening of perform ance an d  its  so­
cialist features in an  empirical, a n d  no t sim ­
ply theoretical way. Her exam ination  looks 
n o t so m uch in to  th e  m echanism  of th e  gu id­
ing and  operation  of p lanned  economies b u t 
ra th e r into their q u an tita tive  achievem ents and  
results from  the  grow th period  of th e  sixties un­
til the  collapse of th e  system . T his was th e  pe­
riod when it was m ostly  th e  ability  to  a d a p t 
to changes in the  world economy, to  glob­
alization and to  technical renewal th a t  de­
cided if a  given economy would lag fu rth er be­
hind or catch up.
W hile studying perform ances an d  th e ir 
factors, the  au th o r is in fact asking ab o u t 
the strategic o rien tation  of econom ic policy: 
is it growth or efficiency-oriented, is i t  closed 
or open? Reform  a tte m p ts  as well as eco­
nomic policy dilem m as were m ostly  re la ted  to  
ju s t  these questions an d  so were debates and  
fights am ong reform ers and  dogm atists: do we 
have, in  o rder to  prove th e  superiority  o f social­
ism, to speed up  th e  pace of grow th a t  any price 
or is i t  b e tte r  to  increase efficiency? Do we have 
to close in even m ore tightly  from  th e  cap ita l­
ist “enem y” and  tu rn  even m ore intensively to ­
wards the  Soviet U nion an d  o ther CM EA coun­
tries, o r do we open u p  to  th e  world econ­
omy? Various countries and  various periods 
produced different answ ers to  these questions 
although, the  Soviet U nion tried  h a rd  to  dom ­
inate  and coordinate th e  economic policies of 
the cam p.
The study  deals w ith the  ad ap ta tio n  re­
actions of four E aste rn  E uropean countries— 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and  H unga­
ry—and  collates them  w ith those of four in ­
dustrialized countries: A ustria , F in land , P o r­
tugal and  Spain. I t  lists four k inds o f reac­
tions to  outside influences: (1) draw ing on o u t­
side resources, (2) boosting  exports , (3) im port 
su b stitu tio n , (4) and  slowing grow th. It ex­
amines the  p a th  an d  characteristics of th e  eco­
nomic policies of the  various countries an d  pe­
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riods, as m easured  by  th e  above four reac­
tions.
T he a u th o r luckily combines and  ap ­
plies the  m ethods of two em inent H ungarian 
econom ists, no tably  the  tren d  concept by Fer­
enc Jánossy  and  Béla B alassa’s m ethod  of an ­
alyzing reactions to ou tside  shocks. A ccept­
ing Jánossy ’s evolution thesis in which the  s ta ­
bility  of long te rm  economic grow th comes 
from  th e  slow change of professional knowl­
edge, it m easures differences and  th e  particu lars 
of th e  a d ap ta tio n  process alongside the  trends of 
grow th. B alassa’s m ethod  breaks up  differences 
in d isparities m easured  against actual changes, 
a n d  the  prolongation  of the  progress of an  ear­
lier period  or o th er countries’ grow th accord­
ing to  answers given to  “w hat if”-sort of ques­
tions. Bekker com pares actual progress p a rtly  
w ith  the  tren d  of th e  given country  a t  un ­
changed conditions, an d  p a rtly  w ith the  de­
velopm ent achieved by o th er countries or re­
gions over th e  sam e period. It is a  well- 
known fact how difficult it is to carry  ou t an 
em pirical s tu d y  of efficiency in in ternational 
com parison. T herefore the  a u th o r has ap ­
proached the  problem  by using flexibility in­
dices: ra th e r th an  any absolu te m easure. This 
has enabled the  m easurem ent and  com pari­
son of changes in tim e and  space. T he re­
search exam ines the export and  im port flexibil­
ity  of th e  G D P as well as its  sensitivity to  ac­
cum ulation  a n d  consum ption  and , from  these, 
tries to  read  th e  underly ing  changes in  eco­
nom ic orien tation . T he analysis openly concen­
tra te s  on th e  real sphere, neglects financial p ro­
cesses (th is is obviously a  continuation  of t ra ­
d itional p lann ing  approaches) and  does n o t in­
clude th e  im pact of non-econom ical changes— 
i.e., political, m ilitary, diplom atic. However, 
these la t te r  factors have, in th e  past, to no small 
ex ten t influenced economic policies as well as 
a d ap ta tio n  processes.
Besides in troducing  m ethods and  the  
1960s as p o in ts  of d ep artu re , the  backbone 
of th e  research comprises an  analysis of the  
ex ternal economy. Incidentally, the  under­
stan d in g  of com plex concepts, notions, rela­
tions and  m easurem ent m ethods m ade m ore dif­
ficult by the  fact th a t  the  au th o r m entions, bu t 
does no t explain, them  w ithin the  tex t. (Defi­
n itions w ithou t explanations and  equations rep­
resenting  correlations can be found in an  annex
only.) It would have been b e tte r  to  b ring  for­
m ulas and explanations together. T here  is an ­
o th er serious deficiency th a t m ay perplex  the  
reader th roughou t the  book: n e ither m eth ­
ods and  research them es nor findings a re  po­
sitioned w ith in  th e  lite ra tu re . We do no t get 
to  know if th is or th a t  is th e  a u th o r’s op in­
ion, w ith whom  she is arguing or where he r con­
clusions differ from  those of others.
T he good points: Bekker p resen ts in a  
novel and  expressive way th e  losses in  th e  term s 
of trad e  suffered by th e  countries u n d e r review 
and  caused by global economic changes follow­
ing the 1973 oil shock. We no t only learn  how 
w rong an d  m isleading th e  official line of th e  so­
cialist countries was—i.e., th a t  they  could fend 
off the  negative im pacts of the  price explosion— 
b u t we also get to  know th a t ,  in  fact, th ey  h a d  
to  book even greater an d  m ore prolonged losses 
th an  m arket economies, especially th e  m ore a d ­
vanced ones. It is m entioned th a t  th is was 
p a rtly  due to  th e  so-called B ucharest p ric­
ing principle of the  CM EA (by which coun­
tries of the  region form ed their export prices 
based on a  five-year average of world m ar­
ket prices), b u t we are  no t to ld  w hat th e  rea­
soning behind th is principle was. It is tru e  
th a t  the  price explosion was, a t  first, n o t so 
devastating; however, i t  weakened the  pres­
sure to  a d ap t to  i t  an d  consequently i t  be­
cam e one of the  m ain  causes of m uch heav­
ier cum ulated  losses th a n  in industria lized  coun­
tries. T he la t te r  were, in a  relatively sh o rt 
tim e, able to  com pensate for their losses caused 
by the  steep  rise of im p o rted  raw  m ate ri­
als by raising their export prices for processed 
goods. Bekker reckons th a t  th is d id  n o t h a p ­
pen in socialist countries, a lthough  th e ir  losses 
cam e no t so m uch from  th e ir  tra d e  w ith  m ar­
ket economies th an  from  w ith in  th e  CM EA. 
At th is po in t, th e  a u th o r  should  have dealt 
w ith th e  in te rnational d isp u te  on  th e  ques­
tions of for whom, an d  how m uch price  p ro ­
p ortions w ith in  th e  CM EA were favourable.
An ind ispu tab le  m erit o f th e  s tu d y  is 
th a t it refutes the  widely held opinion which be­
lieves th a t  the  losses were caused by th e  price 
explosion alone. Instead , it em phasizes the  
d rop  in th e  volume of global trade. T h is is all 
the  m ore im p o rtan t since th is debate  on eco­
nom ic policy dates back a  long way: i.e. is 
it b e tte r  to  overcome difficulties by grow th,
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acceleration, im proved efficiency or perhaps 
by slow-down? M ost illum inating is th e  au­
th o r’s claim  th a t  over the  two ten-year pe­
riods betw een 1970 an d  1990 the H ungarian 
econom y was afflicted by two external trade 
shocks of sim ilar m agnitude: the  price shock 
in th e  1970s was bigger, while in the 1980s 
a  slum p in dem and h ad  a  more serious im­
p ac t. I t  m ust be noted th a t  the  notion of “ex­
tern a l trad e  shock” is som ewhat m isleading. It 
seems as if countries were to ta lly  unable to in ­
fluence th e ir  foreign trad e  prices and m ar­
ket share, respectively. Yet th is was certainly 
no t so: there  is only a  relatively small p ro­
p o rtio n  of deals in which prices are unchange­
able an d  given and  where the  bargaining power 
of th e  parties plays no role ( th a t is, one or 
th e  o ther is a  “price tak er” ). Similarly, it de­
pends largely on in ternal factors such as, for in ­
stance, th e  way in  which changes in  the  vol­
um e of exports are re la ted  to changes in ex te r­
nal dem and—i.e. if th e  m arket share of a  given 
coun try  would grow or shrink.
A fter trea tin g  external shocks, Zsuzsa 
Bekker tu rn s to  the  aforem entioned four kinds 
of a d ap ta tio n  reactions to  see com binations 
characte ris tic  of a  given co u n try ’s economic pol­
icy in various periods. She correctly sta tes th a t 
in  itself, draw ing in external resources is nei­
th e r  right nor wrong; the issues are: w hat are 
loans sp en t on, and  how far does their invest­
m ent serve a  change of stru c tu re  and com pet­
itiveness? In o th er words, how far does it cre­
a te  th e  conditions for sm ooth repaym ent? How­
ever, she fails to stress th a t  indebtedness in 
H ungary an d  elsewhere (e.g. in Poland or in 
m any  developing countries) cannot be sim­
ply b lam ed on an  inadequate  economic pol­
icy. T he worldwide and  extrem ely serious deb t 
crisis cannot be explained from  the dem and 
side only. T he huge supply of cheap loans cre­
a te d  by th e  oil shock was ju s t  as responsi­
ble for th e  accum ulation of practically  non- 
re tu rn ab le  loans. In an  economic sense, it is ob­
vious th a t  th e  fau lt for bad  investm ents lies 
b o th  w ith d eb to r and  creditor. This is tru e  even 
when a loan  is raised by governments or cen­
tra l banks (who are m uch less likely to re­
p o rt  bankrup tcy  th an  private  enterprises are).
B ekker’s com parative study  shows th a t 
in th e  1970s B ulgaria and  Poland drew on m uch 
h igher levels of external resources th an  H un­
gary did, an d  by the  1980s th is process tu rned  
into an  outflow of resources.
There is an  in te resting  dev ia tion  in  the  
slowing down of grow th betw een p lanned  and  
m arket economies. T he la tte r  im m ediately  re­
acted  to  the  oil shock by slowing down grow th, 
curbing im ports and  in troducing energy au s­
terity  m easures; whereas, som ew hat paradoxi­
cally, E astern  E uropean countries experienced 
a six-year long boom. In o th er words, th e ir a n ­
swer to  d ram atic  changes in the  global econ­
omy was acceleration instead of slowing down 
and  th is n a tu ra lly  resulted  in increases in their 
im port and  trad e  deficits.
B ekker’s m ethod  becom es m ost en ligh t­
ening when she exam ines the  four reactions to ­
gether. In th is way she is able to  m easure how 
the ad ap ta tio n  reaction  to external shocks was 
d istribu ted  am ong the  various econom ic pol­
icy opportunities. It tu rns ou t th a t  in th e  H un­
gary of the  1970s b o th  reactions were posi­
tive; export grow th an d  im port su b stitu tio n  
dom inated and the  drawing in of ex ternal re­
sources and  slowing down of grow th played, re­
spectively, sm aller roles. On th e  o th e r hand , 
the  dom inant reaction  of the  80s was th e  slow­
ing down of grow th, followed by export expan­
sion and im port su b stitu tio n ; th e  draw ing in 
of external resources was replaced by an  o u t­
flow.
T he parallel survey of th e  four p lanned 
economy countries shows clear regularities. Bek­
ker calls the  draw ing in of ex ternal resources 
and the slowing down of growth “passive re­
actions" and points ou t th a t they  moved in 
a  con trary  direction with tim e; the  aforem en­
tioned regional boom  of th e  1970s was accom­
panied in  all four countries by trad e  deficits 
and  indebtedness. This, however, lasted  no 
longer th an  th e  la te  1970s when th ey  were 
forced to switch over to  a  balance restoring  pol­
icy. T his policy, w ithou t requiring s tru c tu ra l 
changes was possible by slowing down grow th 
only. T he policy of export expansion and 
im port su b stitu tio n — which Bekker calls “ac­
tive reac tion"—could no t really  becom e dom ­
inan t. In respective cases of the  four W est­
ern countries in the  com parison, the  draw ­
ing in of resources was com bined w ith ex­
p o rt growth: th a t  is, w ith  a  change of s tru c ­
tu re . T his was one of the  engines of th e ir  la te r  
success.
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Bekker con trasts th e  policies of export 
expansion an d  im port su b stitu tio n  as synonym s 
of open ing  and  closing up. T his is often, b u t no t 
alw ays, true: a  policy to  develop com petitive 
exp o rt industries au tom atically  resu lts in im­
p o rt su b stitu tio n . T his is because new an d  com­
pe titiv e  export p roducts m ay a t the  sam e tim e 
replace im ports: developing countries w ith suc­
cessful industries are a  proof of th is fact.
W ith  reg ard  to  th e  ties betw een E ast­
e rn  an d  W estern countries, the  vehicles of a d ap ­
ta tio n  were different in all socialist countries, 
b u t  th e  four under review m ay be grouped 
as this: Czechoslovakia and  B ulgaria opened 
to th e  E ast and  closed to  th e  W est in the 
70s; th u s they  tu rned  to  look for outside re­
sources, too, to  the  E a s t . Poland and  Hun­
gary, on th e ir  p a rt, drew in resources from 
th e  W est an d  exported  a sizable am ount of 
capita], in the  form of investm ent con tribu ­
tion , to  th e  Soviet Union. T hey were confi­
den t th a t  growing raw  m ateria l im ports from 
th e  E ast an d  an  opening tow ards the  West 
m igh t considerably increase th e ir export pos­
sibilities (w hich would help  to  lower th e ir  re­
spective tra d e  deficits). Yet ju s t  th e  oppo­
site  happened: due to  soaring Soviet dem and— 
caused  by a  change in th e  term s of trad e— 
an d  to  th e  recession in  th e  W est, the  So­
viet U nion v irtually  drained off all their ex­
p o rts . A t th e  sam e tim e, opening to the 
W est resu lted  in  exports containing m ore and  
m ore W estern p a rts , and  th is again  widened 
th e  deficit of trad e  done w ith W estern coun­
tries.
Of th e  p roduction  factors, Bekker first 
exam ines th e  characteristics of labour m anage­
m en t. She points ou t th a t th e  im plem enta­
tion  of full em ploym ent was actually  a  specific 
feature  of the  socialist system , no t only in the 
sense th a t  the  level of em ploym ent was higher, 
bu t m ainly in th a t the  proportions of employ­
m en t were modified by the  extensively expand­
ing socialist sector. Beside apparen tly  full 
and  stab le  em ploym ent, th e  change in p roduc­
tiv ity  in  fact becam e unre la ted  to  the  work­
force since th is was a  m ore or less constan t fig­
ure; therefore, th e  apparen t change in produc­
tiv ity  becam e dependent on changes in p roduc­
tio n  tendencies. T his becam e a  m ost decep­
tive phenom enon: the  boom  afte r the  mid-1970s 
seem ed to b ring  ab o u t grow th in p roductiv ity—
i.e. it suggested th a t th e  economy was progress­
ing along an  intensive pa th . However, th e  p ro ­
duction  tendencies of the  E aste rn  E uropean  
countries broke in the  la te  1970s: it was then  
th a t  the  illusion of im proved p ro d u c tiv ity  van­
ished and  it becam e clear th a t  there  h ad  been 
no intensive phase a t all.
C om parison w ith th e  developm ent of in­
dustrialized  countries clearly shows th e  dif­
ferences: there, changes in  tendencies were
followed by adap ta tio n s in em ploym ent poli­
cies, and it was n o t the  workforce b u t  th e  
tren d  of p roductiv ity  which was stable. Look­
ing a t the  long-term  tendencies of p roductiv ­
ity, we see th a t the  indices of the  four W est­
ern countries are usually  b e tte r  th an  those 
of their E astern  E uropean  co u n terparts. At 
this point it m ust be no ted  th a t Bekker deals 
w ith the  p roductiv ity  of work alone; she has 
no t dealt w ith the  p roductiv ity  of th e  o th er 
factors of population . Moreover, no th ing  is 
said abou t th e  fact th a t ,  when th e  num ber 
of those employed does no t follow changes in 
p roduction, th en  ac tual em ploym ent— th a t  is, 
inter-com pany unem ploym ent and  th e  in ten ­
sity  of work, respectively— should  change. A ny­
one who ever visited a  factory  du ring  the  pe­
riod  of s ta te  socialism  knows this.
As there  are no  reliable an d  com para­
ble d a ta  on cap ita l stock, th e  au th o r stud ies th is 
through th e  developm ent of investm ents. As 
a  consequence of the  grow th-oriented econom ic 
policy of socialist countries they  h a d  a  re la ­
tively h igh  ra te  of accum ulation; policy-m akers 
and m anagers alike were perm anen tly  try ing  
to raise the  volume of investm ents. By keep­
ing the  price of cap ital goods artificially  low 
and  channelling investm ents into heavy indus­
try  and new projects, they  d is to rted  th e  s tru c ­
tu re  of capital and  th is inevitably  led to  a  slow­
down in grow th. Bekker indicates th a t  th e  ac­
cum ulation ra tes of E astern  E uropean  coun­
tries were h igher th an  in the  industria lized , and  
even th an  in the  developing countries. How­
ever, she fails to point ou t th a t, given th a t  this 
went on for decades, it was senseless to speak 
of a  shortage of cap ital (as our econom ists did) 
since it was in  fact a  waste, a n d  n o t a  sh o rt­
age, of capital th a t  characterized  socialist m an ­
agem ent .
In analyzing the data on net fixed cap­
ital accumulation in Eastern European coun­
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tries one sees no sign of a  switch-over to the so- 
called intensive phase, i.e. to an im provem ent in 
th e  use of capital. From the  late  1960s onwards 
investm ents rose and th is tendency was still evi­
den t in the  la te  1970s. T he a tte m p t to step-over 
th e  extensive phase (when the  drying up  of re­
sources an d  th e  slum p in revenues was already 
felt) urged policym akers to drive up  the  volumes 
of accum ulation  even m ore forcibly instead  of 
im proving th e  quality  an d  u tiliza tion  of invest­
m en ts. In  sp ite  of considerable efforts, the  for­
m ation  of fixed capital was, in the  long run , 
fa ste r in the  four p lanned economies un d er su r­
vey th a n  in E aste rn  Europe in general be­
cause, as B ekker writes,: “... m anagem ent try ­
ing to  avoid squandering resulted in  quicker 
cap ita l form ation  accom panied by a  lower ac­
cum ulation  r a te ” .
In  analyzing th e  accum ulation cycles of 
the  four E as te rn  E u ropean  countries, the au ­
th o r takes an  original p o in t of view in the  de­
b a te  on  th e  causes of the  cyclic quality  of 
p lanned economies. W ithou t arguing with 
those researchers who believe th a t  the reason for 
the  cycles was the  indigenous bargaining pro­
cess (B auer) o r the cam paigns (Soos) of so­
cialist econom ic m anagem ent, or with those 
who a ttr ib u te  it to inep t regulation (Brody, 
Janossy) o r to  political cycles of m anagem ent 
(U ngvarszki), Bekker offers a  fresh explanation. 
In  com paring the  ac tual process of accum ula­
tion  to the  respective accum ulation trends of 
th e  ind iv idual countries, she finds a  large degree 
of jo in t m ovem ent an d  sizeable swings in the  be­
hav iour of all four E aste rn  E uropean countries. 
She a ttr ib u te s  th e  sudden shift to be la ted  eco­
nom ic po litica l reactions; these occurred when 
th e  loss of balance dem anded im m ediate in ter­
ventions. Im balances were of course induced 
by th e  n a tu re  of the  system  b u t, as Bekker 
w rites, “a  dom inantly  doctrinaire  economic pol­
icy of a  clum sy an d  tardy  system ” could h an ­
dle these “in leaps and  bounds only” .
W ith in  the  analysis of the factors of final 
dem and, the  developm ent of consum ption plays 
a  p ivo ta l role. T he au th o r p o in ts ou t th a t ideol­
ogists declared the  im provem ent of living condi­
tions to be an  u ltim ate  goal; still, whenever they 
had to choose between consum ption and in­
vestm ent, they  invariably opted for the  la t­
ter. She noticed  the  changes of the  1970s bu t 
failed to  m ention  th a t  they  were to no sm all ex­
ten t triggered by the  1956 revolution an d  its 
after-effects. Fear of explosive po p u lar discon­
tent d icta ted  th a t personal consum ption  m ust 
no t dwindle bu t should slowly an d  steadily 
grow. Bekker correctly separates th e  pop u ­
la tio n ’s consum ption from  th e  so-called “col­
lective” one th a t  included and, as such, grew 
a t all tim es quicker them consum ption in gen­
eral. Therefore, there  is m ore to  i t  th a n  a  sim ­
ple conflict betw een investm ent and  consum p­
tion. W antonly generated  investm ent an d  con­
sum ption  induced by pow er an d  political con­
sideration  were here opposed to  consum ption  sis 
defined by actual social needs.
W hile, in  general, consum ption  is a  s ta ­
bilizing factor, accum ulation  is highly sensitive 
to  boom  an d  bust. No o th e r d a ta  is m ore in ­
form ative on the  downward tendency or “col­
lective collapse” of the  eighties, as th e  a u ­
th o r cedis it, th an  the  rap id  fall in th e  vol­
um e of accum ulation in all E as te rn  E uropean  
countries. T he consum ption flexibility of the  
G D P had been system atically  lower, an d  th a t 
of the accum ulation higher, in E astern  E u­
ropean countries th a n  in industria lized  coun­
tries. In o th er words, consum ption in th e  E ast 
was only to the  fru its of grow th. In say­
ing th is the  au th o r provides a  definite a n ­
swer to the  charge—a  sm all ex tent based on of­
ten  c ited  “from  above” even now— th a t  th e  
cause of the  difficulties was our “excessive” con­
sum ption: “... if for th e  purpose of qualifica­
tion we use the share from  un it economic p ro d ­
uct as the  po in t of departu re, ... th en  th e  de­
cisive factor is no t so m uch excessive con­
sum ption b u t excessive accum ulation th a t  a c tu ­
ally ... m asks inefficient and  unreasonable u ti­
lization” .
T he last chap ter of B ekker’s s tu d y  is en­
titled  “A t the  threshold of changing th e  sys­
tem ” . This is a  sum m ary of the  a u th o r’s 
views on fu ture  developm ent tendencies. Look­
ing back on th e  p as t decades experienced by 
the E astern  E uropean countries, she s ta te s  
th a t they  failed to  reach their m uch-heralded 
goal: th a t is, to catch up  with th e  industria l­
ized world; instead they found them selves in a  
m arginal position. The gap between them  and 
the  W estern European countries kept on w iden­
ing a fte r the Second W orld W ar. She warns, 
based on a  widely held view, th a t  according to 
Janossy ’s concept of stab le  developm ent, eco-
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noraic g row th accelerates in  th e  “re sto ratio n ” 
period  “au tom atically” (following a  set-back). 
However, in o rder to  achieve th is  it is neces­
sary  to  intensify investm ents.
Bekker has carried ou t a  m uch deeper 
and  thorough  analysis of facts on the long­
te rm  developm ent of E aste rn  E uropean  coun­
tries th a n  anyone before her. She has focused 
he r a tte n tio n  on econom ic policy and  strategic 
decisions in stead  of th e  m echanism s of decision­
m aking, guiding and im plem entation (as m ost 
of th e  o th e r reform  lite ra tu re  tends to  do). Hers 
is a  pioneering work, yet th is is ju s t  why the  
read e r h as a  certa in  feeling of want: exam in­
ing m acro-relations only one finds no answ er to 
th e  question  of why th e  efficiency of th e  eco­
nom ic activ ities was so low. W hat in terests— 
n o t only th a t  of economic policy b u t corpo­
ra te  a n d  trad e  un ion in terests as well—were in 
play when grow th orien tation  regularly  over­
ru led  efficiency orien tation , and protectionism  
overruled openness. Also we get no explana­
tio n  as to  how, in  sp ite  of several defeats, re­
form  conceptions calling for efficiency an d  open­
ness could revive over an d  over again. T h is is 
because B ekker’s research has in tentionally  ex­
cluded th e  m echanism s of econom ics a n d  the  en­
forcem ent o f the  in te rests of institu tions. How­
ever, i t  involves the  risk of the reader th in k ­
ing th a t  econom ic policy decisions were born 
of ra tio n a lity /irra tio n a lity  and not, as was the 
case, of conflicting in terests.
Sim ilarly d ispu tab le  is Bekker's s ta te ­
m en t th a t  th e  system ic change in the  social­
is t countries resu lted  from  th e ir  economic in­
ab ility  to  a d a p t an d  operate; however, this 
could have happened  earlier if th e  W est had  no t 
h ad  an  in te res t in m ain tain ing  economic rela­
tionships and  thus prevented  a spectacu lar col­
lapse tak ing  place. T here  a re  several reasons be­
h ind  th e  collapse, like th e  spreading of discon­
ten t, th e  weakening of suppression, and  the 
fact th a t  som e groups recognized th e ir  in te r­
ests in  a  sw itch-over to  m arket economy.
A deficiency of th e  study, following partly  
from  th e  m eth o d  applied and  p a rtly  perhaps 
from  th e  a u th o r’s a ttitu d e , is th a t  her an al­
ysis of th e  economic stra teg y  of socialist sys­
tem s does n o t reveal th a t  th e  socialist coun­
tries were in fact anti-dem ocratic  and to ta li­
tarian . T hey  were bu ilt on political oppres­
sion where th e  needs of th e  m ilitary, th e  po­
lice and  th e  secret service were always given 
priority. Speaking of consum ption , th e  au ­
th o r does m ention  th a t  th e  collective consum p­
tion  included war costs, b u t she fails to  p o in t 
ou t th a t  a  sizeable p a rt of accum ulation  also 
served the  war industry , and  th e  grow th gener­
a ted  by it included w ar m aterials.
The four E aste rn  E uropean  countries se­
lected by the  au th o r represent ra th e r  well the  
region's problem s, the  n a tu re  of socialist eco­
nomic m anagem ent an d  the  differences betw een 
socialist countries and  the  developed in d u stri­
alized countries. I t  is exactly  these  differ­
ences th a t  would have deserved m ore a tte n ­
tion . Czechoslovakia an d  B ulgaria  did n o t ru n  
into d eb t and , a lthough  R om ania  h ad  done so 
earlier, it recovered in th e  1980s (a lbe it w ith  a  
heavy price for it le t its  consum ption  slide). Yu­
goslavia’s case, too, should have been presented: 
here, dependence on th e  Soviet U nion h a d  been 
much weaker an d  th e  m arket m uch stronger, re­
spectively, and  still they  experienced sim ilar dif­
ficulties as th e  others w ith ad ap ta tio n .
Bekker should have been much more crit­
ical with the measurement and measurabil­
ity of GDP and national income—that is, their 
importance—because most of her research has 
been based precisely on these factors. She does 
not mention, for instance, Brody’s well-founded 
doubts in this respect and makes no attempt 
to examine by estimate of error how far the dis­
tortion of measurement might affect her analyt­
ical results.
W hen looking in to  th e  prob lem atics of 
ad ap ta tio n , it is a  serious m istake to  deal 
w ith changes in price p roportions an d  dem and 
only and  to d isregard th e  shock caused by 
changes in in te rest ra tes  to  countries already 
in deb t in th e  early  1980s. T he a u th o r a d ­
m its th a t she d id  no t research th e  effect of 
changes in real in te rest ra tes, a lthough  her cal­
culations could have been rounded off by these. 
T he tru th  is th a t  the  sudden  grow th of in d eb t­
edness in th e  early  1980s was in a  large m ea­
sure due to  th e  rise in  in te rn a tio n a l in te r­
est ra tes  and  th is led  to th e  w ithdraw al of a  con­
siderable volume of resources.
T he a u th o r  deals w ith th e  1973 oil shock 
b u t hardly ever m entions th a t  a fte r 1985, oil 
prices m easured a t real values fell to pre-1973
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levels; th is was one of the  m ain causes be­
h ind  th e  set-back of th e  Soviet economy and 
m ost p robab ly  behind its collapse by th e  1980s.
All in all, Bekker seeks an  answer to the 
question: do E aste rn  E uropean  countries stand  
a  chance of breaking ou t and  speeding up  de­
velopm ent, an d  thus dim inishing th e ir time- 
lag  vis a vis th e  developed countries? Her find­
ings convincingly show th a t  th e  past strongly 
lim its the  possibilities of progress. Her a t t i ­
tud e , even if  th is  is no t evident from  the study, 
hsis m uch in com m on with the  widespread th e ­
ory an d  analysis of “p a th  dependency” . She 
righteously warns th a t,  by continuing on the 
p a th  of p as t decades, we m ight easily get 
a  quasi-m arket economy an d  this could con­
serve o u r m arg inal position. Yet it also follows 
from  th e  s tu d y  th a t th e  p a th  was wrong and led 
to  failure because leaders h ad  for decades re­
p ea ted ly  chosen the  worse solution: growth ori­
e n ta tio n  in stead  of efficiency, closing-up and 
CM EA in teg ration  instead  of openness, protec­
tionism  an d  conservation of a  wrong and  obso­
lete  in d u stry  s tru c tu re  instead  of export expan­
sion a n d  restru ctu rin g .
We m ay debate  as to  w hether it would 
have been possible to op t for another, be t­
te r  way under Soviet dom inance and Com m u­
n ist p a rty  rule. Now we do have th a t op p o rtu ­
nity. Yet it is still no t evident if the  dem ocratic 
governm ents can and  w ant to take it. T here  are 
still m any  who argue for the  priority  of growth, 
who, in s tead  of prom oting exports, want to  
raise custom s tariffs (and  surcharges); power­
ful lobbies clam our for m ore subsidies for the 
m ilita ry  in d u stry  and secret services, and es- 
pecially for the  p ro tec tion  of obsolete indus­
tria l an d  agricultura l struc tu res. Everywhere 
th ere  is a  s trong  resistance to much-needed 
changes b u t no doubt there is also a  p o ten ­
tia l for renewal. So, a fte r reading B ekker’s anal­
ysis we can  certainly say there  is hope. Let us 
n o t forsake th a t  hope.
A. NAGY
B A LC ER O W IC Z, L.: Socialism, capitalism,
transformation.  B udapest-L ondon-N ew  York: 
E aste rn -E uropean  University. 1995. 377 p.
T here are few who, before reaching the  
age of fifty, m ay say th a t  they  have reached the  
m ost th a t can  be reached. For researchers hav­
ing ventured into economic policy i t  is especially 
difficult to set the  m axim um. T his is why this 
question has engaged the  a tten tio n  of one of the 
new schools of economics. T he school nam ed 
“political economics” — which sounds a  b it pe r­
verted for H ungarian ears— attem p ts  to de­
scribe w ith dynam ic m athem atical m odels how 
a  situation  can be achieved in which theo re ti­
cally desirable economic policy trends continue 
to prevail a fte r and  in sp ite  of changes of gov­
ernm ent. It is when th is is fulfilled—under 
quite  complex conditions— th a t th e  theo ry  con­
siders the  economic policy successful.
In our region th is theoretical require­
m ent is an illusion for num erous reasons, in ­
cluding the  gap betw een the  po litica l class and 
th e  profession of economic science. Still there  
is someone who, according to  his own adm is­
sion (p. 343), unexpectedly reached th e  axis 
of decision-making, b u ilt up  a  m odel concept 
in a  few weeks under chaotic circum stances, 
and then  saw his concept come tru e . M ore­
over, this no t only h appened  during th e  two 
years when he him self could direct the  p ro­
cesses which is no t negligible in  itself. In 
fact, the  verification cam e when two govern­
m ents who rejected th is m odel sharply (first 
the national populist governm ent of Olszewski 
and  then  the  post-com m unist coalition) p ro ­
ceeded along the  lines set ou t by Balcerowicz. 
Moreover, in his cam paign, P residen t Kwas­
niewski took good care to  p u t  non-econom ic is­
sues and style to th e  fore, repeated ly  tak ­
ing an o a th  to continue with the  reform  trend . 
W hile in 1989, seven years ago, Poland was 
an insolvent, stagnating  country  with runaway 
hyper-inflation, today, for the  fifth year ru n ­
ning Poland is the  fastest developing country 
in Europe, its currency is convertible, its  ba l­
ance of paym ents are in  o rder an d  the  possibility 
of joining the  E uro-A tlantic  s tru c tu res exists. 
T he price of th is transition  did certain ly  n o t ex­
ceed th a t of th e  1929-33 world crisis—in re­
spect of the  recession—and  it has been th e  low­
est and shortest am ong all the  countries in t ra n ­
sition. T he 8 -9  percent of th e  G D P has re­
m ained below th e  18 percent in Chile, 16 pe r­
cent in Peru  or 12 percent in A rgentine from 
am ong the recessions experienced during  the  pe-
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riod of 1960-90 (p. 327); we m ay also add  the 
20 percent in H ungary or the  34 percent in R us­
sia. In  1995 the  inflation in  Poland was a t  the  
sam e level as in  Hungary. USD 1.3 billion work­
ing cap ita l flew in to  Po land  in  1994 an d  USD 
1.6 billion in 1995 and  th e  country  could also re­
tu rn  to  th e  in te rnational bond m arkets. In 
sh o rt: th e  m y th  of “cack-handed Polish”—
carefully bu ilt first by th e  K ádár governm ent, 
th en  by the  A ntall governm ent—has become ill- 
founded, an d  those who read  through th is vol­
um e (published a t  the  end of last year) can  ob­
ta in  an  insight in to  th e  though ts of th e  spiri­
tu a l fa th e r of th is change, which is also u n ri­
valled internationally .
T he title  of th e  book is an  unm asked ref­
erence to  th e  m ajo r work of Joseph  Schum­
p e te r, th e  theoretician  of one of the  g reat­
est effects of dem ocratic  socialism , where he a r ­
gued in favour of the  com patibility  of the 
m arket b u ilt on ventures and  socialism. We 
m ay say th a t  Balcerowicz— having th e  experi­
ences of an  intellectual brought up  in th e  So­
viet em pire—has dedicated  his book to  formu­
la tin g  th e  con trary  thesis.
T h is book is no t a  m onograph, b u t a  col­
lection of lectures an d  articles w ritten  in dif­
ferent periods for different audiences. In spite 
of th e  im plied overlaps th is work has an  in te r­
na l logic. P a r t  one—chapters 2 to  7— includes 
works produced  in 1988-89. In add ition  to  re­
jec tin g  socialism  it  also explicitly form ulates 
th e  necessity for an  open break  w ith the  con­
cep t of th e  th ird  way, i.e. dem ocratic  social­
ism. It is also from  these works th a t the  au ­
th o r ’s definite aversion to g radual changes can 
be deducted . On the  basis of the  Polish expe­
riences, th is is m ore th an  understandable  (al­
though  theoretically  th is also leads to con­
trad ic tions). T he second p a r t,  th a t is chap­
ters 9 to 13, contains w ritings produced be­
tween 1993-95. W ith  the  end of th e  reces­
sion im plied by the  resu lts of the  transform a­
tion , these e laborate  on the  general connec­
tions of th e  economic policy which has tran s­
form ed the  system  and  which can be enforced 
in te rnationally . Finally, the th ird  p a r t,  con­
sisting  of chap ters 14 to  17, includes s tu d ­
ies on Poland  which have been prepared  a t  var­
ious tim es, am ong them  a  closing chap ter on 
a  m ore personal note. T he genre of the  book 
is applied  in stitu tio n a l economics. T he la t­
te r  tries to bridge the  gap betw een th e  m ain 
s tream  of economics which is tu rn ing  in to  m a th ­
em atical abstraction , m ore trad itio n a l econom ic 
schools, and also the  practice of economic pol­
icy.
From  th e  first chap ter, w hich outlines 
th e  fram ew ork of analysis, it is clear th a t  Bal­
cerowicz can n o t be ranked  am ong the  ord inary  
au tho rs of neo-classic orthodoxy. T his is be­
cause his in terest focuses m ainly upon  th e  in ­
stitu tio n s discarded by th e  m ainstream  of eco­
nom ic policy an d  considers it im p o rtan t to  en­
force th e  principles of trad itio n a l m ethodol­
ogy, even w ith in  th e  fram e of verbal argum en­
tation . His approach is in terd isc ip linary  for it 
is an economic analysis enriched w ith th e  in­
clusion of h istorical, social, cu ltu ral and  psy­
chological features. It is in order to  avoid fre­
quent abuses incurred  due to  th is  w ider ap ­
proach b u t which he considers necessary in o r­
der to em pirically verify the  prevalence of the  
said characteristics (p. 12) and  include them  in 
the  general picture. His thesis on th e  m axim um  
speed of in stitu tio n a l changes (p. 10) is a  logi­
cal consequence of th is approach, an d  it is de­
ducted  from  the restric ted  learning capabil­
ity  of, and  th e  lim ited  possibility  to  m oti­
vate th e  players of the  econom y—especially 
th e  adm in istration . W ith  th is th e  a u th o r dif­
fers pleasantly  from  the  widespread vulgar eco­
nom ic trends which consider th a t  the  in stitu ­
tions can be selected, in troduced  or re struc­
tu red  a t will. T h is also explains th a t, while 
he evaluates stab ilisa tion  as a  ro u tin e  step  tak ­
ing well-proved procedures, w ith regard  to  in sti­
tu tions he argues in favour of th e  variety  of n a ­
tiona l ways an d  n o t only of th e  paces. T h u s he 
avoids the  frequent bu reaucratic  an d  intellec­
tu a l sluggishness of th e  “economics of th e  t ra n ­
sition".
T he works in th e  first m a jo r p a r t  of th is 
book m ay be looked upon w ith renewed in ter­
est given the  a tm osphere of th e  reverse change 
of regim e. Chapters 2 and  9 Eire a  sum ­
m ary of the  Polish and H ungarian economic a p ­
proach of the  eighties. According to  th is ap ­
proach a  cap ital m arket is needed for th e  effec­
tive allocation  of cap ital, an d  th is is in fact the  
tra it  of capitalism  which socialism  th o u g h t it 
could exceed by the  cen tral m anagem ent of in ­
vestm ents. M ixed system s, in which ne ither 
horizontal nor vertical coordination  are  in ex­
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cess, canno t be m ain tained . This is w hat ap ­
p ears in  th e  reversion of the  reforms of the  
p lanned  economy, and in  the case of the  liberal­
isa tion  of foreign trade in the  breakdown of ver­
tical dependence, in the  developm ent of the  re­
form  in to  a  change of regime, (pp. 32-33). 
T he ch ap ter com paring W estern debates on so­
cialism  w ith  reform  economics is especially in­
teresting  from  the  aspect of history of the­
ory. Here we can read  interesting d a ta  on 
the  first version dating  back to  1922, w rit­
ten  by Boris B routskous, of the  hybrid  known 
in  H ungary  as th e  Liska m odel. T he au­
th o r shows th a t  it is the  naivete of th e  social­
ist m arket m odels which appeared  in the  fact 
th a t  th ey  were subsequently  neglected by p rac­
tice, as th e ir  theoretical a ttrac tio n  came from 
th e  axiom -level elim ination of p ractical p rob ­
lem s. Chapter 5 proves as a  thesis, and  Chap­
ter 6 on  innovation proves in  relation to  a  con­
crete  a rea , th a t  the  economic system  of th e  So­
viet em pire was a  coherent whole. Problem s 
were caused by th e  whole of the  system , by a  to­
ta lity  which could n o t be superseded by p a r­
tia l m easures. It is hard ly  surprising th a t inno­
vation  research becam e the  m ajo r field of dis­
sa tisfaction  with the system  as a  whole: the rel­
evant researches and criticism s were protected 
by th e —naively u top ian—declarations of the 
founding fa th e rs against the  thought and se­
c re t police. T he question concerning insuffi­
cient innovation could no t be eluded any more 
in the  atm osphere  of ideological excitem ent fol­
lowing the  sp u tn ik  shock. T he answer blam ed 
th e  whole of th e  s tab ility  oriented system . The 
la t te r  lacked th e  carro t and  stick for encourag­
ing basic innovation and  overturning the  ossifi­
cation  which was usual even before and  irrespec­
tive of th e  ex ten t of th e  stagnation  of the  B rezh­
nev years. T he insufficiency of the  reform so­
cialist p ractice  could be dem onstra ted  here too.
It is an  im po rtan t po in t th a t in the  long 
Chapter  7 on ownership em phasis is placed 
on th e  significance of th e  private elem ent not 
only on th e  side of supply  b u t also on the  de­
m and  side (p. 85). T his represents a  conclu­
sion to the  rejection of over-regulated m ixed 
m odels and  hybrid  m odels which red istribu ted  
m ost of the  profit “according to higher view­
p o in ts” . T h is recognition discusses the  con­
trad ic tions of in stitu tiona l non-private owner­
ship  a n d —on the basis of exam ples taken from
the OECD— th e  de terio ra ting  effects of exces­
sive regulation  (pp. 98-99). C om petition  should 
be the  m ediator betw een ownership an d  perfor­
mance (pp. 115-117), b u t th is is w hat is u su ­
ally elim inated by over-regulation. T he au ­
th o r seems to have been carried  away by th e  im­
petus of w riting in th is m uch debated  topic 
as he describes th e  socialist system  as be­
ing inferior in all dimensions, b u t fails to m en­
tion  the  issues of safety, equality an d  th e  possi­
bility of calculating  these factors.
Chapter 8 exam ines th e  possibility  of 
achieving a  “m ix” an d  looks a t  th e  perfor­
m ance of political and  economic system s d a t­
ing back to  1994. T he need for a  com pre­
hensive synthesis dom inates here an d  perhaps 
th is is th e  reason why W alter Eucken is miss­
ing from the list of references. I t  was Eucken 
who, forty years ago, arrived  from  G erm an ex­
periences to  th e  sam e conclusions as Balcerow- 
icz from  th e  Polish ones—namely, th a t  dem oc­
racy  cannot replace capitalism  and  capitalism  
cannot exist well—in  a  civilised way— w ith the  
absence of dem ocratic  institu tions. D em ocratic  
socialism is therefore an  a tte m p t to  square  the  
circle, as if the  freedom  to  choose m eans th a t 
the  m ajority  will op t for the  m ore effective sys­
tem  (pp. 132-133). O pposed to  th is and  con­
tra ry  to the  cliches of developm ent theory, au ­
tocra tic  system s do no t necessarily favour the 
aspects of cap ital accum ulation an d  ex ternal 
growth. T he perform ance of au to c ratic  sys­
tem s is m ore varied an d  the  danger of th e  dis­
to rtion  of such system s in to  popu lis t client sys­
tem  is also m ore likely th an  in  a  parliam en­
tary  shift system  (pp. 138-140).
T he second m ajo r p a r t of th is work cov­
ers the  theory  of change of regim e. Chapter  
9 outlines th e  following: in E aste rn  an d  Cen­
tra l E urope a  different quality  of change is tak ­
ing place com pared to  the  reconstruction  follow­
ing the  Second W orld W ar. D uring the  war the 
in stitu tio n  of m arket was only suspended, while 
in the  “Iron C u rta in " countries it was elim ­
inated. Similarly, in the  developing coun­
tries in m ost cases it was only restric ted  or dis­
torted . Consequently liberalisation  will a u to ­
m atically  solve m ost of the  problem s. In H un­
gary three types of reform —of different d u ra ­
tion, d ep th  and  im pact—becam e necessary: be­
side stabilisa tion  and  liberalisation  the  build­
ing of in stitu tio n  is fundam ental. F irst on pages
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161-162, th en  recurrently , th e  au th o r under­
lines th a t  there  is a  possibility for basic re­
s tru c tu rin g  directly  a fte r th e  changes, in th e  pe­
riod  he  refers to  as th e  “e ra  of ex traord i­
n a ry  p o litics” . T h is is when the  m ost unpleas­
an t, b u t  necessary steps m ust be in itia ted , be­
cause la te r  it is im possible. T h is is th e  recog­
n itio n  which was form ulated  in the  recom­
m endations of th e  B ridge [Hid] group which 
p repared  proposals for th e  A ntall governm ent 
(Külgazdaság,  1990, No. 7), and  also in the  left 
cen tre  coalition  agreem ent (Magyar Hírlap, 22 
Ju n e  1994). However, the  Bridge G roup met 
w ith little  success.
Chapter 10 provides a  com parative  a n a l­
ysis of th e  E aste rn  and C entra l-E uropean  tran s­
form ation . I t  poin ts to  th e  strik ing  con tra­
d iction  th a t ,  following the  failure of the  to ta l­
i ta r ia n  s ta te , policies for red is trib u tio n  came 
to  d o m inate  public  th ink ing  and  governmen­
ta l p ractice  in the  region (som etim es w ith the 
p roc lam ation  of m arket principles). In th is ap ­
proach because s ta te  ad m in istra tion  is seen as 
a  profession a n d  governance is a  lim ited , even 
one of th e  m ost lim ited  resources it falls into 
th e  background. T he m ore it is pulled into the  
sphere  which is referred to  as “th e  s ta te ’s n a t­
ural incom petence” by Balcerowicz—restric ted , 
for exam ple, to  issues of production , cash circu­
la tio n  or m arket p ro tec tion— the m ore in a tten ­
tive will be the  issues requiring  cen tra l coordi­
n a tion . A rguing in favour of quick privatisa tion  
on page 182 and  elsewhere, the  a u th o r em pha­
sises th a t  state-ow ned com panies are always po­
litica l in th e ir n a tu re  and  thus tend  to invite in­
tervention . A t the  sam e tim e, he does no t dis­
cuss th e  issue of sustainability , a lthough less ef­
fective or even scandalous privatisa tion  m ay not 
only be a  basis of reference, b u t also the  d i­
rect cause of resto ra tio n — as seen in Russia.
Chapter 11 discusses the  different ways 
of m oving tow ards a  p rivate  economy an d  con­
ta in s  m ost of the  debatab le  sta tem ents. Al­
though  it was w ritten  in 1995, the  trea tm en t fo­
cuses a lm ost exclusively on the  issues of the 
change in ow nership. M ost of the  issues con­
cerning th e  second wave contain the  m ost dif­
ficult p a r t  of th e  change of regim e, includ­
ing th e  reform  of th e  large system s of redis­
trib u tio n  an d  the  s ta te , th e  reform  of the  fi­
nancial sector and the  connections w ith in ­
te rn a tio n a l institu tions. U nfortunately  th is is
dea lt w ith superficially a t  best. Obviously in  
favour of m ass p rivatisa tion , Balcerowicz p u r­
sues a  debate  w ith the  evolutionists (repre­
sented by János Kornai)  who su p p o rt th e  t r a ­
d itional way of p ropagating  a  p rivate  econ­
omy. In  my view Balcerowicz’s approach  is ex­
aggerated  and  unsuccessful. T he dom estic  or 
even the  Czech and  R ussian practices have no t 
proved the  theory  th a t  trad itio n a l p rivatisa­
tion  is necessarily tim e-consum ing an d  slow, or 
likely to  involve resto ration  (as it is assum ed on 
pp. 197-199), or th a t the  secondary cap ita l m ar­
ket can solve the issues of com pany m anage­
m ent (unsolved in the  coupon m eth o d ). T he 
institu tion-orien ted , wide scope of in te rp re ta ­
tion  of Balcerowicz is also evolutionist. Yet, 
Kornai was also criticised by several of his col­
leagues in 1989, and  on th e  tu rn  of 1995-96, be­
cause of his radical s ta tem en ts  supporting  equi­
librium . T hus th is debate  seems artificial. T he 
real ba ttle-lines lie betw een those who play 
down th e  necessity of in s titu tio n s  an d  those 
who believe th a t  in stitu tio n s can  be  selected 
a t  discretion. On the  o th er han d , th e  sup­
p o rters of stab ilisa tion  and instinctive  keyne- 
sians believe th a t  th e  economy can  still be stim ­
u la ted  by pum ping  in m oney an d  reducing in te r­
est ra tes . In th e  previous chap ter (p. 180) B al­
cerowicz him self refers to  th e  fact th a t  in the  
Czech and  H ungarian cases th e  ex ten t of dis­
equilibrium  differed qualitatively  from  th a t  in 
Poland and th is is why they did no t need 
the  Polish-type stabilisation . T his is, how­
ever, a  theoretical difference.
Chapter 12 covers the  p resen ta tion  de­
livered (together w ith Alan Gelb) a t  the  ple­
nary  m eeting of th e  annual conference of the 
World Bank. In reviewing the  coun try  expe­
riences it is the  im portance of th e  trio  which 
stands ou t, com prises th e  s ta r tin g  speed, the  
harm onisation  of the  m easures an d  th e ir  c riti­
cal mass: w ithou t these the  reform  has no real 
substance an d  is inert. On th e  o th e r hand , 
it is also evident (pp . 221-224) th a t th e  s ta n ­
d ard  ad justm en t policy is viable in an  u n ­
usual m edium  also, i.e. it is n o t necessary 
to wait un til the  building of in stitu tio n s cre­
a tes the  “conditions of th e  m odel” . This 
re la tionsh ip—supported  from  two sides by b o th  
positive and  negative experiences—has proved 
th a t one of the m ost recu iren t com m onplaces 
of post-socialist economic bluff is really  a  mis­
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take. In the  dom estic context it is in te rest­
ing to  notice th a t  p a r t  of the  costs of resto r­
ing th e  banking  system  should certainly be 
borne  by th e  s ta te . Furtherm ore, the  b u d ­
get ad justm en t m ust focus on th e  expendi­
tu re  side an d  th e  la t te r  requires its curtailing. 
However, a  successful ad justm en t does no t re­
place, b u t  ra th e r  lays th e  basis for the  transfor­
m atio n  of th e  system  as a  whole.
T he theoretically  m ost valuable and ex­
citing  p a r t  of the  book is Chapter 13. This 
con tains a  catalogue of th e  m isin terpretations 
of th e  change of regim e. Everyone involved 
in  study ing  E aste rn  an d  C entra l Europe us­
ing a theoretical approach or giving advice con­
cerning economic policy should read th is chap­
ter. It is im p o rtan t in th a t it draws a tten tio n  
to  obvious b u t often neglected rules. For ex­
am ple on pp. 234-238 it is s ta ted  th a t the  ap ­
pearance  of a phenom enon in the OECD re­
gion, which perhaps in tim e will be closer to 
us, is no t a  clinching argum ent for im plem ent­
ing i t  dom estically. I t  repeated ly  rem inds us 
of th e  fact th a t  a  complex system —for exam ­
ple, financial m ediation—cannot be tailored to 
deadlines chosen a t will. Moreover, it is de­
scribed as a  m ethodological gamble to mess 
up coun try  specifics and  therapeu tic  features 
(p. 247). It correctly  rem inds of the connec­
tion  observed in  o u r region—and  thus no t de­
b a tab le  in theory—th a t  indulgence tow ards in ­
flation  an d  a  reflationary  policy leads to  lower 
an d  n o t to higher grow th, to  slower and no t to 
faste r restru c tu rin g . T hus proposals bu ilt on 
co n tra ry  assum ptions may, indeed m ust be re­
jec ted . It is instructive  to read  Balcerowicz's 
app ro ach  to  the  w idespread thesis on the  exag­
gerated  social costs of th e  transform ation . Ac­
cording to  th is approach it is m ethodologi­
cally incorrect to  classify all negative tra its  
un d er th e  te rm  of “costs" because th is sug­
gests th a t  none of these would exist—from 
crim e th rough  poverty to  the  increase of energy 
prices—if the  old system  had not been replaced. 
I t  is widely known th a t  the  la tte r  took place due 
to  the  fact th a t  even the  beneficiaries of the  an­
cien régime  recognised the  unavoidable failure 
of th e  situ a tio n . T he ac tual losses m ust be com­
pared  n o t to  th e  earlier o r unchanged condi­
tions, b u t  to th e  costs u n d er the alternative  pol­
icy, th e  o pportun ity  costs— th a t is, the  Pol­
ish to th e  U krain ian  or the  Czech to the  B ulgar­
ian. It is quite  edifying th a t he repea ted ly  m en­
tions on p. 267 and  elsewhere w hat an  advan­
tage the  stab le  political stru c tu re  w ith elections 
every four years and  a  weak p residen t m eans 
for Hungary. M any in  dom estic pub lic  life re­
fer to th is as politics by  p acts a n d /o r  poli­
tics by a  lim ited  elite above the  head  of th e  peo­
ple. T he absence of th is, co n stan t elections and 
changes of governm ent in Po land  have seldom  
allowed comprehensive steps to have any im ­
pact. C ontinuity  in econom ic policy—praised  in 
the  in troduction—is seen as being even m ore re­
m arkable. T he p a r t  of th e  book which for 
me provided th e  least novelty an d  new ex­
perience was the  th ird  m ajo r p a r t  which in ­
cludes a  descriptive p resen ta tion  an d  com m ent 
on Polish economic developm ents. T he chap­
te r  reviewing the  reform s of the  eighties a r­
gues on an empirical basis in favour of th e  ne­
cessity of a  radical m arket change. Chap­
ter 15 sums up the  years 1989-92 and  concen­
tra tes  on the in te rnational experiences of a d ­
ju stm en t program m es. T his is especially in ­
teresting because it shows th a t  in  sp ite  of 
the  early d ispersal of Solidarity  in  th e  sum ­
m er of 1990, th e  team w ork realised in  th e  tech­
nical m anagem ent ensured  the  continuity  of the  
economic policy. T his policy was la te r  sup ­
ported  against the  lobbies by convertibility, an  
independent bank  of issue and  im port com­
petition . According to the  Polish experience 
the  IM F has played a  negligible role in sh ap ­
ing the  Polish therapy  (p. 310), and  th e  activ ­
ity  of Jeffrey Sachs is m entioned only in  th e  con­
tex t of presenting  th e  in te rn atio n al theory. F i­
nally, a  thorough exam ination  of th e  re tu rn  
of the  successful p a rty  coalition is surprisingly 
m issing from  the  analysis of the  Polish tran s­
form ation betw een 1989 and  1993. T his coali­
tion  partly  overlapped w ith the  previous one, 
as th is m ateria l was com pleted a t  th e  begin­
ning of 1994. In add ition , I would also have en­
joyed to have read  som ething ab o u t the  role of 
the banking system , local power and  the  agri­
cultural lobby; th e  d ilem m a of re sto ratio n  ver­
sus susta inability  is an  issue resu lting  from  the 
au th o r’s own tra in  of thoughts.
Chapter 17 includes personal reflections 
which are  p a r t of a  series of interview s m ade 
w ith C entral-E uropean financial m anagers. In 
fact, any restric ted  sum m ary w ith a  theo re t­
ical approach would have been m ore success­
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ful. For me, am ong the  various points of in­
te re s t th ere  is the  sta tem en t (p. 341) th a t  un ­
der general Jaruzelski a  series of sem inars of u n ­
hidden o rien tation  had been going on in the  of­
fices of the  Polish Econom ic Society on eco­
nom ic system s an d  m odels of radical m ar­
ket transitions. It was under these auspices 
th a t  Balcerowicz (and  his team ) developed a 
s trong  an ti-g radualism  approach. It is clear 
from  the  prelim inary studies th a t th e  Pol­
ish school of liberal m arket economy came to ex­
istence as a  p latform  based on the analysis of in­
te rn a tio n a l experiences prior to th e  ap p ear­
ance of any foreign consultants. If anything in­
fluenced the  Polish approach it was H ungar­
ian  reform  economics and  the  G erm an ordolib­
eral school—th e  la tte r  is known for its strong 
criticism  of G erm an social policy and  agro- 
economic practice. T he in troduction  of shock 
therapy  was confirm ed by necessity and  not 
m erit: Balcerowicz (pp. 343-344) sta tes  th a t 
th e  only o th er options were risky and  obvi­
ously hopeless schemes. T he risk is said  to lay 
in the  fact th a t  the  s tan d ard  ad justm en t pro­
g ram m e was applied in the  context of com pa­
nies which had  no t grown in a  m arket envi­
ronm ent. Consequently, their instincts, based 
upon th e ir m onopolistic positions, would lead 
them  to expect the  help  of the s ta te . T he au ­
th o r refers several tim es to  the  A rgentine presi­
den t Alfonsin who s ta r te d  with radical reforms 
an d  th en , scared  by th e ir  im pact, re tre a te d — 
thus he forfeited b o th  his popularity  and  the 
possibility  of economic recovery a t the  same 
tim e. I t  was w ith th is a rgum ent th a t  he con­
vinced a  form er trad e  union leader to  sup­
p o rt th e  m ark e t economy line in  his role as p res­
ident of the  Polish Republic. T hinking of presi­
den t Jelcin, th is argum ent still sounds convinc­
ing.
Balcerowicz’s book does no t lead us into 
an  unknow n new world. However, it provides 
an  insight in to  the  theoretical background and 
p ractica l trad e  secrets of th e  Polish change of 
regim e. T he a rgum en ta tion  of th e  au th o r is bal­
anced  and  good, a lthough  he will hardly con­
vert readers of different approaches to his own 
belief. His own argum ents are presented th o r­
oughly, precisely and  easy to  follow; all presen­
tations axe well s tru c tu red  and have earlier been 
published or sca ttered  in papers of restric ted  ac­
cessibility. T h is work also dissipates m iscon­
ceptions inasm uch as it frees us from  old th e ­
ses which harps on ab o u t the  political and  ide­
ological im perialism  of the IM F or—referring to 
the  fox of Aesop—from theses presen ting  shock 
therapy as the best of all worlds. V aluable theo­
retical realisations and  practical knowledge can 
be found in  th is book. T he often  open, sev­
eral tim es h idden  com parisons w ith  dom es­
tic circum stances a re  in teresting . T h e  vol­
um e can be read  th rough  an d  enjoyed w ith­
ou t m athem atical o r technical econom ic q ua l­
ifications. T he read er gains a  b e tte r  knowl­
edge of the  issues an d  can avoid m any usual 
trap s  an d  m isunderstandings. A b e tte r  under­
stand ing  of our com panions in distress m ay en­
rich our self-knowledge.
L. CSABA
JO HNSON, S.-LO V EM A N , G.: Starting over 
in Eastern Europe. H arvard  U niversity  Press. 
1995. 211 p.
In th e  wake of s ta te  socialism ’s dow n­
fall in 1989-90 there  was a  sudden  grow th in 
the num ber of in stitu tio n s analyzing the  Po l­
ish economy. T oday there  are m any  new 
or reorganized establishm ents investigating  the  
behaviour of enterprises by  using  s ta tis tica l 
d a ta , questionnaire surveys a n d  o th e r m eth ­
ods of em pirical analysis (Belka, Krajowski and 
Pinto 1993; Dg.browski, Federowicz and Levi- 
tas 1993). T his so rt of research has su b stan ­
tia lly  changed th e  p resum ptions a n d  declara­
tions of certain  Polish econom ists an d  foreign 
consultants w ith regard  to  th e  supposedly “typ­
ical behaviour" of enterprises— including s ta te - 
owned ones—in the  post-socialist period.
In th e  first tw o years of th e  econom ic 
transition  Polish s ta te  enterprises reac ted  to 
the  radical reform s—i.e. th e  so-called “shock 
therapy”—spearheaded  by  Leszek Balcerowicz 
in a  particu la r way. T he behaviour of these  en­
terprises was destructive  an d  even irra tional, 
especially with regard to changes in regula­
tions and environm ent. T hey  used th e ir cap ­
ita l rashly and  am assed huge deb ts w ith banks 
and with each o ther. In sp ite  of falling revenues 
and m arket failures, powerful inter-com pany 
coalitions of workers’ self-governm ents, trad e
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unionists and managers failed to cut back on 
(or did not attempt to reduce) capacities and 
staff. This situation offered fuel for the ar­
guments coining from advocates of radical re­
form and quick privatization. (Sachs and Lip- 
ton 1990, Winiecki 1991, Frydman and Ra- 
paczinsky 1994).
However, em pirical stud ies have revealed 
th a t  m any s ta te  enterprises singled ou t for pri­
vatization  reacted  in  such a  way for a  short 
while only. T he period of self-liquidation and a 
w ait-and-see a ttitu d e  had , in m any cases, ended 
by 1992-93. In fact, m ost enterprises th a t  mo­
bilized th e ir  reserves, launched new or u p d a ted  
p ro d u c ts , p en etra ted  new m arkets an d  stream ­
lined th e ir  organizations have con tribu ted  to 
th e  upsw ing of the Polish economy.
The debate on Polish enterprises has 
added new aspects to our view of post-socialist 
privatization, industrial policy and the role of 
the state, respectively. The book by John­
son and Loveman  is an important contribu­
tion to this debate. It consists of two parts. 
The first part is a case study of three big enter­
prises and its aim is to look into the transfor­
mation of state industries. The second part is 
an analysis based on questionnare surveys and 
case studies and it gives an insight into the en­
vironment of a new and rapidly growing pri­
vate sector and the behaviour of entrepreneurs 
and companies within it.
The stories of three big enterprises show 
many similarities. In the 1970s and 1980s both 
Prochnik (a men's clothing factory) and the 
shipyards of Gdansk and Szczecin were oper­
ating within the framework of a typical state- 
controlled economy. The shipyards worked 
mainly for the Soviet Union and less for West­
ern markets. The clothing factory sold the 
largest part of its production in the West, 
and it also supplied the domestic market and 
the CMEA. The exports of all three enter­
prises were handled by specialized foreign trade 
companies, and the relevant financial trans­
actions were dealt with by the state bank. 
Their production costs included the mainte­
nance of social, cultural and sports establish­
ments, as well as non-profit activities under­
taken at the “request” of regional or cen­
tral party leaders. The fulfilment of such “re­
quests” was the price to be paid for exemp­
tions and subsidies. The collapse of the state so­
cialist system, along with the markets it of­
fered, landed all three enterprises in an unex­
pected and highly difficult situation. The cloth­
ing factory could sell less and less of its prod­
ucts in the domestic and Eastern markets, 
and the shipyards faced a deep financial cri­
sis since they had raised credits for the con­
struction of ships that the Soviets could not 
pay for. Ministries, formerly willing partners 
in crisis management, were dissolved and con­
tacts between party and management disin­
tegrated as the party itself began to crum­
ble.
The newly elected Mazowiecki admin­
istration opted for the privatization of the 
three enterprises. Moreover, Prochnik was part 
of the first privatization package of 20 enter­
prises. Another similarity, not unrelated to po­
litical changes, was that new directors were ap­
pointed to all three enterprises. In the two ship­
yards university-educated activists of the un­
derground Solidarity movement became top 
leaders. The new director of the clothing fac­
tory was also a man with a university de­
gree; he came from the inner circles of an­
other company’s management.
Yet here the string of similarities ends: 
the three men tried out different methods of cri­
sis management. The director of Prochnik 
set up an export department and undertook 
job work. He also strengthened the network 
of domestic distribution. Targeting a well-to- 
do group of prospective customers, he added 
women's clothing to their existing range. Other 
crisis-smitten clothing factories were brought 
into the plan in order to work for Prochnik 
and these factories sold their products under 
the Prochnik brand domestically and abroad.
The Szczecin shipyard, after tough ne­
gotiations with banks, succeeded in avoiding fi­
nancial collapse and set out to re-formulate 
their marketing policy. They narrowed their fo­
cus in order to concentrate on one market seg­
ment and tried to carve out a niche in that seg­
ment.
The new manager of the Gdansk ship­
yard took a quite different path. Placing his 
trust in the new Polish leadership, he set out to 
develop his close ties with the then-President 
Walesa, and thus built his strategy on the ship­
yard’s political capital. (It should be noted 
that the shipyard was a buttress of Solidar­
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ity.) He held  back from  closing loss-m aking 
u n its  an d  even increased the  num ber of em­
ployees. Furtherm ore, he raised  wages and 
let the  sh ipyard ’s social an d  cu ltu ral e stab ­
lishm ent go on  operating . He tru sted  in the 
tim e-honoured stra tegy  of m aking a preem p­
tive move, for he was sure th a t  the  government 
would be his guaran tor and  th a t the  banks, 
too, would finance his am bitious p lans for rais­
ing p roduction .
No such th in g  happened. By th e  tim e 
th e  book  here u n d e r review was w ritten , the 
G dansk  shipyard  was idly waiting for reflota­
tion . A t th e  sam e tim e, Prochnik  was al­
ready  m aking profits and  for the  Szczecin ship­
yard, too, the  worst seemed to  be over. In 
th is p a r t of th e ir  book, Johnson and Love- 
m an rarely touch upon  the  subject of own­
ership . We learn th a t  P rochnik  was priva­
tized, p a r t of its  shares went to a  syndicate, and 
th a t no t such thing happened to  the  two ship­
yards. T he authors, however, do no t tell 
us how th e  owner, be  it the  s ta te  or a  pri­
vate investor, has been able to  control or in­
fluence the  operation  of Prochnik. It is clear 
th a t  a  key figure has been the  m anager-director 
who, according to th e  au thors , has played a 
p ivo ta l role in  working ou t th e  enterprise’s 
p ro jec ts an d  decisions, irrespective of the  form 
of ownership. Such in te rp reta tio n  fits com­
fortab ly  in to  the fam iliar array  of argum ents 
cen tring  upon  th e  power of m anagers’. In­
terestingly  (and  in con trad ic tion  to  the  ap­
proach of case studies), th e  au tho rs neverthe­
less arrive a t  the  conclusion th a t  their exam ­
ples are no t typical. As they  say, Polish s ta te  in­
d u stry  has so far produced a negligible num ­
ber of cases like th a t  of P rochnik or the Szczecin 
shipyard. In fact, m ost s ta te  enterprises are 
still using the  s tra tegy  of wait-and-see and run ­
n ing th rough  th e ir capital. It is generally ac­
cep ted  th a t  the  transform ation  of large en ter­
prises cannot be achieved rapidly  and  th ere ­
fore the  au tho rs th in k  th a t  the  engine be­
h ind  the  desired grow th of the  Polish econ­
omy is m ore likely to be its newly e stab ­
lished p rivate  sector.
T he second p a r t begins by analysing the 
c riteria  of en trepreneurship . Johnson and Love- 
m an  conclude from  th e ir  (a lbeit, non-repre- 
sentative) d a tabase  th a t the  g reat m ajority  of 
new Polish en trepreneurs have already worked
(m ainly in  th e  1980s) as employees in o th e r p ri­
vate ventures and  learned th e  “secrets of trad e ” 
there . They are typically 30 to  40 years old, 
well-educated, an d  versed in  lab o u r an d  busi­
ness organization, m arket research an d  sales.
In Hungary, it was possible to acquire 
such skills not only in the private domain but 
also (and equally well) in the flexible sub-units 
of the reformed state sector, in traditional in­
dustrial and agricultural co-operatives, and in 
the various hybrids of state ownership plus pri­
vate initiative. As Johnson and Loveman see it, 
the under-reformed Polish economy hardly pro­
vided any opportunities for learning such skills. 
Thus it is an open question as to how success­
ful manager-directors, heroes of the first part 
of the book, acquired knowledge enabling them 
to implement modern forms of crisis manage­
ment. Moreover, the authors have not men­
tioned anything about the knowledge that could 
or could not be acquired in private Polish farms; 
this sector seems to have been completely out­
side their scope of interest.
The best exam ple of how involvem ent 
in an enterprise has helped to  “m ake” en­
trepreneurs is a  co-operative in  G dansk. We 
learn  from  the  case study  th a t  th is venture 
was form ed in th e  early 1980s by persecu ted  
and laid-off m em bers of th e  illegal Solidar­
ity  trade union. Founders of th e  co-operative 
w anted to  create  financial security  for those p e r­
secuted, and they  also w anted  to  provide a 
fram ework for th e ir political activ ities. At th a t  
tim e in Po land  it was easy to  find rapid ly  
expanding and  highly profitable m arket seg­
m ents, in which even m odest am ounts of s ta r t ­
ing capital prom ised quick re tu rns. T h is p a rtic ­
u lar co-operative specialized on cleaning chim ­
neys and sm okestacks and  the  dem and for its 
services increased rapidly. An im p o rtan t ele­
m ent of th e ir success was decen tra lization  and  
flexibility. T he heads of 8 to  10-strong team s 
were free to gauge m arket d em and  and  to 
m ake contracts w ith custom ers. T he inform al­
ity  which was a  featu re  of the  so lidarity  move­
m ent itself, had  the  effect of fu rth er s tre n g th ­
ening the  horizontal dem ocratic  order of th e  co­
operative.
However, th e  co-operative, a lthough  suc­
cessful in th e  1980s, began to  encounter difficul­
ties a fte r the  system ic change. One of the  rea­
sons for th is was th a t  a  great num ber of its
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m em bers and its leaders opted for a  politi­
cal career. Yet w hat was even m ore deci­
sive in th e  dow nturn  of the cooperative’s for­
tunes was th a t the  n a tu ra l m arket of th e  co­
operative—i.e. s ta te  indu stry — went in to  deep 
crisis an d  could no longer place as m any or­
ders as i t  h a d  before. A nother significant fac­
to r  con tribu ting  to  th e  decline of the  coopera­
tive was th a t  several of its  m em bers left i t  to 
s ta rt their own ventures.
Beside ventures launched by  ex-members 
o f th is G dansk  co-operative, Johnson and  Love- 
m an also present us w ith case studies of o th er 
new enterprises. M ost of the  la t te r  achieved 
quick grow th and  a m arket presence by swiftly 
supplying th e  sudden dem and created  by sho rt­
ages. T here  is the  sto ry  of a  venture th a t  skil­
fully organized th e  im port of bananas, th e  u lti­
m ate  shortage fru it; ano th e r decided to  im port, 
tran s la te  an d  publish foreign books. Again o th ­
ers, seeing the  poor perform ance and  obso­
le te  selection of goods offered by s ta te  in­
dustries, jum ped  a t the  opportunities for fill­
ing such m arket gaps.
An im po rtan t conclusion drawn by the 
au tho rs is th a t  the  surge in dem and created 
by shortage entails quick, bu t only short-lived 
grow th. T h an k s to  the  new institu tio n a l en­
vironm ent, o thers, too, can easily enter a  pa r­
ticu lar m arket and  th is m arket becomes sa tu ­
ra te d  as com petition  becomes keener. In o th er 
words, in o rder to  achieve long term  growth 
it is n o t enough to  drive ou t s ta te  indus­
try  or trad e  (especially when custom ers have 
less an d  less disposable income). P lans also 
have to  be m ade in o rder to m ain tain  com peti­
tiveness.
Despite the  negative aspects, Johnson 
an d  Lovem an are optim istic. T he heroes of 
th e ir case studies on private  enterprise are (just 
like in the  h isto ry  of s ta te  enterprises) m anager- 
en trepreneurs. Skills acquired in  a  shortage 
econom y will, according to the  au thors, also be 
sufficient in a  balanced m arket for keeping en­
terprises afloat, and even for helping the p ri­
vate sector to achieve rapid  growth.
I know the  situation  in Poland only from 
reading new spapers, and thus I do no t want 
to  evaluate the above assum ptions and esti­
m ates. Even so, 1 want to  m ake two critical re­
m arks.
In th e ir case studies and  surveys Jo h n ­
son and Loveman focus th e ir a tten tio n  on en­
terprises of the  Polish “seaside” , and  the  la t­
te r  region has always been m ore receptive to 
W estern influences. Consequently, we do no t 
know w hether developm ents typ ical for G dansk 
and  Szczecin are  th e  sam e for “sleepier” re­
gions of Poland. T his issue is a ll th e  m ore rel­
evant since th e  au th o rs—as references in  th e ir  
book reveal, intentionally  o r  n o t— deal m ostly  
w ith the  new elite of P o land 's po litical and  eco­
nom ic scene. B u t w hat ab o u t sm all en te r­
prises “down under” w ith little  o r no  po liti­
cal capital? T he m ethodological weaknesses 
of th e  book give rise to even m ore caution . 
T he case studies p resented  use docum enta­
tion or elucidation  criteria  which fall sh o rt of 
those used in H ungarian  p ractice . T hey  con­
ta in  no  system atic m arket descrip tion  a n d  lack 
a  thorough p ictu re  of th e  in te rn a l organiza­
tion. T hey use no source o th er th en  c ita ­
tions from  interviews m ade w ith  com pany di­
rectors, and  these are no t placed alongside doc­
um ents which m ight su p p o rt o r weaken th e ir  a r­
gum ents. T heir concise stories will no do u b t 
m ake good reading an d  one wonders w hether it 
is necessary to adop t the  usual scientific th o r­
oughness and  a tten tio n  to deta il o r to  copy 
(as is p ractised  in  H ungary) if th e  m ethods 
of these repu tab le  M IT and  H arvard-based au ­
thors seem to be effective an d  successful.
M. LAKI
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Conference ‘Management at a Crossboards’
In September 1997 the Faculty of M anagement and O rganization of G ronin­
gen University (Netherlands) will organize an international conference on new 
interdependencies between organization, labour and society. Themes are: Eco­
nomic and Technological Developments and Employment, New Production Concepts 




Faculty of M anagement and O rganization, Groningen University
P.O.Box 800, 9700 AV. Groningen, Netherlands
Phone: +31 50 3634288
Fax: +31 50 3632032
E-mail: B DK - CO NQ B DK . R UG . N L.
More detailed inform ation can be found on Internet location: 
http://w w w .bdk.rug.nl/oti/hrm /norm al.htm .
1st International Conference 
on Technology Policy and Innovation
The conference, which is scheduled to take place in Macau, 2 to 4 July, 1997, is 
being organized very successfully. It will be aimed a t providing a forum to discuss 
curren t trends on management, assessment, commercialization, application and 
organization o f  science and technology. Special emphasis will be given to  knowledge 
integration over a range of traditional disciplines. In addition, visits to  emerging 
economic zones in South Asia will be organized in order to prom ote cooperative 
ties between business, academia and government.
For further information please contact the Instituto Superior Técmco 
AV. Rovisco Pais
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